FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 30, 1971

HELEN DELICH BENTLEY, Chairman
ASHTON C. BARRETT, Vice Chairman
JAMES V. DAY, Member
JAMES F. FANSEEN, Member
GEORGE H. HEARN, Member

FRANCIS C. HURNEY, Secretary
CONTENTS

Tables of cases reported--------------------------------------------- Page V
Docket numbers of cases reported----------------------------------- VII
Table of cases cited----------------------------------------------- IX
Decisions of the Federal Maritime Commission------------------------ 1
Table of Commodities--------------------------------------------- 305
Index digest------------------------------------------------------- 306
**TABLE OF CASES REPORTED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. 9835—Japanese Lines' Pacific Northwest Containerships Service Agreement</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Nos. 9847 and 9848—Revenue Pools, United States/Brazil Trade</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. 9905</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. T–2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co.</td>
<td>233, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. T–2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement</td>
<td>94, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air America Ltd., Hong Kong v. Trans Pacific Freight Conference of Hong Kong</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order To Show Cause</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Trade Sales A/C Consulate of Indonesia v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day Tariff Filing Notice</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Express, Inc.—General Increases in Rates in the U.S. North Atlantic/Puerto Rico Trade</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Increases in Rates in the U.S. Gulf/Puerto Rico Trade</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Line, Inc., et al., Valley Evaporating Co. v.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellenic Lines Ltd., United States v.</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterochemical Corp. v. Port Line, Ltd.</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James v. South Atlantic and Caribbean Line, Inc.</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Air Freight, Inc.—Freight Forwarder License</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., American Trade Sales A/C Consulate of Indonesia v.</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macchione, Mario J.—Freight Forwarder License</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Van Lines, Fort Wayne, Ind.—Freight Forwarder License</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton Line, Union Carbide Inter-America v.</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Westbound Conference, Revell Inc. v.</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Line, Ltd., Heterochemical Corp. v.</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raytheon Co. Andover v. States Marine—Isthmian Agency, Inc.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revell Inc. v. Pacific Westbound Conference</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic &amp; Caribbean Line, Inc., James v.</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed-Freight Inc.—Freight Forwarder License</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States Marine—Isthmian Agency, Inc., Raytheon Co. Andover v.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surcharge of North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association on Commodi-</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ties Moving Under Wine and Spirits Contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transconex, Inc.—General Increase in Rates in the U.S. South Atlantic/</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico—Virgin Islands Trades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Pacific Freight Conference of Hong Kong, Air America Ltd., Hong</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kong v.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Carbide Inter-America v. Norton Line</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Gulf/Puerto Rico Trade—Rate Increases</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DOCKET NUMBERS OF CASES REPORTED

76(I) Heterochemical Corp. v. Port Line, Ltd. .......................... 228
99(I) Joseph and Sibyl James v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Line,
       Inc. ........................................................................ 300
421 Raytheon Co. Andover v. States Marine-Isthmian Agency, Inc. 78
423 The Ereigli Purchasing Mission, Eregli Iron & Steel Works Co. 12
       Eregli, Turkey v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. ........... 427
424 Air America Ltd., Hong Kong v. Trans Pacific Freight Conference
       of Hong Kong. ........................................................... 32
425, 426 Revell Inc. v. Pacific Westbound Conference ................. 197
427 American Trade Sales A/C Consulate of Indonesia v. Lykes
       Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. ........................................... 230
1092 Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship
       Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System .............. 172
68-10 Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agree-
       ments Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684 .................................. 58
68-47 Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al. ............ 16
68-48 North American Van Lines, Fort Wayne, Ind.—Freight Forwarder
       License ................................................................. 215
69-5 Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port
       Authority and States Steamship Co. ............................ 233, 247
69-13, 69-23 General Increases in Rates in the United States Gulf/Puerto
       Rico Trade ............................................................. 212
69-21 Transconex, Inc.—General Increase in Rates in the United
       States South Atlantic/Puerto Rico-Virgin Islands Trade ... 35
69-29 Consolidated Express, Inc.—General Increases in Rates in the
       United States North Atlantic/Puerto Rico Trade ............. 35
69-48 Speed-Freight Inc.—Freight Forwarder License ................ 1
69-57 Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association
       Cooperative Working Arrangement ......................... 94, 104
70-11 Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff
       No. FMC 14 ........................................................... 266
70-13 North Atlantic French Atlantuc Freight Conference—Petition
       for Declaratory Order .............................................. 46
70-17 American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order To Show
       Cause ................................................................. 82
70-24 Agreement No. 9835—Japanese Lines’ Pacific Northwest
       Containerships Service Agreement ............................. 203
70-30 Agreement Nos. 9847 and 9848—Revenue Pools, United States/
       Brazil Trade .......................................................... 149
70-41 Key Air Freight, Inc.—Freight Forwarder License ................ 290
70-42 Agreement No. 9905 ............................................... 163
70-43 Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference
       Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day
       Tariff Filing Notice ................................................ 166

VII
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Docket Numbers</th>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70-44</td>
<td>United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-46</td>
<td>Mario J. Macchione—Freight Forwarder License</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-47</td>
<td>Union Carbide Inter-America v. Norton Line</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-28</td>
<td>Surecharge of North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association on Commodities Moving</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under Wine and Spirits Contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CASES CITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement No. 2214, 13 FMC 70</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. 6510, 1 USMC 775, 2 USMC 22</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. 8660—Latin American/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference</td>
<td>175, 177, 183, 184, 185, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. 8765—Gulf/Mediterranean Trade, 7 FMC 495</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. 8905—Port of Seattle and Alaska S.S. Co., 7 FMC 792</td>
<td>24, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. T-1870: Terminal Lease Agreement at Long Beach, Calif.</td>
<td>240, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Nos. T-1985 and T-1986; Lease Agreements at Long Beach, Calif., 11 FMC 35</td>
<td>240, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Nos. T-2108 and T-2108A, 12 FMC 110</td>
<td>238, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co., 14 FMC 233</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska Seasonal Rate Increases (1962), 8 FMC 1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc.—General Increase in Rates, 9 FMC 220</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Cia. Anonima Venezolana Navegacion, 7 FMC 345</td>
<td>69, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa Steamship Co. v. FMC, 321 F. 2d 756</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleutian Homes, Inc. v. Coastwise Line, 5 FMB 602</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged Rebates of Mitsui S.S. Co., Ltd., 7 FMC 248</td>
<td>71, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All States Service Station v. Standard Oil Co., 120 F. 2d 714</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Export Isbrandtsen Lines v. FMC, 334 F. 2d 185</td>
<td>277, 285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Tobacco Co. v. Cie. Generale Transatlantique, 1 USSB 53</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applebaum, Louis—Freight Forwarder License, 8 FMC 306</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona Grocery v. Atchison Ry., 284 US 370</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic &amp; Gulf Puerto Rico General Increase, 7 FMC 87</td>
<td>43, 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day Tariff Filing Notice, 14 FMC 166</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil Conference v. Brasileiro &amp; Moore-McCormack Lines, 8 FMC 476</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckley Dunton Overseas, S.A. v. Blue Star Shipping Corp., 8 FMC 137_</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cady, William v.—Freight Forwarder License, 8 FMC 352</td>
<td>9, 221, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California v. United States, 320 US 577</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Stevedore &amp; Ballast Co. v. Stockton Port District, 7 FMC 75_</td>
<td>89, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caminetti v. United States, 242 US 470</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain Tariff Practices of Sea-Land Service, 7 FMC 504</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colgate Palmolive Co. v. United Fruit Co. (FMC, Sept. 30, 1970)</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del Mar Shipping Corp.—Freight Forwarder License, 8 FMC 493</td>
<td>9, 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Rate Cases, 8 FMC 16</td>
<td>168, 173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encinal Terminals v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 5 FMB 316</td>
<td>280, 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fares, Motor, Between Northern Kentucky and Cincinnati, 62 MCC 67</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case IP</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMC v. Ab Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 US 238</td>
<td>61, 74, 155, 156, 165, 175, 185, 186, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMC v. Caragher, 364 F. 2d 709</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Time Practices—Port of San Diego, 9 FMC 525</td>
<td>22, 28, 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Increase, Middle Atlantic and New England Territories, 332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC 820</td>
<td>43, 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Increases—Transcontinental, 319 ICC 792</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Ry. &amp; Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 262 US 625</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 US 388</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United States, 287 F. 2d 86</td>
<td>89, 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Comm. of San Diego v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 2 USMC 23</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Tonnage Ceiling Agreement, 10 FMC 134</td>
<td>60, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposition of Surcharge at United States Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 10 FMC 13</td>
<td>169, 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, 264 ICC 695</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Freight Conference Agreements Nos. 9648 and 9649, 11 FMC 382</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements, 14 FMC 58</td>
<td>101, 159, 160, 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F. 2d 51</td>
<td>61, 208, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Atlantic &amp; Gulf Conference v. United States, 347 US 990</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Agreement—Far East Conference and Pacific Westbound Conference, 8 FMC 553</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F. 2d 577</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matson Navigation Co.—Container Freight Tariffs, 7 FMC 480</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Pools Investigation, 9 FMC 264</td>
<td>56, 155, 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle West General Increases, 48 MCC 541</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Charges and Terminal Delivery Services—Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico Trades, 11 FMC 222</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. FPC, 169 F. 2d 392</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 US 415</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Van Lines v. United States, 355 Fd. 2d 326</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Foreign Freight F.I.B. Association v. FMC. 337 F. 2d 289</td>
<td>22, 28, 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nopal v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 8 FMC 213</td>
<td>70, 71, 72, 74, 155, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Mediterranean Freight Conference, 11 FMC 202</td>
<td>21, 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Rate Structures, 12 FMC 34</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranje Line v. Anchor Line Ltd., 6 FMB 199</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overland/OCP Rates and Absorptions, 12 FMC 184</td>
<td>277, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast European Conference, 7 FMC 27</td>
<td>50, 54, 55, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast European Conference—Payment of Brokerage, 4 FMB 696; 5 FMB 65; 5 FMB 225</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast European Conference—Port Equalization Rule, 7 FMC 623</td>
<td>277, 279, 285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F. 2d 197</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Travel Agents Investigation, 10 FMC 27</td>
<td>175, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf Outward Freight Conference v. FMC, 375 F. 2d 335</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Bratti Associates v. Prudential Lines, Ltd., 8 FMC 375</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CASES CITED

Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v. Boston Shipping Association, 420 F. 2d 419——— 96
Port of New York Authority v. Ab Svenska, 4 FMB 202——— 25, 28
Port of New York Authority v. FMC, 429 F. 2d 663——— 277, 280
Puerto Rico Rates, 2 USMC 117——— 29
Rate Agreement United States/Persian Gulf Trade, 8 FMC 712——— 56
Rates on U.S. Government Cargoes, 11 FMC 263——— 92
Reduced Rates on Machinery and Tractors from United States Atlantic Ports to Ports in Puerto Rico, 9 FMC 465——— 99
Reduction in Freight Rates on Automobiles—North Atlantic Coast Ports to Puerto Rico, 8 FMC 404——— 99
Sacramento-Yolo Port District v. Pacific Coast European Conference (ND, Calif., May 15, 1970) ——— 280
Safir v. Gibson (CA 2d, Fed. 26, 1970) ——— 92
Safir v. Gibson, 297 F Supp 630——— 92
Safir v. Gibson, 417 F. 2d 972——— 92
Safir v. Gibson (CA 2d, June 18, 1970) ——— 92
San Diego Harbor Comm. v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 2 USMC 661——— 281
Shain v. Washington National Insurance Co., 308 F. 2d 611——— 52
Stockton Port District v. FMC, 369 F. 2d 380——— 286
Stockton Port District v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 9 FMC 12—— 280, 286, 287
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers Association v. Blue Star Line, Ltd., 2 USMC 31—— 278, 280
Surcharge at U. S. Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 10 FMC 13——— 296
Swift & Co. v. FMC, 306 F. 2d 277——— 50, 55
Tariff Filing Practices of Containerships, Inc., 9 FMC 56——— 224
Terminal Rate Structure—California Ports, 3 USMC 57——— 239, 240
Unapproved Section 15 Agreements—South African Trade, 7 FMC 159—— 86
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 351 US 657——— 88
United States v. American Export Lines, 8 FMC 280——— 21, 29
United States v. Strickland, 200 F. 2d 234——— 260
United States ex rel Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 US 638——— 260
Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 US 261——— 21, 28, 84, 85, 86, 87, 106, 145
West Coast Line, Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 3 FMB 586——— 69, 70, 158, 159
West Indies Fruit Co. v. Flota Mercante, 7 FMC 66——— 21, 24, 30
Wilson, Violet A.—Freight Forwarder License, 13 FMC 30——— 291
York Shipping Corp.—Freight Forwarder License, 9 FMC 72——— 9, 221, 222
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 69-48

INDEPENDENT OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDER

LICENSE No. 1092

SPEED-FREIGHT INC.

Decided August 11, 1970

License revoked. Respondent found to be connected with and controlled by a shipper in foreign commerce; to have submitted false statements in its freight forwarder application; to be without personnel qualified in freight forwarding; and to have failed to report to the Commission required changes of facts as required.

Nicholas Stecopoulos, for respondent.
Donald J. Brunner and Paul J. Kaller, as hearing counsel.

REPORT

By the Commission (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners):

This proceeding was instituted to determine: (1) Whether Speed-Freight Incorporated is connected with and/or controlled by a shipper to foreign countries contrary to sections 1 and 44 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C. 801, 841(b)), and section 510.2(a) of Federal Maritime Commission General Order 4 (46 CFR 510.2(a)); (2) whether Speed-Freight submitted willfully false statements in connection with its application for a license; (3) whether Speed-Freight's present financial position and personnel no longer qualify it as an independent freight forwarder; (4) whether Speed-Freight violated section 510.5(c), General Order 4, by failing to submit required reports of changes of facts; and (5) ultimately whether Speed-Freight continues to qualify for a freight forwarder's license.
Examiner John Marshall issued an initial decision in which he concluded that Speed-Freight: (1) Is connected with, and controlled by Calson Co., a shipper to foreign countries, contrary to sections 1 and 44 of the Shipping Act, 1916; (2) has, through its president and owner, submitted willfully false statements to the Commission in connection with its application for a license, contrary to section 510.9(c) of General Order 4; (3) has changed its personnel to the extent that it no longer qualifies as an independent freight forwarder, contrary to section 510.9(c) of General Order 4, and has failed to report such changes to the Commission as required by section 510.5(c) of General Order 4. The examiner on the basis of the foregoing revoked Speed-Freight’s forwarding license pursuant to section 44(d) of the act and section 510.9 of General Order 4. Speed-Freight has filed exceptions; hearing counsel have replied. We heard oral argument.

Facts

Marion Calas is managing partner of Calson Co. and president of Calsonaire, Inc. Calson is an exporter shipping by air and water. Nicholas Stecopoulos is the owner, president, treasurer, director, stockholder, and attorney of record of Speed-Freight. His principal occupation is attorney associated with a prominent New York law firm.

Calas and Stecopoulos have been friends for many years. For the past 9 years Stecopoulos has been the attorney for Calson and Calsonaire. During that time period, Stecopoulos earned approximately $150 per year in legal fees from Calas. Certain services, however, were performed gratis, such as those relating to Calas’ purchase of the interest of his partner, Mr. Pearson, in Calson and Calsonaire, and Mrs. Calas’ claim arising out of an automobile accident. Calas feels a “moral obligation” to help Stecopoulos whenever he needs help. It was Calas who suggested that Stecopoulos enter the freight forwarding business by employing Eugene Pagano, a prior employee of Calson with approximately 17 years’ experience in freight forwarding.

As vice president, Pagano alone handled all aspects of Speed-Freight’s operations. Stecopoulos had no knowledge of the freight forwarding business. Throughout Pagano’s tenure, Calson and its affiliates were Speed-Freight’s principal customers. Approximately 80 percent of Speed-Freight’s work was for Calson. Pagano came to believe that he was actually working for Calas.

1 The facts set out here are those found by the examiner.
In addition to the regular freight-forwarding service performed by Speed-Freight, a "special forwarding service" was performed almost daily whereby it delivered Calson packages to the airport, presumably John F. Kennedy International.\footnote{Calson has now hired a man to provide this truck service.} The delivery charge was $2.25 per package, irrespective of the number. Although this charge was comparatively high, it was agreed to by Calas. Pagano picked up the packages from Calson's office and ordinarily the vehicle used was a station wagon belonging to Calas' partner, Pearson. The "special forwarding service" consumed approximately 3 hours of Pagano's workday. When he found this to be too much, he complained to Calas. Although the problem was never discussed with Stecopoulos, Calas prevailed upon him to continue the service.

Throughout Pagano's tenure as vice president, Speed-Freight lost money. During this time Octavio Romaro, a full-time Calson bookkeeper, maintained all of Speed-Freight's books and records. These were kept at his Calson office. Therefore, in order to keep Romaro appraised of Speed-Freight's financial affairs, it was necessary for Pagano to visit Calson's office almost daily. Romaro, as treasurer of Speed-Freight, had the authority and responsibility to countersign, with Pagano, all Speed-Freight checks. When, on one occasion Pagano cashed an uncountersigned check, it was Calas who advised him not to do so again.

Pagano was fired from Speed-Freight in October 1966. He was first informed of this by Calas and thereafter received confirmation by calling Stecopoulos.

Some time after Pagano left Speed-Freight, Joseph W. Dueber was hired as traffic and office manager. Having had 12 years of forwarding experience, he had the qualifications necessary for an ocean freight forwarder. He was initially interviewed by Stecopoulos at a meeting with Calas and Stecopoulos in Calson's office.

In the latter part of 1966 there was an interim period between the firing of Pagano and the hiring of Dueber during which time Adji Tjokronolo ran the entire Speed-Freight operation. He was then named, and continues to be, a vice president of Speed-Freight. Adji (as he is referred to throughout the record) has been employed by Calson continuously since 1963. Except for work in that company's exporting business, his only freight-forwarding experience has been with Speed-Freight. Even after Dueber was hired, Adji continued to frequent the Speed-Freight office to oversee the operation and assure that it was "going along the way it was supposed to." During the month of January 1967, he spent up to half of each workday at Speed-Freight
teaching Dueber the “details and technical features of certain accounts.” For “a couple of weeks” he continued to sign all documents and correspondence. Thereafter Dueber began to exercise this function. However, even after Dueber’s initial “training period”, Adji continued to visit the Speed-Freight offices especially in regard to Calson business. Calson had merchandise stored at Speed-Freight and Adji would go there to pack it and to assist Dueber if the volume of work required.

During Dueber’s employment, 1967 and 1968, Romaro continued as Speed-Freight’s main financial officer, maintaining complete control over its financial records which he kept at his Calson office. It was therefore necessary for Dueber to visit the Calson office in order to deliver Speed-Freight invoices or other financial papers to Romaro. Dueber, at no time, had authority to draw Speed-Freight checks, that function being performed jointly by Adji and Romaro.

During 1967, 60–70 percent of Speed-Freight’s work was for Calson. Since then, 40–50 percent has been for Calson.

When Dueber felt the “special forwarding service” was taking too much time, he complained to Adji who then came to Speed-Freight to provide assistance. Whenever Dueber had questions or complaints as to the Speed-Freight operation, he consulted Adji.

Adji continues to serve both as vice president of Speed-Freight and manager of Calson. Although, since Dueber’s departure the latter part of 1968, Adji alone has run the entire Speed-Freight operation, he has received no salary from Speed-Freight. His entire salary has been paid by Calson.³ He maintains one office at Speed-Freight and another at Calson, spending approximately 50 percent of his workday at each place. Adji is the only person now having authority to sign Speed-Freight checks. He infrequently receives instruction, direction, or guidance from Stecopoulos.

On October 7, 1969, Herbert Cooper, senior district investigator for the Federal Maritime Commission, attempted to serve a subpoena upon Adji. In an effort to reach him, he called the Speed-Freight office. He was informed that Adji “had been transferred to the main office.” The address given for the main office was 27 Union Square, New York City, the address of the Calson office.

Romaro is still Speed-Freight’s main financial officer. Although he is employed as a full-time bookkeeper by Calson, he continues to maintain all of Speed-Freight’s books and financial records. These include the “Cash Receipts Journal, Cash Disbursements Journal,

³ Calas testified that Speed-Freight recently reimbursed Calson three or four thousand dollars for Adji’s services during fiscal year ended Apr. 30, 1969.
SPEED FREIGHT INC

Sales Journal, and Accounts Receivable Subsidiary Ledger.” He is assisted by the C.P.A. firm of Osterweil, Oshrin, and Gruhn, which firm also represents Calson. He receives no salary from Speed-Freight, his entire salary being paid by Calson. He has no experience as a freight forwarder.

Romaro’s affiliation with Speed-Freight was a result of the close relationship between Calas and Stecopoulos. Stecopoulos knew that he could use whatever Calas had available. One evening Stecopoulos mentioned to Calas that “* * * somebody has to do the books.” Calas suggested that he use Romaro. Stecopoulos, an old friend of Romaro, then asked him to become treasurer of Speed-Freight on a part-time basis.

Romaro left Calson and Speed-Freight in January 1968, to go to California. When he returned 1 year later, he was immediately rehired by both companies. During his absence, Adji maintained Speed-Freight’s books and records.

Speed-Freight’s rental for its original office at 24–26 13th Street, New York City, was $300 per month. Calson, or its affiliate Calsonaire, paid $200 of this as compensation for storage space. A company called Jalma’s Importers of Antiques also rented storage space from Speed-Freight at “something like $25 or $35 per month.” Recently, Speed-Freight purchased its own premises at 153–07 Rockaway Boulevard, Jamaica, N.Y., paying a deposit of $1,500. Calson continues to rent space there at $200 per month.4

At the present time Speed-Freight is paying salary to no one. A Mr. Loffredo is stationed at 153–07 Rockaway Boulevard to make deliveries for Calson from its stock stored at that location. He also answers the phone for Speed-Freight but is paid by Calson.

During the period 1965–67 over $11,000 was billed to Calson for the “special forwarding service.” Only $3,060 was paid or credited to Speed-Freight’s accounts receivable. Up until the time that Romaro left in 1968, that debt had not been paid. This was so even though Speed-Freight, according to Romaro, was and is operating at a loss.5

Romaro never had authority to sign Calson checks. However, on occasion immediate payment by Calson would be required when no one with authority to sign the check was available. Romaro, then having authority to draw Speed-Freight checks, would pay the bill with

---

4 Testimony of Calas, which conflicts with that of Romaro, indicates that the new building was purchased jointly by Calas and Stecopoulos as individuals, Calas owning two-thirds and Stecopoulos one-third.

5 Stecopoulos testified that the balance due Speed-Freight has been paid and that Speed-Freight presently shows a profit of $1,800. However, he could not remember when it was paid.
SPEED FREIGHT INC

Sales Journal, and Accounts Receivable Subsidiary Ledger.” He is assisted by the C.P.A. firm of Osterweil, Oshrin, and Gruhn, which firm also represents Calson. He receives no salary from Speed-Freight, his entire salary being paid by Calson. He has no experience as a freight forwarder.

Romaro’s affiliation with Speed-Freight was a result of the close relationship between Calas and Stecopoulos. Stecopoulos knew that he could use whatever Calas had available. One evening Stecopoulos mentioned to Calas that “* * * somebody has to do the books.” Calas suggested that he use Romaro. Stecopoulos, an old friend of Romaro, then asked him to become treasurer of Speed-Freight on a part-time basis.

Romaro left Calson and Speed-Freight in January 1968, to go to California. When he returned 1 year later, he was immediately rehired by both companies. During his absence, Adji maintained Speed-Freight’s books and records.

Speed-Freight’s rental for its original office at 24–26 13th Street, New York City, was $300 per month. Calson, or its affiliate Calsonaire, paid $200 of this as compensation for storage space. A company called Jalma’s Importers of Antiques also rented storage space from Speed-Freight at “something like $25 or $35 per month.” Recently, Speed-Freight purchased its own premises at 153–07 Rockaway Boulevard, Jamaica, N.Y., paying a deposit of $1,500. Calson continues to rent space there at $200 per month.4

At the present time Speed-Freight is paying salary to no one. A Mr. Loffredo is stationed at 153–07 Rockaway Boulevard to make deliveries for Calson from its stock stored at that location. He also answers the phone for Speed-Freight but is paid by Calson.

During the period 1965–67 over $11,000 was billed to Calson for the “special forwarding service.” Only $3,060 was paid or credited to Speed-Freight’s accounts receivable. Up until the time that Romaro left in 1968, that debt had not been paid. This was so even though Speed-Freight, according to Romaro, was and is operating at a loss.5

Romaro never had authority to sign Calson checks. However, on occasion immediate payment by Calson would be required when no one with authority to sign the check was available. Romaro, then having authority to draw Speed-Freight checks, would pay the bill with

4 Testimony of Calas, which conflicts with that of Romaro, indicates that the new building was purchased jointly by Calas and Stecopoulos as individuals, Calas owning two-thirds and Stecopoulos one-third.

5 Stecopoulos testified that the balance due Speed-Freight has been paid and that Speed-Freight presently shows a profit of $1,800. However, he could not remember when it was paid.
Speed-Freight funds and Calson would thereafter make reimbursement. Permission for this procedure was granted by Stecopoulos while acting in his capacity as attorney for Calson.

In 1965 Calsonaire paid a $1,000 security deposit to Speed-Freight for the space used at its premises. The security deposit which Stecopoulos was required to pay on the entire premises was only $600. To date, neither the $1,000 nor the $400 excess has been returned to Calas.

In 1966, the financial condition of Speed-Freight necessitated a $2,000 loan which was arranged with Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. Repayment of the loan was guaranteed by Calas and his then partner, Pearson.

Stecopoulos specifically requested that Calas watch over the Speed-Freight operation. This was because Calas was Speed-Freight's most important customer, and because of their long time friendship.

In his application for an independent ocean freight forwarder license, Stecopoulos listed the officers as follows:

- President-Treasurer—Nicholas Stecopoulos.
- First Vice President—Eugene Pagano.
- Assistant Treasurer—Octavio Romaro.
- Secretary—Palma Pirrallo.

Stecopoulos admitted under oath that his present operation is in violation of the Shipping Act and that an intolerable situation exists because the entire operation is being run by an employee of a shipper for whom he does over 50 percent of his forwarding. He also admitted several violations of Commission regulations because of his failure to report changes. He failed to report that Romaro was employed by Calson; that Romaro left his position with Speed-Freight; that Miss Pirrallo had resigned as secretary; that Mrs. Stecopoulos had become secretary; and that Adji, who was known by him to be shipper connected, had joined Speed-Freight.

The license application form contains a question as to whether the applicant, or any officer, director, stockholder, or employee of the applicant, is an owner, in control of, or associated or connected with any: (a) shipper, consignee, seller, or purchaser of shipments to foreign countries. Although knowing that Romaro was employed by Calson, Stecopoulos stated "Octavio Romaro is employed as a bookkeeper by the Indonesia Supply Mission (5 East 68th Street, New York City)."

* Calas could not remember exactly why this was done, but thought that it was because Stecopoulos wanted it.
On May 23, 1969, Stecopoulos informed the Commission by letter that the present officers of Speed-Freight were:

- President-Treasurer—Nicholas Stecopoulos.
- Vice President—Adji Tjokronolo.
- Secretary—Irene Stecopoulos.

That letter failed to inform the Commission that Adji was at this time a manager of Calson. At the time Romaro was reinstated, Stecopoulos knew that he was putting a man in charge of Speed-Freight’s books who was in fact “shipper connected”.

In his application Stecopoulos stated further that “applicant shares office space or office expenses” with no one.

Two and one-half years ago, two Commission investigators questioned Stecopoulos in regard to violations by Speed-Freight. They discussed “the whole problem” and Stecopoulos was thus put on notice that there was a need to “clear up this situation”.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Speed-Freight has taken some 11 numbered exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the examiner. These exceptions all deal with the Examiner’s findings of fact or the inferences he drew therefrom. We have carefully and thoroughly reviewed the transcript of the hearing and the other pleadings of record and we conclude that all of the examiner’s findings were well founded and proper and that the inferences he drew were permissible and valid. Therefore, we shall specifically not treat each exception in this opinion, rather a few examples should suffice to show the nature of Speed-Freight’s objections to the examiner’s decision to revoke its license.

Speed-Freight takes exception to the examiner’s finding that “Calson is an exporter shipping by air and water.” In the words of Mr. Stecopoulos, “Nowhere in the hearing is it ever brought out that Calson ships by ocean-going carrier.” Yet, Eugene Pagano testified that Calson Co. supplied Speed-Freight with both “air freight and ocean freight.” Speed-Freight attempts to counter the testimony of Pagano on the grounds that he was a disgruntled ex-employee whose credibility should be questioned.” Yet, respondent made no attempt whatsoever to discredit Pagano’s testimony at the hearing. In fact as

---

7 When asked what office he currently holds with Speed-Freight, Romaro replied “Treasurer”. Stecopoulos then testified that while Romaro maintains and has control of all of the books and records, he “is not the treasurer • • • does not know what my books contain • • • is not an officer at this time.”

8 Although the exceptions are set forth in 11 numbered paragraphs, the actual number of specific exceptions taken exceeds 11.

9 Mr. Stecopoulos acted as counsel for Speed-Freight.
hearing counsel point out, Pagano’s testimony is wholly uncontradicted. It was up to Speed-Freight to challenge Pagano’s credibility at the hearing and when it failed to do so, it can hardly charge the examiner with error because he “ignored the fact that Pagano was a disgruntled ex-employee.” But the charge that Calson was not a shipper by water is even more difficult to understand in view of the following which appears in the exceptions of Speed-Freight:

Even if Calson Co. did have a number of shipments go overseas by ocean carrier, as an incidental part of its business, which shipments did not amount to more than $1,000 annually in freight charges, would that make Calson Co. a “shipper” within the contemplation of Public Law 87-254 and therefore, be reason enough to force respondent out of business.

The examiner’s finding was fully supported by the record and clearly correct.

Speed-Freight also excepts to the examiner’s finding that $2.25 charged for the “special forwarding service” was “comparatively high”. Speed-Freight says of that finding by the examiner, “This is his own conclusion and not proven by the facts or by any comparison with trucking rates charged at that time by others. Here, again, this finding was solidly based upon the testimony of Pagano and here again this testimony was wholly uncontroverted. It was certainly not the examiner’s duty to introduce the then current truck rates into evidence to prove or disprove testimony otherwise unchallenged by the respondent at the hearing. And it is too late for respondent to gratuitously offer to make such a comparison now.

One other example should suffice. Speed-Freight takes as its “eighth” exception the following: “The examiner states that the $1,000 security deposit paid by Calson Co. to Speed-Freight, has not been returned. The said deposit was returned on September 1, 1969.” The examiner’s finding was based on the following colloquy concerning the security deposit which took place at the hearing:

Q. Has any amount of it ever been paid back?
A. If it hasn’t it will be. Up to this time, it has not.

The witness was Mr. Stecopoulos himself and this exception is necessarily based upon a challenge of his own credibility.

After a careful review of the record and the exceptions taken by Speed-Freight, we conclude that the following conclusions reached by the examiner in his decision are well founded and proper.

Beginning with its initial conception, then formation, and continuously in its operations thereafter, Speed-Freight has maintained the
closest imaginable cooperative and supporting relationship with Calas’ company Calas, a shipper of goods by water in foreign commerce. Pagano, Speed-Freight’s vice president, who handled all aspects of its operations, actually thought that he was working for Calas. Calas, through his companies, provided personnel, two-thirds of the rent, up to 80 percent of the forwarding business, plus economic support through the guise of an overpriced so-called “special forwarding service.” Calsonaire’s payment of the $1,000 security deposit to Speed-Freight and the Calas and Pearson guarantee of the $2,000 loan are merely further proof of the connection of Calas, Calson, and Calsonaire with Speed-Freight.

Adji, while employed full-time as manager of Calson, runs the entire Speed-Freight operation. He maintains an office at both companies, spending approximately half of his time at each.

Romaro, also a full-time employee of Calson, maintains complete control of Speed-Freight’s books and financial records. They are actually located in his Calson office. At no time have either of these men received any salary from Speed-Freight. As hearing counsel put it, the entire Speed-Freight operation rests in the hands of, and is under the direct control of, full-time, fully salaried employees of Calson, a company which accounts for more than half of the business of this forwarder. Since Dueber there has been no one with Speed-Freight who has had any experience in freight forwarding and consequently no one who could possibly qualify it as a freight forwarder.

It is true, as hearing counsel contend, that Speed-Freight is neither an independent, nor a qualified ocean freight forwarder, and therefore it cannot qualify to be licensed as such. Sections 1 and 44 of the act, 46 U.S.C. 801, 841; General Order 4, sections 510.2(a), 510.5(a), 46 CFR 510.2(a), 510.5(a). See Application for Freight Forwarder License—William V. Cady, 8 F.M.C. 352, 360 (1964); Application for Freight Forwarder License—York Shipping Corp., 9 F.M.C. 72 (1965), and Application for Freight Forwarder License—Del Mar Shipping Corp., 8 F.M.C. 493, 497 (1965).

The Commission has held that this licensing statute, like other licensing statutes, should be applied with a liberal attitude to the end that licenses may be granted to qualified applicants, but that if the applicant is not fairly within the definition of independent ocean freight forwarder set forth in section 1 of the act, there is no room for the exercise of liberality. Cady, supra, at 357.

Accordingly, we adopt the foregoing conclusions as our own and while the shipper connection alone is sufficient to revoke Speed-Freight’s license, the record equally supports the other conclusions.
of the examiner: That Speed-Freight submitted false statements in connection with its application for a license contrary to section 510.9(c) of General Order 4; has changed its personnel to the extent that it no longer qualifies as an independent ocean freight forwarder, contrary to section 510.9(d) of General Order 4, and has failed to report such changes to the Commission as required by section 510.5(c) of General Order 4.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 44(d) of the Act and section 510.9, General Order 4, Independent Ocean Freight Forwarder License No. 1092, issued to and now held by Speed-Freight Inc., is hereby revoked. An appropriate order will be entered.

By the Commission.

(Seal)

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
ORDER

The Commission having fully considered the above matter, and having this date made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof;

It is ordered, That the Independent Ocean Freight Forwarder License No. 1092, issued to and now held by Speed-Freight Inc., is hereby revoked pursuant to section 44(d), Shipping Act, 1916, and rule 510.9 of General Order 4.

It is further ordered, That notice of this order be published in the Federal Register.

By the Commission.

(SEAL)

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  

SPECIAL DOCKET No. 423  

THE EREGLI PURCHASING MISSION, EREGLI IRON & STEEL WORKS CO.,  
EREGLI, TURKEY  

v.  

LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC.  

Adopted August 12, 1970  

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING REFUND  

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on August 12, 1970.

It is ordered, That Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. Inc. is authorized to refund to the Eregli Purchasing Mission, Eregli, Iron & Steel Works, the amount of $52,728.64.

It is further ordered, That applicant publish promptly in its appropriate tariff the following notice.

Notice is hereby given as required by the decision of the Federal Maritime Commission in Special Docket No. 423, that effective February 20, 1970, the project rate for machinery, equipment, supplies and parts (Proprietary Cargo) for expansion and construction of Steel Mill in Eregli, Turkey, for purposes of refunds or waiver of freight charges on any shipments which may have been shipped during the period from February 20, 1970 to March 13, 1970 is $52.00 w/m, subject to all other applicable rules, regulations, terms, and conditions of the said rate and this tariff.

It is further ordered, That refund shall be made within 30 days of this notice and Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. shall within 5 days thereafter notify the Commission of the date of the refund and of the manner in which payment has been made.

By the Commission.

[seal]  
FRANCIS C. HURNEY,  
Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

SPECIAL DOCKET No. 423

THE EREGLI PURCHASING MISSION, EREGLI IRON & STEEL WORKS CO.,
 EREGLI, TURKEY

v.

LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC.

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., permitted to refund a portion of the freight charges collected on three shipments of building material from Mobile, Ala., to Eregli, Turkey.

T. S. Buchanan, Jr., for applicant.

INITIAL DECISION OF HERBERT K. GREER, PRESIDING EXAMINER

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (applicant), a member of the Gulf/Mediterranean Ports Conference and a common carrier by water in foreign commerce, has filed an application for permission to refund $52,728.64, a portion of the freight charges collected from Eregli Purchasing Mission, Eregli Iron & Steel Works, Eregli, Turkey (shipper), on three shipments of building material from Mobile, Ala., to Eregli, Turkey, which material was to be used in the construction of a steel mill and in connection with an agency for International Development loan program.

On February 20 and 25, 1970, applicant issued three bills of lading on the shipments, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B/L No.</th>
<th>Commodity/weight</th>
<th>Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,613,899 lbs. fire brick</td>
<td>$59,755.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,607,360 lbs. fire brick</td>
<td>$59,511.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>206,544 lbs. castable refractories</td>
<td>7,244.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total charged and collected</td>
<td>126,508.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This decision became the decision of the Commission August 12, 1970.
The amount assessed and collected was pursuant to the conference tariff (No. 11—FMC 7) effective at the time the bills of lading were issued and when carriage began.

Applicant alleges that prior to the shipment, the shipper’s agent contacted applicant’s New York office and was erroneously informed that the conference tariff contained a project rate identical to the project rate of the North Atlantic/Mediterranean Freight Conference for cargo to be used in the construction of the steel mill at Eregli. It further alleges that applicant’s conference had previously published a project rate for cargo to be used in this construction but had canceled this rate effective July 31, 1965, because cargo for the project had not been offered to the conference or any of its members; however, that it is conference procedure to reestablish a project rate in the event such cargo is offered. It appears that the conference was not promptly notified by applicant that the cargo had been offered and by concurring in this application, the conference agrees that had it been approached to reestablish the project rate for the Eregli Steel Mill project, it would have promptly done so. It further appears that the project rate here sought to be applied became effective on March 13, 1970, prior to the delivery of the cargo on March 16–19, 1970, and prior to payment of the charges on March 26, 1970.

The conference tariff in effect at the time of the shipments included an arbitrary charge on cargo unloaded at Eregli, a bill of lading charge, and a heavy lift charge on packages weighing 801 kilograms or more. The project rate which became effective on March 13, 1970, eliminated the arbitrary charge and the bill of lading charge. The heavy lift charge was applicable only on packages weighing over 4,800 pounds. The fire brick involved in these shipments was packed on skids, each of which weighed approximately 2,629 pounds, and the castable refractories were shipped on pallets each weighing approximately 3,129 pounds, thus under the new tariff the heavy lift charge was not applicable. Applicant seeks to apply the project rate and to refund the difference between the amount collected and the charges at this new rate which, it applied, would be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B/L No.</th>
<th>Freight at project rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$34,943.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>34,802.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,034.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,780.08</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 F.M.C.
The charges at the project rate would be $52,728.64 less than the amount collected.

Public Law 90–928, 75 Stat. 764, authorizes the Commission to permit a common carrier by water in foreign commerce to refund a portion of the freight charges collected from a shipper where there is "an error due to inadvertence in failing to file a new tariff." It is found that the conference of which applicant is a member, under its existing procedure, would have promptly filed the new rate on cargo to be used in the Eregli Steel Mill project had it been notified by applicant that such cargo had been offered, and applicant's failure to notify the conference until after the bills of lading had been issued and the cargo had been shipped was an error due to inadvertence which prevented the timely filing of the new rate.

The application was filed within 180 days of the date of the shipments. No other shipments of the same or similar commodities moved on conference vessels during approximately the same time as the shipments here involved. There are no special docket applications or other proceedings involving the same rate situation now pending.

It appearing that the application involves a situation within the purview of Public Law 90–298, and good cause appearing, the applicant is permitted to refund to the shipper the sum of $52,728.64. The notice referred to in the statute shall be published in the conference tariff. The refund shall be effectuated within 30 days after publication of the notice and within 5 days thereafter applicant shall notify the Commission of the date of the refund and the manner in which payment was made.

Herbert K. Greer,
Presiding Examiner.

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 68-47

VALLEY EVAPORATING CO.

v.

GRACE LINE, INC., ET AL.

Decided August 12, 1970

Respondents' failure to retain a commodity rate on dried fruit items is found to be unjustly prejudicial to shipments of that commodity in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916. Respondents' assessment of an $88 W/M N.O.S. rate on dehydrated apples has not been shown to be unjustly discriminatory in violation of section 17 of the act or so unreasonably high as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States in violation of section 18(b)(5) of the act. Reparation for injury caused as a result of the established violation of the act is awarded to Valley Evaporating Co., in the amount of $8,876.

William L. Dwyer for complainant.
F. Conger Fawcett for respondents.

REPORT

By the Commission: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners)

This proceeding was initiated by the complaint of Valley Evaporating Co., against Grace Line, Inc., Westfal-Larsen and Co., and the Pacific Coast River Plate Brazil Conference, alleging that respondents subjected complainant to the payments of rates with respect to two shipments of dehydrated apples from Argentina to the Pacific Coast of the United States which were violative of sections 16 first, 17 and 18(b)(5) of the Shipping Act, 1916. For injury allegedly incurred as a result of the unlawful rates, complainant seeks reparation from Grace and Westfal-Larsen, in the total amount of $11,912.47. Examiner John Marshall issued an initial decision, dismissing the complaint, to which exceptions and replies have been filed. We have heard oral argument.
II. Discussion and Conclusions

The examiner in his initial decision found no violations of either section 16, 17, or 18(b)(5) of the act resulting from respondents' assessment of an $88 W/M N.O.S. rate on the above-described shipments of dried fruit. In dismissing the complaint, the examiner determined that:

• • • the carriers were legally bound to collect the N.O.S. rate and that no duty was imposed upon the conference or the carriers to provide complainant with actual notice of the tariff revision.

Respondents except to the examiner's conclusions and his dismissal of the complaint and interpret his failure to rule specifically on each of the substantive allegations as an attempt to evade the "central questions" of the case by simply concluding that "since the challenged rate was contained in a published tariff it was perforce lawful regardless of its size." We are in agreement with the examiner's ultimate disposition of the issues in this proceeding with one very important exception. For reasons set forth below, it is our opinion that the facts presented here do support the finding that Valley has been unduly and unreasonably prejudiced in violation of section 16 of the act.

Before addressing ourselves to each of the specific provisions of the act relied upon, we should like to first dispose of another issue raised by complainant in its exceptions. Complainant interprets the examiner's decision as standing for the proposition that a carrier's filing under section 18(b)(3) of the act 4 automatically "exempts the rate from all substantive requirements" and that, thereafter, "the rate no matter how outrageously high or discriminatory becomes 'the only lawful rate.'" While we do not read the examiner's decision as precluding the challenging of a published rate as being otherwise unlawful under the Shipping Act, we should like to dispel any mistaken notions that may have been inadvertently created.

In enacting section 18(b), it certainly was not the intent of Congress to repeal the other substantive provisions of the act and leave carriers free to charge unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory or prejudicial rates by the simple device of first filing such rates with the Commission. The distinction here is between a rate that is lawful and one that is merely legal. In dealing with shippers the carrier is required under section 18(b)(3) to conform the freight charges actually collected to the amount fixed in its published tariffs. In that sense the

4 Section 18(b)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that:

"No common carrier by water in foreign commerce or conference of such carriers shall charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for the transportation of property • • • than the rates and charges which are specified in its tariffs on file with the Commission and duly published and in effect at the time, • • •"
published rate in effect at the time of the movement is the "legal rate." But a rate may be legal in the sense that it is the regularly published rate and yet be unlawful if it violates other provisions of the act. Thus, in publishing a rate or schedule of rates, the carrier or conference acts under the admonition of the statute and, if it establishes a rate which is unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or prejudicial, it may be subject to the payment of preparation for any injury caused by such rate. To hold otherwise would be to make the mere establishment of rates by a carrier conclusive of their reasonableness and justness while in effect.

What we have stated here is by no means novel. As early as 1915, the Supreme Court in *Louis. & Nash. R.R. v. Maxwell*, 237 U.S. 94, 97, held that the rate of a carrier duly filed pursuant to section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act (after which our own section 18(b)(3) was patterned) is the only legal charge and that shippers and carriers "* * * must abide by it unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable." (Emphasis added). This principle was reaffirmed in *Arizona Grocery v. Atchison Ry.*, 284 U.S. 370, 384 (1932), where the court, after discussing the duties of a carrier at common law with respect to the exacting of rates, explained:

* * * In order to render rates definite and certain, and to prevent discrimination and other abuses, the statute [Interstate Commerce Act] required the filing and publishing of tariffs specifying the rates adopted by the carrier, and made these the legal rates, that is those which must be charged to all shippers alike. Any deviation from the published rate was declared a criminal offense, and also a civil wrong giving rise to an action for damages by the injured shipper. Although the Act thus created a legal rate, it did not abrogate, but expressly affirmed, the common-law duty to charge no more than a reasonable rate, and left upon the carrier the burden of conforming its charges to that standard. In other words, the legal rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate—it was lawful only if it was reasonable. Under § 6 the shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but if he could show that it was unreasonable he might recover reparation.

Likewise, while the publication of rates by carriers and conferences operating in the foreign commerce of the United States in the manner required by section 18(b)(3) of the act fixes the standard of legal rates for the time being and so long as such published rates are in effect, this standard is by no means conclusive of their reasonableness and justness under other provisions of the act.\(^5\) The mere publication of a rate cannot make that rate lawful, in the sense of being immune from attack, either with respect to past or future shipments, if it is

\(^5\) For example, see *Investigation of Ocean Rate Structures*, 12 F.M.C. 34 (1968), where the Commission found that the North Atlantic United Kingdom Conference had established rates on specific commodity rates and general cargo N.O.S., which were so unreasonably high as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States in violation of section 18(b)(5) of the act.
otherwise unjust or unreasonable. We move now to a consideration of the specific provisions of the act allegedly violated by respondents.

Section 16 first of the act makes it unlawful for any common carrier within the purview thereof, directly or indirectly:

To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever * * *

Respondents maintain that to establish a violation of this section, it is generally necessary to show “an existing and effective competitive relationship” between the prejudiced and the preferred shipper or cargo. They submit that the complainant has failed to make the required showing here and accordingly no violation of section 16 has been established. Without deciding the validity of respondents’ allegation that no “competitive relationship” has demonstrated herein, we find that the unlawful prejudice to which complainant and its shipments of dried apples have here been subjected is not dependent on the existence of such a relationship.

In support of their contention that a competitive relationship is an essential ingredient of an alleged section 16 violation, respondents rely on several Commission decisions involving alleged discrimination or preference. *West Indies Fruit Co. v. Flota Mercante*, 7 F.M.C. 66 (1962); *United States v. American Export Lines*, 8 F.M.C. 280 (1964); *North Atlantic Mediterranean Freight Conference*, 11 F.M.C. 202 (1967). These cases, however, are not pertinent here. For while an effective competitive relationship is a necessary part of liability under section 16 in situations where the allegedly preferential or prejudicial rates or charges are geared to transportation factors or the differing characteristics of commodities, it is not required where the carrier’s obligation to render a particular service is “absolute” and not dependent upon such factors or differences. As the Supreme Court recognized in *Volkswagenwerk v. FMC*, 390 U.S. 261, 280 (1968), “* * * the Commission, in cases not involving freight rates * * * has often found section 16 violations even in the absence of a ‘competitive relationship.’” We have such a “case” before us here.

In an effort designed to delete “paper rates” on nonmoving commodities, the Conference and its member lines set about updating their tariffs. The process by which this was to be accomplished was for each of the lines involved in a given trade to compile a list of the commodities moving on its vessels “in sufficient volume” to warrant retention of a specific rate, which lists would then be, and subsequently were,
correlated by the Conference secretary. The Grace Line effort was to list all commodities moving in excess of 25 tons or more per year. While the record does not indicate what volume cutoff point Westfal-Larsen adopted as a standard, the record does make it clear that Westfal-Larsen established specific commodity rates on a number of commodities that moved in much smaller quantities during the relevant period than did the dried apple items. It was in determining what constituted "sufficient volume" to justify the retention of a commodity rate that all of the transportation factors and cargo characteristics of the various commodities should have been taken into consideration. And were the attack upon the rates in question prompted by a failure of dried apples to meet the "sufficient volume" criteria lack of competition could well be a defense. But such is not the case here.

Having once established the "sufficient volume" criteria using whatever factors were warranted, respondents, in determining what commodity rates were to be discarded were then required to apply them in a totally fair and impartial manner. At this point the single question involved was whether a given commodity moved in sufficient volume or not. Questions as to the characteristics inherent in the particular commodity involved were irrelevant as were questions of whether the particular commodity competed with any other commodity. Thus, as we stated in Investigation of Free Time Practices—Port of San Diego, 9 F.M.C. 525, 547 (1966), the equality of treatment required in situations of this kind is "absolute and not conditioned on such things as competition." The situation here is analogous to that existing in New York Foreign Freight F. & B. Association v. Federal Maritime Commission, 337 F. 2d 289, 299 (2d Cir. 1964), where the court, in concluding that no "competitive relationship" need be shown where there was substantial evidence that forwarders, "in random fashion," charged shippers markups of widely varying amounts, stated:

* * * Transportation or wharfage charges are dependent upon the particular commodity involved; the cost for shipping or storing bananas, for example, bears no relation to the fees levied for heavy industrial equipment. To find an unlawful discrimination in transportation charges thus quite properly requires a showing of competitive relationship between two shippers who are charged different prices. But forwarders render substantially the same service to all shippers in procuring insurance or arranging for cartage; the commodity being

---

7 The lists of the individual lines were prepared and presented to the Conference secretary who prepared a composite list. On his own initiative he added certain additional commodities for which rates had recently been established, plus others which moved from time to time, of which he had personal knowledge. The resulting composite list was subsequently used as the basis for specific rate adjustments pursuant to the conference's rate increase decision.
shipped has little or nothing to do with the reasonableness of the fee exacted for the forwarder's service. The very practice of charging shippers disguised markups of widely varying amounts on substantially identical services, without justification, seems to us to be prima facie discriminatory in a regulated industry.

Thus, while the respondents had an obligation under section 16 to administer the established volume standards equally to all commodities, the record shows that no commodity rate was adopted on dried fruit items, although commodity rates were established on other items that had moved in smaller quantities during the period involved herein. This, without more, establishes a clear situation of undue prejudice to a "description of traffic," namely dried fruit, vis-a-vis other commodities, in violation of section 16 of the act.

Respondents freely admit that the volume movement of dried apples had been such that a commodity rate on that item should have been retained. Respondents, however, ascribed their failure to establish a commodity rate on dried fruit to an inadvertent "oversight" on the part of a member line.\(^9\) We are not impressed by this argument. While we have no reason to doubt respondents' bona fides in this matter, the fact remains that good faith will not save an otherwise unjustly prejudicial practice from condemnation. The equality of treatment required by section 16 of the act is not conditioned on a carrier's intentions. As we stated in *American Tobacco Co. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 1 U.S.S.B. 53, 56 (1923), if a carrier's conduct subjects a shipper to undue discrimination, the carrier's "knowledge or lack of knowledge of such condition is plainly immaterial."

\(^9\) We cannot agree with the examiner's dismissal of "this oversight" as one "* * * not [of] the type falling within the scope of Public Law 90–298."

Public Law 90–298, enacted in 1968 to amend section 15(b)(3) of the act, authorizes the Commission to permit a common carrier by water in foreign commerce, or conference of such carriers, to refund a portion of the freight charges collected from a shipper or waive the collection of a portion of such charges where it appears that there is an error in a tariff of a clerical or administrative nature, or where through inadvertence, there has been a failure to file a particular tariff reflecting an intended rate, provided, *inter alia*, that the application for refund is filed with the Commission within 180 days from the date of shipment. This amendment was designed to prevent injustice in situations where it would be inequitable to charge the filed rate as required by law.

While it would indeed appear that Public Law 90–298 would have permitted corrective action in the situation now before us, we are not here deciding the merits of that issue, nor do we need to do so in view of the fact that the issue has been rendered moot by the carriers' failure to file an application for refund within the prescribed time. Suffice it to say that we are somewhat dismayed at respondents' failure to utilize existing Commission procedures to rectify their alleged "oversight" even after having been encouraged to do so by the Commission's own staff.

Respondents have made it known during the course of this proceeding that their refusal to file a so-called special docket application was grounded on the belief that this was not the kind of "oversight" intended to be covered by Public Law 90–298. While we appreciate their uncertainty in this matter, we cannot understand their reluctance to submit an application and allow the Commission to decide for itself whether its "oversight" was one intended to be covered by the "special docket" legislation.
Once having found a violation of the Shipping Act, the Commission is empowered, under section 22 of the act, to "* * * direct the payment * * * of full reparation to complainant for the injury caused by [such] violation." For "immediate and direct" injury allegedly suffered, complainant here requests the Commission to order respondents to pay it an amount based on the difference between the $88 W/M N.O.S. rate actually assessed and the preexisting commodity rate of $52 per long ton.

Respondents, while not abandoning their position that "the reparations issue need (and should) never be reached," argue that, in any event, complainant did not suffer any injury compensable by reparation under section 22. In this regard, they argue that the showing necessary for a reparations award under section 16 "presumably remains as enumerated in the West Indies Fruit case, supra, at 70, thus:

Proof of the character, intensity and effect of the competitive relationship is necessary to prove the amount of damages and sustain an award of reparations * * *. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondents point out that in this proceeding complainant's "only claim and sole showing of 'injury' was that it paid more dollars for the transportation of * * * [the dried apples] here concerned, than it would have had some other rate applied." This, respondents submit, is insufficient to establish any legally compensable measure of damages.

Were we considering here a request for reparation based on unlawful preference or prejudice in rates based on the kind of transportation factors or commodity characteristics noted above, we would be inclined to agree with respondents. Since in such a case the existence of a "competitive relationship" between the preferred and the prejudiced shipper is an essential element of a violation involving alleged preferential or prejudicial rates or charges, any award of reparation premised on such violation must take into consideration the "character, intensity, and effect" of this competitive relationship. And in cases of this character, it may very well be that the injury sustained by the complainant because of the unlawful discrimination suffered may be greater or lesser than the amount of the difference between the rates charged them and those charged the preferred shipper. As we explained in Agreement No. 8905—Port of Seattle and Alaska S.S. Co., 7 F.M.C. 792, 800 (1964), a case involving alleged "unlawful discrimination and prejudice" in tariff charges, "Past decisions of the Commission and its predecessors make clear that the person claiming illegal prejudice or disadvantage must establish damage with respect to its ability to compete." (Emphasis added). Thus, this Commission has historically recognized that the extent of damages in rate discrimination cases, being dependent largely on competitive factors, is a question
of fact which must be clearly demonstrated by substantial proof. *Port of New York Authority v. AB Svenska et al.*, 4 F.M.B. 202, 205 (1953).

However, we have already determined that the equality of treatment required here in this case is “absolute” and not conditioned on competition. Therefore, the “character, intensity, and effect” of competition becomes irrelevant and the measure of damages simply becomes the difference between the rate charged and collected and the rate which would have applied but for the unlawful discrimination or prejudice. To the extent that the proper measure of damages is the amount of unlawful excess exacted, it is akin to an “overcharge” and the same principles apply.

Applying these principles to the present situation, the measure of damages is the difference between the amount of freight charges assessed and collected on the basis of the cargo N.O.S. rate of $88 W/M and the amount of freight charges which would have been payable under the preexisting commodity rate on dried apples of $52 per long ton. On this basis, the amount of reparation due complainant on the Grace shipment is $7,882.14. Computed on the basis of the $52 per long ton rate, the total charge on the Westfal-Larsen shipment would have been $1,435.56. Although complainant was ultimately assessed freight charges on this shipment of $5,336.23, or an “overcharge” of some $3,900.67, it has to date only paid $2,429.42, less wharfage and handling. Therefore, the measure of complainant’s damage on the Westfal-Larsen shipment is $993.86, the difference between what was actually collected and what should have been paid. Thus, the total amount of reparation to which complainant is entitled on the two shipments combined is $8,876.

On the theory that “the two sections overlap” and that a violation of one is often a violation of both, Valley also alleged that the respondents violated section 17 of the act as well as section 16. We disagree. Unlike section 16, first, which by its terms prohibits “any” unjust preference or prejudice between shippers and commodities “in any respect whatsoever,” the first paragraph of section 17 concerns itself only with an unjustly discriminatory “rate, fare, or charge.” 10 And as the Commission explained in *North Atlantic Mediterranean Freight Conference, 11 F.M.C. 202, 213 (1967)*, to establish unjust rate discrimination within the meaning of section 17:

* * * there must be two shippers of like traffic over the same line between the same points under the same circumstances and conditions but who are paying different rates. 11 F.M.C. 213.

---

10 Section 17 also declares it unlawful for a carrier to charge any rate which is “unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United States as compared with their foreign competitors.” This portion of section 17 is clearly not applicable here, however, since the alleged unlawful rate is being assessed complainant as an importer of the United States, not as an exporter thereof.
Quite obviously when considered in the light of the above criteria, the present factual situation falls far short of establishing a violation of section 17. Complainant has failed to establish the essential element of a section 17 violation—the existence of another similarly situated shipper. The record is clear that Valley was the only shipper of dried apples in the relevant trade from Buenos Aires to the Pacific Northwest. In fact, there was no other movement of dehydrated apples or other dried fruit commodity in the entire northbound range served by the Conference, other than those of complainant. Manifestly, there can be no discrimination, let alone unjust discrimination, where there is but one shipper involved. By definition, you cannot have discrimination "between" a single shipper. Clearly, no violation of section 17 by respondents has been shown on the present record.

Finally, Valley argues that the N.O.S. rate of $88 W/M as applied to the two shipments of dried apples herein involved was so unreasonably high as to be detrimental to this country's commerce in violation of section 18(b)(5) of the act. Whatever might have been the merits of this contention had that rate been maintained, it is clear that respondents' reinstatement of a specific commodity rate on complainant's product has mooted that issue.

Section 18(b)(5) does not by its terms forbid any specific activity. It merely empowers the Commission to "** disapprove any rate or charge ** which, after hearing, it finds to be so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States." This section is purely prospective in nature and, as the court explained in Federal Maritime Commission v. Caragher, 364 F. 2d 709, 717 (1966):

** simply reflects Congress's awareness that whether a certain rate is "unreasonable" is often a close question and that consequently a regulated carrier should be liable for ** penalties only if it continues to charge unreasonable rates after the Commission has determined they are unreasonable. (Emphasis added.)

We see no reason to distinguish the situation where an allegation of "unreasonableness" under section 18(b)(5) forms the basis for a request for reparation rather than a suit for penalties. Therefore, we find that the court's rationale in the Caragher case, supra, applies with equal force to the present situation and conclude that only after the Commission has determined a particular rate to be unreasonable under section 18(b)(5) may a carrier's continued assessment of that rate

---

11 This holding is fully supported by the legislative history of section 18(b), which section was added to the Shipping Act in 1961. In fact, the court itself points out that during the course of congressional deliberations on the 1961 amendments, a specific provision making it "unlawful" for a regulated carrier to reduce its rates unreasonably was considered and rejected and thereafter section 18(b)(5) was enacted.
be considered a violation of section 18(b)(5) for which reparation may be awarded. Complainant's reliance on the provisions of section 18 (b)(5) in this proceeding is therefore clearly misplaced. Since the alleged "unreasonable" rate is no longer in effect, the Commission has nothing before it to consider for "disapproval" under the provisions of section 18(b)(5).

III. ULTIMATE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of all of the foregoing, we find and conclude that:

1. Respondents' failure to retain a commodity rate on dried fruit is unjustly prejudicial to that commodity in violation of section 16 of the act;

2. Respondents' assessment of an $88 W/M N.O.S. rate on dehydrated apples has not been shown to unjustly discriminate in violation of section 17 of the act or so unreasonably high as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States in violation of section 18(b)(5) of the act; and

3. Reparation for injury caused as a result of the established violation of the act is awarded to Valley in the amount of $8,876.

An appropriate order will be entered.

Commissioners Ashton C. Barrett and James F. Fanseen dissenting:

After a thorough examination of the law and a most careful and deliberate consideration of the powers delegated by Congress to the Commission, it is our opinion that no award of reparation should be made in this case under section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the act), for injury allegedly incurred resulting from unlawful rates held to be in violation of sections 16 first, 17, and 18(b)(5) of the act.

We not only concur in the conclusions of the hearing examiner in his initial decision, but would make the additional specific findings that Grace Line, Inc., Westfal-Larsen and Co., and the Pacific Coast River Plate Brazil Conference published and charged rates on two shipments of dehydrated apples from Buenos Aires to Seattle (1) which did not subject complainant, the Pacific Northwest, or the commodity, dehydrated apples, to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of section 16 first of the act; (2) which did not unjustly discriminate between shippers from Argentina to the Pacific Northwest, between such shippers and shippers from elsewhere, between Pacific Northwest ports and ports elsewhere, and between foreign ports shipping the same and competing commodities to the Pacific Northwest, and were not unjustly prejudicial to United

14 F.M.C.
States exporters in violation of the first paragraph of section 17 of the act; and (3) which were not so unreasonably high as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States under section 18(b)(5) of the act.

In finding a section 16 first violation, the majority chooses not to follow the legal precedent of developing a competitive relationship showing alleged preferential or prejudicial rates or charges being charged—a relationship which the complainant has continually tried to establish in its briefs as well as in its oral presentation before the Commission. Instead, the majority attempts to establish prejudice and preference by adopting the approach that the respondents were under an absolute obligation to render a service at a certain rate—a rate resulting from the fact that a "sufficient quantity" of a commodity justified the retention of a commodity rate in the conference's tariff, whether or not a finding of actual impairment to the movement of the commodity in question has been made or whether or not any evidence was introduced showing an advantage to a competitor in the same trade. Cases supporting this manner of treatment were cited; however, the cases presented evolved from those situations in which other factors than commodity rates gave rise to the causes of action; e.g., shoreside services in Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261 (1968); free-time terminal demurrage practices in Investigation of Free Time Practices—Port of San Diego, 9 F.M.C. 525 (1966); freight forwarder practices in New York Foreign Freight F. & B. Association v. Federal Maritime Commission, 337 F. 2d 289 (2d Cir. 1964).


The Maritime Commission's refusal to require a competitive relationship in certain cases, however, has diluted the principle only in those situations in which there are services that are not dependent upon the nature of the cargo and the various charges therefor.

We maintain that the alleged injury resulting from competing manufacturers and importers of dehydrated apples, foreign and domestic, is the cause of action the complainant must prove. We remain convinced that it is only through the development of the competitive relationship that a finding of preference or prejudice existing

14 F.M.C.
between shippers, localities, or commodities can be established. As was stated in *U.S. v. American Export Lines et al.*, 8 F.M.C. 280, 291:

If commodity rates are compared, to establish a violation of these sections (sections 16 first and 17 of the act), there must be a showing of the character and intensity of the competition; that the difference in rates has operated to shipper's disadvantage in marketing the commodity; the deferring of one person to another or the preferring of one person to another; and unequal treatment between competing shippers or ports.

The mere allegation of a violation is not enough, and in this case the general representations remain unsupported. The only foreign producer or exporter similarly located and disclosed as offering direct competition to the complainant was a person who not only shipped a different product but shipped his produce in a different trade. No meaningful comparative situation is, therefore, presented. Nor can a showing of prejudice or preference be established from the attempt of complainant to compare dried fruit rates with respondent's rate where the rates being compared apply in different trade routes.

On this record a finding of preference or prejudice could not be supported even if one assumes that the same commodity was being compared in the same trade. As respondents correctly cited in their opening brief to the examiner:

Existence of different rates on analogous commodities moving in this trade or a showing that respondents' rates on the same commodity are higher than those of other carriers in other trades is of itself insufficient. Evidence as to volume and claims, handling costs, and the type of vessels operated both as to the trade involved and in compared trades, should also have been submitted. *Puerto Rico Rates*, 2 U.S.M.C. 117, 119 (1936).

In this proceeding no data or evidence of probative value substantiating a violation has been introduced.

Even in the domestic trade, proof is lacking for any finding of preference or prejudice; the record shows only that the competitors with whom complainant ultimately competed were either (1) businesses which did no importing or (2) a producer which imported solely from a different hemisphere (Rovigo, Italy).

The case of proving the alleged prejudice against Seattle as a port and locality, all ports on the West Coast and the River Plate area also remains unsupported. There is no showing that the flow of traffic to or from any locality was in any way affected by the level of the commodity rate. There is no showing of a competitive disadvantage or a locality being preferred.

The fact remains that no finding of a section 16 first violation can be made when proof of actual injury is based on mere hypothetical,
speculative, or conjectural loss. *West Indies Fruit Co. v. Flota Mercante*, 7 F.M.C. 70; Agreement No. 8905—Port of Seattle and Alaska S.S. Co., 7 F.M.C. 792.

If, however, a section 16 first violation be found, we certainly feel that the amount of reparations should be determined only after an exhaustive study of the mitigating circumstances presented here. While all parties acknowledge the "oversight" of the conference, the conference and its members have concern for literally hundreds of rates. As a practical approach to business, the conference had no list or other means of notifying shippers/receivers of general cargo except for those subscribing to its tariff. The cost of such a subscription is currently (and was then) $25 per year, a most inexpensive precautionary measure to employ when one considers the economic facets of a successful business. In contradistinction, a major function of a freight forwarder is to keep its client informed of transportation costs when its services are utilized. The services of freight forwarders were employed, not only in Argentina, but in Seattle as well. Little attempt, if any, was made by the freight forwarders or complainant to ascertain the proper transportation costs prior to shipment—a clear finding of gross negligence.

In summary, no violation has resulted from the failure of respondents to file a commodity tariff similar to one which, as a business judgment, they had once filed and maintained. If complainant had exercised simple ordinary business prudence before the time the two shipments in question were transported, the problem could have been caught before it became an issue, and almost surely the carriers would have responded favorably, just as they did a short time thereafter when the matter was brought to their attention.

Upon hearing oral argument and studying the record before us, we remain convinced that the complaint should be dismissed.

We would, therefore, find no violation of the act or make any award of reparations.

[seal]                                           Francis C. Hurney,
                                                  Secretary.
This proceeding being at issue upon complaint, having been duly heard, and full investigation having been had, and the Commission on this day having made and entered a report stating its findings and conclusions, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof;

Therefore, it is ordered, That respondents be, and hereby are, directed to pay to Valley Evaporating Co., on or before 60 days from the date hereof, $8,876, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on any amount unpaid after 60 days, as reparation for the injury caused by respondent's violation of section 16 first of the Shipping Act, 1916.

By the Commission.

Francis C. Hurney,  
Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

SPECIAL DOCKET NO. 424

AIR AMERICA LTD., HONG KONG

v.

TRANS PACIFIC FREIGHT CONFERENCE OF HONG KONG

August 19, 1970

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING REFUND

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on August 19, 1970.

It is ordered, That applicant is authorized to refund to Air America Ltd., Hong Kong the amount of $267.14.

It is further ordered, That applicant publish promptly in its appropriate tariff the following notice.

"Notice is hereby given as required by the decision of the Federal Maritime Commission in Special Docket No. 424, that effective March 1, 1970, the non-contract rate for Tyres-Aircraft: Returned for Reconditioning, for purposes of refunds or waiver of freight charges on any shipments which may have been shipped during the period from March 1, 1970 to May 3, 1970 is $110.75 W, subject to all other applicable rules, regulations, terms, and conditions of said rate and this tariff."

It is further ordered, That refund shall be made within 30 days of this notice and applicant shall within 5 days thereafter notify the Commission of the date of the refund and of the manner in which payment has been made.

By the Commission.

[SEAL]

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

SPECIAL DOCKET NO. 424

AIR AMERICA LTD., HONG KONG

v.

TRANS PACIFIC FREIGHT CONFERENCE OF HONG KONG

INITIAL DECISION OF HERBERT K. GREER, PRESIDING EXAMINER

Trans Pacific Freight Conference (applicant) seeks permission to refund to Air America, Ltd. (shipper) a portion of the freight charges collected on a shipment from Hong Kong to Los Angeles, Calif. Under its bill of lading dated April 7, 1970, applicant carried cargo for the shipper described as “12 coils Aircraft Tyres.” The rate effective at the time of the shipment was $93 per 40 cubic feet (M) or per 2,000 pounds (W), whichever produced the greater revenue. Applying the measurement rate, applicant collected the sum of $325.50 from the shipper, based on 140 cubic feet.

Effective March 1, 1970, applicant’s conference filed an amendment to its tariff with the Commission (23-FMC-8). Through typographical error, however, the rate for “Types-Aircraft: Returned for Reconditioning” was left blank. Correction of this error was made by filing effective May 3, 1970, and the noncontract rate of $110.75 (W) was published. Under this rate, which is for weight only, the charges would have been $58.36, or $267.14 less than collected. The shipment weighed 1,054 pounds.

Public Law 90-928, 75 Stat. 764, authorizes the Commission to permit a common carrier by water in foreign commerce to refund a portion of the freight charges collected from a shipper where there is “an error due to inadvertence in failing to file a new tariff.” From the evidence presented, it appears that leaving a blank space in the rate column after the commodity description of Aircraft Tyres in the tariff filed on March 1, 1970, was an inadvertent typographical error, and thus this application involves a situation within the purview of Public Law 90-298.

1 This decision became the decision of the Commission Aug. 19, 1970.
The application was filed within 180 days of the date of the shipment; no other shipments of the same or similar commodity moved on conference vessels during approximately the same time as the shipment here involved; and no other proceedings involving the same rate situation are pending. Good cause appearing, applicant is permitted to refund to the shipper the sum of $267.14. The notice referred to in the statute shall be published in the conference tariff and the refund shall be effectuated within 30 days thereafter. Within 5 days after making refund, applicant shall notify the Commission of the date of the refund and the manner in which payment was made.

Herbert K. Greer,

Presiding Examiner.

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Docket No. 69-21

Transconex, Inc.—General Increase in Rates in the U.S. South Atlantic/Puerto Rico—Virgin Islands Trades

Docket No. 69-29

Consolidated Express, Inc.—General Increases in Rates in the U.S. North Atlantic/Puerto Rico Trade

Decided August 20, 1970

Increased rates of Transconex, Inc. and Consolidated Express, Inc., nonvessel operating common carriers in the trade between U.S. Atlantic ports, on the one hand, and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, on the other, not shown to be unjust or unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.

Herbert Burststein, Arthur Libeinstein, and Morris Kassin for respondents, Transconex, Inc. and Consolidated Express, Inc.

Edward Schmeltzer, Mario F. Escudero, and Robert A. Peavy for Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Donald J. Brunner, Paul M. Tschirhart, and Paul J. Kaller, hearing counsel.

REPORT

By The Commission: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Commissioners Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, and George H. Hearn)

Transconex, Inc. (Transconex) and Consolidated Express, Inc. (Consolidated), nonvessel operating common carriers by water (NVOCCs), individually filed with the Commission increased rates applicable to the domestic offshore commerce of the United States. On April 28 and June 6, 1969, the Commission instituted proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the increases of Transconex and Consolidated, respectively. Although the proceedings were not formally con-
solidated, the similar nature of the operations of Transconex and Consolidated resulted in the two proceedings being treated together, reference to the record in each proceeding being allowed by stipulation for evidence applicable to either. All parties filed single briefs applicable to both proceedings, and Examiner Herbert K. Greer issued one initial decision, in which he found the increased rates of the two NVOCCs not unjust or unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. Exceptions to the initial decision were filed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico), which was a party to both proceedings, and by hearing counsel. Replies to exceptions were filed by hearing counsel and jointly by Transconex and Consolidated. There was no oral argument.

FACTS

Transconex is an NVOCC operating between Jacksonville and Miami, Fla., on the one hand, and on the other, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

Consolidated is an NVOCC operating between New York on the one hand, and on the other, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

Both Transconex and Consolidated have filed rate increases which vary as to commodity.

The services provided by respondents and included in a single factor rate are the pickup and delivery of cargo at the shippers' or consignees' door in Puerto Rico and on the mainland at terminals maintained by respondents, all necessary documentation, assumption of responsibility for the goods from door to door, and the arranging for water transportation via an underlying carrier. Respondents are usually able to expedite shipments. Respondents collect small shipments, and at a terminal provided for that purpose consolidate them into containers which are delivered by respondents to the underlying carrier.

Many major moving commodities handled by respondents are essential to the economy of Puerto Rico and because the majority of these commodities consist of small shipments, the services of NVOCCs are vital to that economy.

At Jacksonville, an independent company handles the terminal services for Transconex, except that Transconex employees perform the paper work and documentation. Transconex pays this operator from $75 to $80 per trailer and an additional 10 cents per CWT if inland carriers' equipment is unloaded at the terminal. The principal underlying carrier at Jacksonville handles the cargo from the terminal
to the port; however, the underlying carrier handling approximately 20 percent of the carriage does not perform this service and respondent arranges for it with independent operators. At Miami, the underlying carrier provides the pickup and delivery service to and from the Transconex terminal and the dock. The terminal in Miami is leased. In Puerto Rico Consolidated represents Transconex, providing pickup and delivery service, stuffing and unstuffing containers, documentation and other services. The contract between these respondents provides for a charge of 20 cents per cubic foot and contains a provisions for adjustment of the rate based on projected cost increases.

Consolidated conducts its business in New York through an agent, Valroy Realty, which is owned by the two principal stockholders of Consolidated, Roy Jacobs and Rudolfo Catinchi. This agency contracts with an independent firm to provide leased trucks, drivers, and dock workers for cartage, stuffing and unstuffing of containers. In Puerto Rico, Consolidated rents terminals and office space in San Juan, Ponce, and Bayamon, and operates a trucking concern to provide cartage and pickup and delivery service. Approximately 30 pieces of inland transportation equipment are owned by this respondent. Additional equipment is leased when needed. An unrelated trucking operation in Puerto Rico provides Consolidated with approximately 10 percent of its gross revenue, which is arbitrarily applied as an offset to reduce the costs of total operations in Puerto Rico.

Approximately 40 percent of Consolidated’s gross revenue is paid out for purchasing transportation from underlying carriers.

Labor costs have increased. Consolidated experienced an increase of approximately 34 percent for organized labor and approximately 30 percent for unorganized labor. Transconex has experienced a salary increase of approximately 23 percent in its Miami operation. Cost of living increases in union contracts have contributed to increased costs.

To an undetermined degree, respondents’ costs vary with the amount of cargo handled.

The financial data of record represent actual experience and projected income and expenses, based on estimated increases in cargo handled at the increased rates. The value of fixed assets and projected working capital needs are also established in the record. Respondents estimate a 10-percent increase in cargo handled due to the increased rates, giving the following results as computed by the Commission’s accountant:
Transconex:

Fixed assets .................................................. $3,888.19
Working capital .............................................. 36,000.00
Gross revenue ................................................. 2,190,613.21
Direct expense ................................................. 1,858,335.10

Gross profit .................................................. 332,278.11
G & A expense .................................................. 218,918.55

Net profit before tax ....................................... 113,359.56
Federal tax (approximately 48 percent) ................... 54,412.59

Net income .................................................... 58,946.97

Consolidated:

Fixed assets .................................................. 148,246.93
Working capital .............................................. 175,000.00
Gross revenue ................................................. 3,064,653.00
Direct expense ................................................. 2,570,351.40

Gross profit .................................................. 494,301.60
G & A expense .................................................. 330,248.80

Profit before tax ............................................. 164,052.80
Insular tax (estimated 28.7 percent) ...................... 47,052.80

Net income .................................................... 117,000.00

Transconex's accountant challenged the item for G & A expense and testified that the following corrections should be made:

Gross profit .................................................. $332,278.11
G & A expense .................................................. 277,330.00

Profit before tax ............................................. 54,948.11
Federal tax .................................................... 26,375.09

Net income .................................................... 28,573.02

Hearing counsel, using a 20-percent increase in cargo handled for its computations for Transconex, and excluding the expenses to the NVOCCs for the underlying transportation, obtain the following results:

Transconex:

Total revenue ................................................. $2,382,474.37
(Less annualized cost of underlying carriage) ............ 811,632.53

Gross revenue ................................................. 1,570,841.84
Net income .................................................... 101,124.73

14 F.M.C.
Consolidated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total revenue</td>
<td>3,064,653.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Less annualized cost of underlying carriage)</td>
<td>1,234,362.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross revenue</td>
<td>1,830,291.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net income</td>
<td>114,836.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hearing counsel recognize that their computations of net income for Transconex may be subject to a variation between $101,124.73 and $70,750.78 depending on establishing acceptable general, administrative and selling expenses, and summarize their computations as to both respondents as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rate base (adjusted)</th>
<th>Gross revenue (after tax)</th>
<th>Profit (after tax)</th>
<th>Rate of return</th>
<th>Operating ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transconex</td>
<td>$39,888</td>
<td>$1,570,841</td>
<td>$101,124</td>
<td>253.5</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated</td>
<td>$323,246</td>
<td>1,830,291</td>
<td>114,836</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hearing counsel refer to the testimony of their expert witness to the effect that a rate base may be established by adding the value of fixed assets to working capital necessary for 1 month's operation. Using that rate base concept as to Consolidated, fixed assets are valued at $148,246.93 and working capital required is $175,000, the rate base being $323,246.93. As the estimated net profit according to data furnished is $114,836.96, a 35.5-percent return is found. Transconex's fixed assets have a value of $3,888.19 and working capital requirement is $36,000, which provides a rate base of $39,888.19. Questioning the G & A expenses claimed by respondent, hearing counsel arrive at a profit of $101,124.73, which is 253.5-percent of the rate base. The Commonwealth computes a pre-tax rate of return of 72.2 percent for Consolidated and a rate of return in excess of 200 percent for Transconex.

During the past 4 years, cargo handled by Consolidated has increased threefold.

Transconex is the dominant NVOCC carrier in the Florida-Puerto Rican trade.

There is sharp competition among NVOCCs in the Puerto Rican trade. Vessel operators handle small shipments but do not seek this type of business. One vessel operator offers pickup and delivery service in connection with ocean carriage.

Respondents handle large volumes of cargo with comparatively small investments. Transconex, as projected for a 10-percent increase, will handle 2,367,232 cubic feet or, if hearing counsel's projection of
a 20-percent increase is applied, 2,507,381 cubic feet. Consolidated will handle 4,800,000 cubic feet. Inasmuch as the dollar amount of cargo is not set forth as to the individual commodities handled, profits on separate commodities cannot be determined.

THE EXAMINER'S DECISION

The examiner first of all rejected respondents' contentions, embodied in motions to discontinue the proceedings, that the Commission should determine matters relating to the reasonableness of NVOCCs' rates in a rulemaking proceeding and that the Commission has no jurisdiction over rates and charges for pickup and delivery services. Respondents, the examiner contended, misconceive the purpose of these proceedings, which is not to prescribe general formulas for determining the reasonableness of NVOCCs' rates, but merely to adjudicate the reasonableness of particular increases of the respondents, and that respondents' rates and charges for pickup and delivery services are subject to the Commission's regulatory authority, since such services are accessorial service performed by persons otherwise subject to the Shipping Acts.

The examiner then went on to discuss the various factors which are of importance in determining reasonableness of rates and indicated that "a primary view" of the reasonableness of the rates of NVOCCs, who have small investments compared to their gross incomes, may be had by application of the "operating ratio" concept—i.e., the mathematical relationship between gross income and expenses of operation. Applying this concept and assuming, as do respondents, a 10-percent increase in cargo handled due to the increased rates, the examiner found an operating ratio of 97.3 percent and a profit of 2.7 percent for Transconex using the Commission accountant's computation, and an operating ratio of 98.7 percent and a profit of 1.3 percent using Transconex's figures, which reflect a greater G & A expense. He found the operating ratio of Consolidated to be 97.22 percent and the profit 2.78 percent.

Applying hearing counsel's computation using an estimated 20-percent increase in cargo carried by Transconex, and the exclusion of amounts paid out and recovered from customers for underlying inland and ocean transportation, the examiner found Transconex's operating ratio to be 93.57 percent and net profit after taxes 6.43 percent (or utilizing the greater G & A expense, 95.5 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively), and Consolidated's operating ratio to be 93.7 percent and profit 6.3 percent after taxes.
The examiner concluded that all of these figures are reasonable since they fall within the 7-percent range of profit (i.e. an operating ratio upwards of 93 percent) which the ICC seems to have accepted.

The computation of operating ratio on profit before taxes would produce operating ratios of less than 93 percent (based on hearing counsel’s figures, 87.62 percent, 12.38 percent profit, for Transconex, and 91.04 percent, or 8.96 percent profit, for Consolidated). The examiner rejected the approach of computing operating ratio on profit before taxes, however, since he maintains that the NVOCCs’ “compensation is to be judged by money in hand after all charges against the operation are paid.”

The examiner additionally indicated that he felt that in computing operating ratio, expenses should include the costs to the NVOCC of underlying carriage, since the NVOCC has the obligation to provide such carriage and is responsible to the shipper for loss or damage occurring when cargo is in the hands of the underlying carrier. He therefore recomputed the operating ratio for Transconex assuming the 20-percent cargo increase postulated by hearing counsel, but including the cost of underlying transportation. The result is an operating ratio of 95.76 percent or a profit of 4.24 percent, which he found to be “not unreasonable.”

Finally, the examiner found the increases not shown to be unreasonable in the light of the cumulative effect of the following findings in addition to the apparent reasonableness of the operating ratio: (1) there had been no showing that the increased rates had adversely affected the Puerto Rican economy; (2) respondents have experienced increased costs of operation; (3) respondents operate efficiently; (4) respondents’ operations are increasing; (5) the competition in the trade is sharp and thus tends to hold rates down; (6) the value of respondents’ service to small shippers is substantial, since evidence of record shows many small Puerto Rican shippers could not engage in trade with the mainland without their service; (7) hearing counsel did not contend the rates have been shown to be unlawful; and (8) the Commonwealth has not presented evidence to support its contentions that the increases are unlawful.

Positions of the Parties on Exceptions and Replies to Exceptions

Puerto Rico excepts to the examiner’s ultimate findings that the rate increases of the respondent NVOCCs are not unreasonable, and maintains that the increases “result in an excessive and unreasonable return to respondents which the shipping public should not be required to
bear.” In using “operating ratio” as the primary basis for determining the reasonableness of respondents’ rate of return, the examiner, Puerto Rico asserts, improperly utilized the carriers’ expenses after taxes. If expenses before taxes had been utilized, operating ratios less than the 93 percent generally approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission for its regulated motor carriers would have resulted. Moreover, Puerto Rico maintains, by overly stressing operating ratio, the examiner disregarded two basic matters which must be considered in determining the reasonableness of a carrier’s rate of return, and which a purely numerical operating ratio does not reveal: the need for additional revenue and the need for additional capital. Finally, when the extremely large returns on the NVOCCs’ rate bases are considered in conjunction with the very low operating ratios, an additional indication appears, Puerto Rico claims, that the rate increases are unreasonable.

Hearing counsel agree with the examiner’s conclusion that the rate increases of the NVOCCs here under investigation have not been shown to be unlawful. They except, however, to language in the initial decision which indicates that, generally speaking, an operating ratio of 93 percent or greater is reasonable on the grounds that the record contains no economic evidence supporting adoption of any figure as a reasonable operating ratio for respondents. Hearing counsel support the examiner’s use of the carriers’ expenses after taxes in computing their operating ratio and agree with the examiner that the Commonwealth must bear the consequences of the failure of the record to reveal what would be a reasonable operating ratio for respondents.

Respondents, although preserving their contentions that the proceedings should have been discontinued because the Commission lacks jurisdiction over pickup and delivery rates and charges and rulemaking would have been the proper vehicle for determining the issues herein, urge that the exceptions be rejected and that the initial decision be adopted. Respondents contend that the examiner properly followed precedents of this and other regulatory agencies in computing operating ratio after allowing for taxes as an expense. Respondents maintain that the examiner would have been justified in relying upon operating ratio alone to determine the reasonableness of the rate increases. Respondents assert, however, that the examiner considered all factors which could be considered relevant, including the need for additional revenue and capital, in determining the reasonableness of the increases.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

We agree with the examiner that these proceedings clearly fall within the scope of our authority, and that rulemaking is not the method of procedure which we are bound to follow here. All of respondents' rates and charges for their transportation between the U.S. Atlantic Coast, on the one hand, and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, on the other hand, including rates and charges for incidental pickup and delivery services, are subject to the regulatory control of this Commission. Further, while rulemaking may be appropriate in proceedings designed to establish formulas by which the reasonableness of rates may be measured, rulemaking is not necessary to enable the Commission solely to investigate the reasonableness of rates of particular carriers without establishing any such formulas. As the examiner correctly indicated, a determination as to the reasonableness of respondents' rates is the sole concern of these proceedings.

We also agree with the examiner that the NVOCC's rates here under examination have not been shown to be other than just, reasonable and lawful. We find no basis for adopting the approach advocated by Puerto Rico of determining the reasonableness of respondents' rates based upon computations which fail to take into account the income tax expenses which they are required to bear. We have in the past allowed taxes as an expense in determining reasonableness of rates, and feel that the failure to consider taxes as an expense creates an inaccurate picture of the earnings actually available to a corporation for distribution and capital investment and, consequently, its need for additional revenue. Our treatment of taxes as an expense to be considered in determining reasonableness of rates accords, moreover, with the general approach of courts and administrative agencies.

As the examiner and all parties recognized, the considerations with respect to rates of NVOCCs must necessarily be somewhat different from those which are of prime importance in proceedings dealing with the reasonableness of rates of vessel owning carriers. Generally speak-

---

1 See e.g., Matson Navigation Co.—Container Freight Tariffs, 7 F.M.C. 480, 491 (1963); Certain Tariff Practices of Sea-Land Service, 7 F.M.C. 504 (1963).
2 See e.g., Alaska Seasonal Rate Increases (1962), 8 F.M.C. 1, 5-7 (1964); Atlantic & Gulf Puerto Rican General Increase, 7 F.M.C. 87, 115 (1962).
3 See e.g., Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 282 U.S. 625, 633 (1923); Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 389 (1922); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co., Inc., Cancellation, Tokens, 54 M.C.C. 317, 324 (1952); Fares, Motor, Between Northern Kentucky and Cincinnati, 62 M.C.C. 67, 81-2 (1953). General Increase, Middle Atlantic and New England Territories, 332 I.C.C. 820, 837 (1969) is not, as Puerto Rico contends, authority to the contrary. There, the ICC indicated that taxes should not be taken into account in determining the efficiency of carriers' operations, but did not suggest the taxes should not be considered in establishing the reasonableness of a carrier's return.
ing, the reasonableness of the rate of return of equipment owning carriers has been based upon that percentage of their "rate base," i.e., the property devoted to the relevant trade plus sufficient working capital, which is necessary to allow them to earn a reasonable return in light of the peculiar risks of the service involved. See Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc.—General Increase in Rates, 9 F.M.C. 220, 238 (1966); Atlantic & Gulf-Puerto Rico General Increase, 7 F.M.C. 87, 104, 108–109, 116 (1962). Where, as here, however, a carrier has little investment in equipment, the traditional rate base approach is not sufficient to allow a determination of the reasonableness of carriers' rates. It has been usual, therefore, to consider, at least as an important factor, in proceedings relating to the reasonableness of rates of carriers with little capital investment in comparison with their total costs of operation, the "operating ratio" of such carriers; i.e., the margin between revenue and expenses of operation.4 There is, however, a basic problem inherent in the use of "operating ratio" by itself to determine rate reasonableness: the ratio by itself fails to indicate the existence and degree of need for additional capital and revenue.5 Consequently, the operating ratio approach, per se, may not give a true picture of the revenue requirements of a carrier.

Evidence of record and the following uncontested findings of the examiner strongly suggest that respondents' increased rates are just and reasonable: Respondents have experienced increased costs of operation; they operate efficiently; their operations are increasing; competition in the trade is sharp, ordinarily a strong control over rates; and the value of the services rendered by respondents to small shippers is substantial. Such findings tend to justify increases in the charges made by respondents for their transportation services, if not the particular dollar increases here under investigation.

We have no basis for concluding, however, that such increased charges are unlawful. Various computations have been made with respect to the operating ratios of the respondents, taking into consideration probable revenues and expenses related to the increases. As will be seen from our discussion of these calculations (at p. 40, supra), no operating ratio derived from any of them, other than that excluding taxes as an expense, which we have found to be improper,6 exceeds the 93 percent which the ICC appears frequently to have approved when considering rate increases of carriers owning little or no equipment.7

5 See General Increase, Middle Atlantic and New England Territories, 332 I.C.C., supra, at 837–838.
6 See p. 43, supra.
We agree with hearing counsel that there has been no showing on this record that a 93-percent operating ratio is necessarily proper or a standard for NVOCCs, and nothing we say here is to be construed as implying that such operating ratio is in fact proper, or a standard.

However, since we feel that the traditional rate base approach cannot be applied to these carriers, at least where, as here, there has been no showing of any relationship between such rate base and the carriers' operating ratios, we cannot disapprove the rate increases. Some indication of need for increases has been shown, and no computation we have been able to make with respect to the increases shows them to be improper. Those challenging rate increases in proceedings where such increases have not been suspended must bear the consequences of the failure of the record to contain adequate support for their disapproval. Charges, Delivery, Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico Trades, 11 F.M.C. 222, 229–231 (1967).

These proceedings are hereby discontinued.

By the Commission.

[seal]

J oseph C. Polking,
Assistant to the Secretary.
Conference may not lawfully prevent, under the provisions of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and the Commission's general order 9, relating to withdrawal from a conference, member line from withdrawing and operating independent service in the trade served by the Conference at any time. Failure of line to comply with notice requirement in approved conference agreement with respect to withdrawal is breach of agreement.


Howard A. Levy for American Export Isbrandtsen Lines.

Donald J. Brunner and Ronald D. Lee, Hearing Counsel.

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, Commissioners)

On March 12, 1970, we instituted this proceeding to determine whether American Export Isbrandtsen Lines (AEIL) could under any circumstances effectively withdraw from the North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference (Conference). The proceeding was limited to affidavits of fact and memoranda of law. Memoranda have been filed by the Conference and hearing counsel, and the Conference in addition has filed an affidavit. AEIL has filed papers which, pursuant to its request, have been treated as its memorandum of law.1 We have heard oral argument.

1 AEIL filed several alternative motions and requests for relief. On April 22, 1970, the Commission denied AEIL's request for evidentiary hearing, its motion to discontinue the proceeding, and its motion for enlargement of time to submit affidavits of fact and memoranda of law, but granted its motion to treat its reply to the Conference's petition for declaratory order as its memorandum of law and its request for oral argument.
The following are the undisputed facts with respect to the withdrawal of AEIL from the Conference:

Article II of the Conference agreement (agreement No. 7770) provides in relevant part:

Any Member may withdraw penalty from the Conference, effective not less than 90 days after giving written notice to the Conference office, which shall promptly advise the other Members; provided, however, that the retention of security for the payment of outstanding obligations hereunder shall not be considered as a penalty. Notice of withdrawal of any party shall be furnished promptly to the Federal Maritime Commission.

On December 8, 1969, AEIL advised the Conference that it would resign from membership therein, effective January 20, 1970.

On the following day, the Conference chairman advised AEIL that the resignation could not be effective on such date since he interpreted the above-quoted provision of the Conference agreement as requiring not less than 90 days’ written notice prior to the effective date of termination of Conference membership.

On or about December 19, 1969, AEIL filed with the Commission its tariff No. 1, FMC 106, effective January 20, 1970, which provided independent rates for transportation in the trade covered by the Conference agreement.

By telex of January 16, 1970, and letter of January 19, 1970, the Conference protested AEIL’s independent tariff and requested that it be rejected.

By telegram of January 19, 1970, confirmed by letter of January 20, 1970, the Commission’s staff denied the request for rejection, but preserved the right of the Conference to “pursue any remedies it believes available.”

On January 23, 1970, the Conference filed a petition for a declaratory order stating that the manner in which AEIL had withdrawn from the Conference was unauthorized by the Conference agreement and was then ineffectual. On February 5, 1970, AEIL replied, maintaining that its manner of withdrawal was authorized by the Conference agreement and that it was presently free to operate as a nonconference carrier pursuant to an independent tariff.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

The issue for resolution is simply whether under the provisions of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and the Commission’s general order 9, relating to withdrawal from a conference, the North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference may lawfully prevent American Export Isbrandtsen Lines from withdrawing from the Conference and
operating an independent service in the trade served by the Conference until the passage of 90 days from the date of notice of intention to resign.\textsuperscript{2}

The Conference asserts that, since the withdrawal provision of its agreement is substantially an incorporation of the language contained in section 15 of the Shipping Act and our general order 9, resolution of the issue presented here turns upon ascertaining the intent of the Congress in enacting the withdrawal provisions in section 15 and the intent of the Commission in promulgating its general order 9 to implement them. In requiring conferences to allow their members to withdraw from membership upon reasonable notice without the payment of a penalty, neither the Congress nor the Commission, the Conference contends, meant to imply that a penalty could be imposed for withdrawal upon less than reasonable notice. The Conference further argues that the Commission's own decision in the docket promulgating general order 9 indicates that penalties were never to be assessed for withdrawal from a conference. The requirement of reasonable notice for withdrawal was intended to bar withdrawal on less than such notice, and a failure to give such notice may not be excused by the payment of money. Withdrawal on less than reasonable notice could, the Conference hints, endanger the rights of signatories to dual rate contracts which are guaranteed 90 days' notice of certain changes in such contracts. Although the Conference disclaims the ability to assess penalties with respect to AEIL's withdrawal, it does assert that since the withdrawal was ineffective, it can claim damages from AEIL under the self-policing provisions of the agreement for AEIL's action in filing a separate tariff while still a Conference member.

AEIL, on the other hand, contends that the legislative history of the withdrawal provision of section 15 and the concurrent study of the ocean freight industry by the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary clearly show Congress intended to preserve nonconference competition and the open door policy of conference admission. Essential to both of these goals is the freedom of the shipowner to decide, without economic or legal coercion, whether to operate within or without the Conference system, and the right to change such decision. To construe the withdrawal provisions of section 15 and general order 9 to require notice of withdrawal as a condition to its effectiveness would, AEIL maintains, be contrary to congressional intent. AEIL does not contest the right of the Conference to impose a penalty for its failure to give 90 days' notice of withdrawal.

\textsuperscript{2}Section 15, Shipping Act, 1916, provides that "any member may withdraw from [Conference] membership upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal * * *" and general order 9 (46 CFR 523.2(f)) specifies that "any party may withdraw from the Conference without penalty by giving at least 30 days' written notice of intention to withdraw from the Conference * * *."
Hearing counsel take the position that the legislative history of section 15 of the Shipping Act clearly indicates that AEIL may withdraw from membership in the Conference on less than 90 days after its notice of intent to withdraw, subject to payment of such penalties as may be provided in the Conference agreement for such withdrawal. The purpose of the Congress in enacting the withdrawal provisions of section 15 was, they assert, to preserve the right of conference members to withdraw from conferences without limitation on the power of withdrawal. Additionally, they contend that to require AEIL to remain in the Conference for 90 days following its notice of resignation would render a nullity the phrase “without penalty for such withdrawal” in the provision of section 15 providing that “any member may withdraw from [Conference] membership upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal.” This phrase, they assert, can only be made meaningful by assuming that withdrawal on less than specified notice is possible.

We would agree with the Conference insofar as it contends that the resolution of the issue before us turns solely upon the proper interpretation of the provision of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, relating to withdrawal from a conference and the language implementing this provision in the Commission’s general order 9, which imposes upon Conferences the obligation to include in their agreements language “substantially” the same as that set forth therein. (See 46 CFR sec. 533.2.) Thus, nothing is to be gained from examining the terminology and syntax of the Conference’s withdrawal provision to see how it might differ from that contained in section 15 and general order 9. We think it unnecessary, however, to dwell at any great length on congressional “intent” since we find the language in question quite free from ambiguity.

Section 15 and general order 9 impose two obligations: On the one hand, the conferences are obliged to allow their members to withdraw from conference membership “without penalty” when the withdrawing member gives “reasonable notice”; while on the other, the withdrawing member, if it desires to avoid penalty, is obliged to give the Conference the required notice of its intention to withdraw. The language clearly presents an either/or proposition: either the withdrawing line gives reasonable notice or he becomes subject to a penalty. The Conference’s conclusion that under no circumstances may a withdrawal be effective until the expiration of the notice period completely writes out of the statute and the general order the words “without penalty.” If a line could not effectively withdraw from a conference until the expiration of the notice period, it would be impossible for it to breach

14 F.M.C.
the agreement by failing to give adequate notice of withdrawal and thus a withdrawing line could never be subjected to a penalty for improper withdrawal.

Although we really think it unnecessary, examination of the legislative history of section 15 and the rulemaking proceeding in which the Commission promulgated general order 9, docket No. 981—Rules Governing Admission, Withdrawal and Expulsion Provisions of Steamship Conference Agreements, moreover, reveals no indication whatsoever that the requirement of notice was to act as a bar upon withdrawal on less than such notice. The power to withdraw was necessary to preserve nonconference competition since former conference members, as well as new carriers and presently operating independents, were viewed as necessary sources of nonconference competition. The power to withdraw, moreover, was characterized not simply as a power but as a “right.” There is no indication that this right was in any way to be lessened.

An agreement subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, “is not simply a private contract between private parties, the intent of the parties is only one relevant factor, and the Board not only can, but must weigh such considerations as the effect of the interpretation on commerce and the public. Moreover, the agreement exists legally only because approved by the [Federal Maritime] Board.”

We can only conclude that absent the expression by the Congress of an intention to allow parties to conferences to bargain away their historic right to operate in any lawful fashion which they feel to be in their best interests, the legislature, in enacting the withdrawal provision of section 15, preserved the right of members to resign from shipping conferences at will.

To the extent the somewhat sparse legislative history of the notice requirement itself reveals the congressional purpose behind the withdrawal provision, such legislative history supports this interpretation.

---

8 Hearings on H.R. 6775 before Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st sess. 597-598 (1961); 107 Congressional Record 19360, 19366 (1961). See also in this regard, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce during the hearings on H.R. 6775 indicating that the provisions requiring “conferences to admit or readmit carriers in the trade on reasonable and equal terms and conditions or to provide that any member may withdraw from membership upon reasonable notice” were considered “absolutely essential for otherwise a tight and objectionable monopoly, and the setup as to carriers, especially conference carriers in a given trade, would be frozen and could even result in insufficient service should any substantial increase in commerce develop.”

9 Senate sponsor of H.R. 6775 in debate on the withdrawal provision stated: “The common carrier can get out of the framework of the bill. They can carrier can get out it it wants to until the end of the notice period.”


11 Nothing we say here should be construed as in any way negating or casting doubt upon the obligations of a member line fully to perform strictly in accordance with the Conference agreement so long as it remains a member of a conference.
The withdrawal language first appeared in draft revision No. 2 of H.R. 4299, published April 13, 1961. At that time, it read, "** any member may withdraw from membership without penalty upon reasonable notice." If the bill as then worded had been enacted into law, it would have been extremely difficult to read it as preventing the withdrawal of a conference member until the expiration of a specified notice period since to so construe it would appear to render the words "without penalty" mere surplusage. If withdrawal were only permitted "upon reasonable notice" why were the words "without penalty" put into the provision? The logical implication, albeit a negative one, from the statutory language as it then read was that if one could withdraw without penalty upon reasonable notice, one could withdraw with penalty absent reasonable notice.

On August 8, 1961, the Senate subcommittee print of H.R. 6775, as the bill embodying this provision which passed the House was denominated, contained the following language, identical to the present provision of section 15: "** any member may withdraw from membership upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal."

The addition of the words "for such withdrawal," although the reason nowhere clearly appears in the legislative history of the withdrawal provision, can only be explained as intended to relate back to withdrawal upon reasonable notice, and hence the conclusion is inescapable that a penalty was to be permissible for withdrawal on other than reasonable notice. Virtually the sole concern of those deliberating on the withdrawal provision appears to have been the protection of the absolute right of withdrawal. When the notice requirement was mentioned at all, it was alluded to in a fashion which indicates it was intended to establish a right on the part of the conference membership to be informed, but was not intended to detract in any way from a line's absolute right to withdraw. Thus, for example, during the Senate debate on the withdrawal provision, Senator Engle of California, the Senate sponsor of H.R. 6775, in response to indications by the Justice Department of the necessity of allowing unfettered withdrawal from conferences, stated:

The common carrier can get out of it. All it need do is to serve notice within the framework of the bill. They can get out of it if they want to. A common carrier can get out it it wants to do so." (107 Congressional Record 18157, Sept. 13, 1961).

The reference to the "service of notice within the framework of the bill" as sufficient to get a carrier out of a conference is inconsistent with the Conference's contention that withdrawal cannot be effective until the end of the notice period, but is completely in accord with

14 F.M.C.
the position that withdrawal may be made whenever a carrier wishes to withdraw subject to penalties for withdrawal on less than reasonable notice. The “service of notice” accomplishes the withdrawal, but the “framework of the bill” allows for a conference to impose penalties if the withdrawal has been made on less than reasonable notice.

In our general order 9, we gave content to the abstract statutory requirement of “reasonable notice” by specifying “at least 30 days” as the notice period and providing that “any party may withdraw from the Conference without penalty by giving at least 30 days’ written notice of intention to withdraw from the Conference * * *” The Conference’s contention that this provision of general order 9 was intended to forbid the assessment of any penalty for withdrawal has the same defect as the contention that no penalties were to be assessed under the general withdrawal authority set forth in section 15—it reads the language “without penalty” out of the provision.

There is no necessary relationship, as the Conference appears to suggest, between the 90-day notice provision for withdrawal in its agreement and the 90-day notice which is required under section 14b of the Shipping Act and the Commission’s general order 19 for certain changes in rates and charges subject to dual rate contracts. To the extent that rights of shippers under dual rate contracts could be affected by a carrier’s withdrawal from a conference, they are protected by the specific requirements of the provisions of section 14b and general order 19. The Conference in fact itself acknowledged in our docket 981, the proceeding which formulated general order 9, that there is no necessary correlation between the notice provisions for withdrawal from a conference and changes under dual rate contracts.

The Conference’s suggestion that any conclusion which leaves lines free to withdraw from a conference on less than reasonable notice upon payment of a penalty amounts to excusing the failure to perform a contractual duty by the payment of money is without merit since it rests upon an incorrect assumption. It assumes that there has been a failure on the part of AEIL to perform in accordance with the terms of the conference agreement, i.e. that AEIL had a duty to remain in the Conference, or at least not to operate an independent service, for 90 days following its notice of intention to withdraw. Rather, the

---

6 Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 169 F. 2d 392 (8th Cir. 1948); Shain v. Washington National Insurance Co., 308 F. 2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962); and All States Service Station v. Standard Oil Co., 120 F. 2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1941), which the Conference cites for the position that withdrawal cannot be effective until the expiration of a notice period, are all inapposite. Montana-Dakota involved the attempted withdrawal of a tariff filed with the Federal Power Commission in a manner not authorized by the Commission’s regulations. It did not, strictly speaking, involve the question of a notice period at all. To the extent the case is relevant, it is distinguishable from the instant case.
The duty of the withdrawing line is to give notice under section 15 and general order 9, and if the line fails to give reasonable notice, here 90 days as stated in the Conference’s approved agreement, the line has breached its agreement and is liable to a penalty.  

The question of whether or not a penalty should be imposed for AEIL’s breach of the Conference agreement is outside the scope of the present proceeding. One consequence, however, does flow from our determination that AEIL was authorized by the statute, regulation and Conference agreement to withdraw at any time: once it had withdrawn from the Conference, i.e., as of January 20, 1970, it was free to operate as an independent carrier, and nothing in connection with its operations from that date may be considered in setting a penalty for breach of the withdrawal provision in the Conference agreement. Important considerations in assessing a penalty would appear to include, inter alia, the amount of notice actually given and any adjustments that were required within the Conference as a result of the withdrawal. We also note in passing that the assessment of penalties for breach under the Conference’s position could result in the kind of actions which we feel Congress could not have intended. If all of the activities of AEIL prior to the expiration of the 90-day period constituted breaches of the agreement, as appears logically to follow from the Conference’s position, the Conference could treat each shipment made under an individual bill of lading as a separate breach. The penalties flowing from such approach could be so astronomical as to be confiscatory and result in driving a carrier from the trade to the detriment of our commerce and contrary to the public interest. Although in fairness to the Conference we readily acknowledge that there is no indication that such course would, even had the Conference prevailed, have been followed here, the possibility of such approach under the Conference’s position lends added support to our conclusion that it cannot be the one to have been intended by Congress. An appropriate order will be entered declaring that AEIL was lawfully without the Conference proceeding since here, as we have seen, the manner of withdrawal was fully authorized by section 15 and general order 9. The language of the contracts involved in the latter two cases, unlike the withdrawal provision here under consideration, clearly indicated that the contracts were to remain in effect until the expiration of the notice period—there was no problem of interpreting words like “without penalty.” These two cases, moreover, dealt with private contractual arrangements under which the parties were free to bind themselves to the expiration of certain notice periods as a condition to the termination of their agreements. Here, however, the language and legislative history of the withdrawal provisions of the statute controlling the parties’ conduct show that conference members are not free to enter into such arrangements.  

Although free to do so, no party challenged the reasonableness of the 90-day notice period.  

Counsel for the Conference, in fact, indicated in oral argument that “it isn’t a ghastly case as far as penalties are concerned.”

14 F.M.C.
as of January 20, 1970, and that its failure to give 90 days' notice of its withdrawal constituted a breach of the Conference agreement.

Commissioner George H. Hearn, concurring and dissenting:

The majority states the issue to be whether a conference may lawfully prevent a member line from withdrawing from the conference and operating as an independent in the trade served by the conference. I think this statement of the issue, although consistent with our order initiating this proceeding, misses the point. We are not dealing here with principles of ordinary contract law. It is not argued that a conference can compel the specific performance of a member line. Some principles of contract law may apply, but agreements entered into pursuant to section 15 are in the nature of public, not private, contracts. In re: Pacific Coast European Conference, 7 FMC 27 (1961).

The primary issue is not what remedy a conference has against a member line which contravenes the agreement's withdrawal notice provision. Rather, we must decide what authority the Federal Maritime Commission may and should exercise in such a situation to preserve the public service the conference agreement was approved to insure.

The resolution of this question depends upon the interpretation to be given the provision in section 15 of the 1916 act relating to withdrawal from conference membership. The majority report reads the statutory language as "an either/or proposition" permitting withdrawal on reasonable notice without penalty or imposition of a penalty if withdrawal is not on reasonable notice. This assumes that a conference may impose a penalty for withdrawal under certain circumstances. I do not agree. As I read section 15 and the Commission's general order 9, a penalty may not be imposed for withdrawal.

The majority argument is that, if a member line cannot withdraw from a conference until the expiration of the reasonable notice period, the line cannot commit a breach of the notice provision and can never be liable for a penalty. This reasoning is supported by and logically follows from the majority's assumption that penalties for withdrawal are not completely forbidden. However, that assumption presupposes that the impossibility of withdrawing on less than the notice period is itself impossible because otherwise there could be no penalty for withdrawal. This is merely a combination of circular reasoning and bootstrap argumentation.

The illogic of the majority's argument can be solved and sense made of the matter by use of the alternative assumption: that no penalty may be assessed merely for withdrawal. First, however, it must be recognized that in many instances, if a person can and is determined
to violate the law or commit a civil wrong regardless of the penalty, such action often cannot be prevented. Such is the situation here. If a conference member wants to withdraw, it can do so. Perhaps there may be a way to compel its continued "technical" membership until the specified time to which it contractually agreed. However, a carrier cannot be compelled, under the legal principles here involved, to provide service in the particular trade until such time or at all.

Thus, as a practical matter, it is true as the majority concludes, that a conference cannot prevent a member from withdrawing. And it is conceded, I think, that if a member is in violation of the conference agreement when he "withdraws" on a lesser period of notice than provided in the agreement, the conference then may seek redress against the withdrawing member. No penalty is necessary to compensate the conference. The conference may have an action at law for breach of contract. Also, there may be a remedy under the conference's self-policing system if, for example, the withdrawing member fails to provide service within the scope of the conference trade.

The remaining question is whether the withdrawing member line may offer an independent service in the trade served by the conference prior to the expiration of the conference's notice period. I conclude that the line may not legally do so. The line, for this purpose, remains a member of the conference until its notice period expires, and the Commission was in error in not rejecting AEIL's independent tariff. If a penalty is not necessary to make the conference whole, it could be for the purpose only to act as a deterrent to prevent conference members from withdrawing on less notice than agreed to contractually. Recognizing that a conference agreement is "impressed with the public interest" (In re: Pacific Coast European Conference, 7 FMC 27, 37 (1961)), it would have to be concluded that a withdrawal penalty was established to preserve the public interest in the maintenance of stabilized conference service, and that Congress saw something wrong in withdrawal on less than reasonable notice.

The majority seems to argue, however, that in these circumstances the right of carriers to operate independently outweighs the need for stability of rates and service. I think it a more sound contention that we must balance those two interests. Swift & Company v. FMC, 306 F. 2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Surely the majority view is a little narrow when it sees the notice provision in section 15 as establishing no more than "a right on the part of the conference membership to be informed." If that were so there would have been no need for Congress to have included the requirement of "reasonable notice" in the statute.
The legislative history cannot be read so as to impute to Congress the inclusion of the words "reasonable notice" without purpose. The majority contends that the conference's interpretation of section 15 reads the language "without penalty" out of the statute. The same analysis applies if the provision for "reasonable notice" may be avoided with impunity (on payment of a penalty).

What is clear about the legislative history is that it is not persuasive for either position. Consequently, we should read the statutory language in such manner as to impute to Congress the intention of having given meaning to all the words and so as to further the aims of the 1916 act as a whole. As I have said, we must balance the right of and need for independent service (which I think is very important and necessary) on the one hand, and on the other the right of conferences to prevent actions destructive of their system and the need for stable conference service. *Mediterranean Pools Investigation*, 9 FMC 264, 288–290 (1966); *Rate Agreement United States/Persian Gulf Trade*, 8 FMC 712, 723–724 (1965); *Agreement 8765—Gulf/Mediterranean Trade*, 7 FMC 495, 499 (1964). The withdrawal provision of section 15 can be read to give effect to this policy by interpreting it to establish two elements regarding withdrawal. One is that a member line must give the conference reasonable notice before the line may operate independently. Thus, there must be at least 30 days' notice (general order 9, 46 CFR 523.2(f)), or a longer period may be freely agreed to by the contracting parties if approved by the Commission. Second is that there may not be a penalty for withdrawal whether tendered before or after the expiration of the agreed-to notice period. The conference may seek redress under available means such as its self-policing system.

Consequently, I conclude that the operations of American Export Isbrandtsen Lines as an independent prior to the expiration of the 90-day withdrawal notice period in agreement No. 7770 is a breach of that agreement and in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916; and American Export Isbrandtsen Lines breached that agreement by failing to give 90-days' notice and in any other way it may not have performed its conference obligations before the expiration of the 90 days.

[seal]  

JOSEPH C. POLKING,  
Assistant to the Secretary.
ORDER

Full consideration having been given to the matters involved in this proceeding, and the Commission on this day having made and entered of record a "Report" stating its findings, conclusion and decision thereon, which "Report" is hereby referred to and made a part hereof;

Thereupon, it is ordered and declared, That

(1) The operations of American Export Isbrandtsen Lines on and after January 20, 1970, did not constitute a breach of approved agreement No. 7770 of the North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference from which American Export Isbrandtsen Lines had effectively withdrawn as of that date; and

(2) The failure of American Export Isbrandtsen Lines to give 90 days' notice prior to the effective date of its withdrawal constituted a breach of article II of agreement No. 7770.

By the Commission.

Joseph C. Polking,
Assistant to the Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 68–10

INTER-AMERICAN FREIGHT CONFERENCE—CARGO POOLING AGREEMENTS
Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684

Decided August 20, 1970

Where two signatories withdraw from pooling agreements pending prior to Commission approval under section 15, Commission jurisdiction terminates since section 15 grants jurisdiction only over agreements between persons subject to the Shipping Act, 1916.


Paul J. Fitzpatrick and James L. Malone, hearing counsel.

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, Commissioner)

This proceeding is before us upon exceptions to the supplemental initial decision of Examiner Clarence W. Robinson in which he would approve agreement No. 9683.¹

¹ Agreement No. 9682 expired by its own terms prior to the issuance of a decision by the examiner, and in an earlier initial decision the examiner disapproved agreement No. 9684. Moore-McCormack Lines (Mooremack), a signatory to all three agreements, took exception to the examiner's refusal to approve No. 9684. In view of our decision here, there is no need to discuss those exceptions.
Agreement No. 9683 is a pooling arrangement between some of the members of the Inter-American Freight Conference (IAFC) for the carriage of green coffee from Brazil to Atlantic ports in the United States. The parties to the agreement are grouped by the flag their vessels fly:

**National flag lines:**
- Companhia De Navegacao Loide Brasileiro (Loide).
- Companhia De Navegacao Maritima Netumar (Netumar).
- Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mooremack).

**Brazilian flag.**

**Do.**

**American flag.**

**Nonnational flag lines:**

1. **Pan-American flag lines:**
   - Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentina (E.L.M.A.).
   - Montemar Sociedad Maritime (Montemar).

   **Argentine flag.**

   **Uruguayan flag.**

2. **Other flag lines:**
   - Brodin Line.
   - Columbus Line.
   - The Holland Pan-American Line (Hopal).
   - Ivaran Line.
   - Norton Line.

   **Swedish flag.**

   **West German flag.**

   **Netherlands flag.**

   **Norwegian flag.**

   **Swedish flag.**

The agreement further calls for a minimum number of sailings to be made by each line within each 6-month period for the life of the agreement. Under the agreement each line is given percentage quotas of coffee which it may carry without penalty. Again, the allocation is by flag grouping. Thus, under the first year of the proposed 10-year life of the agreement the national flag lines (Loide, Netumar, and Mooremack) would divide 65 percent of the coffee carryings; the nonnational lines would divide the remaining 35 percent with the Pan-American flag lines (E.L.M.A. and Montemar) taking 9 percent and the other flag lines taking the remaining 6 percent. These percentages are adjusted each year under the agreement until in the 10th and final year, the national flag lines would divide up 80 percent, leaving 20 percent to the other or third flag lines. Other provisions of the agreement restrict membership in the pool to members of the Inter-American Freight Conference; allow further tonnage, sailing and further rationalization among lines in a given grouping; provide for

---

2 Of the 65 percent allocated to the national flag lines, Loide and Netumar would take 32.5 percent and Mooremack would take 32.5 percent. The Pan-American flag lines would split 9 percent, and the third flag lines would variously divide the remaining 26 percent, ranging from 6.1 percent for Brodin, Columbus, Ivaran, and Norton, to 1.6 percent for Hopal.
membership pledges, adherence to tariff locations of pool headquarters and other provisions more or less standard to agreements of this type.\textsuperscript{3}

Subsequent to the issuance of the supplemental initial decision, two of the signatories to Nos. 9683 and 9684 (Loide and Netumar) withdrew from those agreements. Thus, we have presented the threshold issue of whether there remains before us that kind of agreement over which we may exercise jurisdiction. This jurisdiction must come from section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the act), which provides in relevant part:

\textbf{* * * every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this Act, shall file immediately with the Commission a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every agreement with another such carrier or other person subject to this Act * * *.*}

The term "agreement" in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrangements.

In a situation analogous to the one here, \textit{Hong Kong Tonnage Ceiling Agreement}, 10 FMC 134 (1966), a party to the original agreement pending our approval telegraphed the Commission that even though it had voted for the agreement, it was now opposed to its approval. The agreement in question was actually a modification to a basic conference agreement which required a unanimous vote of all parties to modify or amend it. The repudiation by one of the parties of the proposed amendment obviously destroyed the required unanimity, and we were faced with the question of whether there remained any agreement over which we could exercise jurisdiction. We concluded that in order for jurisdiction to exist under section 15 there must be:

\textbf{* * * an actual, viable agreement to which all of the parties have given and continue to give their consent until approval is had.}

\textbf{* * * * * * * * *}

When a group of carriers files a new agreement with the Commission, it is fundamental that each member of this group must give its individual assent to the document purporting to represent the agreement of the parties. If at any time prior to approval by the Commission, one of the parties to the agreement changes its mind and withdraws from the agreement, the document previously filed becomes at that moment obsolete. It no longer constitutes a fair and accurate description of the agreement between the parties.

It has been suggested here that the \textit{Hong Kong} case is distinguishable because we have before us now a new agreement, not a modification to an already approved agreement, which requires unanimity for its approval. According to this view, the real rationale of our decision in the \textit{Hong Kong} case was that we could not force a carrier to participate in an agreement to which that carrier did not voluntarily adhere

\textsuperscript{3} Agreement No. 9684, an arrangement for the pooling of cocoa carryings in the trade from Brazil to United States Atlantic ports, is basically the same as No. 9683.
and that to condition our jurisdiction on the continued adherence of all parties to the terms of a proposed new agreement is to deny our power to modify agreements, which power is specifically spelled out in section 15.

This argument misconceives the nature of our duties and responsibilities when approving agreements under section 15. For as the court said in \( Isb\)randtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cert. denied sub nom. \( Japan\-Atlantic \& Gulf Conference v. United States, 347 U.S. 990 (1954)\):

\[ \text{[T]he Shipping Act specifically provides machinery for legalizing that which would otherwise be illegal under antitrust laws. The condition upon which such authority is granted is that the agency entrusted with the duty to protect the public interest scrutinize the agreement to make sure the conduct thus legalized does not invade the prohibitions of the antitrust laws any more than is necessary to serve the purposes of the regulatory statute.} \]

And in scrutinizing the agreement to make sure that the conduct legalized by our approval does not "invade the prohibitions of the antitrust laws any more than is necessary to serve the purposes" of the Shipping Act, our function is to insure that:

* * * restraints which interfere with the policies of the antitrust laws will be approved only if [those seeking to impose the restraints] can bring forth such facts as would demonstrate that the [restraint] was required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in the furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act. \( FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 243 (1968)\)]

Virtually every agreement filed for approval under section 15 alters the competitive relationships, and whether our decision is to approve, disapprove, cancel, or modify the agreement, that decision is necessarily reached in the light of the new set of relationships created by the agreement. Thus, when prior to our approval of an agreement one of the parties thereto repudiates or withdraws from the agreement, a completely new set of relationships arises, and normally a new beginning is required. Should the remaining parties to the agreement desire approval even without the withdrawing party, it is incumbent upon them to reformulate the terms of the agreement so that it may be tested under the criteria of section 15.

Here we are concerned with the approval of agreements for the pooling of certain cargoes carried from ports in Brazil to ports on the Atlantic Coast of the United States. The agreements include virtually all common carriers active in that trade and purport to allocate certain percentages to each of those carriers. It seems unnecessary to point out that the withdrawal of even one party to the agreement presents a whole new picture and requires that the remaining parties...
present the Commission with the new agreement representing the readjustments made necessary by the change in relationships. The present agreements stand repudiated in one form or another by all the parties thereto except one. Thus, we do not have even a semblance of an agreement before us, and failing this we simply have no jurisdiction under section 15.

This is in no way inconsistent with our power to modify agreements under section 15. The power to modify is not the power to compel acceptance of the modification. When a new agreement filed for approval comports with the requirements of section 15, save in one or even a number of its provisions, we are empowered to modify the objectionable provisions and condition our approval of the agreement upon the acceptance of those modifications. Thus, while the parties to the agreement, should they desire to act in concert, must accept the conditions imposed upon their concerted action by the modifications, they are always free to reject the modifications and continue their operations as before. It should be clear that this proceeding presents us with nothing upon which we could exercise the power to modify simply because we have no agreement remaining before us.

At this point we could simply discontinue this proceeding for lack of jurisdiction, but we have been urged to do more. There is, we are told, a need for "guidelines" in order that future agreements of this kind may avoid the pitfalls encountered by those in this case. We are, quite naturally, reluctant to make pronouncements in the abstract and would prefer to await specific cases. However, because we are acutely aware of the problems encountered in this proceeding, and because we are equally aware that those problems are not unique to this case, we will attempt to draw together our past decisions and formulate those principles which must perforce guide our deliberations in cases like the one here. We would offer a preliminary caveat, however.

Guidelines are nothing more than broad canals within which future action may be channeled with some reasonable assurance of its validity. As such, guidelines do not decide specific cases. Time, circumstance and the facts of the individual case can and probably will alter the "guidelines" to some greater or lesser extent. We offer this fact of administrative life only because our past experience has been that all too frequently broad and necessarily flexible policy statements have been played back as narrow and ironclad precedents which are said to dictate a particular conclusion in a given case.

In order to place the problems presented by the agreements here in

---

4 As noted above, Loide and Netumar have withdrawn all other parties except Moore-mack have excepted to the approval of the agreements.
issue in their proper perspective. It is necessary to deal at some length with the background and circumstances leading to their formulation. The background statement which follows is essentially that of the examiner, as it appeared in his initial decision of June 24, 1969.

For some time now the Government of Brazil has, by the issuance of decrees, bulletins, and resolutions, made it clear that it intends to strengthen its merchant marine and develop its commerce.

Brazil's efforts began with SUMOC 5 181, of April 22, 1959, which required imports with subsidies to be carried on Brazilian flag vessels. SUMOC 181 was followed on November 12, 1959, by Decree No. 47.225, which ordered the movement on Brazilian flag vessels of imports benefiting from certain governmental favors. Then, on October 13, 1960, SUMOC 202 limited shipments to lines associated with Brazilian flag lines under approved agreements. Bulletin No. 401 of the Brazilian Maritime Commission (CMM), effective August 28, 1964, decreed that up to 40 percent of coffee to the United States must be carried by Brazilian flag vessels. Decree No. 60.739, effective May 24, 1967, set up a reciprocity system whereby, under certain circumstances, cargo to be carried on Brazilian flag vessels could be carried by vessels of the other nation involved; third flag vessels (those flying the flags of neither the importing nor exporting countries) could carry the cargo if vessels of neither of the national flag carriers were available. CMM Resolution 2995, effective June 5, 1967, provided that the vessels of the exporting and importing countries should "predominate" in the handling of cargo; this mandate was to be implemented after a meeting of vessel owners. Effective July 13, 1967, Decree 60.994 permitted conference or other agreements only if Brazilian flag lines were parties thereto. Resolution 3022 of August 1, 1967, limited exports to the United States and Canada to member lines of IAFC. Conference and pooling guidelines set forth in CMM Resolution 3131 of November 10, 1967, put a ceiling of 35 percent on the amount of cargo which could be carried by third flag lines.

As of June 1967, agreement No. 5450 (the basic agreement of the Brazil/United States-Canada Freight Conference) was in effect. The Conference embraced the transportation of all cargo, except passengers' baggage and refrigerated cargo, from Vitoria and ports south thereof in Brazil to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports and ports in Eastern Canada. All the parties to the present pooling agreements, except Netumar, were members of that conference (Netumar was not operating as a common carrier in that trade at the time).

6 "SUMOC" is a grouping of letters denoting Superintendency of Currency and Credit, an agency of the Brazilian Government.
In an effort to implement CMM Resolution 2995, as provided thereby, Loide, entirely owned by the Brazilian Government and acting on behalf of CMM, called a meeting of the conference principals for June 26, 1967, in Rio de Janeiro, to discuss a pooling agreement for the carriage of coffee. The meeting lasted until the 30th. Loide at first took the position that the provision of No. 2995, which stated that "shipowners who are nationals of the countries exporting and importing the goods must predominate" (italic supplied), meant that those owners must be allotted 90 percent of the available traffic. Eventually, Loide reduced the figure to 80 percent, but as the 9 nonnational lines felt this was wholly unrealistic in view of their past carryings, no agreement was reached. The meeting culminated in the resignation from the Conference of the Brazilian lines, followed shortly by the resignations of the other lines except Brodin, Columbus, Ivaran, Norton, Hopal, and North Pan-American Lines A/S (Nopal), the latter six being European lines.

Invitations later were extended by Loide to all of the conference lines (resignations had not yet become effective) to meet in its office and continue negotiations. On July 5, 1967, Loide, Netumar, E.L.M.A. (Argentine flag), Montemar (Uruguayan flag), Mooremack and Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. (an American Gulf line) signed a memorandum of intent to form a new conference to be known as IAFC. A formal agreement and a pooling guidelines agreement were executed on July 28, and filed on July 31, for the approval of this Commission (given numbers 9648 and 9649, respectively). The European lines were not members of the new conference, and since Resolution 3022, effective August 10, 1967, excluded from the trade any carriers not members of IAFC, the European lines henceforth could not lift cargo northbound.

During the summer of 1967 the members of IAFC discussed the matter of coffee and cocoa pools, and on August 16 the lines serving the Atlantic ports of the United States signed a coffee agreement and a cocoa agreement and submitted them to this Commission for approval (Nos. 9649-A and 9649-C, respectively). The European lines thereupon filed a complaint with the Commission against the parties to those agreements (docket No. 67-47) and also instituted actions against the parties in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violation of the antitrust laws. The Commission itself instituted an investigation into the matter (docket No. 67-48).

---

6 See footnote 8.
7 See footnote 8.
In late September 1967, the European lines approached the CMM in an effort to have the entire problem reconsidered. On October 23 a meeting of the principals was called for the purpose of getting the lines to agree to a coffee pool. It was generally understood that the CMM would not permit a line to join IAFC unless it participated in a pool. Furthermore, the lines were informed that only the Brazilian lines would handle the negotiations with the European lines, and that if agreement was reached and then approved by the CMM, the other lines would be urged to adopt the results, nine agreements of various kinds were signed on October 28.

One of the agreements was a “proposal” by Loide and Netumar, acting on behalf of the CMM and in accordance with “other applicable Brazilian decrees,” and was accepted by the European lines. As far as here pertinent, the main provisions of that agreement were: (1) the European lines would join IAFC; (2) the coffee and cocoa traffic was allotted in percentages for 6 years, split among the national flag lines as one group (even though Mooremack had not participated in the negotiations), the European lines as a second group, and E.L.M.A. and Montemar as a third group (like Mooremack, Montemar, and E.L.M.A. did not participate in the negotiations); and (3) the European lines were to be “guaranteed percentages [set forth in the document] of the total freight revenues derived from the carriage of all cargoes (excluding bulk cargoes) transported from United States Atlantic ports to Brazil” (italic supplied). A substantially similar document provided: (1) the Brazilian Government would immediately remove “all restrictions upon the transportation by [the individually named lines] of Brazilian export commodities to the United States of America”; and (2) the European lines would withdraw both the complaint before the Commission (docket No. 67-47) and the court antitrust actions. The proposals were not submitted to this Commission for approval, although they were approved by the CMM.

The loading ban against the European lines on northbound traffic was lifted, and these lines affixed their signatures on November 21-22 to an amended IAFC agreement. The document was filed on November 22 for the approval of this Commission, with the request that it be substituted for the original filing. Substitution was granted.\(^8\) Hearing in docket No. 67-48 on the IAFC agreement, as amended, resulted in its conditional approval, on February 16, 1968, for a period of 18 months (11 FMC 332).

In the meantime, as previously noted, CMM Resolution 3131 of November 10, 1967, established new guidelines for flag participation in

---

\(^8\) Agreements 9649, 9649-A, and 9649-C were withdrawn.

14 F.M.C.
the Brazil import-export trades, limiting to 35 percent the traffic that
could be handled by nonnational lines, to be reduced to 20 percent
within 10 years. Some of the Brazilian lines were of the opinion that
the resolution in effect vitiated the agreements of October 28. The res-
olution provided that all conferences, "upon the request of the au-
thorized Brazilian shipowners, will proceed to adapt their agreements
and cargo and freight pools" in accordance with the terms of the reso-
lution. Failure to do so within 15 days of the official publication of the
resolution "will imply the automatic cancellation of the Merchant Ma-
rine Commission's ratification of these agreements and cargo or freight
pools, thus voiding their effect." November 29 was the deadline for
Conference action.

A meeting of the Conference was held in Loide's offices on No-

dember 20. Other meetings followed, but up to November 29, the ex-

piration date, no progress had been made. A stern warning from the
CMM was read to the members on that day, exhorting them to come to
terms. If, at midnight, nothing had been accomplished, Loide would
"retire from these discussions, the Brazilian Government taking into
its own hands the destiny of regularizing this traffic, abolishing, if
necessary, all Freight Conferences and exercising the most rigorous
control of shipments from Brazilian ports." The present pooling
agreements were signed several minutes before midnight on the 29th,
and were filed on December 11, 1967, for the approval of this Com-
mmission. Mooremack, Montemar, and E.L.M.A., who had not partici-
pated in the negotiations leading up to the agreements of October 28,
as previously seen, were signatories to the two pooling agreements.

On the day before the pooling agreements were signed, the question
of southbound compensation, incorporated in the October 28 agree-
ments, was brought up in Loide's office by representatives of the Euro-
pean lines, and the commercial director of Loide stated that the
commitments would be respected. Upon being asked why the subject
matter could not be included in the coffee and cocoa pools, he replied
that it was a southbound matter and would have to be handled sepa-

rately. Within a week following November 29, there was a discussion
with the commercial director in his office, but the parties were advised
to come back inasmuch as the October 28 documents must be adapted to
reflect the new 10-year period in the pooling agreements. A new docu-
ment was prepared and signed at a meeting of the European prin-
cipals in New York in April 1968. This document, containing the
southbound guarantees and the new 10-year percentages, was delivered
to Loide's president on April 9, with the request that it be studied,
approved and signed by the CMM. The matter was again discussed in
June and later, but nothing happened. The presidency of Loide having changed subsequently, a meeting was held with the new official on January 14, 1969, and copies of the document were handed to him on January 17, he having stated that the original could not be found. The original letter was located, and the president promised to study the situation and contact the representatives. As of the time of the hearing (January 21–31), no word had been received from Loide, and as far as is known, no action has been taken as yet.

In a letter dated April 22, 1970, counsel for Loide advised the Commission:

We have just been instructed by Loide to inform the Federal Maritime Commission that because a majority of the membership of the Inter-American Freight Conference opposes the pools, Loide now withdraws its support of both the coffee and cocoa pooling agreements on the 40–40–20 percentage basis.

This was followed by a letter from counsel for Netumar, stating:

Please be advised that my client Companhie De Navegacao Maritima Netumar (Netumar) hereby withdraws its support of both the coffee and cocoa pooling agreements which are the subject of the above proceeding.

Finally, the Brazilian Government in May 1970, issued Resolution 3669, which divides coffee and cocoa shipments northbound for Brazil to the United States between Brazilian and United States flag vessels on a 50–50 basis. Brazil has advised that it will implement this decree by granting 40 percent to United States flag vessels; 40 percent to Brazilian flag vessels, and 20 percent to third flag carriers. Thus, it would appear that Brazil is unilaterally allocating the carriage of coffee between flags on the percentage basis which would have applied in the 10th year of the agreements, had they been approved.

Before dealing with what we conceive to be the basic difficulty presented by this case we think it useful to again allude briefly to the bedrock of our authority and responsibility under section 15.

Section 15 was enacted at a time when the economics of the steamship industry seemed inevitably to lead to anticompetitive cooperation between carriers and the ultimate cartelization of almost every trade in the foreign commerce of the United States. The history of the conference system is far to well known to go into here, but one point stands in need of remaking. The problems with which section 15 sought to deal were created by private (as opposed to governmental) arrangements between the lines themselves. A country’s efforts to

---

9 Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries Investigation of Shipping Combinations, 62d Cong., 2d sess. (1913).

14 F.M.C.
foster the well-being of its merchant fleet did not at that point in history take the form of overt governmental intervention designed to acquire a given percentage of a country's import and export traffic for carriage by its own lines. This was left to a later and different era. Thus, from its inception, section 15 presupposed an absence of overt governmental intervention into the otherwise private and economically motivated arrangements between competing steamship lines operating in this country's foreign trade. At the time of the Shipping Act's passage, the problems presented by "emerging nations" and such concepts as "national flag interest" and "bilateralism" were two world wars and almost half a century away.

These problems are now upon us, most acutely in our trades with the Latin American countries. These nations, for a variety of reasons, find themselves unable to garner for their nationalized and growing merchant fleets any substantial portion of their own export and import traffic—a situation not unknown to our own merchant marine. In recent years these countries have taken steps to secure for their merchant fleets a "predominant" share of their export and import traffic. It is the form which some of these efforts have taken that presents the overriding difficulties presented here.

A whole new set of concepts has arisen. The language of government-to-government dealings in foreign commerce now includes such terms as "emerging nations," "the national interest factor" and "bilateralism." The "national interest factor" is that concept which would give to the exporting and importing countries at either end of the trade route a "predominate" share of the water-borne traffic between the two countries. "Bilateralism" is the shorthand expression used to denote the result of the application of the national interest factor. Ultimately, bilateralism would exclude third flag carriers, or so-called cross traders, from the trade, leaving all the traffic to be divided between the national flag lines.

The first pooling agreements posing problems of bilateralism were at issue in *West Coast Line, Inc. v. Grace Line Inc.*, 3 FMB 586 (1951). There the Chilean Government, through a system of import licensing, sought to garner 50 percent of its ocean trade with the United States for its national flag carrier. Subsequently its aspirations were reduced to splitting 50 percent of the trade between Chilean and so-called "associated vessels—in practical effect the only vessels who could be

---

11 No attempt will be made here to define an "emerging nation" which seems to present much the same problem as attempts to define "time"—everybody is sure they know what it is until they are asked to explain.
12 The national flag line is the line flying the flag of the country at either end of the bilateral trade route.
“associated” were those flying the U.S. flag. Two agreements were filed for approval, the effect of which was to split non-free list cargo (about 50 percent of the total traffic) between United States and Chilean flag vessels. Complainants (third flag lines operating in the trade) sought access to the pools and were denied. They then charged that the pools, together with Chilean Governmental policies, were designed to achieve a monopoly for the national flag lines and thereby exclude all other carriers from the trade.

The Federal Maritime Board, our predecessor, approved the agreements. In doing so, the Board expressly found that the Chilean fleet was capable of carrying the proposed allocation and that:

The evidence shows that the pooling agreements have been followed by a relaxation of Chilean import regulations in a manner which is deemed to be satisfactory to Grace [the U.S. flag carrier] and at the same time are not shown to have resulted in reducing the participation of complainants in the trades nor are they shown to have operated in other respects to the detriment or prejudice of complaints.

A later case, *Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. Cia Anonima Venezolana*, 7 FMC 345 (1962), involved what ultimately took the form of “equal access agreements.” By a series of decrees the Government of Venezuela sought to insure that a greater share of the traffic between the United States and that country was carried by its national flag line Cia Anonima Venezolana (CAVN). Grace Line, the dominant U.S. flag carrier in the trade, sought to counteract these measures by requesting the issuance of rules and regulations under section 19(1)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (46 U.S.C. 876). These regulations were never issued, but they were communicated to the Venezuelan Government by the State Department.

Under Public Resolution 17, 73d Congress, when loans are made by the Export-Import Bank to foster the exportation of agricultural or other commodities, provision shall be made that all such commodities shall be carried exclusively in U.S. flag vessels unless the Maritime Administration grants waivers. In a statement of policy the Maritime Administration announced that it would issue such waivers on up to 50 percent of such cargo to vessels of the recipient nation, provided that nation accorded U.S. flag vessels “parity of treatment.”

---

13 Chile established a “free list” of cargoes which were not subject to the licensing system and thus could be carried by anyone.

14 Section 19 authorizes the Commission to make rules and regulations which affect shipping in the foreign trade, not in conflict with law, in order to adjust or meet conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade, whether in any particular trade or upon any particular route or in commerce generally, and which arise out of or result from foreign laws, rules or regulations or from competitive methods or practices employed by owners, operators, agents, or masters of vessels of a foreign country.

15 These cargoes are generally known as “Government controlled cargoes.”
Under the system of Venezuelan decrees, Grace Line was not accorded parity of treatment. Subsequently, Grace became an "associated" line which association made it eligible to carry cargoes otherwise reserved to Venezuelan lines.

By way of formalizing the situation, Grace and CAVN entered into a pooling agreement to cover the "freighting operations" southbound from the United States to Venezuela. The third flag lines in the trade complained that the agreement would prefer Grace and CAVN over them to the extent that the agreement would be unjustly discriminatory as between ports, unfair as between carriers and detrimental to the commerce of the United States.

In approving the agreement we, much like the Board in the West Coast Line case, supra, found that even if the third flag lines' predictions about the percentage of the total trade to be carried by Grace and CAVN were correct, that percentage would bear a reasonable relationship to their past operating experience in the trade. We further said:

* * * This proceeding lies under section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. This section sets out standards for approval and disapproval according to its terms. We apply those standards and no others. We are not concerned here with any promotional provision of law and our action is not affected by and does not affect decisions under section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

We are wholly unable to conclude that the reasonably probable operations under the agreement will, or are likely to, cause Alcoa, Netherlands or Viking [third flag lines] to withdraw from the trade or any part of it * * * or to take other action which might be considered a detriment to the commerce of the United States, or contrary to the public interest.

At this point the efforts of the Latin American countries to gain a predominate share of the traffic had centered around the consummation of so-called equal access agreements with the United States. These agreements generally sought to insure that each national flag line had equal access to the carriage of Government controlled cargoes. These agreements were normally between the cognizant agency of the particular Latin American country and our Maritime Administration and Department of State. But by 1960, the efforts of Brazil to achieve bilateralism had resulted in a different kind of pooling agreement.

In Nopal v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 8 FMC 213 (1964), the Commission had before it agreement 9040, which purported to "pool" the carriage of coffee from Brazil to United States Gulf and Atlantic ports. The agreement was the result of Brazil's long effort to secure for its national flag line (Loide) either 50 percent of the coffee carry-
ings or a share of the revenue therefrom. While the agreement covered the carriage of coffee to both Atlantic and Gulf ports in the United States, the complainant, Nopal, was a member of only the Gulf pool, and the case involved the agreement only as it applied to U.S. Gulf ports. The main bone of contention was the use of the so-called national interest factor in allocating quotas under the pool. Under national interest, Brazil apparently felt that because it was the exporting country it was entitled to greater preference than even the other national flag lines. In any event, Nopal alleged that the agreement was unjustly discriminatory and unfair as between carriers in violation of sections 15 and 16 of the act and that it had signed the agreement because under SUMOC 202 (see p. 7, supra) the only alternative was complete exclusion from the trade. In refusing to approve the agreement we had the following to say:

Every maritime nation in the world is, of course, intensely and legitimately interested in the economic well-being of its merchant marine. Thus, national interest plays an important part in the overall policies of the maritime nations. But it is of overriding importance to properly distinguish between promotional policies and regulatory policies. The Commission, of course, is a regulatory agency charged by Congress with the administration of this country’s regulatory policy as expressed in the Shipping Act, 1916. And, while as an arm of the U.S. Government we are of course interested in the growth and economic well-being of our own merchant marine, we are bound by the Shipping Act to scrupulously insure that all carriers regardless of flag are accorded equal treatment under the laws we administer.

---

The Shipping Act, 1916, imposes no burden and grants no privilege on the basis of a carrier’s nationality. To the contrary it seeks to insure that all carriers operating in our foreign commerce regardless of flag do so as equals. Thus, we are prohibited under the law from approving such an agreement just as we would be prohibited from using our regulatory powers to attempt to insure that U.S. flag carriers received a given percentage of this country’s export trades. We think it clear that a pooling agreement which allocates percentages or any portions thereof on the basis of flag or national interest is discriminatory as between carriers within the meaning of section 15 [8 FMC at 229].

---

16 While the events leading to agreement 9040 are far too extensive and complex to repeat here, they do provide an interesting and informative backdrop to the present case. (See our opinion in Nopal, supra, pp. 213–227.) Brazil’s insistence on 50 percent of the coffee carryings was made in the face of the established fact that Loide could not possibly carry that percentage, and had in fact proved unable to carry its previously allocated percentage of 19.41 percent under the predecessor pool, agreement 8505–1. Recognizing this, Loide eventually agreed to a reduction of its share, but in no event would it accept a lower percentage than complainant Nopal, a third flag carrier whose past actual carryings had averaged some 32 percent.

17 For an earlier expression of this concept see Alleged Rebates of Mitsui S.S. Co. Ltd., 7 FMC 248 (1962).
We thus arrive at the present case and we will now attempt to express the principles which we are bound by law to apply to future agreements of this kind when determining whether to approve, disapprove or modify them under section 15.

Although we have not yet alluded to the fact, the record establishes that the third flag lines signed the agreement at issue here only under "duress." These lines could either accept the quotas granted to them by the Government of Brazil or carry no coffee or cocoa at all. This accounts for the strange situation we have here wherein a party to an agreement whose signature thereon would ostensibly signify his accord with the agreement's provisions nevertheless protests its approval when it is filed with us. In such a situation we have to agree with the Department of Justice that where a party gives its "assent" to an agreement to avoid governmental exclusion from the trade, there is ab initio no "agreement" of the kind over which we may exercise jurisdiction under section 15. There is simply no room under section 15 for the approval of a pooling agreement which embodies discriminatory or unfair quotas dictated by governmental law regulation, decree, ukase or fiat.

Pooling agreements are the ultimate in anticompetitive combinations. Traditionally, they are proposed when a given trade is disrupted by real or suspected malpractices—usually rebating—on the part of carriers in the trade. It is thought that by assigning each carrier in the trade a percentage of the traffic which bears some reasonable relationship to his past carryings and by penalizing carriage over that quota, the incentive to rebate is removed since the rebate is designed to secure more business. Here the incentive to agree is obvious—the elimination of unfair and ruinous competition. Thus, in theory at least everyone benefits from such a pool. The injection of national interest, however, only further disrupts a trade since its sole aim is the preferment of one group of carriers (the national flag lines) over another group of carriers (the other flag lines). National interest is not grounded on economic or commercial reality; it pays no deference to shipper desires and does not take into account the efficiency of the operator or the worth of the service he renders. In short, national interest seeks to nullify virtually all of the only valid considerations which are relevant to our deliberations under section 15. All of which inevitably destroys that equality of treatment, regardless of flag, upon which our regulatory laws are based.

---

38 We have had occasion to note, however, that "... an effective system of self-policing rather than the complete elimination of all competition is the solution to rumored malpractices and alleged rebates." (8 FMC 232.)

14 F.M.C.
Lest we be thought out of sympathy with the efforts of our neighbors to the south to secure for themselves a greater share of their waterborne commerce, let us say that just as we are ever mindful of the plight of our own merchant marine, we can easily understand the concern they have for theirs. But it must always be remembered that we are charged with the impartial administration of a regulatory statute in the enactment of which Congress has determined that the foreign commerce of the United States is best served by treating as equals all who participate in that commerce. We are not free, whatever our inclination, to alter that conclusion. Just as we are not at liberty to "promote" our own merchant marine we cannot, in the guise of approving agreements under section 15 acquiesce in the efforts of other nations to do the same when those efforts run counter to the laws we administer. Thus, so long as any nation attempts to utilize an "agreement" under section 15 as vehicle for the enhancement of its own national fleet to the detriment of other carriers serving our foreign commerce, we shall, whatever our individual views, be compelled to disapprove those agreements.

Bilateralism, if it is to become the maritime policy of this country, must do so as a result of efforts other than our own. Our position as a quasi-judicial agency charged with the administration of a regulatory statute precludes us from participating in the kind of government-to-government negotiations which lead to the adoption of bilateralism as a national policy. We must be ever mindful of our judicial responsibilities to the people we regulate, and one of the most important of these responsibilities is that of making our determinations in controversial cases under section 15 only on the record after an opportunity for hearing has been afforded to all who would be affected by our decision. We are simply not free to negotiate with other governments on matters which may require us later to sit in judgment on their validity under the Shipping Act. Our role in cases such as this is confined to applying the criteria of section 15 to agreements between persons subject to our jurisdiction and taking such action as is called for under the applicable criteria.

Since, as we have already noted, our jurisdiction fails for lack of an agreement upon which we can act, this proceeding is hereby discontinued.

Commissioner James V. Day, concurring and dissenting:

The subject agreements have been repudiated and our jurisdiction has hence terminated.

However, giving parties some guidelines for formulating future agreements is worthwhile.
Pursuant to section 15 of the Shipping Act we would disapprove a pooling agreement if it is unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, operates to the detriment of our commerce, is contrary to the public interest, or violates some statutory provision.

In deciding, for instance, if a pooling agreement is "contrary to the public interest" we would recognize that such an agreement is inherently difficult to justify unless it is required by a serious transportation need, or necessary to secure important public benefits, (etc.). Just what constitutes "serious transportation need" (etc.) depends on the attendant facts and circumstances.

The fact that "national interest" (national flag preference) was not envisioned by the original drafters of section 15 as "synonymous with public interest" or "serious transportation need" (etc.) does not mean that such a factor (or any other new element) could not be included among the justifications for any agreement before us for approval.

Let us not be overwhelmed by any sort of "bilateral" bogey. Envisioning a concept in its ultimate extreme is no reason not to countenance a reasonable application of a principle. Granting preferred status to national flag carriers solely on the basis of the flag flown is, of course, not a valid factor for determining the pool percentages in an agreement. But some preference for national flag carriers might possibly be permitted as providing a better chance for lower rates, the development or maintenance of more dependable and efficient services, and general trade stability—according to the circumstances!

Nor should we here suggest an agreement should be automatically barred merely because a flag preference principle was urged by government decrees rather than carrier demands in formulating the provisions of the agreement. The real test is whether the agreement is unjustly discriminatory, unfair, adverse to our commerce, or against our public interest.

In conclusion, let us emphasize that all such guidelines as here set

---

19 By its very nature a pooling agreement is a considerable restraint on the actions of the parties thereto which runs against the very grain of our antitrust laws. See FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244 (1968). Hence we require that serious need for such arrangement be shown.

20 As the majority would say—"time, circumstances, and the facts of the individual case can and probably will alter * * *" a situation.

21 "Ultimately, bilateralism would exclude third flag carriers, or so-called cross traders, from the trade, leaving all the traffic to be divided between the national flag lines." Majority opinion at p. 68.

22 As we so said in Nopal v. Moore-McCormack, 8 FMC 213, 229 (1964).

23 I would not want parties to possible future agreements to infer that any "national interest" aspect would undoubtedly kill the agreement when submitted for approval. How can we say that "national interest" inevitably destroys the fairness of treatment that carriers receive under our laws? We must judge on the facts and projections as and when presented to us.
forth should be correctly read for what they really are—direction signposts and not unalterable restrictions.

**Commissioner George H. Hearn, concurring and dissenting:**

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that there is no agreement before us which is subject to our jurisdiction. Also, I agree with the majority's desire to offer some guidelines for subsequent action in the trade. However, I depart from the majority report in the nature of the guidelines. The administrative process, by its nature, may sometimes seem to move slowly and to react rather than act. Consequently, we should demonstrate that our laws and procedures can be forward looking and made flexible enough to adapt to changed conditions.

With no agreement to act upon, our primary concern should be how this case can help overcome the undesirable conditions prevailing in the trade. We should extend our efforts toward preventing events from continuing along their present course of confusion, instability, and animosity. Stabilization of the trade will serve the best interests of the parties and the commerce of the countries involved. It is to that end that I offer these comments. Within the limits of the Commission's authority and discretion to offer guidelines, I think it should be made known what action this Commission may be prepared to take to help resolve the underlying conflicts and issues of this case.

We cannot, of course, offer iron clad guidelines or prejudge future cases. Conditions and circumstances can change rapidly. In fact, our experience under the shipping statutes is indicative of the radical changes which have occurred in ocean commerce just in the last few years. Thus we should strike a balance here between avoiding formulation of strict guidelines and adapting our statutory provisions to the exigencies of current times. Under appropriate circumstances and conditions, what may be unlawful conduct in one instance may be lawful in another; and what may not have been approvable under section 15 yesterday, may be approvable tomorrow. And it should be added that activity which this Commission may be powerless to approve under section 15 may be permissible or noninterdictable when such approval is not sought.

Thus, when agreements proffered for approval under section 15 are entered into by carriers at the insistence (by decree or otherwise) of any nation, we should be wary lest there result national flag aggrandizement to the unlawful detriment of our or other flag carriers. In fact, it may well be that agreements entered into under threat of exclusion from the trade are not approvable under section 15. It does not follow, however, that the same results cannot be achieved in other ways, or that this Commission can or should tell any carrier that it
cannot or should not agree to a limitation on its service in return for continued participation in the trade.

We can offer no rule as to the proper role of "national interest" in particular trades. And we cannot say that implementation of a "national interest factor" is generally good or bad. Many countries, including our own, utilize it in one form or another. When the principle is held above all other considerations, it can be destructive of efficient and reliable ocean service. But national interest when properly utilized can produce lower rates, fully laden ships, regular service and overall stability; and this can occur even when the nation at one end of a trade route tries to exercise considerable control over it. That such stabilization or rationalization may be achieved also by decree should not bring condemnation from our system which accomplishes things differently.

Consequently, we should not now decide when the implementation of national interest may render an agreement or other action unapprovable. I would say only that when a nation seeks to promote its merchant marine in a manner which contravenes the principles and provisions of fairness of our shipping laws, we cannot give such action our stamp of approval. However, when a group of carriers freely enter into an agreement we should not deny approval solely because the national interest of another country is a key factor of the agreement.

I consider it very unfortunate that the agreements before us did not survive to this point in the decisional process. I find no factor inherent in such pools or these particular ones which would render them unapprovable if they were still before us. And further, based upon my present knowledge of the situation, I would approve the pools were they still before the Commission. Such approval would presuppose, of course, that all the original parties to the pools remained willing signatories. If carriers are agreeable to certain conditions, we should not disapprove their agreement because we think they would be better off with another or none at all, or because the pools resulted from such factors as negotiations between governments and carriers. If the commerce of the United States is not adversely affected, such action may not be violative of our laws and may be approvable. A very apropos phrase is: There is more than one way to skin a cat. If the carriers and governments do not solve their trade problems one way, they will do so another way. And the result then may be even more unsavory to us.

What I had hoped for in this case, which has taken so long to reach this stage, was a settlement of the problems in the trade. The pools might have achieved that result; or perhaps better pools can be written which are more acceptable to all parties. It may be noted that pools
have been entered into in the southbound trade between the United States and Brazil. The decision as to them is pending so there is nothing I can say on their merits. Suffice it to say that the pending southbound pools and the government action taken by Brazil as to the northbound trade may be indicative of the future course of events. I am loath to let speculation be my guide; but I urge this Commission to recognize the practicalities of the situation. We can no longer sit atop our perch of platitudes and espouse principles which have lost their relevance. In equal measure must the participants in ocean commerce—especially shippers and carriers—realize that they cannot forestall the changes in technology and politics which are radically altering traditional rights and prerogatives.

In summary, I think the parties to this case particularly, and the shipping industry generally, should be able to leave with something more than an abandoned agreement. We should indicate that an agreement willingly entered into by the carriers and not unlawfully detrimental to our commerce would have been approved if not otherwise contrary to law. At the very least we should offer the parties an indication that they should not despair of receiving a positive response from this Commission and that whatever solutions they may arrive at will be considered in light of the guidelines I have set forth above.

Joseph C. Polking,
Assistant to the Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Special Docket No. 421

RAYTHEON CO. ANDOVER

v.

STATES MARINE-ISTHMIAN AGENCY, INC.

September 28, 1970

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING REFUND

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on September 28, 1970.

It is ordered, That States Marine-Isthmian Agency, Inc., is authorized to refund to Raytheon Co., Andover the amount of $1,372.36.

It is further ordered, That applicant publish promptly in the appropriate tariff the following notice:

"Notice is hereby given as required by the decision of the Federal Maritime Commission in Special Docket No. 421, that, effective March 1, 1969 the heavy lift provision of the Hawk Missile Project Rate—Jeddah, for purposes of refunds or waiver of freight charges on any shipments which may have been shipped during the period from March 1, 1969 to June 2, 1969 is: 'Heavy Lift shall commence for pieces or packages in excess of five (5) long tons; forty percent (40%) reduction in Heavy Lift Charges,' subject to all other applicable rules, regulations, terms and conditions of the said rate and this tariff."

It is further ordered, That refund shall be made within 30 days of this notice and States Marine-Isthmian Agency, Inc. shall within 5 days thereafter notify the Commission of the date of the refund and of the manner in which payment has been made.

By the Commission.

[seal]

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.
States Marine-Isthmian Agency, Inc., permitted to refund freight charges on heavy lifts of specially fabricated parts for Saudi Arabia Hawk Program from New York, N.Y., to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

William L. Hamm for applicant.

INITIAL DECISION OF RICHARD M. HARTSOCK, PRESIDING EXAMINER

States Marine-Isthmian Agency, Inc. (States Marine, applicant), a member of the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf-Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Rate Agreement, has filed an application for permission to refund $1,372.36, the entire freight charges collected from Raytheon Co., Andover, for heavy lift services in the movement of 439,216 pounds, 35,594 cubic feet of specially fabricated parts for the Saudi Arabia Hawk (missile) program from New York, N.Y., to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on April 11, 1969, in applicant's vessel SS Steel Fabricator. The 34 heavy lifts involved individual lifts of 5 tons or less.

The U.S. Atlantic and Gulf-Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Rate Agreement is a steamship freight conference duly organized and existing pursuant to section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as approved by the Commission. As originally constituted, the geographical scope of the agreement did not include the Port of Jeddah. Subsequently members agreed to amend the scope of agreement to include Jeddah and this amendment was approved by the Commission on October 10, 1968. However, prior to Commission approval for the inclusion of Jeddah, the members of the conference including applicant here had on file with the Commission a project rate for material, equipment and supplies destined to Jeddah for the construction and erection of a missile defense system. As part of the project rate, an exemption was given

1 This decision became the decision of the Commission Sept. 28, 1970.
from heavy lift charges for lifts which weighed up to and including 5 tons.

At a rate agreement meeting held on February 18, 1969, the members of the conference agreed to publish a project rate in the rate agreement tariff for the same missile defense system on the same terms and conditions as had been in effect for the individual lines. Unaware of the fact that the individual member lines’ filings had contained an exemption for heavy lifts up to and including 5 tons, the conference staff proceeded to publish a reduction of 40 percent on all heavy lift charges. The rate agreement tariff filed lists heavy lift charges beginning at two long tons. The oversight here resulted in a 40 percent reduction on heavy lift charges between 2 and 5 tons rather than a complete exemption from heavy lift charges up to 5 tons. The project rate was filed with the Commission with an effective date of March 1, 1969.

Prior to this date, on October 15, 1968, the rate agreement had put into effect a general increase on a level 10 percent higher than that which had been in effect for the individual lines both as applicable to rates and heavy lift charges. On February 19, 1969, the conference advised Behring Shipping, the freight forwarder for Raytheon, of the establishment by the conference of the project rate. In so advising the conference stated that there would be a 40 percent reduction in heavy lift rates “subject to usual exceptions.” While the phrase “usual exceptions” was intended by the conference to refer to specific commodities, it was nevertheless subject to the interpretation that the exemption from heavy lift charges up to 5 tons was a “usual exception.”

Subsequent to the April 11, 1969, shipment of the involved commodities the shipper realized that heavy lift charges had not been accorded full exemption for lifts under 5 tons but only on a 40 percent reduction. The conference agreed to exempt the project shipments from heavy lift charges up to 5 tons but had no means of correcting the tariff retroactively.

Public Law 90–928, 75 Stat. 764, authorizes the Commission to permit a common carrier by water in foreign commerce to refund a portion of the freight charges collected from a shipper where there is “an error due to inadvertence in failing to file a new tariff.” In the circumstances here it is found that the conference of which applicant is a member under its existing procedures would have promptly filed a new rate providing exemptions on heavy lift charges up to and including 5 tons to be used in the Saudi Arabian Hawk (missile) program had they been aware of the exemptions in heavy lift charges up to and including 5 tons as filed by individual members of the rate agreement. It is further found that the conference’s staff’s inadvertence in
providing exemption from heavy lift charges up to and including 5 tons in the conference agreement was an error which prevented the timely filing of a new rate.

The application was timely filed and no other shipments of the same or similar commodities moved on conference vessels during approximately the same time as the shipment here involved. There are no special docket applications or other proceedings involving the same rate situation now pending.

It appearing that the application involves a situation within the purview of Public Law 90-928, and good cause appearing, the applicant is permitted to refund to the shipper the sum of $1,372.36. The notice referred to in the statute shall be published in the conference tariff. The refund will be effectuated within 30 days after publication of the notice and within 5 days thereafter applicant shall notify the Commission of the date of the refund and the manner in which payment was made.

Richard M. Hartsock,
Presiding Examiner.

Washington, D.C., September 8, 1970.
Agreement concerning operating differential subsidies for military carryings as agreed to during an operating differential subsidy hearing before the Maritime Subsidy Board, Maritime Administration, provides at least for a cooperative working arrangement; constitutes a special privilege or advantage; and controls or regulates competition, and is thereby subject to filing and approval requirements under section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Ronald A. Capone, and Stuart S. Dye, United States Lines, Inc.
Robert N. Kharasch, States Marine Lines.
Ronald D. Lee, Donald J. Brunner, hearing counsel.

REPORT

By the Commission: (James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners)

On December 17, 1969, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. (AEIL) filed with the Federal Maritime Commission a petition for a declaratory order requesting that the Commission declare an existing stipulation between United States Lines (USL), States Marine Lines (SML), and the American Maritime Association (AMA) to be an agreement within the scope of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The Commission subsequently denied the petition for a declaratory order on March 26, 1970, and simultaneously instituted this proceeding by order to show cause to determine whether the stipulation between USL, SML, and AMA is an agreement which must be filed with
and approved by the Commission under section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. USL, SML, and AMA were made respondents in this proceeding and AEIL was designated petitioner. Hearing counsel also entered an appearance. Oral argument before the Commission was held on June 9, 1970.

FACTS

The Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), provides under title VI for the payment of operating differential subsidies (ODS) to contracting U.S. flag steamship lines operating U.S. flag vessels on essential trade routes under terms, conditions and for the purposes prescribed in the act. Such subsidies are payable by the Maritime Subsidy Board under the Maritime Administration and are designed to equalize U.S. flag operating costs of the recipient line with foreign flag costs. Pursuant to section 605(c) of the 1936 act (46 U.S.C. 1175(c)), a statutory hearing is required prior to the execution of a subsidy contract, at which opponents of the applicant may raise a number of issues bearing on the justification for awarding the subsidy.

In accordance with the above act, USL in September 1969, applied to the Subsidy Board for the continuation of ODS payments on its vessels serving essential trade route No. 12. The Subsidy Board ordered a public hearing on the application in a proceeding designated MSB docket No. S–241.¹

Subsequently, SML and AMA as well as other parties, including petitioner AEIL, intervened in docket S–241 in opposition to the grant of subsidy. Both SML, as an unsubsidized U.S. flag service on trade route 12, and the AMA, as an association whose membership includes unsubsidized American flag operators, objected to the application only insofar as it encompassed operating differential subsidies for the carriage of U.S. military and other preferential cargo. Military cargo is reserved by law exclusively for U.S. flag ships, and therefore not subject to foreign competition. For other such cargo, the preference is not less than 50 percent, section 901(b) Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 46 U.S.C.A. 1241(b).

During the hearing before the examiner in Maritime Administration docket No. S–241 (December 12, 1969), USL, SML, and AMA entered into the following stipulation:

(1) United States Lines does not seek, nor will it accept operating differential subsidy for military carryings whether on break

¹ United States Lines, Inc., application for a new 2 year operating differential subsidy agreement upon the termination of contract No. FMB–19 on Dec. 31, 1969, on trade route No. 12.
bulk or containerships. It will seek to have included in any new operating differential subsidy agreement granted as a result of the pending application a formula for abatement of operating differential subsidy similar to that for domestic intercoastal service.

(2) On the basis of the first paragraph, the AMA and States Marine Lines withdraw from this proceeding with respect to ODS for both break bulk and containership service.

(3) Also on the basis of (1) above, the first paragraph, neither AMA nor States Marine Lines will oppose any use by United States Lines of any nonsubsidized vessel in any nonsubsidized service except that both reserve the right to oppose charter of any CDS built or priced vessel to the military.

(4) States Marine Lines and AMA may continue to participate in docket S-244.

SML and AMA then withdrew from further participation in docket S-241. Petitioner AEIL (a subsidized common carrier by water which competes for military cargo with USL, SML, and members of AMA in trade Route 12) continued to oppose all aspects of USL's application for subsidy in docket S-241 and initiated the petition for declaratory order.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

The issue before us is whether the above stipulation constitutes a section 15 agreement subject to the filing and approval requirements of the Shipping Act, 1916. It is our opinion that the agreement is subject to section 15 and Commission approval.

That section provides that there be filed with the Commission "every agreement" among persons subject to the act:

* fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangement.²

On the basis of a literal interpretation of this language, any agreement falling within any one of the seven categories of activity enumerated therein would be subject to filing and approval, notwithstanding the degree or extent of its involvement or the subjective intent of the parties in entering into the agreement. In 1968 the Supreme Court in *Volkswagenwerk v. FMC*, 390 U.S. 261 (1968), held, in accordance with

with the literal construction, that "Section 15 requires filing of ‘every agreement’ in any of seven categories."

The legislative history of the language supports its literal interpretation. The following history from the Alexander Report, 1914, confirms the congressional purpose to insure broad regulation and control of agreements between and affecting members of the shipping industry:

Nearly all the steamship line representatives expressed themselves as not opposed to government supervision and approval of all agreements or arrangements which steamship lines may have entered into with other steamship lines, with shippers, or with other carriers and transportation agencies. On the other hand, the shippers who appeared as witnesses were in the great majority of instances favorable to a comprehensive system of government supervision of contracts, agreements, and arrangements, and the general supervision of all conditions of water transportation which vitally affect the interests of shippers.

[Recommendation] That all carriers engaged in the foreign trade of the United States, parties to any agreements, understandings, or conference arrangements hereinafter referred to, be required to file for approval a copy of all written agreements (or a complete memorandum if the understanding or agreement is oral) entered into (1) with any other steamship companies, firms, or lines engaged directly or indirectly in the American trade, or (2) with American shippers, railroads or other transportation agencies.

The Commission itself has spoken in conformity with the Alexander Report when in docket No. 948 the Commission concluded:

This philosophy took shape and was enacted as section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, confiding to the agency administering the Act extensive powers of supervision and control as the condition precedent to any of the concerted activities covered by the section's rather all-inclusive language.

Only recently in Public Law 87-346 (75 Stat. 762), amending the Shipping Act, 1916, Congress has reasserted the original philosophy that exemptions from the antitrust laws must be accompanied by effective governmental supervision and control of the concerted activities covered by section 15.

Again in docket 882 the Commission elaborated on the comprehensive nature of section 15 wherein it said:

Congress was fully aware, furthermore, that its plan for "effective government supervision" would be largely frustrated unless the [Shipping] Act were made broadly applicable to all agreements, understandings and arrangements includ-

---

5 In Re: Pacific Coast European Conference, 7 FMC 27, 32-33 (1961).
ing particularly the kind of informal arrangement which existed among the respondents here. [emphasis added]

* * * The language of the section thus clearly embraces every agreement, understanding, or arrangement, whether formal or informal, written or oral, detailed or general.  

In 1968, the Supreme Court in Volkswagenwerk confirmed the above analysis of the legislative history:

Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress, in enacting § 15 of the Act, meant to do less than follow this recommendation cited [cited above] of the Alexander Report and subject to the scrutiny of a specialized government agency the myriad of restrictive agreements in the maritime industry.  

Therefore, under the facts before us, the predominant question is whether the stipulation infringes upon any of the areas set forth in section 15 as requiring Commission approval.

The subject agreement actually consists of four promises between USL, AMA, and SML. USL, for its part, promised that it (1) would not seek or accept operating differential subsidy for military carryings whether on break bulk or containership, and (2) would seek to have included in any new operating differential subsidy agreement granted as a result of the pending application of a formula for abatement of operating differential subsidy similar to that for domestic intercoastal service. SML and AMA, for their part, agreed that they (3) would withdraw from docket No. S-241 with respect to operating differential subsidy for both break bulk and containership service, and (4) would not oppose any use by USL of any nonsubsidized vessel in any nonsubsidized service.

In our opinion the promises as enumerated above collectively cause the stipulation to be an agreement which, at least, provides for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement; constitutes a special privilege or advantage; and controls, regulates, prevents, or destroys competition.

Without question we have a mutual agreement or understanding between USL, SML, and AMA concerning operating differential subsidy for military carryings. The factors of continuing and coordination of effort are present. The objective is the elimination of USL's receipt of ODS for its military carryings. The parties through cooperative arrangements attain that objective, and thereby are engaged in a section 15 working arrangement.

In addition, AMA and SML's promise not to oppose any use by USL of any nonsubsidized vessel in any subsidized service accords

* Unapproved section 15 agreements—South African Trade, 7 FMC 159, 180–191 (1962)

USL a “special privilege or advantage” which is not currently available to others. The value of that privilege or its future availability to others is not in issue. The purpose of section 15 is simply to place before the Commission information which the Commission may review and analyze to determine if the actions are in compliance with the rest of section 15 and the act in general.8

Finally, the subject agreement comes within the provision on competition. That provision speaks to those situations which have not merely a limiting effect on competition, but an effect in general. USL's promise that it will not seek or accept operating differential subsidy for military carryings “affects” competition for military cargoes in the trade between the U.S. East Coast and the Far East. Under the agreement the competitive positions of both subsidized and unsubsidized carriers would be restructured to some extent. The agreement would have an impact on USL's rates for carrying military cargo. Also, to the extent the agreement would direct the flow of military cargo away from USL and to its competitors, it would affect the volume and character of the cargo carried by USL and their competitors. Quite possibly USL will carry less military cargo than under prior operations and will be inclined to make up the loss by increasing its carriage of commercial cargo.

The exact effect of USL's promise cannot be predicted. However, what USL has foregone has a value and is an element of its competitive viability. Thus the agreement is within the scope of section 15.

The respondents contend that section 15 applies only to those agreements so enumerated which are restrictive, anticompetitive operating arrangements. In their opinion, both the literal language and legislative history reflect that the purpose of section 15 was to insure that the Commission would have an opportunity to approve or disapprove any anticompetitive operations or devices employed by persons subject to the act. Though the agreement in question can be said to have competitive consequences as explained above, to so narrowly interpret section 15 is neither in accordance with the literal language of the section nor recent judicial interpretations. As the Supreme Court said in Volkswagenwerk: “To limit section 15 to agreements that ‘affect competition' * * * simply does not square with the structure of the statute.” 9

The respondents further allege that the stipulation is constitutionally exempt from Commission control or interference on the basis

---

that such stipulation is joint or several representation to the government. SML and USL argue that section 15 cannot be constitutionally read to apply to an “agreement” (by way of settlement or otherwise) which involves nothing but “the making of representations to the Government—the speaking of words to the Congress or any agency.” As authority for their position, respondents cite Eastern Railroads Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); and N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). These cases advance the proposition that concerted political activity designed to influence and promote valid governmental action is a constitutional right exempt from any government control or interference. The respondents, therefore, equate the taking of certain positions before a government agency, i.e. that SML and AMA will stop litigating and that USL will stop asking for something, with protected concerted political activity designed to influence governmental action.

Their argument of constitutionally protected “representations to government” under the facts of the subject proceeding is tenuous at best. The cases cited as precedent by the respondents all speak in some form either to the constitutional right to petition or to inform representatives in government of specific desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws or, as in the N.A.A.C.P. case, to the vindication of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights through litigation. The object and emphasis is on protecting concerted political activity designed to influence and promote valid governmental action.

Notwithstanding respondents’ assertions, the subject stipulation does not involve the “concerted action” envisioned in the constitutional right to petition the government or its representatives. Neither does it involve the right to joint together for the purposes of obtaining judicial redress of constitutionally guaranteed rights. It involves instead individual understandings or agreements which were not submitted to the government or any official with any specific intent of exerting influence to obtain an objective from the government. Respondents’ attempt to refer to the stipulation as the mere “making of representations to government” results in an exercise of semantics which losses sight of the intent of the original grant of constitutional protection.

Respondents also contend that the subject stipulation involves only matters within the sole jurisdiction of the Maritime Subsidy Board—that is the granting or denial of a subsidy and the conclusion of Maritime Administration docket No. S-241. Respondents argue that, under these facts, settlements of issues by agreement are within the exclusive province of the Maritime Subsidy Board under the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 and are governed by the Board's rules. Specifically cited are subpart J, section 201.103, "Opportunity for Agreement of Parties and Settlement of Case," of the rules of practice and procedure of the Maritime Administration which provides for "submission to and consideration by the presiding officer of offers of settlement or proposals of adjustment in all hearings" and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554(c) requiring such a provision of all agencies.

At the same time, however, the respondents agree with petitioner and hearing counsel that a Subsidy Board settlement of litigation incorporating an agreement intended to be within the scope of the Shipping Act, 1916, would not be immune from review and approval by the Federal Maritime Commission. The distinction they make is that the subject stipulation, as part of a settlement of litigation before the Subsidy Board, deals exclusively with litigation before that Board and is therefore solely within Subsidy Board jurisdiction.

As we have indicated we reject respondents' analysis of the stipulation and hold that its effect extends beyond the Subsidy Board proceeding and into those areas under section 15 jurisdiction. It is, in our opinion, a settlement agreement subject to section 15.

In addition, it is well settled that two separate government agencies may each have jurisdictional interests in the same event or transaction or series of events or transactions. The Commission, by exercising jurisdiction over the instant agreement, will in no manner impede the exercise of the Maritime Subsidy Board's jurisdiction to grant or withhold ODS to USL.

Contrary to respondents' assertions, our holding also is not in conflict with the policy of encouraging out of court settlements between litigants. We hold only that a settlement agreement involving section 15 issues must be filed with the Commission independently of its effect on any administrative proceeding before the Subsidy Board. In reaching this result we are mindful of the need for expeditiousness in administrative proceedings. We are not bent on prolonging them, and we are not unwittingly strengthening the arsenal of delaying tactics used by parties from time to time. Speed should not be sought for its own sake; and, when proper surveillance of the industry requires it, this Commission should take the action necessary to promote fair dealing. We should not permit parties to bypass the requirements of the shipping laws through the use of stipulations, settlements or other devices.

10 California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Stockton Port District, 7 FMC 75 (1962) and Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United States, 287 F. 2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961).

14 F.M.C.
We have considered all the arguments of respondents, and any which are not specifically dealt with are rejected as without merit or as immaterial to our decision. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, we hold that the agreement between USL, SML, and AMA is a section 15 agreement and accordingly subject to appropriate filing and approval requirements.

We reach this decision fully aware that in light of United States Lines' recent decision to terminate all government subsidies, the questions presented in this case may, in fact, be no longer of substantive import. However, since the agreement in question involves promises which remain valid regardless of their current practical effect, and, since similar agreements may present similar questions, we have decided this case on the basis of the facts as presented.

Chairman Helen Delich Bentley dissenting:

I dissent from the decision of the other members of the Commission that the subject stipulation is a section 15 agreement and therefore subject to filing and approval by the Commission.

I agree with my colleagues that section 15 confers a broad jurisdictional basis for review by the Commission and that an agreement falling within any one of the seven categories enumerated within the section is subject to our jurisdiction. However, I do not agree that the rather all inclusive language of section 15 should be extended to the agreement in question. It is my opinion that the subject stipulation deals solely with pending and prospective litigation before the Maritime Subsidy Board. The stipulation does nothing but agree upon a settlement of litigation over matters peculiarly within the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, and the authority of the Maritime Administration. The mutual promises of USL, AMA, and SML do not in the least result in any restrictions of their operations. Petitioner and hearing counsel have pointed to no assured commercial effect from the agreement other than speculative assertions that the nature of USL operations vis-a-vis its competitors will change. To the contrary, USL's promise to seek and accept less subsidy payments in the case of military cargo does not restrict or inhibit its rights to solicit or carry such cargo wherever and whenever it chooses and at the rates it chooses. Neither do the promises of SML and AMA restrict or regulate their sailings, rates or charges.

Furthermore, no cooperative working arrangement survives the settlement agreement. No highly sophisticated plan of operations has resulted from the stipulation. Nothing exists requiring coordinated activity which could only be accomplished by a policy of cooperation
followed by arrangements made at the managerial level among the participating parties. Carriers are not going to be dividing cargo or costs. At most, the parties exhibited a "cooperative spirit" of a non-operational nature in order to settle the proceedings before the Subsidy Board. A cooperative spirit does not achieve the status of a cooperative working arrangement that would be included within the scope of section 15.11 This is true particularly in light of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's and the Maritime Administration's rules emphasizing the right of the parties to adjudicatory proceedings to resolve their differences by settlement or compromise. These rights have their basis in a fundamental public policy favoring settlement of litigation and controversy by the parties themselves.

The danger I fear from an indiscriminate broadening of the types of agreements which require approval by this Commission under section 15 is that it will open wider the doorway of delay in the adjudicatory process. Administrative proceedings are particularly susceptible to tactics of delay or expansive adjudication which, in effect, hinders efficient regulation and is contrary to the public interest. Within our own area of regulation, the Commission is well aware of the serious difficulties encountered in international trade and, hence, the shipping industry because of the narrowing of geographic distances in the world with the advent of the fast moving age of containerization and house-to-house transportation. Hence, the Commission cannot continue to perform its regulatory functions in a manner suitable only to slow break-bulk freighters; it must move judiciously but rapidly in its decisionmaking process and cut through the road blocks of irrelevant and obsolete legal procedures. For many years the chief and most severe criticism of regulatory agencies in the fields of transportation and communications has been the charge of overregulation, which discourages and inhibits managerial initiative and in certain areas may have made a substantial contribution to bankruptcy or other financial disasters.

Therefore, it is my opinion that the Commission should invoke its jurisdiction only when the settlement involves an agreement with a definitive and assured commercial effect on the operations of the parties subject to the act. When no operational effect is evident, as in the subject agreement, to require Commission approval is an unwarranted extension of our jurisdiction under the guise of the expansive language employed within section 15.

11 See unapproved section 15 agreements—West Coast South America, 7 FMC 22, 25 (1961).

14 F.M.C.
Certainly, with reference to the current proceeding, it was not the intention of Congress to place the Federal Maritime Commission in a position of reviewing every stipulation, settlement agreement, or position taken with respect to participation in a particular proceeding under the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, before the Maritime Subsidy Board. My point is simply that section 15 should not be interpreted to grant jurisdiction which does not serve the essential purpose of the Shipping Act, 1916.

With regard to the question of concurrent jurisdiction raised by the respondents, it is well settled that two separate government agencies may each have jurisdictional interests in the same event or transaction or series of events or transactions. However, the multiple regulation generally occurs in the operational aspects of the business in question and not in a factual situation similar to the subject proceeding. In reference to the Maritime Administration and the Federal Maritime Commission, there exists recent law both from the Commission and the courts which distinguishes to some extent our overlapping jurisdictional interests. In a case involving Grace Line and Prudential, the Commission replied to a question on subsidies that the question of who should get subsidies was not within its jurisdiction but one properly addressed to the Maritime Administration.\(^\text{12}\)

At the same time the second circuit was deciding the *Sapphire* case, wherein it held that the Maritime Administration must be bound by the decision of its “sister agency,” the Federal Maritime Commission, finding certain now withdrawn rates unfair. That decision has since been affirmed on appeal.\(^\text{13}\)

Both of the above cases indicate that certain limits to the exercise of jurisdiction by the two agencies on the same subject are in order.

Moreover, if the Commission assumes jurisdiction, its action amounts to the rendering of an advisory opinion to the Maritime Subsidy Board as to the award of subsidy and conduct of its hearings. The stipulating parties would be required to suspend 605(c) proceedings and come before the Commission to resolve the legality of the stipulation and then resume section 605(c) hearings. The result would create difficult administrative problems in the practical administration of subsidy proceedings. Therefore, where, as here, the question involves the


granting of subsidies and the conditions under which they are granted and, where section 15 interests are at the most uncertain, it appears to me that an assumption of jurisdiction over the agreement by the Commission is not in accordance with its primary interest in regulation. Section 15 is not intended to, and does not, regulate the subsidy program.

Finally, I concur with my colleagues in their rejection of respondents’ argument that the subject stipulation is constitutionally protected under Noerr and related cases. In addition, I also recognize that resolution of the questions presented may have limited effect in light of United States Lines’ decision to forego any further government subsidies.

In summary, then, my position is that section 15 does not speak to an agreement with which we are concerned. The Commission’s jurisdiction under section 15 does not extend, in my opinion, to settlement agreements before other agencies involving solely nonoperational matters of pending or prospective litigation before that body.

Francis C. Hurney, Secretary.

[seal]

14 F.M.C.
Agreement No. T-2390 of the New York Shipping Association, providing an assessment formula to meet certain obligations in collective bargaining agreements with the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, when subjected to certain modifications, found not to be unjustly discriminatory nor unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, or importers, nor to be otherwise unlawful in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916. Agreement No. T-2390, as modified herein, is hereby approved.

Alfred Giardino, C. P. Lambos, and Gerald A. Bodner for respondents, the New York Shipping Association and its members.

Edward D. Ransom for intervener, the Pacific Maritime Association.


Ronald A. Capone, John Williams, and Russel T. Weil for intervener, Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc.


Alan F. Wohlstetter and Ernest H. Land for interveners, the United Fruit Co. and Wallenius Line.

Herbert Rubin and Cecelia H. Goetz for intervener, Wolfsburger Transport-Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Robert M. Vorsanger and Frederick M. Porter for interveners, American Sugar Co. and the American Sugar Refining Co. of New York.

Land Service, Inc., Hamburg America Line and North German Lloyd.  
William Warner for intervener, Wilford & McKay, Inc.  
Samuel H. Moerman, Arthur L. Win, Jr. and F. A. Mulhern for intervener, the Port of New York Authority.  
Mario F. Escudero, Dennis N. Barnes, Edward Aptaker, and Robert A. Peavy for intervener, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  
Robert Foerster and Aaron Silverman as hearing counsel for intervener, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.  
Norman D. Kline and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel for the Federal Maritime Commission.

REPORT

By the Commission (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners.)

We instituted this proceeding pursuant to section 22 of the Shipping Act 1916, to determine whether an agreement (T–2390), providing for assessment at a combined man-hours/tonnage basis for raising money for fringe benefit obligations of the New York Shipping Association, Inc. (NYSA) to the longshoremen of the Port of New York, should be approved, disapproved, or modified pursuant to section 15 (46 U.S.C. 814). Numerous parties, many of whom actively participated in the proceeding, intervened. In an initial decision served August 13, 1970, examiner Charles E. Morgan concluded that agreement No. T–2390, with certain modifications, should be approved.

Exceptions were filed by NYSA, Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc. (TTT), Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), and United States Lines, Inc. (U.S. Lines), Wallenius Line (Wallenius), Wolfsburger Transport-Gesellschaft m.b.H. (Wobtrans), 13 breakbulk carriers,¹ the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and hearing counsel. All of these parties replied to the exceptions including United Fruit Co. (United Fruit), who seek affirmation of the examiner's decision insofar as it

relates to the assessment of bananas under the agreement. Oral argument was held on October 14, 1970.

We have considered the exceptions of the parties and find that they are essentially a reargument of positions and issues which were fully briefed and treated by the examiner in his initial decision. Upon careful examination of the record, and the briefs and argument of counsel, we conclude that in the main the examiner's disposition of these positions and issues was well founded and proper. We find ourselves in disagreement, however, with the examiner’s treatment of automobiles, trucks, and buses and his placement of only the northbound trade from Puerto Rico to the Port of New York in the “excepted cargo” category of the agreement.²

Generally, few exceptions were taken to the findings of fact upon which the examiner based his conclusions with respect to agreement No. T–2390.³ Furthermore, a careful analysis and consideration of all exceptions reveal that there is no meaningful disagreement between the parties as to the facts concerned. Differences go, in the main, to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom and the interpretation of the law applicable thereto. Accordingly, we adopt the examiner’s statement of facts and we further conclude that the examiner’s decision, which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, is well founded and proper and, except for his conclusions with respect to automobiles and the Puerto Rico trade, we hereby adopt it as our own.⁴

²The examiner's conditions numbered 2 and 5.
³For example, the breakbulk carriers state:
As is apparent from the above exceptions, we take issue with some of the examiner’s conclusions; we are virtually in complete agreement, however, with his comprehensive and accurate statement of the facts.
⁴NYSA, in its preliminary statement, notes:
Other than with respect to the limited exceptions set forth above, NYSA fully endorses the examiner’s ultimate findings and conclusions in this complex and critical case involving some 2,255 transcript pages and 69 detailed exhibits entered by NYSA and 14 separate intervenors. The examiner has lucidly and fully set forth in his factual findings the history and necessity for T–2390.
Wobtrans observes:
So far as automobiles are concerned, the critical facts for the most part are not in dispute, although many find no reflection in the initial decision.
On the other hand, the exceptions of Seatrain and U.S. Lines announce:
Basically, Seatrain and U.S. Lines except to the entire decision from the first page listing appearances to the last page.
⁴At this point, the examiner’s initial decision, a copy of which is attached hereto, should be read in full, since the discussion of our conclusions which differ from the Examiner’s assumes, to some extent at least, a prior reading of his decision.
AGREEMENT NO. T-2336

THE PUERTO RICAN TRADE

The examiner would require that cargoes northbound from Puerto Rico to the Port of New York be treated under the “excepted cargo” provision of the agreement. He concluded that the “facts and circumstances of record” provide “some considerable justification” for placing a portion of the trade into the preferred status. We agree that the facts and circumstances of record provide justification for special treatment of this trade but would extend the excepted status to the entire trade, not merely the northbound segment.

Generally, those opposing any special treatment for this trade argue that any modification of the agreement would create an undesirable trade approach to the industry-wide assessment problem, that the trade is neither marginal nor subjected to land transportation competition or diversion, and that a substantial additional burden would be required of other carriers in the industry.

Those parties supporting the view that the entire Puerto Rican trade be treated at the reduced rate of assessment claim that the trade is unique in that it is dependent upon low-cost transportation and any increase in costs would have an adverse effect upon its exporting industries, the increased burden of $0.93 per ton for shortfall costs under the present agreement is unwarranted and unfair, that if relief were granted to the entire Puerto Rican trade, the added costs in other trades would be no greater than $0.07 or $0.09 per ton and there is no evidence concerning the net impact of this increase upon any breakbulk or other foreign trade carrier.

---

6 The examiner described the term as follows:

“Excepted cargo” under agreement No. T-2390 is all domestic cargo (limited to that moving in the domestic, coastal or intercoastal trade of the United States, but not including cargo moving “to” Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, or any other point outside the continental limits of the United States), all lumber at lumber terminals, bulk cargo (including scrap and sugar), and passengers and their personal baggage.

Excepted cargo is excepted from the regular man-hour and tonnage assessments (described herein below) of No. T-2390, and in place thereof, payments or assessments on excepted cargo shall be made on the basis of the then-existing man-hour assessment in effect for pension ($0.70), welfare and clinics ($0.415), guaranteed annual income (GAI) ($0.555), and NYSA administration ($0.04), but not any payment for “shortfall,” or a total of $1.71 per man-hour, for the contract year through Sept. 30, 1970. Thereafter in the next contract year excepted cargo would pay or be assessed additional amounts per hour in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement escalations effective Oct. 1, 1970. Excepted cargo shall also continue to pay any royalty which may be applicable.

The figure above of $1.71 per hour plus $0.699 per hour for vacations and holidays (the vacations and holidays are not directly in issue herein) results in a total for excepted cargoes of $2.409 per hour for the contract year 1969-70. This figure of $2.409, or $2.41, is often referred to in the record as the total man-hour assessment for that year for “excepted cargo.” For the 1970-71 year, the man-hour assessments for “excepted cargo” would total $1.84, plus $0.719 for vacations and holidays, or a total of $2.559. These so-called “excepted cargo man-hour assessment totals do not include certain assessments for “shortfall.”
It is our view that while the examiner was justified in granting special treatment to a portion of the Puerto Rico trade, he did not go far enough and that the very factors which lead him to grant his limited relief require similar treatment for the entire trade.

This trade, fully containerized now and almost completely so well before the 40 million man-hour basis was implemented, has provided a steady growth for years resulting in increased work opportunities. Tied to this is the fact that the assessment under excepted cargo status provides for rate of reimbursement to the ILA for every item of increased labor costs with the exception of "shortfall." 7

Evidently, the examiner's decision to limit special treatment of this trade was influenced by his conclusion that:

Some trades may appear to be more responsible than other trades, for example, for segmented problems, such as the shortfall of hours worked. But, for the industry benefit in not having to stuff and strip all containers, and for many other benefits to NYSA as an industry, the conclusion must be made that on the whole we are dealing with overall industry problems, with industry benefits, and with industry obligations and liabilities.

But here in our view lies the critical area of dispute; i.e., treatment of the segmented problem of shortfall 8 as applied to this particular trade. The record establishes that this trade, while responsible for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Short tons</th>
<th>Assessable tons</th>
<th>Man-hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>566,000</td>
<td>808,600</td>
<td>(1')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>602,000</td>
<td>860,000</td>
<td>(1')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>677,000</td>
<td>967,100</td>
<td>(1')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>802,000</td>
<td>1,145,700</td>
<td>(1')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>897,000</td>
<td>1,281,400</td>
<td>504,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,126,000</td>
<td>1,608,600</td>
<td>633,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,166,000</td>
<td>1,664,700</td>
<td>655,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,356,000</td>
<td>1,937,100</td>
<td>762,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,465,000</td>
<td>2,078,600</td>
<td>818,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,097,000</td>
<td>2,424,300</td>
<td>954,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,841,000</td>
<td>2,630,000</td>
<td>1,003,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 N/A = Not Applicable.

---

6 Exhibit show the following:

""Shortfall" is that item of annual expense attributed to the failure of the Port of New York to obtain a total of 40 million man-hours of labor. The examiner found:

For a number of contract years, from October 1963 through September 1968, there were at least 40,000,000 or close to 40,000,000 man-hours per year of longshore labor in the Port of New York. For the contract year, Oct. 1, 1968, to Sept. 30, 1969, there were 33,935,416 man-hours, a substantial decline, but included in this period were 56 days of the longshoremen's strike.

The examiner also concludes that "shortfall is only one small part of the overall picture hereina, and shortfall has been greatly exaggerated as a controlling factor in determining the proper assessment herein."
other items of labor costs, did not cause the shortfall. If we approved the agreement without the modification, then the increased burden placed upon the Puerto Rican trade would amount to a shortfall "tax" of $0.93 per ton. Technological advances should bear only their appropriate share of the costs they impose on labor and other aspects of the trades in which the advances are implemented. Where pioneering innovators are no longer responsible for such costs, they should not be burdened with costs properly allocable elsewhere. To require otherwise would place a penalty rather than a premium on innovation.

In partially exempting the trade the examiner was quite obviously concerned with the employment and economy of Puerto Rico and with the "Fomento" industrialization program fully described by him in his initial decision. We think the examiner's consideration of these factors was proper, but we are compelled to view these factors and the record as a whole as clearly establishing the adverse effect the present agreement would have upon the entire trade, both northbound and southbound.

We have in the past recognized the peculiar status of the Puerto Rican economy and its dependence upon low-cost ocean transportation, as hearing counsel and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have pointed out in their support for "excepting" the entire trade. We ourselves have said:

Puerto Rico is dependent upon the United States, not only for basic consumer goods, but also for the raw, intermediate, and finished products required in connection with Operation Bootstrap. In order to keep the cost of living within the limited means of its people and to insure the growth of Operation Bootstrap, Puerto Rico must have ocean rates maintained at the lowest reasonable levels. Reduction in Freight Rates on Automobiles—North Atlantic Coast Ports to Puerto Rico, 8 F.M.C. 404, 409 (1965). (See also Reduced Rates on Machinery and Tractors from United States Atlantic Ports to Ports in Puerto Rico, 9 F.M.C. 465 (1966)).

Accordingly, we believe that all cargoes to and from Puerto Rico and the Port of New York should be treated under the "excepted cargo" status provided under the excepted cargo provision of the agreement.

For example, the examiner found: Of particular interest in this Puerto Rican trade is the commonwealth's so-called "Fomento" program of industrial promotion. Principal products of Fomento plants in Puerto Rico are apparel, and fabricated metal and electrical products. These items, when transported to the Port of New York, then sell in highly competitive markets, vulnerable both to import as well as to domestic competition.

Our decision here includes automobiles, trucks, and buses moving in this trade for the same reasons set out above.
The examiner concluded that “Agreement No. T-2390 should be amended in its tonnage definition of tons of automobiles, trucks, and buses to specify calculation at 18 percent instead of 20 percent of the cubic measurement of the vehicles”\(^{11}\). After a detailed recitation of the facts, positions and the actual costs involved under the agreement, he stated:

Based on all the facts herein, and using our best judgment of the charges and benefits, which cannot be finely and precisely related, a fairer assessment herein on automobiles would be one based on 18 percent of measurement tons. This would reduce the cost of the tonnage portion of the formula under No. T-2390 by 10 percent, or by 21.4 cents per automobile, and there is testimony of record that in volume carriage of automobiles, cents per auto are important. The resulting costs would be, as estimated herein, $2.86 per auto for lift-on/lift-off ships and $2.38 per auto for ro-ro ships.

Wobtrans, in their exceptions, contend that “changing the tonnage definition of automobiles from 20 percent to 18 percent of measurement tonnage in no way cures the basic inequities in T-2390. It still leaves fringe labor costs for automobiles substantially higher than breakbulk.” Wallenius \(^{12}\) submits that:

\* \* \* should automobiles moving in the Puerto Rican trade by excepted from the T-2390 formula, automobiles moving in the European trade should likewise be so excepted and furthermore, that should the Puerto Rican trade be excepted on the basis that it has not contributed to the shortfall the application of this standard also requires that automobiles be excepted since they have not contributed to the shortfall either.

NYSA and the breakbulk carriers contend that the automobile assessment definition contained in the agreement should be approved. NYSA point out that both Wallenius and Wobtrans have assessment ton productivity “between 3\(\frac{1}{2}\) to more than 7 times that of the average breakbulk operators”. The breakbulk operators claim that the examiner’s reduction from 20 percent to 18 percent of cubic measurement results in a per ton charge to Volkswagen at the low end of the scale under T-2390. They point to the following costs per ton comparisons:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Breakbulk} & \$3.02 \\
\text{Container} & 1.60 \\
\text{Ro/Ro} & 1.54 \\
\text{Volkswagen} & .35 \\
\text{Volkswagen (as modified by examiner)} & .33
\end{array}
\]

\(^{11}\) Agreement No. T-2390 limits the assessment of these commodities to tons defined as 20 percent of cubic measurement.

\(^{12}\) Wallenius Line has already passed on to its shippers the additional costs under the agreement by use of tariff amendments which provide for refunds appropriate to relief granted by us.
Our review of the record here leaves us unconvinced that the 20 percent of measurement tonnage used to assess automobiles is unfair. The considerations prompting our treatment of automobiles in the Puerto Rican trade are simply not the same as those involving the assessment of automobiles in other trades. The prime factor here is the significantly higher productivity in the handling of automobiles vis-a-vis breakbulk operations. Furthermore, the additional costs to both Wallenius and Wobtrans under the agreement are not substantial in our view and are, in any event, offset by the substantial benefits applicable to automobile carriers. We have carefully viewed each of the arguments put forth by the parties, and on the basis of this record we believe that automobiles, trucks, and buses as treated under Agreement No. T-2390 should be approved as submitted.

ALASKA AND HAWAII, AND BANANAS

A review of the exceptions taken to the examiner’s treatment of the Alaska and Hawaii trades and the banana interests reveals them to be nothing more than a reargument of contentions rejected by the examiner in his initial decision. Our analysis and consideration of the record convinces us that the examiner’s conclusions on these issues were well founded, proper, and solidly based upon the evidence of record.

The examiner also concluded that approval of the agreement is subject to the condition that it be modified “to provide that bananas be calculated at 55 percent of cubic measurements of the boxes in which the bananas are shipped as part of the tonnage definition of the agreement.” United Fruit, representing the only banana interests participating in this proceeding, although seeking “excepted” status, concluded that the “** Examiner’s approach of modifying the tonnage definition for bananas under T-2390 constituted an equitable resolution of the controversy.” We conclude that the examiner’s treatment of this commodity is correct and our review of the record shows it to be well founded and proper.13

---

13 The examiner also treated in the last few pages of his decision a number of contentions styled as “miscellaneous arguments” advanced in this proceeding. Most of the exceptions dealing with this portion of the decision were raised in the joint briefs of Seatrain and U.S. Lines. We are in complete accord with the examiner in his treatment of each of these contentions.

The only “new” argument was raised by Seatrain and U.S. Lines concerning our decision in docket 68-10, Inter-American Freight Conference Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 14 FMC 58 (8/20/70). They claim that since the agreement is opposed by three lines the Commission lacks jurisdiction ab initio. We have already rejected this contention on Mar. 11, 1970, and find nothing in our recent decision to alter our views. In that proceeding, we did not even have a semblance of an agreement before us as all parties except one either withdrew or opposed the agreements. Here, the by-laws
For the foregoing reasons, and with the exceptions noted herein, we will adopt the examiner's decision as our own. An order will be issued approving Agreement No. T-2390, appropriately modified as required herein.

[Seal]

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

of the NYSA provide that a majority vote is sufficient to support the adoption of the agreement, as was fully discussed by the examiner.

We find the examiner's conclusions well founded and proper, and accordingly we adopt them as our own. One further comment is needed that the examiner treated a petition for a declaratory order which procedurally may only be decided by us (46 CFR 502.63). In any event, we agree with his disposition of that order. All pending motions (including those submitted after the rendering of the initial decision) are hereby denied for the same reasons set forth by the examiner.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 69-57

AGREEMENT No. T-2336—NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION, COOPERATIVE WORKING ARRANGEMENT

ORDER

The Federal Maritime Commission having instituted this proceeding to determine whether we should approve, disapprove, or modify a certain assessment agreement adopted, in accordance with the by-laws of, and by the membership of, the New York Shipping Association, Inc. (NYSA), and the Commission having this date made and entered its report adopting the examiner's initial decision (except as to certain modifications of the subject agreement), which report and initial decision are made a part hereof by reference;

Therefore, it is ordered, That pursuant to section 15, Shipping Act, 1916, Agreement No. T-2390, as modified herein, is approved effective October 1, 1969.

It is further ordered, That NYSA within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, submit to the Commission a report containing the manner and method adopted by NYSA to accomplish such adjustments, if any, in the assessments, as are made necessary by the terms and conditions of the approval of T-2390 granted herein.

By the Commission.

[SEAL]

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 69-57

AGREEMENT No. T-2336—NEW YORK SHIPPING ASSOCIATION,
COOPERATIVE WORKING ARRANGEMENT

Agreement No. T-2390 of the New York Shipping Association, providing an
assessment formula to meet certain obligations in collective bargaining
agreements with the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO,
when subjected to certain modifications, found not to be unjustly discrimina-
tory nor unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, or importers, nor
to be otherwise unlawful in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916. Agreement
No. T-2390, as modified, approved.

Alfred Giardino, C. P. Lambos, and Gerald A. Bodner for respondents, the New York Shipping Association and its members.

Edward D. Ransom for intervener, the Pacific Maritime Association.

Stanley O. Sher and Joseph Adams for interveners, States Marine
Lines, Inc., Isthmian Line, Inc., A/B Atlanttrafik, Barber Lines,
Concordia Lines, Hellenic Lines, Ltd., Hoegh Lines, Meyer Line,
Moller Steamship Co., Inc., Nedlloyd Lines, Norwegian America Line,
Blue Sea Line, and Marchessini Lines.

Ronald A. Capone, John Williams, and Russel T. Weil for inter-
vener, Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc.

Neal M. Mayer and Marvin J. Coles for interveners, Seatrain Lines,
Inc., and United States Lines, Inc.

Alan F. Wohlstetter and Ernest H. Land for interveners, the United
Fruit Co. and Wallenius Line.

Herbert Rubin and Cecelia H. Goetz for intervener, Wolfsburger
Transport-Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Robert M. Vorsanger and Frederick M. Porter for interveners, American Sugar Co. and the American Sugar Refining Co. of New
York.

Walter E. Maloney, Gerald A. Malia, and Bradley R. Coury for
interveners, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Atlantic Con-
tainer Line, Dart Steamship Co., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., Sea-
Land Service, Inc., Hamburg America Line, and North German Lloyd.

William Warner for intervener, Wilford & McKay, Inc.

Samuel H. Moerman, Arthur L. Winn, Jr., and F. A. Mulhern for intervener, the Port of New York Authority.

Mario F. Escudero, Dennis N. Barnes, and Robert A. Peavy for intervener, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Robert Foerster and Aaron Silverman as hearing counsel for intervener, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Norman D. Kline and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel for the Federal Maritime Commission.

Initial Decision of Charles E. Morgan, Presiding Examiner ¹

By order of investigation served November 28, 1969, this proceeding was instituted pursuant to section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the act), to determine whether the Commission should approve, disapprove, or modify a certain new assessment agreement adopted, in accordance with the by-laws of, and by the membership of, the New York Shipping Association, Inc. (NYSA).

Hearing in this proceeding was held in February and in March 1970, in New York City, and in May 1970, in Washington, D.C. Numerous interveners entered the proceeding from time to time both before and after the commencement of the hearing. For example, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico petitioned to intervene on March 4, 1970, and Wallenius Line on March 9, 1970. Most of the direct testimony is in the form of written statements or exhibits. All of the record has been considered carefully, with a view open to all possible solutions of this assessment problem consistent with the requirements of the law.

There were three NYSA assessment agreements subject to this proceeding since the inception of this case, but the assessment agreement now in issue (Agreement No. T–2390), to which the testimony of record substantially all is directed, provides a combined man-hours/tonnage basis for raising the moneys for certain fringe benefit obligations of NYSA to the longshoremen of the Port of New York. When the hearing had started, the agreement then in issue, No. T–2364, provided a tonnage basis of assessment, rather than the combination basis now in issue.

¹ This decision became the decision of the Commission Nov. 18, 1970.

14 F.M.C.
The need for this new combined man-hours/tonnage basis of assessment largely was brought on by containerization, at least indirectly if not directly. As containerization increased in the Port of New York, the old method of assessment on a man-hours basis became outmoded by the needs of the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (ILA or the Union), and by the resulting needs of NYSA.

Prior to the present three agreements of NYSA, none of the older man-hours based assessment agreements or none of the cooperative working arrangements regarding assessments has been filed for approval of the Commission because until the decision of the Supreme Court in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261 (1968), it had been believed generally that assessment agreements of the nature of the one here in issue were not subject to section 15 of the act.

The necessity for a change in the assessment method was recognized unanimously by the membership of NYSA on October 1, 1968, by a resolution which provided that the old system of allocation of the expenses of pensions, welfare, and clinics, guaranteed annual wage, and NYSA operating expenses, solely on the man-hours basis, would be discontinued, and that a new system would take effect as of October 1, 1968.

Whereas the present labor contract of NYSA with the ILA provides that payments, or contributions paid by the employers, to the Welfare Fund, to the Medical and Clinical Services Fund, and to the Pension Trust Fund, will be at set rates in cents per man-hour and at a set minimum of 40 million hours, there is nothing in the labor contract restricting NYSA in its method of collection of the needed moneys from its members. In other words, except for past customs, NYSA is free to use any appropriate and lawful method which it chooses to assess its members to obtain the necessary moneys for fringe benefit payments. The Union also held the view that NYSA could assess its members on any basis, man-hours, tonnage, or otherwise.

When the 1968-71 labor contract was ratified unanimously by the members of NYSA on February 14, 1969, it was done with the general understanding of the membership, the Labor Policy Committee, and the Board of Directors of NYSA that there would be some reallocation of the fringe benefits assessment in order to transfer some of this cost from the breakbulk operators to the innovators. During the course of contract negotiations, on many occasions, the Union had stated a desire to become involved in the question of assignability of costs among the members of NYSA. Also, the Union, at the time of ratification of the labor contract, and later, recognized that the man-hours burden on the breakbulk segment of the NYSA industry
should be eased. When the first year of the new contract ended on September 30, 1969, the Union took a stronger and more insistent position, and in effect said:

You told us during the negotiations that you were going to make your own allocations, that when we raised the issue of what we considered to be necessary protection for breakbulk carriers that you would take care of that reallocation among yourselves and we should let you do it.

However, after the labor contract was signed the atmosphere within and among the segments of NYSA changed, and the reallocation or change in the man-hours method of assessment was low in being realized.

In fact, for the entire first year of the new contract, and for part of the second year of the contract, the old man-hours basis of assessments was continued. It was not until some time after the Commission on March 11, 1970, gave its conditional approval of Agreement No. T–2390, that a new method of assessment began to be implemented. The Commission stayed its conditional approval on April 9, 1970, but lifted the stay on April 14, 1970.

Containerization began to be a problem in the labor relations affecting the Port of New York in the late 1950’s. The ILA’s complaints began in 1958 when there was arbitration involving Railway Express containers to Europe. Containerization was an important issue in the 1959 labor negotiations with the ILA. During the period 1960–68, containerization of cargo increased every year. There were many labor disputes resulting from the threat to longshore job opportunities, many grievances, work stoppages, and arbitrations, and much litigation caused by containerization. Strikes and strife were interposed during the whole period between 1958 and 1968.

Containerization has increased substantially over the years. In 1968 it represented 8,500,000 tons out of about 25 million tons of general cargo moved in the Port of New York. By the end of the present labor contract on September 30, 1971, it is evident that more tons will be moved in the Port of New York by containerization than by the breakbulk method. In the last year of the contract it is estimated that 12,880,000 tons will move by containerships carrier, out of a total of 28,591,517 tons, with 11,624,439 tons moving by breakbulk carriers. The balance of the tonnage is estimated as 3,427,078 tons by unitized carriers and 660,000 tons by roll-on/roll-off carriers (ro-ro).

Unitized carriers are those using pallets and other similar means, which are somewhat more efficient or more productive in loading and unloading tons per man-hour, than are the conventional breakbulk
carriers. Ro-ro ships are those on which motorized vehicles are driven on and off usually under their own motive power, or are rolled on and off using their own wheels, rather than being lifted on and lifted off the ship. Vehicles, etc., transported on the very advanced ro-ro ship, the Ponce de Leon, of Transamerican Trailer Transport (TTT), include not only automobiles, trucks, and buses, but also such equipment on wheels as construction cranes, bulldozers, and agricultural vehicles. This ship handles a very substantial number of wheeled cargo trailers, which are pulled on and off the ship by the cab-tractors parts of the trailer-trucks. The tractors do not go on the deep sea voyages. Different tractors are utilized on the New York and Puerto Rican ends of a voyage.

As each month passes, more containerships are entering the Port of New York, and more jobs for longshoremen are lost. As an example, United States Lines is converting a number of ships from breakbulk vessels to full container vessels, with an estimated loss of a million man-hours of longshore labor per year.

The New York-Puerto Rican trade in 1958 was entirely breakbulk, and generated 1,250,000 man-hours of longshore labor per year (based on 650,000 revenue or assessable tons divided by an estimated average productivity on breakbulk cargoes of 0.52 tons per man-hour for loading or discharging). Today this trade is fully containerized, and generates substantially less man-hours (about 1,003,700 man-hours estimated for 1969). This, of course, is not the whole Puerto Rican story. So-called assessable tons in this trade have grown tremendously from 650,000 in 1958 to 2,630,000 in 1969, and the man-hours have increased in recent years. The man-hours figures of record in exhibit 15 for the years 1963 through 1968 are somewhat underestimated because the containership estimated average productivity of 2.54 tons per man-hour was used in the calculations, despite the fact that some breakbulk carriers remained in the trade in these years. But, the general trend of the figures is correct, in that man-hours are increasing in recent years because of the increased tonnages. In any event, it is improper to ignore the history of this trade, and for proper perspective we must look back as far as 1958.

Any single carrier may say that it entered this Puerto Rican trade in May 1968, and was not responsible for any shortage or “shortfall” of man-hours worked in the trade because such hours increased from 1968 onwards. This overlooks the fact that longshoremen are industry employees (they may work 2 days in a week for one carrier and 3 days for another carrier), and the fact that the labor negotiations and labor problems of NYSA–ILA at the Port of New York have
been and must be dealt with on an industry, rather than on a carrier-by-carrier basis. Also a few years cannot be isolated from the many years over which the labor problems have developed.

Bull Line, a breakbulk carrier, was the dominant carrier in this Puerto Rican trade until 1961, and discontinued service in 1962. Alcoa, a breakbulk operator, discontinued its services in 1965, and American Union Transport (AUT) ceased its breakbulk operations in 1968, when its principal owner became the principal owner of TTT, and TTT commenced its roll-on/roll-off operations in this trade. Motorships of Puerto Rico, which had conducted a breakbulk operation northbound and handled automobiles almost exclusively southbound, discontinued its services in the Puerto Rican trade in 1968. With containerized carriers replacing these breakbulk carriers, the result was, as seen above, fewer longshore hours in 1968 than in 1958.

In Puerto Rico this problem of reduced man-hours caused by the switch to containerships, or the problem of a potential loss of man-hours in other Puerto Rican trades, has been recognized in another way, in that the wages for discharging and loading containerships ($4.25 per hour), are substantially higher than the wages for discharging and loading breakbulk ships ($2.71 per hour). Breakbulk ships still operate to and from Puerto Rico in other trades. Of course, loaders and unloaders of containerized cargoes may tend to be more skilled laborers than those loading or unloading breakbulk cargoes.

Also pertinent to the equities of the New York-Puerto Rican trade, is the fact that for the 12 years since 1958, despite substantial increases in wages and other costs of operation of ocean carriers, there have been no general increases in the freight rates of the ocean carriers. It may reasonably be assumed that in more recent past years, because the New York-Puerto Rican trade was fully containerized and thereby enjoyed high productivity ratios of tonnages loaded and discharged to man-hours of labor used, that perhaps this trade was in the past underassessed for certain fringe benefit labor costs levied on the man-hours basis alone, in relation to other trades not fully containerized and not enjoying the same high productivity ratios. Therefore, any new assessment, such as in No. T-2390, cannot be considered solely on the basis of its relation to past assessments, but must be considered on the basis of whether the new assessment is reasonable considering all factors which are pertinent. Even though in the 1964 labor contract, there may have been less emphasis on the effect of the containerization, there was so much stress on this factor in the 1968 negotiations, that we must consider the entire history of containerization in the Puerto Rican trade.
In each of the ILA-NYSA labor contract negotiations between 1959 and 1968, the ILA demanded that all containers be stuffed and stripped on the piers by ILA labor. By other concessions, the NYSA was able to forestall this demand, but by 1968, containerization had grown to such an extent that the ILA had to be satisfied in some way on this issue. The ILA had seen the breakbulk operators in the Puerto Rican trade almost completely disappear; the ILA was witnessing the springing-up of many new container services in the North Atlantic; and it saw many new large container and ro-ro ships arrive in the Port of New York, to be worked by one-fifth or less of the man-hours of labor used by the ships which were displaced. To the ILA and its members, this meant that the 1968 negotiations had to be utilized to obtain full protection from the effects of containerization on job opportunities.

The 1968 demands of the ILA included many designed to blunt the effect of containerization on longshoremen's jobs, including:

(a) All containers to be stuffed and stripped on the piers by ILA labor.
(b) All containers to be unloaded from vessels before a single container could be loaded on vessels (contrary to the existing practices, and thereby cutting productivity about in half).
(c) A minimum of three gangs of longshoremen to be employed on containerships (in lieu of the existing freedom of the employer to use as few as men as he needed, probably only one or two gangs).
(d) The $1 a ton container royalty to be increased to $4 a ton.

In addition to the demands above, the ILA also demanded in 1968 that there be increased pensions, an early retirement and a 40-hour guaranteed workweek every week of the year. In justification for these additional demands, the ILA also insisted that the effect of containerization on job opportunities made these demands necessary.

The ILA also demanded that the container lines pick up a greater share of the costs of labor benefits than before, in order to assure the continuance of sufficient contributions to meet the obligations of the ILA to the longshoremen. On this matter, NYSA took the position that the problem of meeting the costs of the labor benefits and the resultant allocations of assessments as between breakbulk and container operators was an internal concern for NYSA, and that the Union should not interfere. NYSA felt, among other reasons, that if there were to be two labor contracts negotiated, or if there were carrier-by-carrier labor contracts, that the Union would be in a position to whipsaw the carrier members of NYSA to their great disadvantage. Finally, the ILA after raising this assessment allocation issue many times withdrew its demand, and thereby allowed NYSA to handle
and settle the matter internally. Needless to say, internal NYSA settlement of the problem of allocation of assessments did not come easily, and this proceeding was the ultimate result.

The NYSA industry was able to trade off each of the ILA’s demands which specifically would have restricted containers. However, the resulting 1968–71 labor agreement contained the following new industry obligations, which were to be imposed on all carriers, whether containerized, ro-ro, breakbulk, unitized, or otherwise:

(a) A greatly increased pension.
(b) An early retirement.
(c) A guaranteed annual income (GAI) based on 2,080 hours a year.
(d) A 40-million hour basis of guaranteed contributions to the pension, and to the welfare and clinics funds.

To meet these new expenses, it was only natural that NYSA should come up with some new method of assessment which would fairly distribute the burden of the new contract, and as seen, the NYSA membership unanimously agreed on October 1, 1968, to come up with a new method not so based on man-hours. This action was taken even prior to the unanimous ratification by NYSA members of the ILA labor contract, which ratification occurred on February 14, 1969. Of course, after the ratification of the labor contract, and with assessments “temporarily” being collected on the old man-hour basis, at least some containership carriers presumably were not unhappy with any delays in reaching a permanent assessment formula on some basis other than a sole man-hours basis. Contrary-wise, the Breakbulk carriers were unhappy with the delay in agreeing to a new formula.

In the same 1968–71 labor contract, the NYSA industry obtained certain benefits from the ILA in return for the increased NYSA obligations. The NYSA benefits were:

(a) Rules on containers which permitted most containers (other than those containers with less-than-truckloads or with consolidated loads) to move freely without stuffing or stripping.
(b) An assured labor supply (by agreement to open the longshoremen’s register).
(c) Mobility of the work force (between Port areas, etc.).
(d) Prior day ordering, of certain men to report for work.
(e) Control of the work force (better disciplinary arrangements).
(f) A labor contract of 3 years (instead of one year or two).

NYSA and its members are respondents in this proceeding. Also, some of the members of NYSA are interveners and are represented by their own counsel herein. In the present posture of this proceeding there are three member interveners vigorously opposing approval by
the Commission of the combined man-hours/tonnage assessment agreement in its present form, namely, TTT, Seatrian Lines, Inc. (Seatrian), and United States Lines, Inc. (U.S. Lines). There are other opposing interveners not members of NYSA, but affected by the terms of any assessment agreement adopted by NYSA, inasmuch as these interveners directly or indirectly pay for certain costs of loading and discharging vessels, including costs which are affected by the assessment agreement herein. These interveners are the United Fruit Co. (United Fruit), an importer of bananas, Wallenius Line (Wallenius) an ocean carrier of motor vehicles, and Wolfsburger Transport-Gesellschaft m.b.H. (Wobtrans), also a carrier of motor vehicles.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico opposes approval of the agreement insofar as it believes that the new assessment formula discriminates against member carriers of NYSA operating between New York and Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth supports the so-called “excepted cargo” treatment (see below) for the Puerto Rican trade. There are only three carriers in this Puerto Rican trade, namely, TTT, Seatrian, and Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land). The principal carrier in this Puerto Rican trade (about 60 percent of cargoes), which carrier is Sea-Land, does not oppose the assessment agreement presently filed for approval.

The order of investigation provided that any modification of the assessment agreement first filed herein, or any further temporary or permanent assessment agreement to be filed herein, would be subject to this investigation. There were two prior filed agreements subject to this proceeding, namely this proceeding's title agreement, Agreement No. T-2336, adopted by NYSA members on September 29, 1969, a so-called “temporary” agreement, and Agreement No. T-2364, adopted by NYSA members on December 19, 1969, a so-called “permanent” agreement. But these two earlier agreements were superseded by Agreement No. T-2390, the present permanent agreement, adopted by NYSA members on February 26, 1970, which provides an assessment formula on the combined man-hours/tonnage basis.

The temporary No. T-2336 was largely on a man-hour basis, except that so-called “shortfall” of contributions to certain funds, not caused by strike or economic recession, was to have been assessed only against container cargo tonnage. Agreement No. T-2364, the first permanent agreement, provided a tonnage basis as the sole method assessment on most cargoes, measuring automobiles at 25 percent of cubic tons. This agreement placed in an “excepted cargo” status other cargoes such as bulk scrap and sugar, and coastwise and intercoastal cargoes (on a man-hour basis, plus royalty where applicable).
When Agreement No. T-2364 with its tonnage assessment of $2.07 per ton, as estimated for the October 1, 1969, to September 30, 1970, contract year, was the agreement of NYSA filed for approval herein, it was opposed by the containership operator segment of NYSA membership virtually unanimously. Agreement No. T-2364 was adopted by a 35–17 vote. Agreement No. T-2364, with its tonnage assessment basis, had been supported vigorously by the conventional breakbulk-ship operators segment of NYSA members.

But, when the combined man-hours/tonnage formula of Agreement No. T-2390 became the outstanding agreement filed for approval herein, most of the containership members of NYSA ceased their opposition. At that time, interveners Sea-Land, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Atlantic Container Line, Dart Steamship Co., More-McCormack Lines, Inc., Hamburg America Lines, and North German Lloyd withdrew from active participation in this proceeding.

Almost all of the breakbulk members, as well as most of the containership members of NYSA granted their support, though reluctantly, to Agreement No. T-2390, when the membership vote was taken. Agreement No. T-2390 was adopted by a 58–3 vote. The three noes were TTT, Seatrain and U.S. Lines. Two breakbulk lines, Hellenic and Marchessini, abstained from voting. Although no segment of NYSA was delighted with No. T-2390, the majority of the NYSA membership felt that No. T-2390 was the best type of compromise assessment agreement acceptable to the membership as a whole. The breakbulk segment of the NYSA industry was somewhat unhappy because the old man-hour assessments had been continued over a year past the resolution date of October 1, 1968, which date was also supposed to be the effective date of a new assessment method. After some days of hearing, this combined man-hour/tonnage basis of assessment agreement (No. T-2390) was conditionally approved by the Commission on March 11, 1970, subject to further hearing and subsequent judgment by the Commission.

On brief, a number of the breakbulk members of NYSA, interveners Atlanttrafik, Barber Lines, Blue Sea Line, Concordia Line, Hellenic Lines, Hoegh Lines, Isthmian Lines, Marchessini Lines, Meyer Line, Moller Steamship Co., Inc., Nedlloyd Lines, Norweigian America Line, and States Marine Lines continue to support the whole tonnage formula of No. T-2364 as the fairest method of assessment, although alternatively they would in the spirit of compromise support the combined man-hours/tonnage formula of Agreement No. T-2390 if it were to be applied retroactively to the first year of the labor contract as well.

14 F.M.C.
as to the last 2 years of the contract, and if No. T-2390 does not afford special treatment to any interests such as to the Puerto Rican trade.

Other parties, the lumber interests (Wilford & McKay, Inc.) and the sugar interests, are interveners, but are satisfied apparently with the so-called “excepted cargo” treatment given to them by Agreement No. T-2390, and they have not actively participated in this proceeding since that agreement was filed.

“Excepted cargo” under Agreement No. T-2390 is all domestic cargo (limited to that moving in the domestic, coastal or intercoastal trade of the United States, but not including cargo moving “to” Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, or any other point outside the continental limits of the United States), all lumber at lumber terminals, bulk cargo (including scrap and sugar), and passengers and their personal baggage.

Excepted cargo is excepted from the regular man-hour and tonnage assessments (described herein below) of No. T-2390, and in place thereof, payments or assessments on excepted cargo shall be made on the basis of the then-existing man-hour assessment in effect for pension ($0.70), welfare and clinics ($0.415), guaranteed annual income (GAI) ($0.555), and NYSA administration ($0.04), but not any payment for “shortfall,” or a total of $1.70 per man-hour, for the contract year through September 30, 1970. Thereafter in the next contract year excepted cargo would pay or be assessed additional amounts per hour in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement escalations effective October 1, 1970. Excepted cargo shall also continue to pay any royalty which may be applicable.

The figure above of $1.71 per hour plus $0.699 per hour for vacations and holidays (the vacations and holidays are not directly in issue herein) results in a total for excepted cargoes of $2.409 per hour for the contract year 1969–1970. This figure of $2.409, or $2.41, is often referred to in the record as the total man-hour assessment for that year for “excepted cargo.” For the 1970–1971 year, the man-hour assessments for “excepted cargo” would total $1.84, plus $0.719 for vacations and holidays or a total of $2.559. These so-called “excepted” cargo man-hour assessment totals do not include certain assessments for “shortfall.”

Of course, cargoes which benefit from being treated as “excepted” are those cargoes which have high productivity, that is, they incur relatively few man-hours of longshore labor per ton of cargo loaded or unloaded. The theory of “excepted cargo” is that it is marginal cargo, because, among other reasons, of competition with rail and
truck operators, and because of the possibility of diversion to other ports. Presumably, if an assessment on excepted cargoes were too high these cargoes would fail to move to and from the Port of New York, thereby ceasing their limited or marginal support of labor fringe benefit costs, such as pensions, etc.

Agreement No. T–2390 defines a ton as a measurement ton of 40 cubic feet, or as weight ton of 2,240 pounds, whichever is greater, that is, whichever of the weight or measurement produces the most tons. Such a ton has been referred to by NYSA as a revenue ton or more accurately as an assessable ton.

United Fruit asks that bananas be treated as excepted cargo, or alternatively that the ton on which the assessment for bananas is made under Agreement No. T–2390 be defined as a weight ton of 2,240 pounds provided that in no event the assessment for bananas shall be lower than that imposed upon excepted cargo. Bananas measure more in tons than they weigh.

Wallenius Line, a common carrier of foreign cars to New York and of American cars from New York, asks: first, that autos be treated as excepted cargo; alternatively, second, that an interim assessment of $2.73 per man-hour be continued (this is the figure of $2.409 above plus $0.321 for shortfall for 1968–1969 and 1969–1970; the $2.73 is composed of $0.70 for pensions, $0.415 for welfare and clinics, $0.555 for GAI, $0.14 for 1968–1969 shortfall, $0.181 for 1969–1970 shortfall, $0.04 for NYSA support, and additionally $0.699 for vacations and holidays); third, that if the man-hour/tonnage formula of No. T–2390 is applied to autos, that the autos be assessed not on this agreement's basis for autos of 20 percent of measurement tons, but on 50 percent of weight tons of 2,240 pounds; and fourth, that in any event that no less favorable treatment be granted to Wallenius for its autos than is to be granted to Wobtrans for its autos or to autos moving in the Puerto Rican trade. Wallenius utilizes ro-ro ships to a large extent, whereas Wobtrans utilizes lift-on/lift-off ships mainly.

Wobtrans, a wholly owned subsidiary of the German manufacturer of Volkswagen autos, and an operator by long-term charter of over 60 vessels engaged in the transport of Volkswagen products from Germany to the United States and to other places, asks, first, that autos be placed in the "excepted cargo" category; second, that autos be assessed by weight (100 percent of weight), rather than by measurement (the measurement tons of autos are greater always than are the weight tons); and third, alternatively, that autos be assessed on 10 percent of measurement. Wobtrans also suggested, but does not press the suggestion that 5.85 percent of measurement tonnage would
be proper for vehicles limited to those handled on conventional ships only.

Hearing counsel for the Federal Maritime Commission support special treatment as "excepted cargoes" for automobiles and bananas, the Puerto Rican trade, and in addition, the trades between New York and Hawaii and between New York and Alaska. Hearing counsel for the Maritime Administration did not actively participate in this proceeding after the adoption by NYSA of Agreement No. T-2390.

The other interveners not specifically mentioned in the body of this report, but shown in the list of appearances herein, participated to a relatively minor extent in this proceeding, and have not filed briefs. The eight intervening stevedores at one time were greatly concerned with the fact that as employers of longshoremen they would have been required to collect certain assessments including delinquent accounts, but under Agreement No. T-2390, it is the vessel operator member of NYSA, or agent of a nonmember, that is "responsible" for the per-ton assessments in the event that such assessments have not been paid through the hands of the stevedore, direct employer of the longshoremen. The Port of New York Authority (PNYA), another intervenor, furnished considerable data as to tonnages to NYSA, in connection with NYSA committee studies. Since PNYA has filed no brief, presumably it does not oppose No. T-2390.

NYSA is an association of ocean carriers, operators of vessels calling at the Port of New York, of ocean carriers' agents, and of contracting stevedores, watching agencies, marine carpenters, etc., employers of deep-sea longshoremen and of other labor generally associated with the loading, unloading and handling of ocean-going ships and their cargoes in the Port of New York. These carriers and their agents are voting members, and the stevedores and others are associate nonvoting members of NYSA. One of the main functions of NYSA relates to the conducting of negotiations with labor representatives regarding collective bargaining agreements.

The agreement in issue, No. T-2390, is a resolution of NYSA, mainly providing its method or formula of assessment for the 2-year period of October 1, 1969, to September 30, 1971. The assessments for this 2-year period include some obligations of "shortfall" which arose in the contract year 1968–1969. The agreement is designed to raise from NYSA member carriers or from member agents of nonmember carriers, the moneys necessary to meet certain obligations arising under the collective bargaining agreements between the members of NYSA and the International Longshoremen's Association.
Specifically, the assessments are to meet the costs, or obligations, or liabilities of NYSA to the longshoremen of: (a) pensions, (b) welfare and clinics, (c) guaranteed annual income (GAI), (d) "shortfall" of actual total hours worked in the Port of New York under a 40 million-hour a year guarantee with respect only to pensions and to welfare and clinics, and (e) administrative support or expenses of NYSA. The above five items have been described under a general category of so-called "fringe benefits." All of these assessments are for the two-contract years 1969-1970 and 1970-71, except additionally there is the "shortfall" which was caused by the shortage of man-hours worked in the contract year 1968-1969. The "shortfalls" anticipated for the years 1969-1970 and 1970-1971 would be built into the calculations of total liabilities for these years. (See below the manner of calculating the tonnage portion of the assessment under No. T-2390.)

The fringe benefits above are considerable when stated in dollar amounts. For example for the NYSA-ILA contract year, October 1, 1969, to September 30, 1970, pensions payments must be made to the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund in the minimum (probably in practical effect also the maximum) amount of $28 million in accordance with the contract with the Union on the basis of a minimum of 40 million hours at $0.70 per hour. The record of actual experience for part of the 1969-1970 year, projected for the whole year, shows that the hours worked in this year will amount to about 33 and a fraction million. For a number of contract years, from October 1963 through September 1968, there were at least 40 million or close to 40 million man-hours per year of longshore labor in the Port of New York. For the contract year, October 1, 1968, to September 30, 1969, there were 33,935,416 man-hours, a substantial decline, but included in this period were 56 days of the longshoremen’s strike.

Similarly, the minimum for welfare and clinics for the same 1969-1970 contract year is $16,600,000 based on the same 40 million hours, at $0.415 per hour, to be paid in total to the NYSA-ILA Welfare Fund and to the NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund. The Trustees of these two funds will allocate the $16,600,000 as they see fit between these two funds in accordance with their needs.

GAI is not a firm figure under the labor agreement, but depends on how many longshoremen entitled to 2,080 hours per year of work, vacations, etc., fail to meet this goal, and must have their differences paid for out of the GAI fund. GAI has been calculated, collected, or both, at $0.12 per hour under the old contract for the year 1967-1968, at $0.22 per hour for 1968-1969, and at $0.555 per hour on a temporary
1970 is $15,600,000.

Thus, adding pensions of $28 million, welfare and clinics of $16.6
million, and GAI of $15.6 million, we get a total of over $60 million to
be assessed for 1969–1970. These total “industry liabilities” of NYSA
to the ILA exist notwithstanding any factor of “shortfall.” There is
considerable reference in the record and in the briefs to the dollar
amounts of shortfall, and to who may or may not have caused short-
fall, but shortfall is only one small part of the overall picture herein,
and shortfall has been greatly exaggerated as a controlling factor in
determining the proper assessments herein.

For the contract year October 1, 1970, to September 30, 1971, total
liabilities for pensions, welfare and clinics, GAI (estimated), and
NYSA support are $66,300,000. The pensions, welfare and clinics, and
GAI are industry problems at least in part, because the liabilities for
these benefits cannot be totally and directly attributed to any par-
ticular ocean carrier or carriers, or for that matter to any particular
trade. Some trades may appear to be more responsible than other
trades, for example, for segmented problems, such as the shortfall
of hours worked. But, for the industry benefit in not having to stuff
and strip all containers, and for many other benefits to NYSA as an
industry, the conclusion must be made that on the whole we are deal-
ing with overall industry problems, with industry benefits, and with
industry obligations and liabilities.

Pension, and welfare and clinics assessments, once collected, are
turned over to trustees of so-called “joint funds” administered by both
representatives of the employers (NYSA) and of the longshoremen
(ILA). Vacations and holiday, GAI, and NYSA support assessments
are turned over to so-called “management funds,” administered solely
by NYSA.

The principal expenses of an ocean carrier connected with the em-
ployment of longshoremen, of course, are the basic wages (including
overtime payments) of the longshoremen. On general cargo for the
contract year 1969–1970, wages are $4.25 per hour, and overtime is
$6.375 per hour. Rates for other cargoes are higher, ranging to as much
as $8.50 for wages and $12.75 for overtime for explosives and for
damaged cargo under certain conditions. Wages are paid on actual
hours worked, and continue on the man-hour basis, not being affected
by Agreement No. T–2390. Likewise, unaffected by Agreement No.
T–2390, is the expense of vacations and holidays which continues on a
man-hour basis. For 1969–1970 it is $0.699 per hour. Generally speak-
ing, the breakbulk carriers pay more in the form of wages and vacation
AGREEMENT NO. T-2336

and holiday expenses, because they use more man-hours of labor per ton of cargo, than do the containerization operators. To the extent that containerization caused increases in wage costs, and in vacation and holiday costs, this is in no way reflected in Agreement No. T-2390, which relates to other labor benefits.

In the shipping industry in the Port of New York, longshoremen necessary do not work everyday for the same ocean carrier. For example, three gangs of longshoremen may be employed by one carrier, such as TTT, on Thursdays and Fridays each week, and these same gangs will work for another carrier on other days of the week. Gangs of longshoremen should be available whether there are many or few ships in port, whether the ships are at one pier or another pier in a particular area, whether there are needs for longshoremen in one area or other areas of the port, etc. Naturally no system of availability and mobility of longshoremen works perfectly, so at times there may be underemployment and at times shortages of longshoremen. There have been such shortages of labor in the past in Brooklyn, Staten Island, and New Jersey. Presumably the new labor contract with the open register will help in this regard, and it would help all of the industry, including containerized lines.

In the circumstances, the longshoremen as a whole, of necessity, become “industry” employees, rather than merely employees of a particular ocean carrier or stevedore. It is true that some individual longshoremen may work full time for a single ocean carrier, as for example in the case of certain employees who work in a terminal, rather than on the ships when they are in port. But, longshoremen must look to the industry for many of their benefits, such as pensions, welfare and clinics, and guaranteed annual income, and also vacation and holiday pay. As individual ocean carriers leave the shipping business, and consequently leave behind them pension and other obligations, the continuity of industry benefits becomes essential to the longshoremen.

As seen above, various cargoes are unloaded and loaded from ships at various rates of “productivity” depending upon both the type of cargo and the type of vessel. For example, a containership, with an average or estimated productivity of 2.54 tons per man-hour of longshore labor may be loaded or unloaded about 5 times as fast as a conventional ship with a productivity of 0.52 tons per man-hour. Average estimates of record of productivity used by NYSA in this proceeding, and generally accepted by all parties herein with the understanding that productivity varies from carrier-to-carrier and from ship-to-ship, are, 0.52 for breakbulk, 0.75 for unitized, 2.54 for containerships, and

14 F.M.C.
3 for ro-ro ships. Bulk cargoes, bananas, and automobiles are in special categories of their own.

Agreement No. T-2390 provides specifically that the method of assessment on all cargo, not including "excepted cargo," for the 2-year period from October 1, 1969, to September 30, 1971, inclusive, shall have two parts. First, Agreement No. T-2390 provides a man-hour assessment of 93.1 cents (which was intended to cover certain expenses in the old NYSA-ILA contract which expired on September 30, 1968, namely pension of 47 cents, welfare and clinics of 31.5 cents, GAI of 12 cents, and NYSA support of 2.6 cents). Second, Agreement No. T-2390 provides a tonnage assessment of an amount (bookkeepers might call this a "plugged amount" because it is an amount necessary to strike a balance between two other amounts) which is to be calculated by the Board of Directors of NYSA in a specified manner as follows:

First, estimate "total liabilities" for the contract years 1969/1970 and 1970/71: for pension; for welfare and clinics; for GAI; for the 40 million hour guarantee for pensions, welfare and clinics (shortfall); and for NYSA support; also 1968/69 shortfall. Second, deduct the estimated total revenue to be derived from the man hour assessment of 93.1¢ and the continued man-hour revenue assessment provided from "excepted cargo" from the total liabilities next above to secure a total estimated "net liability." Third, compute the assessment per ton by dividing this "net liability" by the total estimated "non-excepted tonnage" to be loaded or discharged in the Port of New York during the period October 1, 1969 to September 30, 1971.

The assessment for the tonnage portion of this formula was first estimated by NYSA to amount to $1.23 per ton.

Agreement No. T-2390 requires the Board of Directors of NYSA not to modify the 93.1 cents per man-hour portion of the assessment formula, but that the Board modify the tonnage portion of the assessment from time to time on the basis of experience. In other words, the $1.23 per ton is a plugged but also a flexible figure dependent upon changes in estimates of the "total liabilities" and the "net liability" referred to above for the fringe benefits.

Exhibit 10 of record shows the underlying calculations made by a NYSA assessment committee, and this Committee's estimate of various liabilities. This exhibit includes also a prediction that the cost per ton of the tonnage portion of the combined man-hours/tonnage assessment under the T-2390 assessment formula would be $1.23 per ton. The assessment committee's estimates, calculating the man-hour portion of the combined assessment as a per ton figure, by dividing the 93.1 cents per man-hour assessment by the productivity factors of tons per
man-hour, resulted in the following total costs per ton for fringe benefits:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Man-hour assessment</th>
<th>Tonnage assessment per ton</th>
<th>Total per ton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breakbulk:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.931</td>
<td>$1.79</td>
<td>$3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitized:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.931</td>
<td>$1.24</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.931</td>
<td>$0.37</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro/Ro:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.931</td>
<td>$0.31</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, the above general estimates must be adjusted for the variations in productivity of individual carriers. Seatrain's productivity is higher than 2.54. TTT's productivity is 3.35 or 3.36, or higher than the above 3.0 ro-ro productivity. On this basis, for example, TTT's comparable costs would be $1.51 per ton instead of $1.54 per ton.

As seen above, the cost per ton of breakbulk tonnage for fringe benefits is $3.02, compared with $1.60 for containerized tonnage under the T-2390 formula, using the $1.23 per-ton tonnage factor. But regardless of whatever tonnage factor is to be used, breakbulk operators would pay a total per ton more than the total per ton paid by containerized operators. For example, if the per ton factor were $1.13, breakbulk would pay $2.92 and containerized would pay $1.50 as totals under T-2390. This is true because the man-hour portion of the combined assessment would remain weighted against the breakbulk operator to the extent that his productivity of tons per man-hour is less than the productivity of a containerized operator. Also, the 93.1 cents per man-hour portion of the assessment in Agreement No. T-2390 remains constant.

To repeat a point, the unfairness of using only a man-hours basis of assessment was recognized and acknowledged by all members and segments of NYSA on October 1, 1968. On that date at a special membership meeting of NYSA, the resolution adopted unanimously read:

Resolved that the past and present system of allocating expenses of pension, welfare and clinics, and guaranteed annual wage under the collective bargaining

14 F.M.C.
agreement, and NYSA expenses, solely on the basis of man-hours worked, shall be discontinued and a new system shall be devised and ratified by the membership, such new system to take effect as of October 1, 1968.

The problem herein is not with this resolution; but, how to implement it. A straight man-hours assessment is patently unfair, but the problem remains how do you modify this old assessment basis, and yet encourage innovators to invest large sums of moneys in modern containerships, containers, cranes and shoreside equipment. Such investments for modern containerships, ro-ro ships, containers, cranes and shoreside equipment have run into many millions of dollars.

The above costs for fringe benefits, for example, for containerships of $1.60 per ton, do not include the additional costs for the so-called “container royalty,” which amounts to $1.00 a royalty ton for containers on fully containerized ships, to $0.70 a royalty ton for containers on partially containerized ships, and to $0.35 a royalty ton for containers on breakbulk ships. A royalty ton is a gross ton, which is estimated by the assessment committee of NYSA to amount to 1.6 measurement tons. Thus, there are more revenue or assessable tons to 1 gross ton. Accordingly, we cannot use the figures of 35 cents, 70 cents, and $1 as added costs per assessable ton, but must use lower figures, as adjusted by the 1.6 ratio, or by some other ratio suitable to a particular ocean carrier. Various figures of record are 28 and 47 cents, and no doubt there are others for the container royalty per assessable ton.

The assessment committee calculated a 1968–1969 shortfall of $4,991,710 after adjustments for a surplus of GAI and a resulting GAI contribution or payment to pensions and welfare and clinics of $629,618, without which payment the said shortfall would have been $5,621,328.

Man-hour collections of assessments at 93.1 cents based on an estimated 33.1 million man-hours in the Port of New York per year were estimated by the assessment committee at $30,816,100 for each of the two contract years of 1969–1970 and 1970–1971.

Liabilities were estimated by the assessment committee for 1969–1970 as a total of $59,200,000 and for 1970–1971 as a total of $66,300,000. (Pensions of $0.70 and $0.75 per hour, times 40 million hours; welfare and clinics of $.415 and $.495 per hour, times the 40 million hours, and estimates of GAI and NYSA support as shown in exhibit 10.) These total liabilities figures for 1969–1970 and 1970–1971, of course, include any anticipated “shortfall” for these 2 years since the liabilities are calculated on the 40-million-hours basis.

---

*Paid by the ocean carriers to the Union.*
Recapitulating, there were for 1968–1969 shortfall $4,991,710, for 1969–1970 liabilities $59,200,000, for 1970–1971 liabilities $66,300,000, or a total of $130,491,710 for the 2 years’ assessments. Subtracting the man-hour assessments for the 2 years totalling $61,632,200, results in a “net assessment” of $68,859,510 of additional costs to be levied on the per ton basis. Dividing this “net assessment” by a tonnage for the 2 years of 56,071,517 tons, for all cargoes but “excepted cargo, gives the estimated assessment per ton of $1.23.

The assessment committee had made a study estimating 27,480,000 so-called assessable tons for 1960–1970 and 28,591,517 assessable tons by 1970–1971. These assessable tons are referred to by some persons as stevedore tons. Actually they are tons of 2,240 pounds or of 40 cubic feet, whichever is the greater. From exhibit 10, it is not clear that any allowance, or that a proper allowance was made for assessments to be collected on “excepted cargoes.” Making such an allowance would reduce the “net assessment” of $68,859,510 of costs above for the 2 years to be levied on the per-ton basis. Likewise, it appears that the assessment committee failed to make proper allowances for automobiles moved on ships carrying automobiles and other vehicles exclusively.

Not all parties agree with these figures above and the estimated $1.23 per ton assessment no doubt is overstated. There are disputes as to the proper shortfall figures and as to the proper tonnages to be used. There is a dispute as to the figures or estimates of tonnage used for all cargoes but “excepted cargoes.” Here again, experience will develop the actual figures, and the board of directors of NYSA must adjust the $1.23 per ton assessment upwards or downwards under the terms of Agreement No. T–2390. If too little tonnage factor assessments are collected, or if too much tonnage factor assessments are collected, additional assessments, or refunds of over-assessments, respectively, will be made by NYSA.

In any event, the validity, reasonableness, and lawfulness of Agreement No. T–2390 does not depend upon the figure of $1.23 used by the assessment committee, nor upon the exact dollars and cents amount of this per ton assessment factor. Whether the agreement results in an assessment of $1.23, or $1.13, or some other tonnage factor does not affect the general theory behind Agreement No. T–2390 that assessments should be made in the present circumstances at the Port of New York on a reasonable combination basis of man-hours and of tonnage.

If anything is wrong with the $1.23 figure, the record as a whole shows that this figure will be lower. Therefore, while the man-hour part of Agreement No. T–2390 is a constant 93.1 cents, the tonnage...
portion of the formula to the extent that it is lower than $1.23 per ton will benefit the ocean carriers with high productivity ratios, that is, the container and the ro-ro carriers, for example. Of course, a reduction in the tonnage factor below $1.23 per ton will also benefit the breakbulk carriers, but not as much as it will benefit the operators with higher productivities.

There is a long history of the evolvement of the combination man-hour/tonnage formula of Agreement No. T-2390, for assessing the fringe benefit costs herein. The underlying principle is to assess these costs in a manner approximating the benefits to be received by the various modes of operation of the ocean carriers. The T-2390 man-hours/tonnage assessment is to be uniformly applied to all operators, but those in the “excepted cargoes” category, which continue on the historical man-hours basis.

Historically, a man-hours assessment was used in the industry. This was generally equitable and fair to the industry as a whole when all ocean carriers operated in relatively the same conventional manner, that is, when all cargoes generally were breakbulk. With the advent of containerization, inequities resulted, and the man-hours assessment fell more heavily on the breakbulk segment of the industry than on the containership segment.

In theory, there may come a time when the industry may be virtually entirely containerized, as it may be soon in the North Atlantic trade, in which event an assessment based only on tonnage (as in Agreement No. T-2364) would be completely fair and equitable to all ocean carriers. This would be so, inasmuch as the tonnage assessments surely would be related to benefits received. Furthermore, since income and revenues of the carriers are based on tonnages carried, as a carrier increased its tonnages and received increased benefits from longshore labor efficiency and knowhow, the carrier would have increased revenues to pay for these fringe benefits of pensions, welfare and clinics, and guaranteed annual income.

In the present situation at the Port of New York, it is estimated that in the contract year 1969–1970, the breakbulk and unitized carriers together will handle about 15.4 million tons of cargo compared with 12.1 million tons of cargo handled together by container and ro-ro carriers. By 1972–1973, it is projected that the container/ro-ro segment will handle 16.5 million tons compared with 14.5 million tons by the breakbulk/unitized segment of the industry. For 1970–1971, it is estimated that breakbulk operators would carry 11,624,439 assessable tons, unitized operators 3,427,078 tons, containerized operators 12,880,000 tons, and ro-ro operators 660,000 tons.
Contributions in 1970–1971 to fringe benefits on the old man-hours assessment basis would be, as estimated on page 23 of exhibit 4b, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Breakbulk</th>
<th>Unitized</th>
<th>Container</th>
<th>Ro-Ro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pension @75 cents.</td>
<td>$16,766,017</td>
<td>$3,427,116</td>
<td>$8,803,148</td>
<td>$165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare and clinics @49.5 cents.</td>
<td>11,066,571</td>
<td>2,261,897</td>
<td>2,510,078</td>
<td>108,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAI @22 cents.</td>
<td>4,318,091</td>
<td>1,065,287</td>
<td>1,115,990</td>
<td>48,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a probability that GAI should be refigured at 55.5 cents, but this is unnecessary here, for the principle to be illustrated.

The above table shows the great imbalance of payments for fringe benefits if they are based on the man-hours basis alone. The containerized operators would be carrying more tons than the breakbulk operators, but the breakbulk operators would be contributing very much more of the moneys for the pension, welfare, and clinics and GAI benefits. The imbalance again is related to the varying rates of productivity, that is, tons loaded or unloaded per man-hour. Breakbulk operators would be paying for fringe benefits between four and five times as much as containership operators, but breakbulk operators would be carrying less tonnage than the containership operators.

After the October 1, 1968, meeting of the membership, the board of directors of NYSA appointed a seven-member Assessment Committee which held several meetings and reported back on April 1, 1969, that the Committee had been unable to reach agreement on any principles relating to an assessment formula. A strike had commenced in the Port of New York on December 20, 1968, and it ran for 56 days until a new NYSA–ILA contract was ratified on February 14, 1969, both by the ILA membership, and by a unanimous vote of NYSA. Once the strike was settled and the full costs of the labor agreement were known, NYSA members again turned their attention to the proper allocation and assessment of costs.

At a special membership meeting on April 17, 1969, Capt. G. H. Evans, a vice president of States Marine Lines, Mr. M. R. McEvoy, then the president and now the chairman of Sea-Land, and Mr. C. P. Lambos, an attorney of the firm of Lorenz, Finn & Giardino, were appointed as a three-man committee to develop a method of assessing the various fringe benefit costs of the NYSA–ILA labor agreement. Mr. Lambos had long experience and had practically devoted his entire career to the study and handling of NYSA labor problems. The other two gentlemen represented respectively the breakbulk and containerization industry viewpoints.
This assessment committee of three men was authorized to have the widest latitude in studying all facts necessary, including the right to retain economists, actuaries, accountants, and other experts. It was given access to all facilities and staff of NYSA, and was directed to give all interested parties an opportunity to be heard. The committee held its first meeting on April 1, 1969, and worked diligently thereafter. The committee found it necessary to develop an "industry viewpoint" as distinguished from the parochial viewpoint of any single member of the committee, or of any segment of the industry.

Two points were clear to the committee. One, the container operator took the position that the assessment of costs should not place a penalty on one who had committed itself to a substantial capital investment; and, two, the breakbulk operator felt that it should not be burdened as a result of contract costs caused by containerization. The committee also felt that each operator must pay its own direct labor costs, that is, pay its own wages. The committee had more difficulty with other costs, but it aligned vacation and holidays as an integral cost of employing labor, that is, as direct labor costs.

The assessment committee decided that there should be a second grouping of so-called "industry costs," consisting of other benefits which not only contain future and present costs, but also costs generated by past obligations. This second, or industry, category included pensions, welfare and clinics, GAI, and NYSA support.

A major part of pensions to be paid in the next 40 years by the industry consisted of past service liability, not only of present members of the work force, but also of those already on pension. As to welfare, the cost of death benefits, hospitalization, surgical and medical expenses, continue to be about the same regardless of man-hours worked, and are the same for a worker whether he works an average of 2 thousand hours or 700 hours a year. The industry agreed in 1964 to support four medical centers or clinics. Concerning GAI, it is difficult to find a rationale which would justify charging an employer who has maintained job opportunities (man-hours of labor) more than is charged to one who has decreased job opportunities. When container-ship services replace breakbulk services in a trade, job opportunities are decreased about 80 percent.

In other industries where an employer decreases the number of men as a result of automation, such individual employer usually and normally has been required to pay the costs of dislocation. The entire cost of automation has been borne by such an employer himself, and not by other employers in the same industry who have not gone into innovation. Conversely in the NYSA industry, displacement of jobs is taken care of by GAI, by pensions, including early retirement pro-
visions, and by continued welfare and clinics benefits to those for whom no work may be available. As shown above, what has happened is that the major share of such GAI, welfare and clinics, and pension benefits have been paid, not by the innovator (containerships and ro-ro operators), but by the one who has not changed his operation (the breakbulk operator).

The assessment committee concluded that the fringe benefits of pensions, welfare and clinics, and GAI had to be treated separately, and not in the same manner as direct labor costs. Also, the committee was well aware of the unanimous resolution of the membership of NYSA, that the past system of allocating these benefits solely on a man-hour basis had to be discontinued.

The assessment committee made reports in June 1969, and in September 1969, and as a result a temporary assessment formula was adopted on September 29, 1969, and was filed the next day with the Commission as Agreement No. T-2336. In its September 15, 1969, report, the assessment committee recommended that the Committee be discontinued, and that a new committee be formed to take its place. This committee was not allowed to be disbanded, and it came up finally with a unanimous recommendation on February 6, 1970, for resolution of the assessment problem, on a combination man-hours/tonnage basis, which was substantially the same basis as in Agreement No. T-2390, except for certain changes as to expected cargoes and automobiles resulting from the membership meeting on February 26, 1970.

Containerization has not always been a major consideration in NYSA-TLA labor negotiations, but it played the major role in the 1968 negotiations, and caused sharply increased costs in virtually all categories of the labor contract. Whereas, the 1964 contract resulted in a so-called package increase of $0.80 per hour, the October 1, 1968, to September 30, 1971, contract resulted in a package increase of $1.60 per hour, which does not include shortfall and GAI. Including those additional two items would make the package total about $2.20 per hour. GAI was increased from 1,600 hours in the old contract to 2,080 hours in the new contract.

The $1.60 package includes an increase of $0.98 per hour in basic wages on general cargo, from $3.62 in September 1968, to $4.60 in September 1971; an increase of $0.28 per hour in pension, from $0.47 in 1968, to $0.75 in 1971, and an increase of $0.16 per hour in vacation and holidays, from $0.559 in 1968, to $0.719 in 1971.

In more concrete terms, the maximum vacation was increased from 4 weeks under the old contract to 6 weeks under the new contract, and holidays were increased from 12 under the old contract to 13 days a
year under the new contract. Welfare and clinics' increased costs were largely due to inflation. Four medical clinics are maintained in various areas of the Port of New York. It appeared to NYSA that one of these clinics was not necessary because of declining man-hours, but it must be supported by continued clinic payments. Concessions from the Union to limit clinic facilities could not be obtained because of containerization. Pension benefits' increases included the change from $175 to $300 a month for regular pensioners who were at least 62 years old, with 25 years of service. The new contract provided an early retirement, at $250 per month at age 55 or over, with 20 years of service.

The opening demands of the ILA at the 1968 negotiations included straight time pay of $6 per hour, and overtime and holiday pay of $12 per hour; a 6-hour workday; a 2-year term for the contract, cradle to grave complete welfare coverage, pension of $400 per month after 20 years of service regardless of age, with additional $10 per month for every year over 20, 50-percent widows' pension, full funding of pensions within 10 years, GAI changed to GWW (guaranteed weekly wage or pay of 40 hours every week, even if work was 80 hours in another week), 16 holidays, 6-weeks vacation, all containers and containerized cargoes to be stripped and loaded by ILA, a $4 a ton royalty fund "on all bulk cargo," and signing of the agreement by all ports the same day—"one port down—all ports down."

Ten cents of the $1.60 package was given in addition to a $1.50 offer by the Labor Policy Committee of NYSA, at the behest of the International President of the Union as the price for his support of the package. The other $1.50 was given by NYSA to break an impasse in the negotiations in the last week of the Taft-Hartley injunction in an attempt to avoid the strike which resulted later.

The NYSA industry did obtain certain benefits in the 1968–71 contract, including the open register of longshoremen, the filing of employer lists of permanent employees, the free use of employers on a prior day order basis of their list men for work anywhere in their zone, prior day ordering system (8 a.m. start), port-wide mobility of longshoremen, acceptance of the principle that GAI recipients must work and be available for work and debiting of up to 4 days' pay for each day an employee fails to accept work, elimination of travel time for all new men entering the industry, industry-wide discipline and discharge, new grievance procedures, and a 3-year contract.

Lack of manpower had been costly to the industry in the 1966–68 period. There were shortages of manpower in Brooklyn, Staten Island, and New Jersey; employers were unable to obtain the number of gangs
needed to work ships, many gangs could not be worked as gangs because they reported with a short complement, and other gangs had to be broken up to obtain fill-ins for absentees. On the terminals, truck lines had been paralyzed by shortages of checkers, cargo had remained on piers too many days, terminal labor had not been available in needed numbers, and some fill-ins ordered at the hiring centers at 8 a.m. reported hours later if they were available at all.

The costs to the industry of the above lack of manpower has not been computed, yet it was undoubtedly many million dollars a year, both in the cost of moving a ton of cargo, and in the loss of ships' time in turnarounds at port. Under the new 1968–71 contract, the concessions made by ILA to NYSA should benefit all operators, both breakbulk and containerized. All operators should pay for these benefits.

Lack of control over the work force under the old contract had a substantial effect on productivity. Under the 1968–71 contract, procedures on industry discipline and GAI penalties, together with the open register, if properly implemented, should promote a good measure of employer control over the work force.

No one can exactly measure or calculate in dollars and cents the benefits to the NYSA industry of the new labor contract, but the industry did obtain substantial benefits, and these benefits cannot be charged or credited solely to any particular segment of the industry because the entire industry will benefit from the new contract.

Basic wages under the new NYSA–ILA contract increased from $3.62 to $4.60 per hour, an average of 9.02 percent in each of the 3 years. The entire contract package increase of $1.60, exclusive of GAI increases, averaged an increase of 10.6 percent a year. Adjustments in other industries ranged from 6 to 10 percent, putting the ILA at the top of the scale. A national average for the 3 years for certain industries was 6.6 percent a year.

Under most American-flag deep-sea labor contracts early retirement is available at any age after 20 years of service. Although this was sought by the ILA, early retirement was granted at age 55 or over with 20 years of service. This limited early retirement brings certain benefits to the NYSA industry, especially in areas of the Port of New York which had lost work opportunities. Every early retiree eliminates an eligible from continued GAI protection. It is cheaper to pay $3,000 a year early retirement than $8,320 per year (wage of $4 times 2,080 hours) under the GAI. “Twenty years and out” had become a rallying cry on the waterfront. Undoubtedly the fear of con-
tainerization played a major role in the Union's initial demand for an early retirement age, and the NYSA industry might well have avoided such a benefit in the absence of the containerization issue.

The normal pension was increased from $175 to $300 per month. Under the old contract, widows were entitled to 50 percent of the pensioner's benefits. The new contract froze widows to 50 percent or $100 per month whichever is lesser. This limited the increase to past and present widows to $12.50 per month. The higher pension benefits in the new contract were caused in part by the containerization issue.

GAI was increased in the new contract from 1,600 to 2,080 hours. The GAI program was instituted originally as payment for the reduction in the size of the gang and utilization of manpower and equipment provisions in the 1964 labor agreement. The increase in hours to 2,080 was in consideration of the long term (3-year) contract, open register, flexibility, GAI safeguards such as heavy debiting for failure to work, and control of the work force. Containerization, as the major fear of the employees, played a major role in the increase in GAI benefits.

An analysis of the recipients of GAI benefits for the period January 1, 1968, to September 30, 1968 (under the old contract), shows that 657 longshoremen received GAI payments totalling $1,211,810.15. Of this number, 343 men received $914,900.21. Not all of this cost was because of containerization. For example, 70 workers who received $227,994.20 had worked at an Army base in the Port of New York, and from this base, the military had transferred the work out of the port area.

Once the $1.60 package increase was offered to the Union, the NYSA employers were willing to let the ILA freely assign the money to the various benefits. The cost of $0.14 per hour assigned to the additional fifth and sixth weeks of vacation was a substantial benefit, but from the employers' viewpoint it was better spent for vacations than for wages. If spent for wages, it would have had an immediate effect on overtime, upon taxes, and on social coverages such as unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation and social security. The two additional weeks of vacation also create 80 additional hours now deductible from the improved GAI benefits. Six weeks of vacation totalling 240 hours and 13 days of holidays totalling 104 hours, both subtracted from 2,080 hours GAI, leave 1,736 hours without regard to other deductions, which employees must work or be offered work, in which case these employees will not be entitled to GAI benefits. With respect to the sixth week of vacation, containerization contributed to this cost.
because it was the overriding issue in the entire negotiations for the 1968-71 contract.

Besides all the above benefits to the ILA, there is the so-called Container Royalty Fund, which was begun in 1961. This fund provides employee benefits supplementary to the contract benefits. The rates of royalty contributions continued the same after October 1, 1968, as before that date.

In summation, the containerization issue was the most critical single issue in the negotiations for the 1968-71 ILA contract. The ILA used containerization as the basic reason for its demands for increased pension and GAI benefits. Containerization caused an increase in the benefits, for early retirement, for the normal pension of $300, for the increase in GAI to 2,080 hours, and a portion of the shortfall of work in the Port of New York under 40 million hours a year. Containerization should be credited for its container royalty payments which are used to make supplementary benefits to employees.

The following table shows for the contract year 1969-1970 the per ton costs on the January 1970 interim assessment basis of $2.73 per man-hour (for pension 70 cents, welfare and clinics 41.5 cents, GAI 55.5 cents, NYSA Support 4 cents, shortfall 32.1 cents, and vacations and holidays 69.9 cents), plus wages of $4.25 per hour, using the productivity factors of 0.52, 2.54, and 3.0, respectively, for breakbulk, container and ro-ro ships. These costs are compared with the per ton costs under the combined man-hour/tonnage formula of No. T-2390.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per ton</th>
<th>Breakbulk</th>
<th>Container</th>
<th>Ro-Ro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Costs per ton interim man-hour basis of $2.73:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages $4.25 per hour</td>
<td>$5.17</td>
<td>$1.67</td>
<td>$1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacation and holiday, $0.699 per hour</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension, welfare and clinics, GAI, NYSA support, shortfall $2.031 per hour</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container royalty</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost per ton</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Costs per ton under T-2390:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per ton</th>
<th>Breakbulk</th>
<th>Container</th>
<th>Ro-Ro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacation and holidays</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions, welfare and clinics, GAI, NYSA support, shortfall 99.1 cents per man-hour and $1.23 per ton</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container royalty</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost per ton</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Rate per hour divided by productivity factors to arrive at cost per ton.
2 The figure of 28 cents is an estimate submitted by NYSA and involves converting long tons into assessable tons (sometimes called revenue or stevedore tons with the conversion factor varying as to various carriers).
3 Productivity factors divided by 99.1 cents per man hour, to arrive at costs per ton for this man-hour factor, plus $1.23 per ton for tonnage factor.

Under No. T-2390, the costs for loading or discharging cargo, including wages, vacations, holidays, and fringe benefits would be

14 F.M.C.
$12.53 per ton of breakbulk cargo compared with $3.83 per ton for containership cargo and $3.47 per ton of ro-ro cargo. Obviously the differences under the breakbulk cost of $8.70 a ton for containership cargo, and $9.06 a ton for ro-ro cargo should be substantial motivation for innovation.

For the purposes of this record, the above table, which was based on exhibit 32 of record, is one of the most significant tabulations of record. Here is the effect of the change from the January 1970 interim man-hours basis to the Agreement No. T-2390 basis. Breakbulk carriers obtain relief to the extent that their costs are reduced from $13.42 a ton to $12.53 a ton, whereas containership carriers' costs are increased from $3.03 a ton to $3.83 a ton, and ro-ro carriers' costs are increased from $2.61 a ton to $3.47 a ton. These seem to be eminently fair and equitable results, from a dollar and cents cost per ton viewpoint.

Of course, using percentages rather than dollars and cents comparisons, the containerships and ro-ro carriers are subjected seemingly to more substantial increases, and, of course, if the increases are compared on a man-hours basis (ignoring productivity factors), even further increases and even further higher percentages can be shown for the containership and ro-ro carriers. However, all parties admit that the assessment issue and problem in this proceeding boils down to "a dollars and cents issue." This means dollars and cents costs per ton, and not dollar and cents per man-hour.

This is consistent with the fact that if the carriers were to have to increase their freight rates, because of these assessments here in issue, their freight rates would be related to the tons of cargo handled and the costs per ton of handling such cargoes, and contrary-wise, the carriers' freight rates are not directly related to costs per man-hour of longshore labor.

Where both breakbulk operators and containership operators compete in the same trade, they certainly must be aware that they compete ratewise in costs per ton to the shipper and not in per man-hour costs of longshore labor to the carrier. It follows, that the fairest way of assessing industry fringe benefit costs is on all the members of the industry on the same per ton basis, at least for some portion of the fringe benefits.

On the basis of the facts and discussion up to this point in this report, it clearly is evident that the provisions of Agreement No. T-2390 are just and reasonable and otherwise lawful under the Shipping Act from the standpoint of cargoes and carriers in general which operate in and out of the Port of New York. However, there remains
the question of what exceptions or changes if any, there should be added to the present exceptions to the general application of Agreement No. T-2390.

There remain to be considered the special pleas of the Puerto Rican trade, the banana and automobile interests, the pleas of Seatrain and U.S. Lines, the situation faced by TTT, the provisions in the agreement regarding the Tonnage Review Committee, and other matters, including the treatment of the Hawaiian and Alaskan trades.

There is no trade now, and there has not been for at least the last 20 years any trade between the Port of New York and Alaska. There is therefore no purpose for an assessment on nonexistent cargo. But, to encourage such cargo to move, if and when some trade between the Port of New York and Alaska may develop, it seems advisable to place such cargo at least for a while in the "excepted cargoes" category under Agreement No. T-2390.

The trade between New York and Hawaii is not extensive at present. Westbound to Hawaii only U.S. Lines offers a common carrier service. It is a weekly service. It is estimated that 75,000 payable or revenue tons moved westbound from New York in 1969 in U.S. Lines' service. Another 25,000 tons moved from other Atlantic Coast ports, making about 2,000 tons per sailing. The Hawaiian service of U.S. Lines is operated in conjunction with its Far East service, with about 10 to 15 percent of the aggregate gross round trip revenues being Hawaiian revenue, including Hawaiian cargoes from all Atlantic ports.

U.S. Lines' service from New York to Hawaii is a conventional service but with a number of containers carried on breakbulk ships. Under these circumstances for the westbound trade to Hawaii, there is some doubt whether placing this portion of the trade in the "excepted cargoes" category would decrease the costs of the carrier, because the evidence tends to show that breakbulk carriers would pay more assessments if placed in the excepted cargoes status than they would pay under Agreement No. T-2390 under the combined man-hours/tonnage basis. Here again, the individual productivity of a particular ship determines the result. U.S. Lines believes that there is substantial merit in the suggestion that Hawaii be placed in excepted cargo status.

Eastbound, from Hawaii to the Port of New York, there is no common carrier service. Some tonnages have moved eastbound on full shipload charters, consisting mainly of canned pineapple cargoes. States Marine Lines discontinued its common carrier service eastbound from Hawaii to New York in 1967, because of the competition of con-
tainerships operating between Hawaii and the west coast of the continental United States.

The trade between Hawaii and the Port of New York is susceptible to competition which includes transcontinental overland movement between Oakland, Calif., for example, and the Port of New York. Seatrain already publishes freight rates from Hawaii to interior points in the United States, and in the reverse direction. Such rates presently extend only as far east as Chicago, but Seatrain when it works out the details will be publishing Hawaiian rates to and from almost any and all points in the continental United States. Such service would be via Seatrain Lines across the Pacific Ocean, and via land carriers across the continental United States. Under the circumstances shown, it would appear that there is substantial justification for considering the trade (via the all-water route) between New York and Hawaii to consist of marginal cargoes highly subject to diversion to other routes, and therefore that these cargoes in this trade should be placed in the “excepted cargoes” status under Agreement No. T-2390. It is so concluded that this excepted status is proper for cargoes in this Hawaiian trade.

There are some similarities between the Hawaiian and Puerto Rican trades, and some differences. Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico depend upon ocean transportation. Any increases in transportation costs affect the growth of their economies. Both trades must be served by American-flag vessels and Americans crews.

There is one big difference between the Hawaiian and Puerto Rican trades. Trade between New York and Hawaii had decreased in recent years because of the competition with containerships operating between Hawaii and the west coast ports of the continental United States. States Marine Lines was forced out of the Hawaiian New York eastbound trade in 1967. Previously the Matson-Isthmian joint service in the trade was dissolved and Isthmian Lines withdrew from the service. On the other hand, there has been a tremendous and steady increase in the trade between the Port of New York and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

In the fiscal year 1957-1958, this Puerto Rican trade amounted to 455,000 short tons. The cargoes in this trade increased every year, and in fiscal 1968-1969 amounted to 1,841,000 short tons, or over four times as much as in the first of these 12 fiscal years. The steady growth every year since fiscal 1957-1958 in the New York-Puerto Rican trade shows that it is not likely to dry up, or wither away, because of any reasonable increase in assessments. Therefore, there appears to be no
substantial reason to blanket this entire Puerto Rican trade under the “excepted cargo” status.

There is little likelihood that this cargo as a whole will be diverted to other modes of carriage, as in the case of domestic intercoastal or intercoastal cargoes which are subject to rail and motor truck competition. Of course, we do not ignore the fact that the Puerto Rican economy is generally at a level below the rest of the United States, and that Puerto Rico has been struggling for some years to develop its own industry.

It has been estimated, that the difference in charges to this New York-Puerto Rican trade, under Agreement No. T−2390 (using the 93.1 cents factor for fringe benefits, plus 69.9 cents per hour for vacations and holidays, or $1.63 total, times an estimate of man-hours of 1,003,700 for the 1969−1970 contract year, plus the disputed tonnage factor of $1.23 per ton times 2,630,000 assessable tons), versus the charges at the rate for excepted cargo ($2.41 per man-hour times man-hours of 1,003,700), shows about $2,452,014 in additional costs, to this trade for the year.

Naturally, all interests in this Puerto Rican trade would like to avoid these additional costs, and also quite naturally there are other trades and interests at the Port of New York which do not want to bear any share of such costs as might be caused by giving Puerto Rican cargoes “excepted” status. Since the estimated assessable tons in this Puerto Rican trade for the 1968−1969 fiscal year amounted to 2,630,000, and using that tonnage for the 1969−1970 contract year, the above estimated differences in charges between No. T−2390 and the “excepted” rate of $2.41 per man-hour, would amount to about 93 cents an assessable ton.

It was estimated by an economic consultant that the difference in costs of T−2390 and excepted cargo status for the Puerto Rican trade could result in increased freight rates in this Puerto Rican trade of about 4 percent. Whether or not freight rates are increased in this Puerto Rican trade may depend upon what Sea−Land does, since it handles most of the cargoes and, of course, any alleged unreasonable increase would be subject to protest and possible investigation by this Commission.

Of particular interest in this Puerto Rican trade, is the Commonwealth’s so-called “Fomento” program of industrial promotion. Principal products of Fomento plants in Puerto Rico are apparel, and fabricated metal and electrical products. These items, when transported to the Port of New York, then sell in highly competitive markets, vulnerable both to import as well as to domestic competition. Two
thirds of the Fomento exports from Puerto Rico were food products, tobacco products, textiles and apparel, shoes, leather products, and miscellaneous small products.

Over 100,000 persons are employed in the Fomento industries. Employment is heaviest in the apparel (37,000), leather products (9,000), textile products (8,000), and metal products and electrical goods industries (9,000). The Fomento plants are an export-oriented sector of the Puerto Rican economy, and this is an impelling part of the whole economy of Puerto Rico. About one-fifth of Puerto Rico's apparel shipments to the United States, two-fifths of its shoe and leather products shipments, and nearly half of its electrical products shipments enter through the Port of New York.

From the facts and circumstances of record it appears that there is some considerable justification for putting a portion of the New York-Puerto Rican cargoes in the "excepted cargo" status. It is concluded that the northbound cargo moving from Puerto Rico to the Port of New York is entitled to the "excepted cargo" status.

There is no precise breakdown of record between cargo moving from the Port of New York southbound to Puerto Rico, and cargo moving from Puerto Rico northbound to the Port of New York. Presumably, however, the northbound cargo is less than half of the total. Excepting cargoes northbound from Puerto Rico will place a substantial added burden on nonexcepted cargoes in other trades under Agreement No. T-2390, but at the same time, it will relieve the Puerto Rican carriers of part of the substantial increases in assessments faced by them.

Seatrain estimated increased costs per year of from $750,000 to $1 million in the Puerto Rican trade, and TTT estimated increased costs of $603,500. TTT's witness sincerely believed that this cost would result in a loss to TTT of over $100,000 in 1970, but for competitive reasons TTT was unwilling to give sufficient details of its corporate expenses at the hearing to all parties so that this projected loss could be verified. In any event, the exception for Puerto Rican-New York northbound cargo found reasonable herein does not rely on the financial situation of these two carriers.

Besides the man-hours/tonnage combined assessment formula, Agreement No. T-2390, also provides for the Board of Directors of NYSA to select a qualified neutral group, to be known as the "Tonnage Review Committee." Further, No. T-2390 provides that "any member" of NYSA can request modification of the tonnage definition in the agreement with respect to "any specific cargo," and this Tonnage Review Committee can order an appropriate modification of the tonnage
definition for the specific cargo, provided that this Committee shall consider, among other factors:

(a) Protection of the continued movement in the Port of New York of marginal commodities such as homogenous cargo.

(b) The need to maintain equitable and nondiscriminatory rules of tonnage definitions with respect to all cargo.

(c) Effect of modification on the purposes of the tonnage formula and its continued ability to meet obligations under the ILA contract.

(d) The contribution rate of such commodity may not be reduced to a point below that which would be paid if the assessment were on an hourly basis.

The limitation in Agreement No. T-2390 of who may request a modification of the tonnage definition to "any member," in the view of witnesses and counsel for NYSA, should have been expanded to include also any person or interest substantially affected by the assessment formula and tonnage definitions in Agreement No. T-2390, including persons, such as United Fruit, Wallenius, and Wobtrans. Accordingly, our approval of Agreement No. T-2390, shall be conditioned on the modification of that agreement to expand the definition of who may request modification of the tonnage definitions to include persons substantially affected thereby.

During the course of the hearing in this proceeding the Tonnage Review Committee of NYSA was constituted and began to function. How it functioned and how it was constituted appear properly to be matters under the general supervision and control of NYSA, but with the clear and firm understanding that anything accomplished by this committee has no more standing under the Shipping Act, than an act of NYSA. In other words, the door was left open at the hearing in this proceeding for the parties to come voluntarily together in reaching any stipulation of facts or in reaching any agreement or any modification of any agreement, and for the parties then to submit such stipulation of fact or agreement between themselves as a matter to be considered by the Commission. Barring any stipulation of fact or agreement of the parties as a result of actions or deliberation of the Tonnage Review Committee (and there have been no such stipulations or agreements as to automobiles, bananas, or any other cargo), any action of the Tonnage Review Committee is not a part of the record herein, and cannot be considered in the disposition of this proceeding.

When the NYSA Assessment Committee was considering the assessment problem, in general it gave very little detailed consideration to the problem of assessments on automobiles. Understandably, it had plenty to do otherwise and was facing almost an insurmountable task.

14 F.M.C.
It was felt that problems, such as the assessments on automobiles, could be considered on an individual basis, such as the basis provided later in Agreement No. T-2390 by the means of the "Tonnage Review Committee." At least one assessment committee member expressed the view that perhaps automobiles should be assessed on a weight (tonnage) basis, but as provided in Agreement No. T-2390 by the NYSA membership, "Tons of unboxed automobiles, trucks and buses shall be calculated at 20 percent of the cubic measurement of the vehicles."

Since any ruling giving special treatment to automobiles under Agreement No. T-2390 necessarily would apply to all automobiles, trucks, and buses, whether importes or exports, and whether in the European, Puertó Rican, or any other trades, such ruling must also consider not only the effect on vehicles handled by Wallenius and Wobtrans, but also the effect on the vehicles handled by TTT, Sea-Land and others. Imports of automobiles into the United States far exceed exports from the nation, and imported foreign vehicles on the whole are smaller and lighter than exported American cars, trucks, and buses.

For automobiles, special treatment under Agreement T-2390 is sought by both Wallenius and by Wobtrans. In 1968, as shown by Department of Commerce figures, 193,511 vehicles came into the United States through the Port of New York. These vehicles apparently consisted mainly of automobiles, with very few trucks and buses. Adding exports to these imports would make a total in 1968 of about 250,000 (Bureau of Census figures) vehicles imported and exported via the Port of New York. The total for 1969 would be larger than for 1968. The number of imported automobiles registered in the United States in 1968 was 985,767, according to Automotive News. In other words, it is estimated that of the total registered imports of autos into the United States, 20 percent or less came in via the Port of New York. Of the total cars delivered to the Port of New York in 1968, there were 88,837 Volkswagens.

Wobtrans transports autos to the United States in so-called lift-on/lift-off type ships mainly (90 percent), and in so-called roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) type ships to a lesser extent (less than 10 percent). Wobtrans' carryings consist principally of the small Volkswagen autos. Wobtrans' stevedore at the Port of New York, Pittston Stevedoring Co., is a member of NYSA, and the cost to Wobtrans of discharging its vehicles at the Port of New York includes NYSA assessments.

An average vehicle imported by Wobtrans weighs 0.87 long tons, or 1,949 pounds, and measures 8.7 tons, or 348 cubic feet, a ratio of measurement to weight of 10 to 1. On the average, to discharge a
Wobtrans vehicle from a conventional lift-on/lift-off vessel requires 0.973 man-hours, and from a ro-ro vessel, 0.486 man-hours. About 1.0277 Wobtrans' vehicles are unloaded per man-hour of longshore labor from a lift-on/lift-off ship, and about 2.0576 vehicles per man-hour from a ro-ro ship.

The cars imported via the Port of New York on Wallenius' ships are handled in both lift-on/lift-off, and in ro-ro ships. All cars exported from the Port of New York on Wallenius' ships are handled on roll-on/roll-off vessels. In 1966, Wallenius imported 38,553 automobiles through the Port of New York, using 46,718 man-hours of longshore labor, or at an overall productivity rate of .825 cars per man-hour. This overall rate improved by 1969, possibly because of efficiencies or because of the greater use of ro-ro ships. In 1969, Wallenius imported 67,886 automobiles through the Port of New York using 60,643 man-hours of longshore labor, or at a productivity on the average of about 1.12 cars per man-hour. Presently, the average discharging rate on a lift-on/lift-off vessel of Wallenius is 20 to 50 autos per gang hour with gangs of 25 men, or an average of about one car per one man-hour. On ro-ro ships of Wallenius on import cars, the discharging rate averages between 50 to 65 cars per hour with gangs of 30 to 35 men. Using figures of 57.5 cars and 32.5 men, results in a rate of discharge of about 1.77 cars per hour as a rough estimate on ro-ro ships of Wallenius, but this may be a low estimate, particularly when the Wobtrans' rate of discharge of 2.0576 vehicles per man-hour is considered.

From the above figures it is concluded that Wallenius was importing into the Port of New York more cars on its lift-on/lift-off vessels than on its roll-on/roll-off vessels, but where it had fewer cars to handle as in the case of its exports, it preferred to use and did use exclusively its ro-ro vessels. Exports from the Port of New York on Wallenius vessels in 1969 totalled 12,634 cars.

Those cars exported by Wallenius were, of course, heavier American cars. A Lincoln weighs 5,000 pounds and measures 611 cubic feet, an Impala 3,700 pounds and 560 cubic feet, and a Maverick 2,392 pounds and 401 cubic feet. The imports were lighter foreign cars, including Volvos, Opels, and others. Wallenius' imported cars averaged in 1969 in measurement 360.09 cubic feet or 9 measurement tons, and in weight 1.008 long tons, or about 2,258 pounds per car.

Many vehicles, including many automobiles move out of the Port of New York to Puerto Rico, including both many new and used cars. A considerable number are carried in this New York-Puerto Rican trade by Sea-Land in its specialized lift-on/lift-off ship, the Detroit.
TTT carries many automobiles to Puerto Rico in its speedy ro-ro ship, the *Ponce de Leon*. Substantially all of the autos in this trade are carried southbound, with only a few northbound.

TTT's *Ponce de Leon* has five garage-like decks, which enable it to accommodate about 240 trailers used as containers for containerized cargoes. This ro-ro ship averages about 375 to 400 automobiles on each southbound weekly voyage, on a fully loaded voyage of its ship. As many as 450 to 500 automobiles might be carried depending upon the mix of the cargo as between automobiles and trailers. There are heavy and slack seasons for the movements of automobiles to Puerto Rico, but when fewer new cars are moved, generally used cars fill the void.

TTT points out that autos to many Puerto Ricans, especially where bus transportation is poor or nonexistent, are properly classed as necessities, along with basic food imports to Puerto Rico. It is TTT's feeling that practically all of its southbound carryings are essential to the economy of Puerto Rico, whether foods, raw materials for Puerto Rican industries, autos, cranes, bulldozers, industrial steel, etc. On one voyage, TTT carried 48 trailer loads of foodstuffs and 28 trailer loads of steel construction plate.

TTT's commodity carryings for the year 1969 (there were no carryings in January and part of February 1969 because of the longshore strike), included passenger automobiles totaling 12 percent. Commercial vehicles, including trucks, buses, roadbuilding vehicles, etc., amounted to another 11.1 percent of the total carryings. The roadbuilding, etc., portion would not be included under autos, trucks, and buses under Agreement No. T-2390, and making such allowance, would leave a total for TTT of autos, trucks, and buses, of more than 12.6 percent and less than 23.7 percent, a substantial percent of TTT's carryings to be affected by any ruling providing special treatment for autos, trucks, and buses. It should also be borne in mind in considering overall assessments on TTT in this proceeding, that it has been concluded already, that the northbound Puerto Rico to New York trade should be placed in the "excepted cargo" status.

Productivity for TTT, based on 26,117 vehicles (of all kinds, that is, all self-propelled vehicles included buses, trucks, automobiles, cranes, agricultural equipment, and anything other than a trailer) divided into 35,640 man-hours, amounted to a rate of $0.73 vehicles per man-hour. Of course, excluding the cranes, etc., would produce a higher productivity rate for automobiles.

As Captain Evans testified, there are two requisites in loading a ship, one relating to weight and loadline regulations, and the other re-
lating to space and the cubic measurement of the cargo. Thus a ship may be full to cubic capacity or full to weight capacity. Freight rates accordingly are based on measurement and on weight as may be appropriate in any instance. Likewise, stevedore costs apparently are related to measurement, weight, and other factors affecting productivity. All these factors also are to be considered in determining the reasonableness of any assessment formula.

Productivity factors depend upon the the type of tons or type of units related to man-hours of labor. One and a fraction vehicles of Wobtrans are unloaded per man-hour from lift-on/lift-off vessels, and two and a fraction Wobtrans' vehicles are unloaded per man-hour from ro-ro vessels. Converting from units of autos, to units of tons, and using measurement tons with 8.7 measurement tons for a Volkswagen, we find that 8.94 cubic tons of Volkswagens are unloaded per man-hour from a lift-on/lift-off vessel, and that 17.9 cubic tons of Volkswagens are unloaded per man-hour from a ro-ro vessel. As seen, expressed in cubic tons, the productivity rate on these automobiles is very high, and naturally any shift from a man-hours basis to a tonnage basis, even to a part-tonnage basis, will increase the assessment on automobiles substantially. It likewise follows that maybe automobiles were under-assessed in past years to the extent that their high productivity rates and the man-hours formula produced low assessments per automobile.

There is some indication of record of a possibility of diversion of automobiles away from the Port of New York to other ports, if some relief from the assessment rule in Agreement No. T-2390 is not provided. However, this evidence is not persuasive, and the record as a whole is clear that automobiles are not the marginal type of cargo which cannot stand the burden of some reasonable increase in assessments for the fringe benefits herein. Wallenius already has passed on, on will have passed on, its increased assessments under No. T-2390 in the form of a surcharge on its rates, which surcharge is now effective, or will be effective shortly. The question which remains is whether the burden to be placed on automobiles is fair in relation to the benefits to be received.

In the whole tonnage Agreement No. T-2364, which never became effective, the high measurement tonnage productivity rate for automobiles was recognized, insofar as that agreement provided:

Tons of unboxed automobiles shall be calculated at 25 percent of the cubic measurement of the vehicles. (Emphasis added.)

This 25 percent basis for automobiles also was under consideration by the NYSA membership when it adopted Agreement No. T-2390
with the 20 percent of cubic measurement basis for tons of *unboxed automobiles, trucks, and buses*. The change from 25 to 20 percent apparently was made partly in an attempt to mollify the automobile interests in this proceeding, and partly in view of the fact that on another coast, the West Coast of the United States, there had been a compromise settlement of a dispute, using 20 percent of cubic measurement for automobiles in connection with the so-called "Mechanization and Modernization Fund" (the Mech Fund) of the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA).

Wobtrans contends that the treatment of the automobiles in Agreement No. T-2390 cannot be justified by reference to the terms of settlement which finally ended eight years of controversy regarding PMA's Mech Fund. In the case on the West Coast, PMA was establishing an entirely new charge to fund the Mech Fund, whereas at the Port of New York, only a new formula is at issue. Wobtrans argues that in the PMA settlement, the formula therein assessed bulk cargo at one-seventh of the general cargo rate, cargo in containers at seven-tenths of the general cargo rate, and automobiles and trucks exclusive of trailers at one-fifth of the general cargo rate, and therefore that this PMA basis of settlement cannot be compared with the NYSA formula of a wholly different schedule of charges, such as the excepted cargo status for bulk cargo which excludes shortfall. The Commission approved the PMA compromise formula on the understanding that no party therein voiced any objection to the method of assessments. Wobtrans insists that the terms of the PMA settlement constitute no precedent whatever in the present controversy.

Let us now consider the actual costs in dollar and cents per automobile under Agreement T-2390. Using, for convenience, the productivity figure of 1.0 (instead of 1.0277) vehicles per man-hour for a lift-on/lift-off vessel, and 2.0 (instead of 2.0576) vehicles per man-hour for a ro-ro vessel, under Agreement T-2390, fringe benefit costs for one automobile would be 91.3 cents for lift-on/lift-off and 45.65 cents for ro-ro for the man-hour portion of the formula; and for the tonnage portion of the formula, using $1.23 per ton times 20 percent of 8.7 tons, costs would be $2.14 per automobile, or totals of $3.05 for lift-off, and $2.60 for ro-ro per auto.

These automobile costs for fringe benefits under Agreement No. T-2390 are substantial costs, but they appear to be at least reasonably related to the benefits received, although somewhat on the high side. Based on all the facts herein, and using our best judgment of the charges and benefits, which cannot be finely and precisely related, a fairer assessment herein on automobiles would be one based on 18
percent of measurement tons. This would reduce the cost of the tonnage portion of the formula under No. T-2390 by 10 percent, or by 21.4 cents per automobile, and there is testimony of record that in the volume carriage of automobiles, cents per auto are important. The resulting costs would be, as estimated herein, $2.86 per auto for lift-on/lift-off ships and $2.38 per auto for ro-ro ships. It is concluded that Agreement No. T-2390 should be amended in its tonnage definition of tons of automobiles, trucks and buses to specify calculation at 18 percent instead of 20 percent of the cubic measurement of the vehicles.

It is requested that bananas be treated as "excepted cargo" under Agreement No. T-2390, or that they be assessed on long tons of 2,240 pounds under the combined man-hours tonnage formula provided the assessment be no lower than on excepted cargo. Bananas are packaged in boxes at 45 pounds gross a box, with the bananas occupying 60 to 70 percent of the inside cube of the box. Bananas are transported in full shipload lots, in the holds of conventional breakbulk reefer vessels, from which they are discharged by a system of conveyor belts which deliver the boxed bananas either to railcars or to trucks within the terminal. ILA labor is utilized for the entire discharging operation from the ship's hold to the inland conveyance. The method of discharging bananas has not changed appreciably in recent years.

Boxes of bananas discharged by United Fruit at its Weehawken terminal from 1966 through the first quarter of 1969, have been at a fairly steady rate of labor productivity, averaging about 23.9 boxes per man-hour of longshore labor. Using for convenience the rounded figure of 24 boxes, times 45 pounds a box, results in 1,080 pounds per man-hour, or somewhat less than half a long ton per man-hour on the average on a weight ton basis. However, bananas uniformly measure more tons than they weigh.

United Fruit refers to figures of 524,433 long tons for the 2-year period of October 1, 1969, through September 30, 1971, as equivalent to 1,200,846 measurement tons, which is a ratio of about 2.29 measurement tons to one long ton of bananas.

United Fruit also makes an updated projection for these two years of a total of 1,413,764 measurement tons, and 595,000 man-hours per year of longshore labor times 2 years, or a productivity of about 1.19 measurement tons per man-hour. Therefore, on a measurement ton productivity basis, bananas fell fall between the containerized cargo (productivity of 2.54) and the breakbulk cargo (productivity of 0.52).

Bananas must compete in price with other fruits. There is some possibility of the diversion of bananas away from the Port of New
York to other ports. Del Monte Co. recently inaugurated a banana discharge operation in Wilmington, Del., for the sale of bananas in the metropolitan New York, and other areas, because of higher terminal costs at New York and other reasons. Also, bananas have been assessed for some fringe benefits on the west coast on a weight basis.

As seen, bananas are largely comparable to breakbulk cargoes except for a productivity rate of 1.19 or somewhat more than twice that of the average breakbulk productivity rate of 0.52. Bananas are measurement rather than weight cargo.

In all the circumstances herein, it is concluded that a reasonable basis of assessment of bananas would be on the basis of Agreement No. T-2390, but defining a ton of bananas on the basis of 55 percent of a cubic or measurement ton, rather than 100 percent of such a ton. While it is not believed that this basis now found reasonable and lawful herein would reach below the minimum basis for "excepted cargoes," as provided in Agreement No. T-2390, this new tonnage definition for bananas of 55 percent of cubic, is made subject to the limitation that the assessment on this basis be not less than the contribution would be on the man-hours "excepted cargo" basis.

A number of miscellaneous arguments have been advanced in this proceeding. One contention is that Agreement No. T-2390 requires innovators to absorb some of the direct costs of breakbulk operators. This contention is erroneously based on the premise that pension, welfare and clinics, and GAI costs are direct costs of each employer, but the facts are that these are not direct costs, but fringe benefit industry costs.

Another argument is that the Commission lacks jurisdiction because Agreement No. T-2390 is a non-agreement, or because it is an agreement controlling or regulating labor and collective bargaining. Neither contention is correct. Although No. T-2390 was not adopted by the NYSA membership unanimously (it was adopted by a 58 to 3 vote, and extended by a 61–3 vote), it was adopted in accordance with the bylaws of NYSA. The situation here is different from that in Hong Kong Tonnage Ceiling Agreement, 10 F.M.C. 134 (1966), as the Commission ruled on March 11, 1970, in this proceeding.

The bylaws of NYSA in the present situation required only a majority vote. The bylaws specifically provide for the adoption of an assessment formula to meet labor contract costs. The bylaws make it clear that a member of NYSA may withdraw from the labor contract within 14 days after ratification of such contract by a written refusal to subscribe to such contract, but once a carrier ratifies the labor con-
tract such carrier is bound to pay the assessment for the labor contract. (Articles I, II, and VI of the bylaws of NYSA—Exhibit 7 of this record.)

In other words, by ratifying the labor contract with ILA, each of the member carriers of NYSA, including TTT, Sentrain, and U.S. Lines, recognized, acknowledged, and in effect agreed to pay its fair share of assessments for fringe benefits under the labor contract, and each knew that the majority will of NYSA would determine the method of assessments, or at least each was charged with such knowledge. The old man-hours basis of assessment was not ever filed for approval nor approved by the Commission, although it had the force of custom and usage. Nevertheless, that man-hours basis was in no wise prescribed by the bylaws of NYSA, or by the labor contract with ILA as the only means of assessment of fringe benefits.

Agreement No. T-2390 does not control or regulate labor and collective bargaining. Rather it is an agreement between NYSA members, in the form of a cooperative working arrangement of a substantial nature, inasmuch as it provides for the assessment of about $60 million or more per year on NYSA members and others. This agreement is clearly subject to section 15 of the act and to the jurisdiction of the Commission under the standards of the Volkswagenwerk case, above.

Agreement No. T-2390 is said to be violative of the antitrust laws, but there is no basis for this contention in this proceeding. The agreement is not a price-fixing arrangement, as it merely provides an assessment arrangement to meet the costs of a separate labor contract. If any prices were fixed, they were fixed in the labor contract, and even that is extremely doubtful. Even if No. T-2390 were to be considered one of a nature contemplated by the antitrust laws, nevertheless it would have to be approved under the Shipping Act, because there is such a clear compelling transportation need for this Agreement to avert chaos at the Port of New York.

Another argument is made that there has been no need shown for Agreement No. T-2390, but this is contrary to the facts. The labor contract, a necessity to the ILA and to NYSA, requires that there be sufficient assessments of NYSA members to meet the needs created by the labor contract. Unless Agreement No. T-2390 is approved, or unless a substitute agreement of substantial merit is approved, there is a strong likelihood, that insufficient funds would be raised to meet the obligations of the ILA labor contract, and consequently that labor chaos at the Port of New York would result. This record demonstrates an overwhelming transportation need for Agreement No. T-2390, subject to the modifications herein already discussed.

14 F.M.C.
Some contention is also made that the ILA labor agreement is the only basis upon which labor costs may be assessed in the Port of New York. This is incorrect as the labor agreement does not so provide. The labor agreement states the obligations of the parties, but does not provide how the monies are to be raised by NYSA to meet its obligations.

There is no showing in this record that Agreement No. T-2390, as modified, will be unjustly discriminatory, or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers or ports, or that it will operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or will be contrary to the public interest, or that it will be otherwise in violation of the Shipping Act.

There is argument by some carriers herein that Agreement No. T-2390 does not sufficiently recognize their substantial investments in containerships, ro-ro ships, containers and shoreside equipment, but careful consideration of the history and terms of Agreement No. T-2390 leads clearly to the conclusion that this investment factor was weighed carefully. Aside from the inherent justness of Agreement No. T-2390, the investment in containerships and ro-ro ships is in large part returned to the investor in the form of the benefits received from the speedier turnarounds in port of these newer type ships, with the resultant savings in vessel time and expenses.

Some carrier elements in this proceeding insist that the whole tonnage formula of the prior agreement, No. T-2364, which never became effective, should be approved herein. The time probably will come sometime in the future when the whole tonnage formula will not only be reasonable and lawful, but also acceptable to substantially all elements of NYSA. That time, however, is not here now, and to now approve a whole tonnage formula would be almost as disruptive to the NYSA industry as to continue the old man-hour formula, which assuredly has outlived its former usefulness and has outlived whatever lawfulness it had if it had any lawfulness. In all the circumstances herein, there appears to be no other reasonable and lawful alternative but to approve the combined man-hour/tonnage formula of Agreement No. T-2390, and to approve that Agreement subject to certain modifications as found justified herein.

One further point needs clarification. The effective date of our approval of Agreement No. T-2390 is October 1, 1969, or the same date as the beginning of the second year of the three-year ILA labor contract. This does not entail any serious administrative problems for NYSA because records have been kept of man-hours and tons on and since that date, with the exception of one or two carriers. One carrier, Seatrain, has refused to obtain from its shippers on the basis of Agreement No. T-2390, and thus has not paid.

However, it has provided estimates that these payable to assessable tons as defined in Agreement No. T-2390, would not be justly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, or ports, or that it will operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or will be contrary to the public interest, or that it will be otherwise in violation of the Shipping Act.

There is argument by some carriers herein that Agreement No. T-2390 does not sufficiently recognize their substantial investments in containerships, ro-ro ships, containers and shoreside equipment, but careful consideration of the history and terms of Agreement No. T-2390 leads clearly to the conclusion that this investment factor was weighed carefully. Aside from the inherent justness of Agreement No. T-2390, the investment in containerships and ro-ro ships is in large part returned to the investor in the form of the benefits received from the speedier turnarounds in port of these newer type ships, with the resultant savings in vessel time and expenses.

Some carrier elements in this proceeding insist that the whole tonnage formula of the prior agreement, No. T-2364, which never became effective, should be approved herein. The time probably will come sometime in the future when the whole tonnage formula will not only be reasonable and lawful, but also acceptable to substantially all elements of NYSA. That time, however, is not here now, and to now approve a whole tonnage formula would be almost as disruptive to the NYSA industry as to continue the old man-hour formula, which assuredly has outlived its former usefulness and has outlived whatever lawfulness it had if it had any lawfulness. In all the circumstances herein, there appears to be no other reasonable and lawful alternative but to approve the combined man-hour/tonnage formula of Agreement No. T-2390, and to approve that Agreement subject to certain modifications as found justified herein.

One further point needs clarification. The effective date of our approval of Agreement No. T-2390 is October 1, 1969, or the same date as the beginning of the second year of the three-year ILA labor contract. This does not entail any serious administrative problems for NYSA because records have been kept of man-hours and tons on and since that date, with the exception of one or two carriers. One carrier, Seatrain, has refused to obtain from its shippers on the basis of Agreement No. T-2390, and thus has not paid. However, it has provided estimates that these payable to assessable tons as defined in Agreement No. T-2390, would not be justly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, or ports, or that it will operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or will be contrary to the public interest, or that it will be otherwise in violation of the Shipping Act.
Seatrain, has refused to obtain, or to seek to obtain tonnage records from its shippers on the basis of the tonnage definition in Agreement No. T–2390, and thus has not supplied tons on that basis to NYSA. However, it has provided tons as freighted, or as payable, and estimates that these payable tons may be about 10 percent below the assessable tons as defined in Agreement No. T–2390. In any event, any difficulty in supplying assessable tons under the Agreement's definition should not be considered as a factor important enough to result in our disapproval or approval of the agreement. The matter of methods of obtaining assessable tonnage figures, and audits of such figures, etc., should be left to NYSA administrators, and if they cannot resolve the problem, the parties may return to this Commission to resolve any remaining problem of this sort. To go back to the first year of the 3-year labor contract would entail serious administrative problems, and not to make Agreement No. T–2390 effective until some time after October 1, 1969, would be grossly unfair and unjust, to an intolerable degree, to a considerable number of NYSA members.

It should be remembered that we retain continuing jurisdiction over agreements under section 15, whether or not we have previously approved an agreement. This last caveat applies to all phases of the present agreement. As future experience under this agreement may show that it, as modified, is or is not entirely reasonable, the parties will be able to return to us if the situation clearly warrants some adjustment, and obtain appropriate relief. Our judgment now is that Agreement No. T–2390 as modified is lawful and the best agreement that can be approved on this record.

All proposed findings and conclusions have been considered, and to the extent that they are found material and supported by the record have been substantially incorporated herein, and otherwise are denied.

All pending motions and petitions (including petition for declaratory order) hereby are denied, as either lacking in merit, or as being covered by the findings and conclusions herein, or as being unnecessary to the resolution of the issues in this proceeding.

**ULTIMATE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.** It is concluded and found that the expenses or charges which are to be paid or borne by ocean carriers, shippers, and other affected persons as a result of the assessments under Agreement No. T–2390 as modified herein cannot be precisely related to the benefits to be received by the same ocean carriers, shippers and persons who pay or bear the said expenses or charges, but there is ample evidence of record to conclude and to find, and it is concluded and found that the said expenses or

14 F.M.C.
charges are reasonably and lawfully related to the said benefits. It is concluded and found, that Agreement No. T-2390 of the NYSA subject to the modifications herein below, has not been shown to be, and is not unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports; that this agreement as modified will not operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or be contrary to the public interest, or otherwise be in violation of the Shipping Act. This agreement is approved, as of October 1, 1969, and our approval is made subject to the conditions that the agreement be modified: (1) To provide that any person substantially affected by the tonnage definition as well as any member shall have the right to request modification of the tonnage definition by the Tonnage Review Committee; (2) to provide that tons of automobiles, trucks, and buses shall be calculated at 18 percent of the cubic measurements of the vehicles as part of the tonnage definition of the agreement; (3) to provide that bananas be calculated at 55 percent of the cubic measurements of the boxes in which the bananas are shipped as part of the tonnage definition of the agreement; (4) to provide that cargo to and from both Alaska and Hawaii be treated under the “excepted cargo” status (with certain man-hour assessments and royalty where applicable) as provided under the excepted cargo provision of the agreement; and (5) to provide that cargoes northbound from Puerto Rico to the Port of New York likewise be treated under the “excepted cargo” status as provided under the excepted cargo provision of the agreement.

CHARLES E. MORGAN,
Presiding Examiner.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Docket No. 70-30

Agreement Nos. 9847 and 9848—Revenue Pools, U.S./Brazil Trade

Decided November 17, 1970

Agreement 9847 between Moore-McCormack, Lloyd Brasileiro and Netumar, calling for the apportioning of freight revenue on certain cargo shipped by those lines from Atlantic ports of the United States and destined to ports on the coast of Brazil, and agreement 9848 between Delta Steamship Lines, Lloyd Brasileiro and Navegacao Mercantil S/A.—Navem, calling for the apportioning of freight revenue on certain cargo shipped by those lines from Gulf ports of the United States and destined to ports on the Brazilian Coast between Recife and Paranagua, not found to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers; detrimental to the commerce of the United States; or contrary to the public interest or otherwise in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Thomas E. Stakem and Donald MacLeay on behalf of Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. and Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.

Neal M. Mayer and Marvin J. Coles on behalf of Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, S.A.

R. C. Giallorenzi for Companhia de Navegacion Maritima Netumar.


Thomas K. Roche and Raymond de Member for The Northern Pan-American Line.

Elmer C. Maddy and Baldwin Einarson for Norton Line and Ivaran Lines.

James L. Malone and Donald J. Brunner hearing counsel.

REPORT

By the Commission: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett and James V. Day, Commissioners)

This proceeding was initiated by the Commission on August 7, 1970, to determine whether proposed pooling agreement Nos. 9847 and 9848 are unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, whether
they will operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States or be contrary to the public interest or in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916, within the meaning of section 15 of that act, or whether they will subject particular traffic to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of section 16 of the act. In order to expedite procedure, the Commission sat, en banc, on September 9, 10, and 16, 1970, for the taking of evidence. 1 Briefs were subsequently filed, and oral argument held on October 6, 1970. This decision constitutes the Commission's final decision in this proceeding.

Agreement 9847, between Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mormac), a U.S.-flag carrier as one party, and Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, S.A. (Lloyd) and companhia de Navegacion Maritima Netumar (Netumar), as the other parties, establishes a revenue pooling and sailing arrangement in the southbound trade between all ports on the Atlantic Coast of the United States to ports on the Coast of Brazil in the Fortaleza/Porto Alegre range, both inclusive. 2

Agreement 9848 is between Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. (Delta), a U.S.-flag line, and the parties of Lloyd and Navegacao Merchantil S/A.—Navem (Navem), both Brazilian-flag lines. This agreement establishes a similar pooling and sailing arrangement concerning the southbound trade from U.S. Gulf ports to ports in Brazil in the Recife/Paranagua range, both inclusive. 3

The agreements are substantially identical in their provisions. Both agreements covers the carriage of all cargo carried by the signatories, government and commercial, with the exception of dry and liquid bulk cargo, mail, cargo of non-U.S. origin transshipped at a U.S. Atlantic port, and cargo originating in the United States and transshipped via any Brazilian port to a destination which is not a pool port. Other relevant and essential provisions of the agreements provide for the following:

(a) Equal access to cargoes controlled by both the United States and Brazilian Governments. The parties commit themselves to act through appropriate governmental channels to assure that the legal and/or administrative regulations and practices in force regarding the reservation and protection of cargo are extended equally to both parties;


2 A copy of agreement 9847 is available at the Federal Maritime Commission.

3 A copy of agreement 9848 is available at the Federal Maritime Commission.
(b) Rationalization of sailings with an agreement that the parties will provide sufficient cargo capacity to satisfy the needs of the trade, each party having agreed to maintain a minimum number of sailings per calendar year. An increase in the number of minimum sailings may be agreed upon but is subject to prior approval of the appropriate governmental authorities of the United States and Brazil;

(c) No infringement on the right of third-flag ships to compete for cargoes available to them;

(d) The pooling of revenue between the parties with the following stipulations:

1. Sixty percent of average revenue of both parties to be considered "handling charges";
2. No pooling of the first $100,000 of overcarriage revenue after deducting the agreed "handling charge";
3. Extra length, heavy lift, and ad valorem charges are included in the pool account; however, surcharges, taxes, and port differentials are to be excluded;

(e) A 3-year approval;

(f) Periodic meetings among the principals in order to adjust the agreements in line with the needs of the trades;

(g) An exchange of manifests and other shipping documents through a "pool accountant"; and

(h) The rates, rules, and regulations to be applied are those contained in the schedules issued by the parties which, at this time, are set forth in the tariff of the Inter-American Freight Conference (IAFC), of which all parties are members.

Petitioners Norton Line (Swedish-flag) and Ivaran Lines (Norwegian-flag), appeared in opposition to approval of agreement 9847. The Northern Pan-American Line (Nopal) (Norwegian-flag) appeared in opposition to approval of agreement 9848. The Department of Transportation intervened, but did not actively participate in the proceeding.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Atlantic/Gulf/Brazil trade has been in a state of turmoil for many years while Brazil has endeavored to unilaterally protect and foster its Merchant Marine through the issuance of a large number of decrees, laws, resolutions, and bulletins. These governmental edicts, going back as far as 1959, may be summarized as follows:

(a) Establishment of a program to upgrade the foreign commerce fleet of Brazil with new ships constructed both in Brazil and in foreign shipbuilding centers;

14 F.M.C.
(b) An effort to carry a substantial portion of the foreign commerce of Brazil in Brazilian ships;

c) The stated position that the trade between two nations should be carried predominantly by the ships of those nations;

d) The understanding that reciprocity in the carriage of government-controlled cargoes should be granted to ships of nations that guarantee like treatment to Brazilian-flag ships;

e) The position that all cargoes favored with exchange or tax privileges and all cargoes generated by governmental entities are considered government-controlled cargoes (see Decree Law 666, issued in July 1969);

(f) Equal access to controlled cargoes will depend on the degree of reciprocity granted by other nations;

(g) Controlled cargoes may be waived to third-flag ships;

(h) No shipping lines may engage in Brazil’s foreign commerce unless they belong to conferences participated in by Brazilian carriers; and,

(i) Brazilian lines are encouraged to negotiate agreements with other shipping lines in the same trade, bearing in mind the Brazilian Government objective to have Brazilian ships carry a substantial portion of Brazil’s foreign commerce.

Since 1960, numerous efforts to stabilize conditions in the trade have met with failure. A primary issue in the negotiations in both agreements has been the question of “equal access” to Brazilian Government-controlled cargo moving southbound.

In October of 1960, Mormac and Lloyd reached agreement on equal participation by the parties in the transportation of cargo from the U.S. Atlantic Coast to Brazil. The Commission, on May 25, 1965 (dockets 921 and 928), approved this southbound pool on two conditions: (a) deletion therefrom of all reference to commercial cargo, and (b) deletion therefrom of article 10 of the agreement which was concerned with the cooperative solicitation of cargo. These conditions were not acceptable to the Brazilians and the agreement consequently was not effectuated.

In June of 1967, at a principal’s meeting of the then-existing seven conferences in the trade in Rio de Janeiro, efforts were made to reach agreements on northbound coffee pools. Since no agreement could be reached, the Brazilian lines withdrew from the conferences and formed, with the U.S. lines, a new conference covering both northbound and southbound movements of all cargo between the U.S. Atlantic and U.S. Gulf ports and the East Coast of South America.

---

This new conference, known as the Inter-American Freight Conference, now is operating under a Commission approved agreement (FMC No. 9648-A). European third-flag lines serving the trade eventually entered the IAFC, and the original seven conferences were disbanded.

Following the withdrawal of the U.S. and Brazilian lines from the seven original conferences, a new principals’ meeting was held in Rio de Janeiro in October 1967, at which the Brazilians agreed in principle with the European lines on northbound coffee quotas, together with certain “southbound guarantees” for the European third-flag carriers (October 28, 1967). The Brazilians subsequently assigned coffee carriage percentages to the American lines without their concurrence or participation. These percentages were totally unacceptable to the U.S. carriers as being entirely too low and out of concert with their past carryings northbound in the trades.

The lines serving the North Atlantic/Brazil trade did execute coffee, cocoa and general cargo pooling agreements (FMC Nos. 9682, 9683 and 9684) following the formation of the IAFC. The general cargo pool expired under its own terms prior to approval and effectuation. The coffee and cocoa pools were effectively nullified by the Commission in its decision in docket 68-10 (served September 4, 1970), when that proceeding was discontinued for lack of jurisdiction.

In 1967, Netumar and Navem entered the Atlantic Coast to Brazil and Gulf to Brazil trades, respectively. This action was prompted by a Brazilian Government move to encourage the entrance of privately owned shipping companies flying the Brazilian flag into the Brazilian foreign commerce.

On June 11, 1967, a “Memorandum of Understanding,” signed by Maitland Pennington of MARAD and Paulo Strauss of the Brazilian Merchant Marine Commission (the predecessor to SUNAMAN), gave “equal access” to Brazilian and U.S. Government-controlled cargoes to both American and Brazilian lines. The “Memorandum,” however, provided only for waivers under P.R.–17 of Export-Import Bank cargoes, but no other U.S. Government-controlled cargoes. At the October 1967 IAFC principals’ meeting, the Brazilians, feeling this arrangement too one-sided, repudiated it.

On August 7, 1968, Delta, Lloyd, and Navem reached agreement on (a) equal access to government-controlled cargo, (b) rationalization of sailings, and (c) an equal sharing of cargo to be carried by Delta and the Brazilian lines on a flexible payment ton formula. The agreement did not provide for the exchange of revenue but called for adjustments in cargo carrying to reach equality between the parties.
The agreement was approved by the FMC on December 3, 1968, on a 1-year trial basis. Although manifests and other shipping documents were exchanged by the lines for three-fourths of a year, the agreement was never implemented and was permitted to expire. No renewal of Commission approval was sought.

As a result of Brazilian Decree Law 666, on August 13, 1969, an interim Rationalization and Cargo Agreement was drawn up and signed by Mormac. The National Superintendency of the Merchant Marine (SUNAMAN) denied approval stating that any agreement of such nature can be approved only if it covers both government controlled and all other cargoes carried by the companies, signatories of the agreement, in the traffic between the two interested countries.

In March 1970, a “Memorandum of Consultation” was agreed to by United States and Brazilian Government representatives. The understanding covered the following guidelines:

(a) The Brazilian and United States Governments will enter an agreement providing for equal access to government-controlled cargoes except such government-controlled cargoes as the Brazilian Government may waive to third-flag lines;

(b) The agreement will provide for the equal division on a revenue basis between the national lines of the two countries of government-controlled cargoes:

(c) If the third-flag lines are willing to enter into revenue pools in the northbound trade on a basis which is acceptable to the United States and Brazilian lines, then the Brazilian Government will release by waiver sufficient freight for the third-flag carriers to come up to the southbound share agreed upon for them by the lines in the conference;

(d) The United States and the Brazilian lines will enter into a revenue pool in the southbound trade providing for an equal division of revenue arising from such trade as they may carry between them;

(e) Pools based on revenue and specifying shares for all lines serving the U.S. North Atlantic and Gulf/Brazil trade in coffee and cocoa, will be negotiated by the conference members;

(f) The details of the pooling agreements, such as the number of sailings, over- and under-carriage provisions, and similar matters, will be determined by the lines which are parties to them;

(g) Agreements should not exceed 3 years initially, but may be renewable;

(h) Agreements should relate only to cargoes covered by the IAFC;

(i) The southbound equal access provisions will become effective upon agreement by all lines participating in the conference to negotiate the northbound and southbound agreements described herein. Equal access agreements shall not be terminated during the period of negotiations among the lines;

(j) The Governments of the United States and Brazil will take action to stop rebating activity in the northbound trade; and

(k) The Government of Brazil and the Government of the United States will consult with each other before either government terminates the equal access provisions which have been put into effect.

14 F.M.C.
In April 1970, the IAFC principals reconvened and again failed to reach a pooling agreement on a multilateral basis because of continued inability to agree on apportionment of cargo. Subsequent to adjournment, Mormac, Lloyd, and Netumar initiated negotiations which resulted in the signing of agreement FMC No. 9847 (U.S. Atlantic Coast/Brazil trade, southbound only), which is before the FMC for approval in this docket. At the same time Delta, Lloyd, and Navem negotiated a similar agreement, FMC No. 9848, also before the Commission, covering southbound cargo between the U.S. Gulf Coast and Brazil.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

It is in the best interest of the commerce of the United States to achieve, insofar as possible, stability in the southbound trade between the United States and Brazil. We conclude on the record herein, agreements 9847 and 9848 will contribute substantially to that stability, thereby benefiting the commerce of the United States without infringing upon the requirement under the Shipping Act, 1916, that all carriers, regardless of flag, be accorded equal treatment under the laws administered by the Commission. No violation of sections 15 or 16 of the Shipping Act exists.

The agreements, although admittedly anticompetitive devices, have been shown by respondents to be necessary under present conditions existing in the trade areas served. In 1966, in the *Mediterranean Pools Investigation* case, we explicitly set forth a guide for approving pooling agreements, wherein we said that:

* * *

The question of approval under section 15 requires (1) consideration of the public interest in the preservation of the competitive philosophy embodied in the antitrust laws insofar as consistent with the regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act and (2) a consideration of the circumstances and conditions existing in the particular trade involved which the anticompetitive agreement seeks to remedy or prevent. The weighing of these two factors determines whether the agreement is to be approved. For presumptively all anticompetitive combinations run counter to the public interest in free and open competition and it is incumbent upon those who seek exemption of anticompetitive combinations under section 15 to demonstrate that the combination seeks to eliminate or remedy conditions which preclude or hinder the achievement of the regulatory purposes of the Shipping Act.

Again, in 1968, in *FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien*, 390 U.S. 238 (1968), we required that those proponents seeking to impose restraints

---

which interfere with the policies of the antitrust laws must demonstrate that the restraints are required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or to be in furtherance of some valid regulatory purposes. We now affirm those standards and base our approval herein on findings consonant with those prior decisions.

Agreements 9847 and 9848 are concerned with an estimated 80 to 85 percent (that being the best estimate available on the record) of the cargo moving southbound in the trade from the Atlantic Coast and Gulf to ports of the East Coast of Brazil, together with such uncontrolled commercial cargo that the signatory lines carry.

Respondents and hearing counsel have taken the position, with which we concur, that no evidence was presented which indicates with any degree of certainty that the competitive situation will be changed to any significant degree by approval. At the present time, third-flag lines carry approximately 15 percent of the cargo in this trade. They participate to a limited extent in the carriage of cargo controlled by the Brazilian Government, not by any existing right, but by virtue of waivers issued by Brazilian authorities. These waivers are granted when it appears the Brazilian-flag vessels first, and the U.S. vessels second, cannot handle the cargo offered. Therefore, the effect of these agreements will be to grant the U.S. lines and Brazilian lines equal access to the 80 to 85 percent United States and Brazilian Government-controlled cargo moving in the trade. It is this “equal-access provision” which is the heart of the agreements and the primary reason they were negotiated. Simply, the provision calls for reciprocal rights to carry the controlled cargoes of the United States and Brazil by national-flag carriers of each country without the necessity of obtaining waivers. As was repeatedly brought out in the arguments of hearing counsel and the respondents, the mutual benefit accruing to the signatory lines from such an arrangement is fully apparent. The agreements make participation in the carriage of cargoes otherwise largely inaccessible to non-Brazilian lines available to the signatory lines. Non-government-controlled cargo carried by the signatories is subject to the agreements; however, third-flag lines will remain free to compete on equal terms for the carriage of that cargo.

Therefore, the realities of the trades necessitate these agreements. In order to preserve their own participation in the South American

---


8 Whether a certain commodity is or is not government-controlled is not capable of a precise definition as the same commodity may, at one time, be government-controlled, but not at other times. The consensus seems to be that the best estimate of government-controlled cargo moving in the southbound trade is between 80 and 85 percent.
trades, certain Scandinavian lines have likewise entered into agreements with Brazilian lines which apportion the cargo carried in the trades between South America and their own countries. Those agreements show not only the implementation of the policies of Brazil, but they show the willingness of the national-flag lines of those Scandinavian countries to participate in such agreements. In addition, as we stated in docket No. 67–48, Inter-American Freight Conference Agreements Nos. 9648 and 9649 and other Related Agreements, 11 FMC 332 (1968), approving the IAFC discussed above:

We are not cited to nor can we find anything in section 15 or any other provision of the Shipping Act which would render unlawful an agreement between carriers operating between two countries to “recognize” the publicly announced policies of those countries.

It is apparent from the petitioners’ case opposing approval of the agreements that central to their concern is the fear that operation of the agreements will in effect eliminate them from the trades or, at the least, cause them sufficient serious injury so that the quality of their service would decline appreciably; and that this would be unjustly discriminatory and unfair as between carriers, in violation of the 1916 act, detrimental to the commerce of the United States, and contrary to the public interest. We find ourselves unable to conclude that this will or is likely to happen. As aptly stated by hearing counsel, the evidence on balance simply does not show that the proposed agreements will eliminate or seriously restrict them. The evidence adduced at the hearing, while indicating that there may be some limited disadvantage to the third-flag carriers flowing from these agreements, does not support their contention that they will be driven from the trade by virtue of these agreements or indeed even irreparably damaged. Speculation is the principal basis for petitioners’ contention, and the evidence presented by them was of a basically conjectural nature concerning what they thought might happen. There is no substantial evidence to support either the conclusion that third-flag lines will be deprived of the opportunity to equally compete for nongovernment-controlled cargo or that cargo designated as government-controlled cargo will be substantially increased resulting in the elimination of or substantial decrease in free noncontrolled cargo available for third-flag competition.

9 An example of pooling agreements executed by Brazilian lines under government sanction with carriers of other nations can be found in the “Memorandum of Agreement” signed on Oct. 9, 1969, with the shipping lines of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark dealing with the trade of each of these countries with Brazil. A copy of this agreement is available at the FMC and MARAD (see exhibits 8 and 9). Agreements of similar nature have also been executed with other European countries.


14 F.M.C.
To attribute the conjectured disadvantage to third-flag lines to the agreements before us is unrealistic. It is not the agreements which basically cause limitations on third-flag lines. Rather, it is the Brazilian laws and decrees and the U.S. cargo preference laws which limit the operations of the third-flag lines. Historically, the U.S.-flag lines have carried the major portion of the cargo moving between the United States and Brazil. The Brazilian Government, determined to insure the participation of its flag vessels in all trades, has issued decrees to effectuate that purpose. Likewise, the impact of these decrees, especially Decree Law 666 issued in July 1969, has resulted in a loss of cargo by U.S. lines. Since Decree Law 666, Mormac and Delta’s southbound carryings and their success in obtaining waivers to carry Brazilian Government-controlled cargoes have been materially impaired.

Cognizant of these facts, we are unable to deduce more from the petitioners’ case than a suspicion of possible increasingly adverse consequences of an indirect nature. There is no solid evidence that the presently available commercial cargo, whatever its extent, will not continue to be open to petitioners nor that they will not be able to continue to receive waivers of Government-controlled cargo if the agreements are approved. Therefore, we conclude that at this time it does not appear that the status quo will be appreciably altered with reference to third-flag participation in the trade.

There is considerable similarity between the problem before us and the problem presented to the Commission in Alcoa v. Compania Anonima Venezolana Navegacion, 7 FMC 345 (1962), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. FMC, 321 F. 2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1963), where the Commission approved an agreement between a Venezuelan Government-owned line (“CAVN”) and Grace Line, Inc. (“Grace”). In that case, the Venezuelan Government similarly had emphasized a nationalistic shipping policy with the issuance of numerous decrees, the effect of which was to reduce significantly Grace’s participation in the trade. The Commission found that, on balance, the evidence did not show that the agreements would eliminate or seriously restrict the third-flag lines in the trade. It took the view which we now affirm that “something more than a fear of increased competition is necessary to justify a finding that an agreement is unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, contrary to the public interest, or otherwise merits disapproval under section 15 of the act.”

In the Alcoa-CAVN case, the Commission cited West Coast Line, Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 3 FMB 586 (1951), wherein the Federal Mari-

---

12 Id. at 361.
time Board, in upholding the pooling agreements in question, dismissed the issue of unjust discrimination under section 15 with the following language particularly relevant to the present agreements:

One thing seems reasonably clear and that is that the pooling agreements between respondents were not entered into for the purpose of eliminating complainants as a factor in the trade. It was readily testified to by a witness of Grace that the Chilean regulations were a very important motivating circumstance that led to the execution of the pooling agreements. The pooling agreements developed as the result of a number of other factors also, but the Chilean regulations were clearly dominant.

* * * * * * * * * *

This Board is only able to decide cases on the evidence of existing facts and the reasonable deductions to be drawn therefrom. It is not authorized to base decisions on speculative possibilities. However, the Board points out that a finding at this time that the operations of the pooling agreements in question do not today result in unfair discrimination does not close the door to a reexamination of the same pooling agreements at a future date if changed conditions bring about changed results. Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, expressly provides that the Board may "disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement * * * whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair" etc. (Emphasis ours.) 13

As our predecessors pointed out in that decision, our present approval of agreements 9847 and 9848 in no way limits our section 15 right of reexamination at any future date should changed conditions bring about changed results. We shall closely follow the progress of these agreements in alleviating the instability that plagues the trades in question. At this time, however, we find it unnecessary to impose additional reporting requirements on the parties as requested by hearing counsel because any requirements above those provided in the agreements would not yield benefits commensurate with the work involved in their preparation.

Our decision to approve agreements 9847 and 9848 is not in conflict with the guidelines established in our decision in docket 68–10, Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 14 FMC 58–62 September 4, 1970. Before setting forth those principles in docket 68–10 which we indicated would guide our deliberations in cases such as this one, we offered the following preliminary caveat:

Guidelines are nothing more than broad canals within which future action may be channeled with some reasonable assurance of its validity. As such, guidelines do not decide specific cases. Time, circumstance and the facts of the individual case can and probably will alter the "guidelines" to some greater or lesser extent. We offer this fact of administrative life only because our past experience has been that all too frequently broad and necessarily flexible policy


14 F.M.C.
statements have been played back as narrow and ironclad precedents which are said to dictate a particular conclusion in a given case.\footnote{\textit{FMC} docket 68–10, \textit{Inter-American Freight Conference Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 14 FMC 58, 62.}}

Therefore, it was not our intent in docket 68–10 to render a blanket prohibition against approval on all pooling agreements. Rather, it was our intent to forewarn potential parties to such agreements that pools not grounded on economic or commercial reality and based instead solely on the grounds of national interest without deference to shipper desires, or the efficiency of the operator, or the worth of the service rendered, would not meet the criteria under section 15 for Commission approval.\footnote{\textit{Id.} \textit{72.}}

We affirm our statement in docket 68–10 that:

There is simply no room under section 15 for the approval of a pooling agreement which embodies discriminatory or unfair quotas dictated by governmental law, regulation, decree, ukase or fiat.\footnote{\textit{Id.} \textit{72.}}

However, as hearing counsel and respondents have demonstrated, no attempt to unlawfully favor any flag carriers is embodied in these agreements; rather, their purpose is remedial—to overcome present inequities prevailing against respondents in their southbound carriage. No treatment of petitioners with an “uneven hand” or attempt to favor national-flag carriers in violation of sections 15 and 16 first of the Shipping Act exists, as was the situation in \textit{Nopal v. Moore-McCormack}, 8 FMC 213 (1964), or in FMC docket 68–10, supra.

**Ultimate Conclusions**

In summation, and upon the record before us, we have reached the following conclusions:

First, that the purpose of these agreements is to rationalize sailings and to provide U.S. lines with equal access to government-controlled cargo.

Second, that the participation of third-flag lines in carriage of cargo in this trade will not be affected to any significant degree in relation to the cargo they now carry.

Third, that approval of these agreements will contribute substantially to stability in the southbound trade between the United States and Brazil, thereby fulfilling a serious transportation need without constituting unjustly discriminatory or unfair treatment between carriers. The agreements will neither operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or be contrary to the public interest
or in violation of the act within the meaning of section 15, nor will they subject particular traffic to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of section 16 of the act.

Fourth, that should the competitive situation be so adversely affected as petitioners fear, this Commission retains jurisdiction over these agreements and upon proper showing, may require their modification or disapproval at any time.

Agreements 9847 and 9848 are approved for a 3-year period as requested.

Commissioner George H. Hearn, concurring:

I concur in the conclusions reached by the majority in this case, and I agree, generally, with the majority report. However, I wish to make a few observations on some aspects of this case.

There can be no doubt that the trades involved herein have been in a state of instability in recent years, and that such a situation is undesirable and detrimental to the foreign commerce of the United States. Furthermore, I find no factor inherent in the type of agreements before us to render them unapprovable, and I consider them well suited to overcome the difficulties in the trades to which the agreements apply.

However, I think we should realize that these agreements do more than correct instability. The instability involved is not the result, primarily, of commercial interaction, but of government action specifically designed to create conditions which would require agreements of the kind we are approving.

Thus, our approval is a recognition of prevailing political and commercial realities in international trade. And as I said in docket No. 68–10: 17 “Under appropriate circumstances and conditions, what may be unlawful conduct in one instance may be lawful in another * * * [and] activity which this Commission may be powerless to approve under section 15 may be permissible or noninterdictable when such approval is not sought.” Furthermore, as to action colored by government measures and amenable to our approval: “If the commerce of the United States is not adversely affected, such action may not be violative of our laws * * *” 18 and its approval may be both desirable and necessary. We “cannot forestall the changes in technology and politics which are radically altering traditional rights and prerogatives.” 19

---

17 Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 14 F.M.C. 58, 75.
18 Id. 76.
19 Id. 77.

14 F.M.C.
Nevertheless, it should be made clear that there must be a limit not only to the extent and purpose to which the "national interest factor" may be used. There is a limit also to the methods by which governments may seek to introduce even a permissible level of "national interest" into commercial activities. International shipping policies of governments and carriers, to obtain in the foreign waterborne commerce of the United States, must not transgress the bounds created by Congress in our antitrust laws. It is only within this framework and that of our shipping statutes, with the exceptions and exemptions created therein, that the Federal Maritime Commission may accept or approve conduct in the foreign waterborne commerce of the United States.

It cannot be said that utilization of a "national interest factor" is generally good or bad. Cargo control and preference laws, for example, can be legitimate expressions of the needs of nations. When, however, national interest is advanced at the expense of all other considerations, it can hinder reliable ocean service. But properly utilized, national interest can produce trade stability, especially as here, where government activity on both sides is aimed at such goals as elimination of overtonnaging and maintenance of efficient service. That agreements implementing national interests benefit the carriers of the countries involved does not, per se, render them unapprovable.

Likewise, speculation that such agreements may prove at some future time to be detrimental to our commerce or otherwise in violation of our laws is not a ground for disapproval. Section 15 agreements are restrictive of competition; but Congress has determined that this departure from our antitrust principles is permissible when placed under appropriate regulation. Consequently, the Federal Maritime Commission has as one of its functions the surveillance over approved section 15 agreements to ward against their operation in violation of law.

For the reasons set forth in the majority report and in accordance with the foregoing comments, I concur in the conclusions of the majority in approving agreements Nos. 9847 and 9848.

Francis C. Hurney,  
Secretary.

[seal.]  
14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 70-42
AGREEMENT No. 9905

Decided November 28, 1970


Richard W. Kurris for respondent American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.


Marvin J. Coles and Paul N. Tschirhart for respondent Seatrain Lines, Inc.


REPORT

By the Commission: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners)

On August 14, 1970, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mormac) and American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. (AEIL), entered into an agreement of purchase and sale whereby AEIL agreed to purchase from Mormac four so-called ro-ro vessels, the SS Mormacsea, SS Mormacsky, SS Mormacstar, and SS Mormacsun. Notice of this agreement was published in the Federal Register on October 17, 1970, and protests to the approval of the agreement, which we have designated as agreement No. 9905, were filed by Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain) and Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land), both of which requested a hearing. Because both protesters indicated that their interests with respect to the sale of the ro-ro vessels centered upon the use to which AEIL intended to put such vessels, the Commission instituted this proceeding by an order to show cause served October 30, 1970, which provided that AEIL file an affidavit indicating its future operational
plans for the four Mormac vessels, together with other operational data demonstrating that agreement 9905 should be approved, and ordered Sea-Land and Seatrain to show cause why the agreement should not be approved. Mormac intervened on November 5, 1970, and it and AEIL have filed affidavits herein.

Neither Sea-Land nor Seatrain now opposes our approval of agreement 9905. Seatrain has, by statement filed November 13, 1970, withdrawn from the proceeding based upon the statement in AEIL's affidavit that the acquired vessels will not be used in competition with Seatrain in the North Atlantic/Northern European trade. Seatrain therefore declares that it has "no further objection to agreement No. 9905." Sea-Land, on the other hand, as was indicated in our order to show cause in this proceeding, is concerned not with the agreement of sale and purchase as such or even with the authority which must be obtained from this agency prior to effectuation of the agreement, but only with the use made of the vessels by the buyer pursuant to an operating differential subsidy contract. We have no jurisdiction over the payment of operating differential subsidies and the use made by carriers of vessels operating pursuant to such subsidies. Sea-Land has in fact recognized this by saying that it does not object to the Commission's passing on the approvability of agreement 9905 without hearing, if the Commission holds that the subsidy issue is "not reached in deference to the primary jurisdiction and expertise of the MA/MSB."

We are thus presented with an agreement with respect to which no party desires a hearing and to which no party objects with respect to any matter which is within our jurisdiction. We believe that the uncontested affidavits in support of agreement 9905 submitted by Manuel Diaz, vice chairman and chief executive officer of AEIL, and William T. Moore, chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer of Mormac, provide a substantial basis for approval of the proposed agreement. As indicated in these affidavits, agreement 9905 provides merely for the sale of the vessels and contains no other commitments, understandings or undertakings of any nature between Mormac and AEIL. AEIL is not purchasing the Mormac North Atlantic service; there is no merger or consolidation of assets between the companies; there will be no continuing arrangement between the parties as a result of the sale; there is no transfer of operating subsidy rights from Mormac to AEIL; and there is no understanding between the carriers in any way restricting or limiting future competition between them. The sale and purchase of the subject vessels was approved by the Maritime Administrator and the Maritime Subsidy Board on Oc-
October 19, 1970. In fact, as the uncontested affidavits of the carrier parties indicate, the agreement not only has not been shown as likely to have detrimental effects, but appears to afford substantial benefits to the foreign commerce of the United States and to the public interest. The high speed of the Mormac vessels will allow the AEIL to increase its port coverage, thus allowing shippers a more comprehensive direct service and benefiting added ports as well. The public will be afforded the use of a new and modern high-speed roll-on roll-off service not presently available in the trade in which AEIL states the acquired vessels will be used. The operation of the vessels in this trade, furthermore, does not appear to result in an appreciable increase of capacity which could cause overtonnaging.

The Commission, of course, retains jurisdiction under section 15 over agreement 9905 and can at any time either upon complaint or of its own motion reexamine the agreement to see whether it should be cancelled, disapproved or modified. We make one final observation with respect to the course followed by the Commission in this proceeding, although perhaps such is not required because of Seatrain’s withdrawal therefrom. Seatrain had maintained that the issuance of a show cause order in this case improperly shifted the burden of proof on to the carriers protesting approval of a section 15 agreement. The burden of proof has not been transferred to the protesting carriers by the issuance of a show cause order in this proceeding. The burden of proof with respect to approval of a section 15 agreement ultimately rests with the Commission. “The Commission must of course adduce substantial evidence to support a finding under one of the four standards of section 15 * * *.” FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244 (1968). Similarly, the proponent of a proposed agreement may be required to come forward with information concerning such agreement, and it is for this reason that the show cause order issued herein provided that AEIL furnish information “which would tend to demonstrate that agreement 9905 should be approved under section 15.” The requirement that protesters to this agreement show cause why it should not be approved merely placed them under the obligation to come forward with information in support of the allegations made in their protests.

Based upon the uncontested affidavits submitted in this proceeding, we conclude that agreement No. 9905 is approvable under section 15. Therefore, it is ordered that agreement 9905 is approved and that this proceeding is hereby discontinued.

[seal]                     Francis C. Hurney,
                          Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 70-43

ATLANTIC AND GULF/WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA CONFERENCE IMPOSITION OF A BUNKER SURCHARGE ON LESS THAN 90-DAY TARIFF FILING NOTICE

Decided December 17, 1970

Imposition by the Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference of a bunker surcharge in response to rising fuel costs on less than 90-day notice found to be violative of section 14b(2) of the Shipping Act, 1916, and article 10(c) of the Conference's Merchants' Freighting Agreement.

Rising bunker costs, under the facts herein, do not constitute an "extraordinary condition" within the meaning of Article 10(c) of the Merchants' Freighting Agreement nor do such increased costs unduly impede, obstruct, or delay the carriers' service within the context of said clause.

David Orlin and Jose A. Cabranes, in behalf of Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference.

Joseph B. Slunt and Donald J. Brunner, hearing counsel.

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners):

This proceeding was instituted to determine whether the bunker surcharge imposed on 30 days notice by the Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference violates section 14b(2) ¹ of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (the act), and article 10(c) ² of their Merchants'

¹ Section 14b(2) provides:
That whenever a tariff rate for the carriage of goods under the contract becomes effective, insofar as it is under the control of the carrier or conference of carriers, it shall not be increased before a reasonable period, but in no case less than 90 days.

² Article 10(c) provides:
In the event of any extraordinary conditions not enumerated in article 10(a), which conditions may unduly impede, obstruct, or delay the obligations of the carriers, the carriers may increase any rate or rates affected thereby, in order to meet such conditions; provided, however, that nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the provisions of section 18(b) of the Shipping Act, 1916, in regard to the notice provisions of rate changes.
Freighting Agreement and, accordingly, why the Commission should not order the respondents to defer the effective date of their bunker surcharge a sufficient period of time to satisfy the 90-day notice requirements. The proceeding was limited to the submission of affidavits and memoranda, and by agreement of the parties, oral argument was dispensed with. The Conference submitted an opening brief supported by affidavits of officials of the Conference's two American-flag member lines, John J. Haggerty of Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc. (Prudential) and Lloyd Strickland of Gulf and South American Steamship Co., Inc. (G & SA). Hearing counsel subsequently submitted a brief in reply to which Mr. Haggerty was given the right of response by supplemental affidavit. No petitions to intervene were filed with the Commission.

FACTS

The Conference operates in the U.S. Atlantic and gulf to west coast of South America trade, pursuant to Commission-approved Agreement No. 2744. It also maintains a dual rate contract system approved by the Commission.

On October 23, 1970, the Conference submitted to the Commission a telegraphic revision of its Southbound Tariff SA–12, FMC–1, instituting a "bunker surcharge" of five percent on all contract, noncontract, special, charitable, and industrial contract rates, effective November 23, 1970. On October 26, 1970, the staff of the Commission sent a telegram to the Conference stating its view that the surcharge required 90-day tariff notice and requested that the effective date be altered accordingly. On October 28, 1970, the Conference rejected the staff's view and requested a formal ruling by the Commission on the matter. To allow for such ruling, the Conference deferred the effective date of the surcharge to November 30, 1970.

The Conference instituted its bunker surcharge, relying upon the authority granted under section 10(c) 3 of the Merchants' Freighting Agreement, drafted and approved by the Commission, to increase, on 30 days' notice, any rate or rates affected by any (1) extraordinary conditions not enumerated in article 10(a), 4 which may (2) unduly

---

3 Id.
4 Article 10(a) provides:

In the event of war, hostilities, warlike operations, embargoes, blockades, regulations of any governmental authority pertaining thereto, or any other official interferences with commercial intercourse arising from the above conditions, which affect the operations of any of the carriers in the trade covered by this agreement, the carriers may suspend the effectiveness of this agreement with respect to the operations affected, and shall notify the merchant of such suspension. Upon cessation of any cause or causes of suspension set forth in this article and invoked by the carriers, said carriers shall forthwith reassume their rights and obligations hereunder and notify the merchant on 15 days' written notice that the suspension is terminated.

14 F.M.C.
impede, obstruct or delay the obligations of the carrier. Article 10(c) thus grants an exception, under the appropriate conditions, to the ordinary requirement of 90 days’ notice for a rate increase as required by section 14b(2) of the act.

The Commission, in its order to show cause of November 4, 1970, expressed the opinion that “the cost of bunker transpiring in the Conference trade since January 1, 1970, does not constitute an extraordinary condition within the meaning of article 10(c) of the Merchants’ Freighting Agreement”, and that such increased costs “will not unduly impede, obstruct, or delay the carriers’ service within the context of said clause.” The Conference, on the other hand, stated that it was the view of its members that the increase in bunker prices in recent months went far beyond any situation which could have been reasonably anticipated by a prudent operator and, therefore, constituted an extraordinary condition within the meaning of article 10(c) of the Merchants’ Freighting Agreement, permitting the giving of 30 days’ notice of the surcharge.

Therefore, the issue before us is whether the recent increases in bunker prices meet the criteria of article 10(c) so as to justify the imposition of a surcharge on 30 days’ notice.

Discussion

After full consideration of the briefs and supporting affidavits, it is our decision that the increase in bunker prices occurring in recent months does not represent an “extraordinary condition” within the meaning of article 10(c) and, accordingly, the Conference must be held to the requirement of 90 days’ notice as set forth in section 14b(2) of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Article 10(c), approved in The Dual Rate Cases, 8 F.M.C. 16 (1964), was intended to allow conferences and individual carriers maintaining a dual rate contract system to increase rates on the 30-day notice provided in section 18(b) of the act where extraordinary circumstances other than those set forth in article 10(a) unduly impeded or delayed the carriers’ service. In approving clauses to justify rate increases on short notice, we were merely recognizing that there would almost certainly arise circumstances where carriers might be entitled to relief from the 90-day notice obligation as prescribed by section 14b(2), Shipping Act, 1916. However, we think it clear that the involved circumstance must be both “extraordinary” and at the same time it must unduly impede, obstruct or delay the obligations of the carriers. The current conditions caused by increased bunkering costs are neither “extraordinary” within the meaning of article 10(c), nor
do they represent an undue impediment or obstruction to the carriers' obligations.

Respondents contend that this construction of article 10(c) is "unduly narrow" and fails to take into account both "the severity of the emergency fuel shortage which they argue has led unexpectedly to a series of dramatic and unforeseeable price increases in one of the carriers' major cost factors" and the "substantial adverse effects of those increases upon the financial conditions and operations of the carriers."

To support their contentions, respondents submitted public statements and press releases referring to the national fuel shortage and specifically the shortage of residual fuel including Bunker C residual fuel upon which the shipping industry relies. Supplementing these statements, respondents have submitted statistics verifying the increase in costs for Bunker C fuel since January 1970.

We have noted the above data and the definite price trends in the cost of the Bunker C type of fuel. However, we are unable to agree with the conclusions drawn by respondents from that information. As pointed out by hearing counsel and confirmed by respondents' supporting statements, the shortage of residual fuel oil is not an entirely new fact of commercial operation. Rather, the shortage has been developing due to increased demand since 1960, with the current crisis in supply starting at least 2 years ago. Likewise, as also noted by hearing counsel, the price information furnished by the Conference itself, as well as that obtained by our own staff, clearly shows that the behavior of the prices was such that a vessel operator using a reasonable degree of care could foresee that the prices were climbing to the present levels. Prices have consistently risen over a period of 8 months. The greatest increase, a total of 100 percent, occurred at U.S. east coast ports. However, a close examination of that 100 percent increase shows that it consisted of: a 9 percent increase from January to March, an 8 percent increase from March to May, a 13 percent increase from May to June, a 16 percent increase from June to July, a 12 percent increase from July to August, and a 16 percent increase from August to October. Other ports showed similar increases for the same period. These increases are out of the ordinary but, in our opinion, they cannot be classified as drastic overnight increases amounting to a sudden emergency or an unforeseeable condition.

In docket No. 65-7, "Imposition of Surcharge at United States Atlantic and Gulf Ports on Cargo Moving Between Said Ports and Latin American Ports," 10 F.M.C. 13 (1966), we had cause to consider the language of article 10(c) as it applied to a longshoremen's strike which occurred in 1965. We said:

14 F.M.C.
The criteria are apparent: the condition must be outside or beyond the carrier's control, the condition must impede or delay the carrier's service, and there must be an emergency, an abnormal condition, or an extraordinary circumstance.

The words—emergency, abnormal, extraordinary—are subjective; they presuppose some lack of foreseeability.

Thus, the carriers must provide 90 days' notice of rate increases to dual-rate shippers if the conditions that give rise to the need for the increase are "normal"; that is, foreseeable by the carriers. For example, where such conditions as rising salaries, costs of vessels, fuel, or increased stevedoring expense require additional freight revenue, then 90 days' notice is required because the carrier is expected to anticipate these needs. This is so because exporters, in conducting their business, need the stability afforded by a guarantee of 90 days' notice. Indeed, this is one of the most important inducements to shippers to commit themselves to an exclusive patronage contract with a conference. In this context, under the dual-rate contract, the notice requirement is highly important. Carriers have a strict duty to anticipate the need for rate increases and give timely notice thereof to dual-rate signatories. The factual question, therefore, is whether the carriers, in the exercise of a high degree of diligence should have foreseen or anticipated the conditions which unduly impeded, obstructed, or delayed the obligations of the carriers.\(^5\) (Emphasis ours.)

The 90-day notice benefit is one of the most important inducements to shippers to commit themselves to an exclusive patronage contract. Shippers frequently make contracts and quote prices based on freight costs having at least a 90-day duration. If the freight costs are increased on only 30 days' notice, the shipper in many instances will either have to absorb the increases on prices already quoted or try to pass on the increase at the risk of losing the sale. These observations are relevant to the case in issue and further substantiate our inability herein to recognize or create an exception to the 90-day rule.

As we have stated, we do not find an existing extraordinary condition as required under article 10(c). However, should we have found such fuel costs to be extraordinary conditions within the meaning of article 10(c), it is our position that such increased costs still would not "unduly impede, obstruct, or delay" the carrier service as required by said article. Respondents have presented no substantial evidence that they would suffer the type of economic harm that would impede or obstruct their services. In Mr. Haggerty's supplemental affidavit, he

speaks to the withdrawing of certain vessels by Prudential from all service by early 1971, as an impediment to their service. However, at the same time he indicates that the cost of Bunker C fuel was not the only factor contributing to the decision to withdraw these vessels from service. Without more facts than presented, we are unable to treat the suggested relationship between the cost of fuel and withdrawal of service as anything more than conclusory and self-serving.

Respondents also mention delays of “long awaited capital expenditures” and delays “in its service to this trade as a direct consequence of the rise in fuel price.” However, at no point did they present the Commission with specific incidents of such delays and, therefore, the relationship was again only conclusory and self-serving.

Finally, the Conference urges that they certainly cannot be held responsible for the increase in fuel prices, and with this we agree. However, we do not agree that this places the circumstance “outside or beyond the control of the Carrier”, thus allowing the Conference to escape responsibility for the manner in which it responds to the changed conditions. The carriers, of necessity, must be held to a high degree of diligence with regard to shippers and the implementation of rate increases after proper notice. The repeated increases as well as the general worldwide upward movement in bunker costs should have served as warnings to the carrier members of the Conference simply as prudent businessmen long experienced in dealing with fluctuating costs and prices.

**Conclusion**

Therefore, based on the record before us, we conclude that the imposition by respondents of the bunker surcharge under consideration herein, on less than 90 days’ notice is violative of section 14b(2) of the Shipping Act, 1916, and article 10(c) of the respondents’ Merchants’ Freighting Agreement. Respondents are hereby ordered to defer the effective date of their bunker surcharge a sufficient period of time from October 23, 1970, to satisfy the 90 days’ notice requirement.

[Seal]

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
The Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference dual rate contract system requiring signatory shippers to commit exclusive patronage to the Conference in all three outbound trade areas, found contrary to the public interest and, accordingly, not permitted approval under section 14b of the Shipping Act, 1916.

The Conference is required to amend clause 2 of its dual rate contracts so that such contracts be offered separately in each trade area the Conference serves.

Robert L. Harmon, Esq. and William J. Ziegler, Esq., for Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and member lines.


REPORT

By the Commissions (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; George H. Hearn, Commissioner)*

This proceeding is before us on exceptions to the initial decision of examiner Edward C. Johnson in which he recommended the Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference be permitted the continued use of its currently employed exclusive patronage (dual rate) contract system.

BACKGROUND

On January 15, 1962, certain steamship lines filed with the Commission Agreement No. 8660 for approval under section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. The purpose of this agreement was to form

*Commissioner Ashton C. Barrett did not participate.
the Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference (Conference) which was to supersede 10 existing conferences serving the trade inbound and outbound between ports on the west coast of the United States and Canada and ports in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and the west coast of South America.1 Under Agreement No. 8660, this trade was divided into five-so-called "trade areas" and it was provided that only carriers actively serving a particular trade could participate in matters affecting that area, e.g. ratemaking.

Subsequently, the signatories of No. 8660 filed a proposed "Shippers Rate Agreement" and a "Receivers Rate Agreement" with the Commission for approval under section 14b of the Shipping Act, 1916. It was proposed that the Shippers Rate Agreement, entitling shippers to lower rates for their exclusive patronage to conference lines, would be offered to all shippers in the three outbound trades, whereas the Receivers Rate Agreement would be offered to all receivers (or importers) in the two inbound trades.

On February 27, 1964, we instituted the original proceeding in this docket to determine:

(1) Whether Agreement No. 8660, establishing the Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference, should be approved under section 15, Shipping Act, 1916, and (2) whether the "Shippers Rate Agreement" and the "Receivers Rate Agreement" filed for use in connection with Agreement No. 8660, if approved, should be approved under section 14(b), Shipping Act, 1916; * * *

After hearings, Examiner Edward C. Johnson issued an initial decision in which he approved both the conference agreement and the dual rate contracts, the latter with certain modifications not relevant here. Exceptions to the initial decision were taken by hearing counsel and certain interveners.

On March 30, 1964, we issued our Report in "The Dual Rate Cases," 8 F.M.C. 16 (1964), which included our decision on the issues raised in docket No. 1092, along with the decisions in approximately 60 other dockets then pending before us. We approved both agreement No. 8660 and the Conference's dual rate contract form, provided, however, that a merchant not be required to obligate himself to exclusive patron-

---

1 The 10 predecessor conferences were:

No. 6670—Camexco Freight Conference.
No. 6070—Canal, Central America Northbound Freight Conference.
No. 6170—Capac Freight Conference.
No. 8390—Caribbean/Pacific Northbound Freight Conference.
No. 7270—Colpac Freight Conference.
No. 4284—Pacific Coast/Caribbean Sea Ports Conference.
No. 7570—Pacific Coast/Mexico Freight Conference.
No. 7170—Pacific Coast/Panama Canal Freight Conference.
No. 4630—Pacific/West Coast South America Conference.
No. 6270—West Coast South America/North Pacific Coast Conference.

14 F.M.C.
age in all the five trade areas. In requiring that the Conference offer its dual rate contract in each of the five trading areas which it served, we had the following to say:

The use of a dual rate contract by the new conference presents a special problem, however * * * the conference members themselves have recognized that five separate trade areas are involved and that a carrier who does not serve a particular trade should not be permitted to control the rates and practices in that trade. Yet, if the conference is permitted to offer a single dual rate contract which includes all five of the trade areas, merchants will be forced to obligate themselves to exclusive conference patronage in trade areas not desired in order to obtain contract rates in a trade area where they feel the dual rate contract meets their needs. This seems to us neither necessary nor fair.

We have approved the new agreement on the ground that it is largely concerned with providing a means of central administration for a number of conferences. In keeping with this, we are approving the use of a dual rate contract in each of these five trade areas and merchants must be offered the privilege of executing a contract for any or all of the trade areas, as they desire. We find that it would be both contrary to the public interest and detrimental to commerce for the conference to require that a merchant obligated himself to exclusive patronage in all of these trade areas in order to obtain contract rates in a single trade. Any such requirement would, of necessity, bring into serious question the new conference arrangement itself. (Emphasis ours.)

The Conference appealed our decision in “The Dual Rate Cases,” supra, as it related to docket No. 1092, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The exact relief sought by the Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference in its appeal was set forth in its “petition for review of an order of the Federal Maritime Commission,” dated April 10, 1964:

Petitioners pray that this court declare invalid, permanently enjoin, set aside, and suspend the enforcement and carrying out of the said order of the Federal Maritime Commission insofar as the said order prescribes a form of “Shippers Rate Agreement” to be used by the Conference, and that the said Shippers Rate Agreement be offered to “merchants” in each of the five trade areas covered by the Conference, and such other and further relief as may be proper in the premises.

The Conference’s appeal was consolidated for decision with appeals of the Pacific Coast European Conference and the Pacific Coast River Plate Brazil Conference from the Commission’s orders issued in “The Dual Rate Cases” in docket No. 1007 and docket No. 1057, respectively.

On February 3, 1965, the court handed down its decision in Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F. 2d 197 (C.A. 9, 1965), wherein it remanded the proceeding to allow us to cure certain procedural defects not relevant here. The court, however, was silent concerning the Commission’s requirement imposed in docket No. 1092, that the Conference offer its dual rate contract in each of the five areas in which it operated.
Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing, we reimposed the requirement that the Conference offer its dual rate contract in each of the five trade areas covered by the conference agreement. (See our earlier report in this proceeding, 12 F.M.C. 149.) In doing so we concluded that respondents had failed to meet the test first espoused in Investigation of Passenger Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C. 27 (1966), and affirmed by the Supreme Court in FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968), that:

* * * conference restraints which interfere with the policies of the antitrust laws will be approved only if the conferences can “bring forth such facts as would demonstrate that the [restraint] was required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in the furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.” [390 U.S. 243]

Respondents, on February 4, 1969, petitioned the Commission to reopen the proceeding to afford them an opportunity “to meet the new burden of proof” imposed by “the rule of F.M.C. v. Svenska Amerika Linien”, supra. They took the position that the Svenska decision, which “was not handed down by the Supreme Court until March 6, 1968, some 6 months after the close of the evidentiary hearings in this docket”, constituted a “changed condition of law” and due process required that they be given an opportunity to prepare the record necessary to satisfy this “changed condition of law”.

We granted respondents’ petition to reopen and remanded the proceeding to the examiner:

* * * for taking further evidence on the question of whether Respondents' present dual rate contract system is required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in the furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.

In his Initial Decision, the examiner found:

* * * that the Latin America Pacific Coast Steamship Conference's present dual rate contract system has been shown to be required by serious transportation needs, is necessary to secure important public benefits and is in furtherance of the valid regulatory purposes of the Shipping Act.

On the basis of this finding, the examiner concluded that respondents' present dual rate system should be permitted “continued use and approval”:

* * * the Commission's decision of January 7, 1969, should be modified * * *, and the order served therewith should be vacated and these proceedings should be terminated.

The examiner’s findings and conclusions were based upon the testimony of “11 representative witnesses consisting of shippers, car-
riers, freight forwarders and conference officials. The examiner quotes exhaustively from the testimony of these witnesses and reaches the following "general conclusions":

1. A representative cross-section of shippers and receivers and freight forwarders, who are intimately connected with the details of shipping arrangements, have experienced an improvement in the service offered by the conference members since the implementation of the present contract system;

2. The present contract system acts as an incentive to the conference member lines to increase their investments in vessels committed to the conference trade and that the present improved level of conference service is a primary result of the present contract system;

3. The rule proposed by the Federal Maritime Commission will result in a deterioration of service in the area served by Respondents and presents a threat to the transportation needs of the shipping public;

4. Rate stability, which is desired by and essential to shippers and receivers, is dependent to a very large degree upon the maintenance of the present contract system;

5. For sound business reasons, the testimony discloses that shippers and forwarders alike desire the type of flexibility provided by the present two-contract system and that the "flexibility" proposed by Hearing Counsel may well result in disorganization and trade disruption;

6. Shippers and receivers receive fair treatment under the present system and can see no advantage in tampering with, or changing their contract arrangements when they are assured that these arrangements work to their advantage, as at present. Actually the record discloses and I so find and conclude that the two-contract system now in use by the Conference is required by a serious transportation need in the area involved herein, is necessary to secure important public benefits, and is in the furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.

Hearing counsel excepts, principle at least, to all of the examiner's general conclusions. Specifically, he objects to the examiner's basic conclusions that the present contract rate system has: (1) Resulted in improved service in the conference trade; (2) provided an incentive to member lines to increase their investments in vessels committed to the conference trade; and (3) resulted in rate stability in the various trade areas.

**The Contract System and Improved Service**

In concluding that the present improved level of service is a result of the present contract system, the examiner relied principally upon the testimony of four witnesses: Mr. John W. Flook, manager of the trading department of Macondray & Co.; Mr. Edward H. Shustack, president of R. H. Baker & Co., Inc.; Mr. Albert A. Wright, assistant

---

2 The 11 witnesses who appeared at the hearing may be broken down by category as follows: five shipper witnesses, three carrier witnesses, two conference witnesses, and one freight forwarder association witness.
manager of traffic and distribution department, Standard Oil Co. of California; and Mr. James R. Scott, manager of transportation services of the U.S. Borax and Chemical Corp., of Los Angeles. In each instance the examiner has quoted, paraphrased or referred to only those portions of testimony which are most favorable to the conclusion he reached. The testimony of Mr. Flook offers an example. The examiner cited the following in support of his conclusion that the improved service level was due to the present contract rate system:

Q. Mr. Flook, you have been a party to, signatory to the dual rate contract since 1961?
A. Yes.
Q. And you indicate in your written testimony that it has been your experience that the rate agreement covering the three southbound and two northbound has resulted in improved service; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. On the part of the Conference?
A. Yes.
Q. What are you comparing that to?
A. Well, we are comparing that to the previous system where there were 10 individual rate agreements.
Q. So since the Federal Maritime Commission's approval of the super conferences, we might call it, you have gotten better service?
A. We have, yes.
Q. In your opinion, is this attributable to the amalgamation of separate conferences into one?
A. Yes, it is an ability by the Conference, I feel, to better structure rates.
Q. I don't understand that.
A. Well, with the Conference controlling the five different trade areas, three southbound and two northbound, we feel that it offers the lines a greater opportunity through the participation of the European lines that do service the area, to offer better service both north and southbound.

From the foregoing, it is just as easily concluded that the establishment and approval of the "super conference" was the cause of the increased service level such as it may be. The real difficulty lies in concluding that it was the present contract rate system that produced the alleged result. Indeed, it would seem that it was the conference agreement that enabled the European lines to participate more fully. The same is true of the other testimony relied upon by the examiner in concluding that improved service was the result of the contract rate system.

THE CONTRACT SYSTEM AND RATE STABILITY

In our earlier report in this case we had the following to say concerning the respondents' contract system:

The contract system as such does not prevent discrimination in rates. The contract system is a tying device; it does nothing more nor less than obligate
a shipper in exchange for a lower rate to the exclusive use of conference vessels. We find no persuasive evidence in the testimony of record which demonstrates that there would be any more or less *stability* under a one-contract-one-trade system than there is under the present single contract system. [Emphasis ours.] 12 F.M.C. at page 157.

Again, the testimony relied upon by the examiner fails to demonstrate how the single contract system provides rate stability which would not otherwise prevail under the system which would offer a separate contract for each of the five trade areas. The following treatment of one witness' testimony is illustrative:

Witness John W. Flook testified that the present contract system "is important to maintain stability of rates" and that "the imposition of the Commission's proposed rule would probably result in instability of rates and service in the trade areas served by the Conference due to the possibility of disruptive non-Conference service." Mr. Flook, upon cross-examination, said that as an exporter, his company often sold goods for delivery forward, for up to 60 days in advance. He further stated:

We require, when making these contracts to be assured that at the time of shipment the rate on which we based our cost calculation would apply.

If, on the other hand, there were non-Conference lines within the trade area and there was a freight war in existence where the Conference and the non-Conference lines were competing for the cargo, the natural instability would exist.

In response to an inquiry from the presiding examiner, Mr. Flook stated:

I think that as far as the imports are concerned, I think the general consumer will always benefit by the, again, stability of rates and not having to pay an increased rate on one occasion and a lower rate on another occasion.

*I relate that to the item that we are importing in greatest volume, cocoa beans, that due to the fixed rate that we have had in effect, the buyers can anticipate their costs on a better basis.*

As a matter of fact, in that way the consumer benefits by not having a fluctuating rate.

Or as another example the examiner offers:

Mr. M. J. McCarthy, of the Freight Forwarders Association, stated that he had been in the shipping business for 41 years, and that this present contract system "better affords stability of rates", and that without the present contract system there would be no rate stability. When hearing counsel asked whether the shipper should have the option of shipping conference or non-Conference, Mr. McCarthy stated:

If you put it that way, Mr. Tell, forget about the Conference, just break them up and forget about it if you're going to give the latitude where he can ship conference or non-Conference. If he has that latitude, I see no reason why he should have a Conference. Why don't you walk right into a rate war?
Here, as with almost the entire approach of the examiner and the respondents to the issue at hand, it was made to appear that the choice involved is between the present contract or no contract at all, which is, of course, not the case. We do not insist that a shipper be allowed the choice of conference or nonconference within a "trade area", we only insist that a shipper be allowed to choose whether or not to sign a contract for each of the five trade areas. Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that rate stability is dependent upon the present contract system.

THE CONTRACT RATE SYSTEM AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVE

According to the examiner:

Mr. Robert B. Swenson of Balfour Guthrie & Co., Ltd. stated that the present contract system acted as an inducement to Grancolombiana, for whom his company acts as agent, to increase their service and investment in the trade and to maintain their present investment. He stated:

Well, we only recently, I should say the last 3 months of 1968, completed a study; we as agents completed a study for Grancolombiana on the future of the particular trade route and based on this, they are presently studying this and have told us indirectly that they are planning to add to their fleet and improve their service to some extent.

Now, of course, this study and their planning is based upon the fact that there will be certain tonnages moving, and if you take away the larger parcels, of course, the service could not exist, and instead of having a ship every 2 weeks, there will be maybe a ship a month, or a ship every 6 weeks.

Thus, in Mr. Swenson's opinion, it would appear that the plans of Grancolombiana to extend their service are directly related to the maintenance of the present contract system, and specifically, the maintenance of the present level of service is dependent upon the conference lines carrying certain base parcels cargo which he felt would be taken away if the Commission's rule went into effect. In light of Mr. Swenson's additional statement that the Grancolombiana Line covers all three of the so-called southbound "trade areas" with the same ship the importance of one contract covering all three trade areas and of Grancolombiana's ability to depend upon patronage for the entire conference area becomes of considerable importance.

In light of such testimony it is apparent that the possibilities of the conference carriers for maintaining and extending service and for their adding to their fleets are directly related to the carrier's assurance that the cargo upon which they are dependent in the Latin American trade area will not be taken away.

I therefore find and conclude from the testimony that the present level of conference service is a result of the present contract system now in use.

The record shows that Mr. Swenson's complete testimony does not demonstrate that Grancolombiana's plans are dependent upon the continuation of the present contract system. Rather, they are tied to the continuing carriage of certain "base parcels cargo". Here, we would agree with hearing counsel that even without the single contract system.
if a nonconference carrier wishes to carry base cargoes, he would; (1) have to offer a lower rate, and (2) convince the base cargo shipper that regular and dependable nonconference service will be provided. If the Conference service in the particular trade area is dependable and efficient and the rates are reasonable, it follows that the shippers of any size in that area will sign contracts and the Conference will be adequately protected in that trade area.

**THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED CONTRACT SYSTEM**

The examiner concluded that "the rule proposed by the Federal Maritime Commission, which would require the respondent conference to offer its contract separately in its five ratemaking areas, would prove detrimental to the commerce of the United States and would adversely affect the public interest."

Here, the examiner relies most heavily on the testimony of Mr. Henri P. Blok, now chairman of the respondent conference. Mr. Blok emphasized two factors which the examiner found to be unique to the respondent conference. First, this conference serves a trade area "situated in one of the most active cross-trade routes in the world." Second, "11 members of the Pacific Coast/European Conference and several transpacific carriers are members of this conference, but their membership in the respondent conference is somewhat incidental to the major trade routes they serve." The examiner then had the following to say concerning the Blok testimony:

As a result of the first of these factors, he stated that his conference is peculiarly susceptible to "raiding" by nonconference members on an occasional basis in the cross trade areas; that if such raiding should occur, it would be an easy step for those carriers who are also members of other conferences to withdraw from their regularly scheduled sailings of the respondent conference because of the second factor; and that resulting chaos and loss of service throughout the conference would occur.

The testimony of Mr. Blok is to be contrasted with that of Mr. Raymond Burley, Mr. Blok's predecessor in the chairmanship of the respondent conference, and a man whom the examiner recognized as "a distinguished shipping authority" of more than 20 years experience. In responding to an inquiry regarding the effect of the super conference on nonconference competition, Mr. Burley testified in 1967, "The effect it had on nonconference competition has not been material because we did not have a great deal of nonconference competition at the beginning."

The testimony of Mr. Blok primarily relied upon by the examiner was:
It is not difficult to recognize that nonmember European carriers, whose vessels in the exercise of their primary trade route functions also regularly traverse various Latin American trade routes, remain an ever-present potential to lift an occasional parcel in the Latin American trade whenever they find cargo offerings on their major trade routes uncomfortably disappointing. In doing so, these carriers may be less concerned about any particular return they receive, as long as this return at least covers the out-of-pocket costs of handling and contributes something towards the cost of overhead, which could well be preferable to having to return their vessel partly unfilled.

* * * under the present conference contract system whereby shippers in general have more at stake than losing their privileges to individual, limited designations, the danger is small that regularly engaged Latin American Conference carriers will have to face non-Conference liftings at rates they, or any one who could try to make a living in that trade, could possibly afford. If the present contract system were broken down under the Commission's proposed rule, however, I fear that a good many shippers, who regularly ship to a given area, would easily be swayed to rely on the availability of dead space in nonmember European vessels. They would thus cancel their contract to that area, but retain their contracts to other areas in the expectation that the Conference service there would be maintained. This may appear attractive to the shipping public at first glance, but the almost inescapable consequence is that many of the Latin America Conference member lines will rapidly lose interest in this cross-trade which heretofore assured them of cargo offerings to all areas to remunerative rates. After all, it is assured, paying, rate level which induces the carriers to allocate a portion of their vessels' space to the Latin America trade, sometimes even at the expense of cargo-offerings in their primary (Europe) trade. Necessarily, the end result of the Commission's rule must be a spotty, cutrate, unreliable service which is neither responsive or adequate to the demands to the shipping public.

The validity of this argument depends, of course, upon the real and effective presence of competition from nonconference carriers, the mere presence of such carriers in the trade is not enough. They must offer a service which is truly competitive with that offered by the respondents. To be truly competitive such a service must, in the view of the respondents' own shipper witnesses, be adequate and dependable and offer reasonable and stable rates. Moreover, in a statement not referred to by the examiner, Mr. Blok places the extent and severity of the nonconference competition in its proper perspective. Mr. Blok, after alluding to the 11 members of the Pacific Coast European Conference, who are members of the respondent conference, states:

At the present time, in the same Pacific Coast/European trade there are nine other carriers not members of this conference, which are exclusively engaged in that major trade route. If it ever appeared that the present members of the Latin American Conference were unable to cope with the tonnage moving in the Pacific Coast, Mexico, Central America, Canal, Caribbean trade, any of these non-member European carriers may be interested in joining the Latin American Conference which, after all, is open to all qualified carriers. As it presently stands, however, the present Latin American membership appears to fill the bill.
and is encouraged to stand by its commitments primarily because of the stable conditions which prevail under the present contract system.

It is only after this statement that Mr. Blok points out that:

It is not difficult to recognize, however, that these nonmember European carriers * * * remain an ever-present potential to lift an occasional parcel of cargo * * * whenever they find the cargo offerings on their major trade route uncomfortably disappointing.

Thus, the nonconference competition which respondents cry would wreak havoc and chaos in the trade if we were to modify their present contract system as proposed reduces itself to some nine lines which might be "interested in joining" the respondent conference if it appeared that respondents were "unable to cope with the tonnage moving" but which also remain every ready to "lift an occasional parcel" when the offerings in their own trade become disappointing.

Finally, again unmentioned in the initial decision, the following colloquy between Mr. A. Wright, assistant manager of traffic and distribution department, Standard Oil of California and hearing counsel is illuminating:

Q. Mr. Wright, you indicated that you export to all three trade areas in question?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have any idea as far as the percentage breakdown goes where your exports go?
A. No, sir, Mr. Tell. We have 13 subsidiaries that are signatories to the involved contract here, and I simply have not had an opportunity to refine the figures to get a percentage breakdown from one area to another.

Q. Well, is there a particular area in your estimation which occupies a greater percentage of your exports than, say, another?
A. I would suspect that the areas in Central America and Venezuela, for example, loom large in the picture.

Q. What products do they export?
A. Petroleum products basically.

At the time, at the same time, we also have a fairly steady movement of in-bound maintenance materials for our installations down there. It could be machinery, pipes, valves, things of that nature.

Q. So, in other words, you are party to both the shipper's agreement and receiver's agreement; is that correct?
A. No, sir. We do not appear as signatory to the northbound agreements.

Q. Why is that?
A. We have very little movement coming north.

Q. When you come north, do you ship Conference?
A. We ship on the Conference lines, yes.

Q. Why, in your estimation, is there no necessity to become part of the receiver's agreement if you utilize Conference service coming north?
A. The need is so minute that it simply is not worth the necessary policing activity of maintaining the Conference agreements and maintaining the records and so forth; it just isn't worth it to us.
Q. Do you utilize anything else but Conference service coming north?
A. No to my knowledge.
Q. In your estimation, would it not be advantageous to be a party of the receiver's agreement coming north even though your shipments are negligible just by the fact you get a 15 percent reduction?
A. It could be; and if the movement were ever to escalate, it would be; I suspect that we would.

Contrast this statement of Mr. Wright's with our own conclusion as to one of the primary difficulties we found with present contract rate system. In our earlier report we said:

Whereas before approval of agreement 8660 a shipper could have signed a dual rate contract with one, several, or all of ten conferences • • • now a shipper must obligate himself in all three outbound trades and a receiver in both inbound trades. Thus, a shipper who ships the vast majority of his goods in, say, trade area "A" and only rarely has shipments in trade area "B" must nevertheless commit rare shipments in "B" to conference vessels in order to obtain the lower contract rate in "A".

Nothing in this record causes us to change our mind. We have been offered nothing in the way of transportation need, important public benefits to be secured or valid regulatory purpose to be achieved by the present system. Here, as in the earlier hearing, the vast bulk of the testimony is either speculative as to the consequences of modifying the present system or leads to the conclusion that factors other than the contract rate system—such as the approval of the so-called super conference itself—have been the causes of the rate stability, dependable service, etc., pointed to by respondents as supporting the continued use of the present system.

We have very carefully reviewed the record before us and we find nothing that would lead us to change the conclusions reached in our earlier report, which conclusions we set forth below omitting quotation marks for the sake of convenience.

In choosing an organizational structure for their amalgamated conference, the respondents decided to divide it into five trade areas and to restrict participation in matters relating to those trade areas to those member lines actively engaged in them. Presumably, these trade areas are based upon some geographic and operational logic. Thus, within the Conference respondents have insured the autonomy of the groups of lines operating in a given trade area. Should another line wish to have a say in matters concerning that area, he must institute a service in it. Rates are geared to the operational circumstances and, presumably, to the needs of the shippers in a given trade. It is only when it seeks to obtain a shipper's exclusive patronage that the Conference adopts an all or nothing approach. Whereas before the approval of Agreement No. 8660 a shipper could have signed a dual rate
contract with one, several, or all of 10 conferences (assuming they would all have obtained approval of contracts under 14b), now a shipper must obligate himself in all three outbound trades and a receiver in both inbound trades. Thus, a shipper who ships the vast majority of his goods in, say, trade area “A” and only rarely has shipments in trade area “B” must nevertheless commit those rare shipments in “B” to conference vessels in order to obtain the lower contract rate in “A”. But what are the legitimate commercial objectives achieved by the present contract system, which objectives fairly detract from the weight of the loss of freedom of choice by the shipper? What transportation need is served by the present system? What important public benefits are secured by it? Is the present system imposed in furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act?

It has been suggested that the present contract system affords increased stability of rates. But the evidence of record much more readily supports the inference that such stability as exists is due to the concerted ratemaking activity under the conference agreement rather than the contract system. Indeed, the record establishes no real connection between the present contract system and rate stability or the prevention of rate wars.3

It has also been suggested that the single contract system has provided increased service to conference shippers. But here again the testimony of record convinces us that any increase in service has resulted from the new trading scope of the Conference under Agreement No. 8660, not from the operation of the present contract system.

A good deal of time and testimony was devoted to demonstrating that the present system has not permitted the member lines of the Conference to increase rates through monopolistic strength. This simply is not relevant to the question at hand. To the extent that it shows anything, such testimony simply shows that even with a single contract system the Conference falls somewhere short of a complete monopoly. It does not go to any legitimate commercial objective of the system.

Absent the protection of section 14b, the exclusive patronage tying arrangement embodied in a dual rate contract would clearly run counter to the antitrust laws. It is therefore contrary to the public

---

3 Rate wars are almost exclusively due to the rate-cutting practices of nonconference lines, yet the record is devoid of any meaningful references to nonconference competition. Indeed, the stability alluded to in the testimony is really the absence of discrimination among shippers, apparently as would have been practiced by the member lines themselves. See testimony of Gottshall quoted at 12 F.M.C., at p. 156. But such discrimination is prevented by the fact that once the rates are fixed by the members in concert they are required to be published and filed with the Commission under section 18(b) of the Shipping Act, and the members are then obligated to charge only those rates. Whether there be a single contract system or a system which embodies the one-trade-one-contract requirement is simply irrelevant to such “stability” of rates.
interest unless necessary to pursue some legitimate commercial objective. In the normal run of things, that legitimate commercial objective will be a conference's need to protect itself from the inroads of nonconference competition. Here Respondents have been granted permission to use a dual rate system. We will continue that permission. The only change we will require is that the contract be offered separately in each of the five trade areas, and insofar as the record shows such a contract system will still afford sufficient protection against nonconference competition. We remain unconvinced, for the reason set forth above that the present so-called single-contract system is required by some serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of any valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act. Accordingly, we will not sanction the present system's unwarranted inroads upon the nation's antitrust policies. An appropriate order will be issued.

Commissioner James V. Day, Dissenting

This case concerns the validity of the dual rate system now used by the Latin America/Pacific Coast Conference. The Conference covers five trade areas—three outbound from the United States and two inbound. The dual rate contract employed by the Conference binds a shipper in any one outbound trade area to the exclusive use of conference vessels in that area and the two other outbound trade areas if and when he ships in such other areas. Conversely, a shipper (receiver) in either one of the inbound trade areas must exclusively use conference vessels in both inbound trade areas.

The basic issue in this case is whether such a dual rate contract is against the public interest as this term is used in section 14b of the Shipping Act.

The majority has again found that the subject dual rate contract is against the public interest.¹

¹ The majority likewise found in a prior opinion wherein it stated that the contract, restricting shipper choice of carriers, violated the antitrust laws and was hence against the public interest absent the Conference showing the necessity for such restriction. (Agreement 8660–12 FMC 149 (1969).)

The Conference then objected and petitioned as follows: "Come now respondents, the Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and its member lines, and respectfully petition the Commission to reopen the subject docket for further evidentiary hearings in light of the Commission's report served on Jan. 7, 1969.

"The basis for this petition and motion is that the Commission has, in its report, unfairly and improperly applied the rule of F.M.C. v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 235 (1968), to the respondents for the reason that respondents have not been afforded an opportunity to meet the new burden of proof imposed by that rule. The decision in Svenska was not handed down by the Supreme Court until Mar. 6, 1968, some 6 months after the close of the evidentiary hearings in this docket. Nonetheless, on the basis of the Svenska decision the Commission has held in its report that, 'It is up to respondents to
The majority in this instance has reached the opinion that the contract is invalid via the following legal rationale or route.2

The majority decision states: (1) That the subject dual rate contract violates the antitrust laws (in that it restricts shippers from going nonconference).3

The majority says: (2) That the subject contract restriction violating the antitrust laws is in itself (sufficient and) substantial evidence that the contract is against the public interest.4

The majority holds: (3) That without countervailing evidence showing the necessity for this dual rate contract, the contract being inherently against the public interest must be declared invalid.5

show that the two-contract system is required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in the furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.'

"Respondents propose to demonstrate through the introduction of competent testimony that the two-contract system presently being utilized by the Conference is required by a serious transportation need, is necessary to secure important public benefits and is therefore in furtherance of valid regulatory purposes of the Shipping Act. Such testimony was not proffered during the prior hearings because of respondents' belief (wholly reasonable, we submit, in the pre-Svenska context) that, before their present contract system could be disapproved the Commission had the burden of making affirmative findings, within the meaning of the Shipping Act, that the present system was detrimental to the commerce of the United States and contrary to the public interest."

Respondents were granted further hearing and the matter is now decided. (In this opinion, italics have been added for emphasis.)

2 It has followed the test heretofore spelled out at length which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, in FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244–6 (1968) for interpreting sec. 15 of the act. It has done this, as it has said, in agreement that "the statutory phrase 'contrary to the public interest' as it appears in section 14b has the same meaning as it does in section 15". (See "Majority Opinion" of January 1969; 12 FMC 149, 153.)

3 The majority says (at p. 184) that "absent the protection of sec. 14b, the exclusive patronage tying arrangement embodied in a dual rate contract would clearly run counter to the anti-trust laws'.

4 In its prior opinion (12 FMC 155) the majority emphasized that an exclusive patronage tying arrangement violates the antitrust laws and "Therefore, unless there are to be diametrically opposed meanings attached to the public interest standards as they appear in secs. 14b and 15, there is without more, 'substantial (and sufficient) evidence' that respondent's contract is contrary to the public interest." (Footnote omitted.)

This position, of course, is consonant with the Court's in Svenska which held (as to sec. 15) that "once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is contrary to the public interest'.

However, compare some of the legislative history of sec. 14b. The Senate Committee said "We believe that any contract which contains the eight safeguards expressly required by the amended bill makes out a prima facie case that the contract is not—contrary to our public interest—." S. Rept. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1961).

The subject contract, of course, contains such special sec. 14b safeguard provisions and under the Senate rationale it could have been approved by the Commission without further evidence. The majority holds otherwise.

6 This is the Court's position relative to sec. 15, namely that "once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is 'contrary to the public interest' unless other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the weight of this factor'. FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244–6 (1968).

This is now the Commission's position relative to sec. 14b. One should compare, however, this present position to the Commission's statement in The Dual Rate Cases, 8 FMC 16, 50 (1964), where in discussing the subject dual rate contract it said: 'One intervenor in docket No. 1092 argues that there is no 'need' for the extension of the dual rate system
this regard the test employed by the majority for such supportive evidence is that it show that the contract is required by some legitimate commercial objective—i.e., required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or (required) in furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.\textsuperscript{6}

The majority also imply that the subject contract must absolutely be required in order to achieve a valid commercial objective and any degree of restraint in the contract not necessary to achieve that legitimate objective will be struck down as not in the public interest.\textsuperscript{7}

to areas included in the new conference agreement which are not now covered by existing dual rate systems of the individual conferences. Sec. 14b does not require that the conference demonstrate a positive need for the system as a prerequisite for approval. Rather it authorizes the use of dual rate contracts if they meet certain safeguards." This statement confirms a prior opinion of the examiner ("Initial Decision," January 1964, at p. 31).

However, regardless of whether the contract initially be considered as either prima facie in the public interest (and hence not requiring a demonstration of its need) or inherently against the public interest (and thus requiring justification), supportive evidence has been introduced which insures the contract's validity.

\textsuperscript{6} Oneonders the completeness of the majority's general statement that "In the normal run of things, that legitimate commercial objective will be a conference's need to protect itself from the inroads of nonconference competition." (supra, p. 18).

The legislative history of our law reveals that sec. 14b was enacted "so as to expressly authorize the use of dual rate systems by conferences, irrespective of the presence or absence of nonconference competition." H.R. Rept. No. 498, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1961).

Further, the Senate Committee considering this legislation found: "1. Conferences need the right to use dual-rate contracts—In order for the ocean common carriers and conferences serving our foreign commerce to do so on a regular, dependable, and nondiscriminatory basis, they must be allowed, as they are throughout the rest of the maritime world, to enter into dual-rate contracts with shippers and consignees. Otherwise, the economics of ocean shipping will force the lines concerned into rate wars among themselves that might result in the destruction of ocean common carriage. If that happens, there can be no doubt that the high cost American lines will be the hardest hit." S. Rept. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1961).

Likewise, it has also been noted that sec. 14b springs from "an appreciation of the hard fact of international shipping life that—the only method that has proved practical to assure continuity of service on a particular route with a degree of stability of rates, in view of the very large investment required in the establishment of a regular service, is—[the] providing [of] specific inducements to shippers to utilize the services of the particular line or lines regularly serving that route." S. Rept. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).

Shippers are likewise concerned with obtaining sound service for their trade objectives. Further, they look to the dual-rate system to provide stability of rates and for assurances that their transportation costs are identical with those of their competitors shipping within the same conference. H.R. Rept. No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961) and S. Rept. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961). In summary, the aim of the law is "the betterment of the American merchant marine and the stability of foreign commerce." H.R. Rept. No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).

Thus, all the above considerations, I would say, should also be considered within the scope of 'legitimate commercial objectives'—or pertinent to "serious transportation need, important public benefit, or in furtherance of valid regulatory purposes."

\textsuperscript{7} Thus the majority's statement—"In the normal run of things, that legitimate commercial objective will be a conference's need to protect itself from the inroads of nonconference competition. Here respondents have been granted permission to use a dual-rate system. We will continue that permission. The only change we will require is that the contract be offered separately in each of the five trade areas, and insofar as the record shows such a contract system will still afford sufficient protection against nonconference competition." (p. 18).

14 F.M.C.
Such is the majority rationale. But in applying all these principles I reach a different result than the majority. I weigh the evidence of record and I conclude as has the Examiner that the subject dual rate contract is in the public interest—required by legitimate commercial objective that is, required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits and is in furtherance of valid regulatory purpose.

In the aforesaid regard I more specifically conclude that the present contract rate system is necessary to maintain the same current level and degree of: (1) improved service in the conference trade; (2) real incentive to member lines to increase their investments in vessels committed to the conference trade; (3) sound assurance of rate stability; and (4) particular competitive benefits now enjoyed by shippers.

I further conclude that the majority alternative contract rate system will not be sufficient to accomplish the same results in support of the public interest.

These conclusions are derived from a review of all the accumulated evidence in this record now before us. The particular evidence which I find persuasive is as follows:

(1) Improved service:

The testimony of eight witnesses was cited by the examiner in support of his conclusion that the present level of improved service is attributable to the present contract system.

For example, witness Warrick testified (I.D. p. 11) that the present system of one contract covering all southbound areas reduces "redtape and paperwork" and provides dependability:

We know that we are covered in all of the areas; we don't have to worry about arranging contracts with each and every individual carrier or conference. There is a certain amount of dependability in that respect by having the one arrangement under which we are operating today.

Mr. Swenson testified (I.D. p. 13) that the present contract system has acted as an inducement to increase service:

* * * we as agents completed a study for Grancolombiana [and] * * * they are planning to add to their fleet and improve their service to some extent.

Now, of course, this study and their planning is based upon the fact that there will be certain tonnages moving, and if you take away the larger parcels, of course, the service could not exist * * *

As the examiner notes, it would appear from the above testimony that Grancolombiana's plans to improve service are related to main-

---

8 Messrs. Flook (shipper), Shustack (shipper), Wright (shipper), Scott (shipper), Warrick (shipper), Rutherford (shipper), Walker (Grace Line), Swenson (Grancolombiana Line).
tenance of the present dual rate contract coverage—securing certain parcels of cargo.\(^9\)

Witness Shustack stated (I.D. at p. 8) that the present system has encouraged a sufficiency of service, has ensured his ability to compete in South America, and is of benefit to U.S. commerce:

The service as furnished by the Conference enables a sufficiency of vessels and availability of the sufficiency of vessels to make the required shipments over a period of time of these contracts.  

* * * with this system not adhered to wherein just chance carriers that come in and scoop up some of the business and run off with it and discourage the regular Conference vessels in making these odd ports, we might not then be able to compete in South America.

Q. “Would you say that the single Conference contract system serves a beneficial need and is of benefit to the commerce of the United States?”

A. “From my own experience I have found it has met a need and is so.”

Witness Scott testified (I.D. at p. 9) that “the single conference contract covering all the trade areas serviced by the Conference presents a potential for satisfying important transportation needs in the area * * * which could not be obtained under the Commission’s proposed rule.”\(^{10}\)

One may also recall earlier testimony of record by witness Hansbrow (carrier agent) who said (I.D. 1968 at p. 23):

Q. Once having an advantage of a greater number of shippers who are bound by agreement to ship on Conference vessels, would you say that it is an incentive to the line involved, to extend its service in order to carry more cargo?

A. I would think very definitely so, yes.

Further, witness Gottschall of Sea-Land earlier stated (I.D. 1968 at p. 24):

Q. Would you say, then, that the employment by a single Conference of a single contract system was encouraging to your extension of service in Latin America?

A. Yes, it was.

In the light of such testimony it is clear that maintenance and extension of service is directly related to the present single contract system. One thus concludes that the present level of improved service is, indeed, a result of the present system.

---

\(^9\) The importance of the single contract coverage to Gran colombiana is self-evident when it is noted that the line covers all three southbound areas with the same ship according to Mr. Swenson.

\(^{10}\) The witness further stated (I.D. at p. 10) relative to “area” that “we feel that the Latin American area is generally one area” and that “we haven’t had any problems on getting our shipments out on Conference vessels. We consider Conference vessels as a whole rather than [individual lines].”
(2) Real investment incentive:

Witness Swenson testified (T.D. at p. 13) that the present contract system has also acted as an inducement to Grancolombiana to increase its investment:

* * * we as agents completed a study for Grancolombiana on the future of the particular trade route and based on this, they are presently studying this and have told us indirectly that they are planning to add to their fleet. * * *

Now, of course, this study and their planning is based upon the fact that there will be certain tonnages moving, and if you take away the larger parcels, of course, the service could not exist * * *

* * * I am afraid * * * if we broke up the present contract structure that we have and allowed a shipper to ship non-Conference to Central America and Conference to South America or the Caribbean area, this would take away a very substantial portion of their base cargo, and obviously it would mean that the service would be reduced. (Tr., p. 127)

In view of such testimony one concludes that the present real investment incentive is indeed based on having the certain assurance of shipper business through the present contract coverage.

(3) Sound assurance of rate stability.

The Examiner has cited the testimony of eight witnesses in support of his conclusion that the present sound assurance of rate stability is dependent on the present contract system.11

For example, Mr. Blok, the Conference Chairman, stated:

These carriers provide this service at agreed, dependable and uniform rates, offering regular sailings in response to the need of the traffic. More importantly, these carriers are willing to commit themselves to this incidental trade precisely because they are assured of a remunerative rate level and of loyalty on the part of the shipping public.

I likewise conclude, therefore, that the particular incentive and assurance of rate stability now existent is due to the present wide coverage of the one contract system.

(4) Particular competitive benefits now enjoyed by shippers:

The examiner relied on the testimony of seven witnesses to reach his conclusion that the present contract operates to the particular benefit of shippers.12

For example, the examiner noted that witness Shustack stated he had found the present system gave his company an availability and a sufficiency of vessels which allowed his company to compete in areas where they would not otherwise be able to compete.

11 Witnesses Shustack, Warrick, Torres, Scott, MacInerney, Flook, McCarthy, and Blok.
12 Witnesses Scott, Shustack, Rutherford, Flook, Warrick, McCarthy, and Walker.
Witness *McCarthy*, President of the Pacific Coast Customs and Freight Brokers Association, which handles between 50 and 60 percent of the total cargo moving in the Latin American trade, said:

The way it [the conference contract system] is working now, he [the shipper] has that flexibility to quote his export price under one contract in the three trade areas, which is flexible to the shipper and flexible to me as a forwarder.

Further, in late testimony, Mr. *McCarthy responded* (I.D. at p. 24):

* * * I thought I answered it sometime ago by stating that the flexibility as proposed by the Commission as against what the situation is today in my opinion the shipper has more flexibility today than he would have under, say, two, three, or four contract rate systems.

I am speaking from experience that I have found in the European Conference and the Westbound Conference trade that flexibility within those trades in my opinion is very, very good for the shipper, and I think the same condition should exist in the trades in the Latin American countries.

Now, as I told you before, that a shipper by having a contract in the whole area that we're talking about in South America is in a position to quote prices in any area and thereby no delay in that shipper getting a contract from the Conference.

Now, I know that has happened, and when you had the Conference before there was delays. I know that the Conference puts out a contract as quickly as possible but the shipper has to have that flexibility to say I can go here, there and there, and I have one contract.

As a further example of how the present contract system benefits shippers in getting business, and foster extensions of commerce, one notes the testimony of Mr. *Walker* (I.D. at p. 12):

* * * rates have been arranged by the conference to Peru and Chile because there is every evidence that this will expand, if successful, to every country in Latin America, and this particular shipper has contracts; he is particularly interested in our Conference setup because he has confidence in it that if he is treated properly and in a business-like way in one area that he can build into the other area and expect the same treatment.

I also refer to prior testimony of record by the respondent Conference chairman stating that under the present contract system:

We are better able to assure the shipping public that their competitor is getting the same rate, freight rate, as he is, so they have greater surety in the selling in Latin American markets. Agreement No. 8660, 12 FMC 149, 162 (1969).

Hence, I conclude that such testimony as above noted supports the view that the present contract system provides particular benefits now enjoyed by shippers.

**THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF THE MAJORITY’S SYSTEM**

The examiner concluded that the majority's alternative would be detrimental to commerce. He reached this conclusion from the testi-
mony of five witnesses.\textsuperscript{13} He noted that the lines stated they would lose their particular incentive to maintain their present level of service and investment and that shippers favoring the present system were fearful that the majority's system would result in a disruption of service for our commerce.

For example, the examiner noted (I.D. at pp. 14 and 15) the testimony of Conference Chairman Blok who referred to the particular vulnerability of the respondent conference and the impact which the Commission's proposed rule would have on the service which the other witnesses stated they enjoy and wished to maintain. Mr. Blok emphasized that eleven members of the Pacific Coast/European Conference and several transpacific carriers are members of this conference, but their membership in the respondent conference is somewhat incidental to the major trade routes they serve.

As a result of this factor, he stated that he believed it would be an easy step for those carriers who are also members of other conferences to withdraw from their regularly scheduled sailings of the respondent conference and that upon such occurring chaos and loss of service throughout the conference would occur. Mr. Blok described the situation as follows:

If the present contract system were broken down under the Commission's proposed rule, * * * the almost inescapable consequence is that many of the Latin America Conference member lines will rapidly lose interest in this [trade] which heretofore assured them of cargo offerings to all areas at remunerative rates. After all, it is an assured, paying rate level which induces the carriers to allocate a portion of their vessels' space to the Latin America trade, sometimes even at the expense of cargo offerings in their primary (Europe) trade. Necessarily, the end result of the Commission's rule must be a spotty, cutrate, unreliable service which is neither responsive or adequate to the demands to the shipping public.

Prior testimony of record supports the above evidence.  
Then Conference Chairman Burley said in 1967:

I testified earlier that one of our real problems in the matter of administering a noncontract rate system and keeping rate stability in our trade was the fact that the Latin states are right in the middle of the cross trades.

In other words, as this map displays, vessels traversing the area from the Orient to the Atlantic coast traverse part through Central America, South America, through the Caribbean.

They are potential nonconference competition if they so wish.

We have the Japanese lines that come from Japan via the Pacific coast to the west and east coasts of South America. If they weren't conference members they would be potential competition.

* * * I think that we have kept it fairly well under control through our single-contract system. (1967 Tr., pp. 26–28)

\textsuperscript{13} Witnesses Blok, Walker, Swenson, Flook, and Shustack.
I would further note the testimony of shipper witness Flook who said (I.D. at p. 17) that if the present contract system were broken up into a number of separate contracts, there would be no incentive for the present carriers to remain in the trade and that this "would result for a time in a freight war and could possibly disrupt the service which we are presently enjoying on a really scheduled basis."

Under all the circumstances above noted, I conclude that switching to the majority's alternative would prove detrimental to our commerce and not in the public interest.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, we here determine the issue of whether the Conference's dual rate contract is against the public interest as this term is used in section 14b of the Shipping Act.

The majority presumes it is useless the contract is shown to be required by some legitimate commercial objective—i.e., required either by a serious transportation need, or necessary to secure important public benefits or [required] in furtherance of some valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.

I have found that the contract is required in order to maintain the existing: improved carrier service, carrier investment incentive, assurance of rate stability, and competitive benefits to shippers. Each one of these factors is certainly a legitimate commercial objective representing a serious transportation need, an important public benefit or furthering a valid regulatory purpose.

I would emphasize that the contract is essential for not merely one but, indeed, for all four factors or objectives. If the contract related to just one, of course, this alone could be support for its continued use.

As a final word on geographic areas I would point out that there are a number of other conferences cited in the record which offer approved dual-rate contracts covering a geographical area greater than the areas covered by respondent's contract and which thus bind shippers to ship only conference in such greater area (regardless of the routing

---

14 Witness Edward Shustack summed up the attitude of the shipping public:

> I would be loath to tamper with a system that is working and working real well especially when American manufacturers are at a disadvantage shipping to foreign ports versus their counterparts in other countries.

> I would have to be shown a substantial advantage in such a change before I would want to tamper with what I feel to be an unknown situation.

15 See the legislative history of section 14b noting these factors of service, investment, rate stability, and shipper benefit. Footnote 6 at p. 3, *supra*.

14 F.M.C.
of their current business). Broadness of coverage cannot \textit{per se} be equated with badness in viewing the history of respondent conference.\textsuperscript{16}

Where, of course, the present shipper contract is here found on the evidence to be required, this is sufficient to justify its use regardless of whether the conference structure also contributes to the improved service, carrier investment incentive, assurance of rate stability, or the competitive benefits to shippers flowing from dual-rate contract coverage.

Indeed, the evidence is certainly "substantial" that this long-existing dual-rate contract is required. Testimony was taken from 11 representative witnesses consisting of carriers, conference officials, shippers, and freight forwarders. Essentially, all the testimony is in favor of the present dual-rate contract (that it is required) and against the majority substitute (not shown to be able to achieve as much for our commerce, our carriers and our shippers). It would seem far less certain in protection of the public interest to ignore sworn testimony of shippers and carrier management as to the benefits merely because such benefits possibly could "be more readily attributed to causes other than the present contract system". This is particularly so where the sworn testimony was: (1) open to the testing of cross examination; (2) remains unrebutted; and (3) pertains to actual operating experience over a number of years. I would further emphasize that actual experience must be given proper weight. The factor of actual experience tends to insure the probative value of testimony pointing out the particular benefits attributable to the subject system.

I hereby hold in the light of all the evidence that the existing dual-rate contract accomplishes legitimate commercial objectives and is in the public interest. Hence, and subject always to appropriate Commission review, the conference is entitled to continue using its existing dual rate contract.

(Seal)

F\textsc{rancis C. Hurney},
\textit{Secretary.}

\textsuperscript{16} This long-used system of one contract for shipments to Latin America (and another for shipments therefrom) is consonant with shipper testimony that "the Latin American area is generally one area" and "We consider Conference vessels as whole rather than [individual lines]." (Footnote 10, supra.) In this connection, a significant number, although not all, of the conference carriers operate in several of the five trade areas the conference has designated regarding carrier operations.

In the final analysis it is no more valid to try conforming apples to oranges than to say that the shipper contract coverage must be splintered in accord with the conference's internal organizational structure of five carrier areas. The conference structure merely insures that the particular carriers operating in an area have the say in such area—logically, they are best equipped through their current operations to vote therein on pertinent conference matters. This is hardly necessary or desirable to the shippers' business operations in this case. Certainly the evidence here shows that the present shipper contract coverage is considered to be at least one necessary support for present and potential business and benefit to all.

14 \textsc{F.M.C.}
This proceeding was initiated by the Federal Maritime Commission to determine whether the Commission should by rule require the Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and its member lines (respondents) to offer its dual-rate contracts in each of the five trade areas covered by the Conference agreement, and the Commission has fully considered the matter and has this date made and entered of record a report containing its findings and conclusions thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof. The Commission found in said report, inter alia, that the existing Conference dual-rate system, requiring signatory shippers to commit their exclusive patronage to the Conference in all three outbound trade areas, and signatory receivers to give their exclusive patronage to the Conference in both inbound trade areas, is contrary to the public interest and cannot be permitted approval pursuant to section 14b of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Now, therefore, it is ordered, That clause 2 of respondents’ dual-rate contract be amended to read as follows:

2. Trades covered by this Agreement:

This Agreement covers the transportation by water of goods from Pacific coast ports of the United States and Canada and the ports in Latin America as set forth in the five trade areas described in this clause. Merchants executing this contract may do so for any or all of the trade areas, as they desire, and notation of the trade areas covered by this contract shall be made at the end thereof: (1) from Pacific coast ports of the United States and Canada to:

Trade area “A” ports on the Pacific coast of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Puerto Armuelles, R.P.;

Trade area “B” Colon and Panama City, R.P., Balboa, and Cristobal, C.Z., ports in Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Atlantic coast of Columbia, Atlantic coast of Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, French Guiana, French
West Indies, Atlantic coast of Guatemala, Haiti, Atlantic coast of Honduras, Jamaica, Leeward and Windward Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, Atlantic coast of the Republic of Panama, Surinam, Trinidad and Venezuela;

Trade area “C” Pacific coast ports in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile;
(2) to Pacific coast ports of the United States and Canada from:
Trade area “D” Pacific coast ports of Chile and Peru;
Trade area “E” Caribbean ports of Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Trinidad, Windward and Leeward Islands, Barbados, French and British Guianas, Surinam, French West Indies, Venezuela, Netherlands Antilles and Colombia, Colon and Panama City, R.P., Balboa and Cristobal, C.Z., ports on the Pacific coast of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

It is further ordered, That, effective 30 days from the date of this order, respondents’ dual-rate contracts, amended in accordance with this order, shall be used by respondents to the exclusion of any other terms and provisions for the purpose of according merchants, shippers, and consignees contract rates.

By the Commission.

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

STAY OF ORDER

Granted March 12, 1971

The Commission’s report and order in this proceeding, served December 31, 1970, would require the respondent conference to amend its dual rate contract to offer a separate contract rate system in each of five “trade areas” whereas the existing contract system binds signatories to all inbound or outbound trade areas. The date for compliance with this order is currently March 31, 1971.

Respondent has now petitioned for a stay of this order pending judicial review of the Commission’s decision and order in this proceeding. Respondent sets forth various grounds to support its request. Essentially, respondent seeks to demonstrate that compliance with the order would be burdensome and costly and that a grant of a stay would result in no appreciable injury to the shipping public.

Good cause appearing, respondents request for a stay of the Commission’s order in this proceeding pending judicial review is hereby granted.

By the Commission.

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

(SEAL)
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Special Docket Nos. 425 & 426 Revell Incorporated

v.

Pacific Westbound Conference

February 16, 1971

Notice of Adoption of Initial Decision and Order Granting Refund

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in these proceedings and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on February 16, 1971.

It is ordered, That applicant is authorized to refund to Revell Inc., the amount of $3,199.27.

It is further ordered, That applicant publish promptly in its appropriate tariff the following notice.

Notice is hereby given that as required by the decision of the Federal Maritime Commission in Special Docket Nos. 425 and 426, that effective July 23, 1970 the contract rate on Item 1115, Kits, Hobby, Plastic Construction, for purposes of refunds or waiver of freight charges on any shipments which may have been shipped during the period July 23, 1970 to January 15, 1971 is $48.25 W/M, subject to all other applicable rules, regulations, terms, and conditions of said rate and this tariff.

It is further ordered, That refund shall be made within 30 days of this notice and applicant shall within 5 days thereafter notify the Commission of the date of the refund and of the manner in which payment has been made.

By the Commission.

[seal]  
Francis C. Hurney,  
Secretary.

197
Applications to refund a portion of freight charges granted.

INITIAL DECISION OF HERBERT K. GREER, PRESIDING EXAMINER

No. 425

Pacific Westbound Conference (applicant) seeks permission to refund to Revell, Inc. (shipper), a portion of the freight charges collected on five shipments of Revell Educational Hobby Kits and Revell Plastic Model Kits carried on vessels of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (K Line), a member of respondent conference. The rate applicable at the time of shipment was $50.50 W/M (item 1115, PWC local tariff 3, FMC 8) and, in accordance with the conference tariff, K Line collected a total of $30,835.31 from the shipper. The shipments were delivered to the consignee at various times between August 18 and November 27, 1970.

At a meeting of the conference held on June 24, 1970, the member lines approved a reduction in the rates applicable to kits, hobby, plastic construction, contained in local tariff item 1115 of PWC tariff 3, FMC 8, from $50.50 W/M to $48.25 W/M, to become effective June 29, 1970. Revell was advised of this reduction. Through inadvertence, the reduction was made in the tariff on local item 1115-A of tariff No. 3, covering kits, plastic model industrial construction, but not accomplished for item 1115, which was specifically applicable to the shipment here involved. Prior to the submission of this application, applicant filed with the Commission a corrected tariff page setting forth a rate of $48.25 W/M for kits, hobby, plastic construction, the rate here sought to be applied.

1 This decision became the decision of the Commission February 16, 1971.
Public Law 90–298, 75 Stat. 764, authorizes the Commission to permit a common carrier by water in foreign commerce to refund a portion of the freight charges collected from a shipper where there is shown to be an error in a tariff of a clerical or administrative nature. The evidence presented by applicant shows that the conference members, at a regular meeting, voted to reduce the rate on the commodities involved in these five shipments but inadvertently failed to file a tariff amendment reflecting the reduction.

The application involves a situation within the purview of Public Law 90–298 and the application was filed within 180 days of the shipments. No other shipments of the same or similar commodity moved on conference vessels during approximately the same time as these shipments, and no other proceedings involving the same rate not disposed of in this initial decision are pending. Applicant having complied with the legal requirements, and good cause appearing, applicant is permitted to refund to the shipper the sum of $3,014.84. The notice referred to in the statute shall be published in the conference tariff and the refund shall be effectuated within 30 days thereafter. Within 5 days of making the refund, applicant shall notify the Commission of the date of the refund and the manner in which payment was made.

No. 426

The facts and circumstances set forth in this application, which involves the same parties, are identical with those set forth in No. 425 except that the shipment was of a lesser amount of the commodity, was carried by Yamashita-Shinnihon Line, also a member of the conference, and the bill of lading was dated October 31, 1970. The findings as to error in a tariff of a clerical or administrative nature, as set forth in No. 425, are incorporated herein, and as it appears that the application conforms to the statutory requirements, applicant is permitted to refund to the shipper the sum of $184.43. Applicant shall advise the Commission of payment as required in No. 425.

Herbert K. Greer,
Presiding Examiner.


14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

No. 70-46

INDEPENDENT OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDER LICENSE
No. 1132—MARIO J. MACCHIONE

February 23, 1971

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION; ORDER OF SUSPENSION

Notice is hereby given that the Commission has determined to adopt the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding served February 9, 1971, the effect of which is to suspend respondent’s freight forwarder license for a period of 90 days.

Therefore, it is ordered, that independent ocean freight forwarder license No. 1132, issued in the name of Mario J. Macchione, is hereby suspended for a period of 90 days from the date of service of this order.

It is further ordered that license No. 1132 be returned to the Commission to be held during the period of suspension which will expire May 27, 1971.

It is further ordered that copy of this notice be published in the Federal Register.

By the Commission.

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

[seal]
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

No. 70-46

INDEPENDENT OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDER LICENSE
No. 1132—MARIO J. MACCHIONE

Freight Forwarder License No. 1132 suspended for 90 days.

Walter E. Doherty, Jr., for respondent.

Charles Haslup, III, and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel.

INITIAL DECISION OF HERBERT K. GREER, PRESIDING EXAMINER

This investigation was instituted by the Commission to determine whether respondent Mario J. Macchione has engaged in activity in violation of sections 510.23(a) and 510.24(e) of Federal Maritime Commission General Order 4 by permitting his license or name to be used by another person and by receiving compensation (brokerage) for freight forwarder services through a separate establishment without written approval of the Commission, and to determine whether respondent’s freight forwarder license should be revoked.

A stipulation of facts was submitted and no hearing was held. The facts which have been stipulated by and between the parties, insofar as necessary for resolution of the issues presented, are as follows:

1. In September 1969, one John F. Crowley, an employee of respondent, having obtained an agreement to handle the shipments of Nashua Corp., approached respondent regarding the use of Freight Forwarder license No. 1132. Respondent being unaware that the arrangement would be contrary to the Commission’s rules and regulations, agreed.

2. Crowley organized Door to Door International, Inc., and began operating as a freight forwarder under respondent’s license. Crowley was not conversant with Commission rules and regulations.

3. Between October of 1967 and February 16, 1970, Door to Door International handled approximately 198 shipments which were forwarded under respondent’s license No. 1132.

4. As of February 16, 1970, Crowley, as Door to Door International, Inc., ceased operating as a freight forwarder and turned over all shipments he had contracted for to respondent for handling.

1 This decision became the decision of the Commission February 23, 1971.
During this period, Crowley did not share in respondent's freight brokerage revenue, nor did respondent share in freight forwarder fees collected by Door to Door International, Inc.

It is found that respondent violated the Commission's rules and regulations governing freight forwarders by permitting his license No. 1132 to be used by Door to Door International, Inc.

It is concluded that, except for the activities above found, respondent is fit and able to operate as a freight forwarder and that, as hearing counsel recommends, a fair and reasonable penalty for violations found is suspension of respondent's license No. 1132 for a period of 90 days.

Respondent's Ocean Freight Forwarder license No. 1132 is suspended for a period of 90 days from such date as the Commission may order.

HERBERT K. GREER,
Presiding Examiner.

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 9, 1971.
14 F.M.C.
Pursuant to all of the standards of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and pertinent interpretations and adjudications thereof, agreement No. 9835 is approved.

This agreement, as filed with the Commission, represents the full and complete agreement of the parties. There are no additional ancillary understandings or arrangements among the various carrier members to this agreement which have been entered into and carried out or which have not been filed with and approved by the Commission.


Norman E. Sutherland and Thomas J. White for the city of Portland, Oreg., and the Dock Commission of the city of Portland.

Gerald Grinstein and Richard D. Ford for intervenor port of Seattle.

James Albert and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel.

REPORT

By the Commission: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; James F. Fanseen, Vice Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners)

Pursuant to section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, the Commission, on April 17, 1970, originally approved agreement No. 9835 over the protest and request for hearing of the city of Portland Commission of Public Docks (hereafter Portland). Portland then filed an application with the Commission seeking a stay of its order of approval. The application was denied on May 25, 1970, and Portland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for a stay, alleging that an unfiled agreement not to serve Portland existed between the Japanese Lines party to agreement No. 9835.
On June 12, 1970, the court in *The city of Portland, Oregon v. Federal Maritime Commission and the United States of America*, No. 24182, granted a stay of the Commission’s order delaying its effective date for 60 days and remanded the record to the Commission in order to expedite the holding of a hearing to determine, in light of the protest of Portland, whether the agreement and the alleged ancillary agreements, if any, should be approved. The Commission on June 25, 1970, ordered (pursuant to sections 15 and 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C. 814 and 821)), an expedited investigation and hearing be held to determine (1) whether agreement No. 9835 should be approved, disapproved or modified pursuant to section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916; (2) whether this agreement as filed with the Commission represents the full and complete agreement of the parties; and (3) whether there are any additional ancillary understandings or arrangements among the various carrier parties to agreement No. 9835 which have been entered into and carried out or which have not been filed with and approved by the Commission.

Hearings were duly held, and Examiner John Marshall’s initial decision recommending approval of the agreement was served on October 5, 1970. Parties participating in the hearing were: Portland as protestant, six Japanese Lines as respondent; the port of Seattle as intervenor and hearing counsel. Exceptions to the examiner’s decision were filed by Portland and hearing counsel.

Subsequent to filing of the exceptions, the Japanese Lines agreed to institute service to Portland every 20 days, and Portland withdrew its exceptions. Hearing counsel excepted to the examiner’s rejection of their proposed modification proscribing the practice of the member lines to agreement No. 9835 of absorbing inland freight on Portland cargo and moving that cargo via Seattle.

While the Commission concurs with the examiner’s ultimate conclusion to approve the agreement without the modifications advocated by hearing counsel, the subsequent service to Portland and withdrawal by Portland of its exceptions, renders moot a number of issues discussed by the examiner. Therefore, in our opinion, we think it inappropriate to treat those issues, and accordingly we have restricted our decision here to conclusions which reflect the existing facts in determining compliance with the standards for approval set forth in section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. It is not, however, our intention to either reject or affirm the examiner’s initial decision. Rather, our decision herein merely speaks to the change in circumstances since the issuance of the initial decision.

---

FACTS

1. The Japanese Ministry of Transport (MOT) is responsible for the formulation and effectuation of policy in connection with the construction and operation of Japanese-flag vessels. Any Japanese carrier wishing to build a vessel must first get the approval of MOT. Moreover, financing through the Development Bank of Japan is dependent upon such approval. MOT, with the advice of the Shipping and Shipbuilding Rationalization Advisory Council, an advisory body to the Minister of Shipping and Shipbuilding Policy, concluded that the most economically feasible and efficient service between Japan and the Pacific Coast ports of North America would consist of a three-vessel system providing, inter alia, weekly service where possible, interchange of containers, space charters, and centralization and joint operation of container terminal facilities.

2. On September 11, 1968, the managing directors of the respondent lines were orally directed to work out an arrangement to accomplish the above objectives and to submit the specific terms of such an arrangement to MOT and the FMC for approval. The opportunity was never available to any one of the six lines to build a containership for operation in the Pacific Northwest trade, or to operate a container venture on any basis other than under the arrangement directed by MOT.

3. In October 1969, the carriers agreed on the basic formula that the arrangement would be designed around. It closely followed agreement No. 9718, which pertains to Japan-U.S. Pacific Southwest full-containership service.2

Signed by the six lines in December 1969, agreement No. 9835 provides for joint containership service between Japan and ports in the States of Oregon and Washington. The service would be provided by three fully containerized vessels. The six participant lines would be divided into teams of two, with each team jointly owning and operating one vessel. Sailing schedules would be subject to the unanimous agreement of all six lines though solicitation and booking of cargo would be on an individual basis by each line for its own account. Individual bills of lading would be issued. There are no provisions for the pooling of revenues or the sharing of operational expenses among the parties to the agreement. The agreement does provide, however, for the sharing of administrative expenses as well as the

2 Filed May 10, 1968, and approved by the Commission July 3, 1968. Four of the six Japanese lines are included; i.e., Japan Line, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsu-O.S.K. Lines and Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. U.S. Pacific coast calls under the agreement are made at Los Angeles and Oakland only.

14 F.M.C.
interchange of containers and related equipment. In addition, there is a provision providing for the transportation of each line’s containers on any of the three ships by way of a space chartering arrangement. The agreement is to remain in effect for 2 years with the option to extend the agreement for another year by unanimous consent of the parties.

4. MOT does not control the selection of ports. This is left to the discretion of the lines. In October 1969, all six lines agreed that it would be best to review the results of the three vessel operations, at least through the main winter season of December, January, and February, before deciding whether to call at Portland. Portland was so advised in early February 1970.

5. There is no indication that the Lines at any time had decided to exclude Portland on a permanent basis, and as we have already noted, subsequent to the examiner’s decision, the Lines agreed to serve Portland. Their interim decision not to serve Portland was based on the factors of cargo opportunities, competitive considerations, and the desire to maintain a 30-day turnaround or round-voyage schedule. The record indicated (1) that if Portland could produce enough traffic to justify the call and (2) that if the call could be made within the 30-day turnaround time limitation “throughout the seasons,” Portland would be given direct full-containership service. Such considerations were responsive to the MOT directive for regular service.

6. As of this report, Portland has been served under the consortium arrangement on the following dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golden Arrow</td>
<td>12-11-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotaka Maru</td>
<td>12-30-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beishu Maru</td>
<td>1-23-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Arrow</td>
<td>2- 8-71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. As early as February 1970, the Lines advised their agents that they had temporarily agreed on the calling ports and the schedule for the first vessel. The April 13, 1970, issue of the Pacific Shipper contained the outbound and inbound schedule of that vessel, the Golden Arrow. However, such preliminary actions are not subject to section 15 sanctions, and no operation was conducted under agreement No. 9835 prior to Commission approval on April 17, 1970. No cargo was booked and no joint advertisements were published.

Discussion and Conclusions

Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, provides, in part:

The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing, disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement * * * whether or not previously approved by it, that
AGREEMENT NO. 9835

it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between * * * shippers, * * * ports, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of the Act, and shall approve all other agreements * * *.

Consequently, the Commission is charged with disapproving a section 15 agreement based on the following four standards: (1) unjust discriminations; (2) detriment to the commerce; (3) contrary to the public interest; and (4) violation of the Act (Shipping Act, 1916). As the court indicated in FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 245 (1968), the Commission must be presented with substantial evidence to support a finding under one or more of the above standards. On the record before us, it is our opinion that such “substantial evidence” cannot be found to justify disapproval of Agreement No. 9835. As the examiner concluded in his decision, a proper judgment on balance must be that operations under the agreement, “will not be unjustly discriminatory in any true sense of the word, will be beneficial to the commerce, in keeping with the public interest, and not a violation of the Shipping Act, 1916.”

International shipping is currently experiencing a phenomenal increase in the utilization of containerships for the transportation of cargo. It is absolutely essential to the success of this new shipping system that the high cost vessels, supporting equipment and facilities be utilized in the most economical and efficient manner. In the interest of fulfilling that objective as well as providing regular service, interchange of containers, space charters, etc., MOT directed that full-containership service to the Pacific Northwest be provided through utilization of the consortium arrangement.

Agreement No. 9835, under the now-existing circumstances, quite obviously affords transportation benefits, including, among others, the regularity of service and the efficient utilization of high cost equipment, which far outweigh any relevant antitrust considerations which could be marshaled against its approval under section 15. Investigation of Passenger Travel Agents, 10 FMC 27, 34 (1966), aff’d FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. supra. We are presented with no question of merger or consolidation. The companies maintain their separate organizations and identities. There is no sharing of revenues or profits. As pointed out by the examiner, “the agreement merely provides for a cooperative working arrangement covering space chartering and interstitial agreements on future sailings and administrative details.”

In addition, the question of whether agreement No. 9835 is unjustly discriminatory under section 15 has become essentially moot with the subsequent decision of the Lines to provide direct containership serv-
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

ice to Portland on a 20-day cycle. Portland had contended during the hearing that respondents had entered into a clandestine determination to restrict or exclude the containership service from calling at Portland. The alleged “permanent exclusion” of Portland from any direct service was the only ground upon which the charge of discrimination was based. The new arrangement for direct service is satisfactory to Portland and constituted the basis upon which they withdrew their exceptions to the examiner’s decision. The record reveals no other facets of the agreement which are potentially unjustly discriminatory under section 15.

In our order of investigation, we also questioned the existence of ancillary understandings or arrangements among the parties which may have been effectuated without Commission approval. As we indicated in our original order of approval, and now affirm herein, “there is nothing in the agreement filed with the Commission which indicates that it does not embody the complete understanding of the parties.” The subsequent service to Portland by the consortium has negated considerably the merit of the original objection. Even before the initiation of the Portland service, the record did not support a finding that the Lines had entered into any permanent form of ancillary understanding or arrangement not to serve Portland in the future.

Further, it is our conclusion that the agreement as filed represents the full and complete agreement of the parties. Portland had originally contended that the agreement is incomplete in that it contemplates future agreements between the Lines with regard to schedules and advertising, space charters, mutual accounting procedures, and container interchanges. However, those matters do not speak to the essence of the agreement. As the examiner indicated, the Commission, MOT and the Lines know what the arrangement is. Formalization of the remaining details will not constitute the creation of a new agreement or arrangement requiring separate section 15 approval. Rather, they refer to what the Commission and the courts have termed “interstitial sort of adjustments.”

Those adjustments in terms of hearing counsel’s analysis, are merely “ordinary administrative matter among the operators which does not affect the quality, quantity or cost of service to the shipper.” The Commission, of course, retains continuing jurisdiction over operation of these agreements, and should any matter other than administrative or operational adjustments be the subject of future agreement between the lines, then appropriate compliance with section 15 requirements will be required.

*Isbrandtsen Co. v. U.S., 211 F. 2d 51, 56 (1954).*
There remains before us the question of hearing counsel’s proposed modifications which were rejected by the examiner. Specifically, they propose that first a proviso be added to clause 1, “Sailings” of the agreement to prohibit the issuance of bills of lading to ports other than “those ports specified in the bills of lading [which] are served directly by the vessel or vessels on the voyage on which the cargo is carried.” The intent of the proviso is to insure that Portland’s growth potential as a container port is not arrested by absorption practices which divert cargo. Without the proviso, they maintain that the agreement may be an instrument by which discrimination between ports is effectuated.

Second, hearing counsel proposes that the Commission, for the sake of clarity, should further modify clause 1. “Sailings” so that the agreement is defined to mean “by unanimous assent” as per the intent of the parties to the agreement. As authority for this modification, they cite the Mediterranean Pools Investigation, 9 FMC 264 (1966) case, wherein the Commission stated:

On several occasions our predecessors have pointed out that “all agreements should be complete and the language used should be so clear as to eliminate all necessity for the interpretation as to the ‘intent’ of the parties.” In the Matter of Agreement No. 6510, 1 U.S.M.C. 775-778, 2 U.S.M.C. 22; see also Beaumont Port Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 3 F.M.B. 556, 581.

It is our opinion that these modifications suggested by hearing counsel should be rejected for the reasons set forth by the hearing examiner. The validity of inland port-to-port absorption practices was not an issue in this case. The Commission’s order of investigation did not call for an investigation into absorption. Absorption between Seattle and Portland is the subject of FMC docket No. 70-19, Intermodal Service to Portland, Oregon, to which Seattle, Portland, and the Lines are parties. No direct evidence was received at the hearing on this issue, and it would be inappropriate to modify the agreement on that ground at this time. The public interest is adequately safeguarded because of the proceeding in FMC docket 70-19.

As to the proposed modification substituting the words “by unanimous assent” for “agreement” within clause 1, “Sailings,” it is our opinion that it is unnecessary for approval. The terms of the agreement as it stands contemplate the unanimous action of the parties. Nothing of substance would be gained by the modification.

Hearing counsel, on December 30, 1970, filed a paper entitled, “Reply to Various Motions for Summary Disposition,” in which they request oral argument unless the Commission approve the agreement with their suggested modifications, or approve the agreement without adopting the examiner’s initial decision and with the explicit under-
standing that the Commission's rulings on the absorption of inland freight in docket No. 70-19 will be applied equally, both in time and force, to the parties and practices in the instant proceeding.

Having dispensed with hearing counsel's proposed modifications, we find no reason to grant their request for oral argument. Therefore, it is accordingly denied. By way of comment, however, it is clear to us that insofar as parties and practices in the instant proceeding are involved in docket No. 70-19, then any decision forthcoming therefrom would be wholly applicable to these similar parties or practices.

Finally, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. (AEIL), on November 2, 1970, filed its third petition for leave to intervene. This petition, as in the case of their prior petitions, was filed for the purpose of being given an opportunity to argue to the Commission that AEIL has a right to be heard in the event the Commission should determine that the proceeding herein encompasses the absorption/substituted service issue. Having specifically ruled against consideration of the absorption issue, we therefore deny AEIL's petition to intervene.

We have considered all aspects of agreement No. 9835 with reference to the various papers submitted by the parties to the proceeding and the facts as they have developed. Any arguments or positions not specifically dealt with are rejected as immaterial to our decision based on the facts as they currently exist before us. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, we hold that agreement No. 9835, providing for containership service to the Pacific Northwest, is approved without modification. An appropriate order will be issued.

[Seal]

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 70-24

AGREEMENT No. 9835—JAPANESE LINES' PACIFIC NORTHWEST CONTAINERSHIP SERVICE AGREEMENT

Order

This proceeding having been instituted by the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Commission having fully considered the matter and having this date made and entered of record a report containing its findings and conclusions thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof;

It is ordered, That agreement No. 9835, as filed with the Commission and executed by Japan Line, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsui-O.S.C.K. Lines, Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Showa Shipping Co., Ltd., and Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co., Ltd., on December 24, 1969, is approved and this proceeding is discontinued.

By the Commission.

[seal]  
FRANCIS C. HURNEY,  
Secretary.

211
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

No. 69-13

GENERAL INCREASES IN RATES IN THE U.S. GULF/PUERTO RICO TRADE

No. 69-23

GENERAL INCREASES IN RATES IN THE U.S. GULF/PUERTO RICO TRADE

Decision adopted March 4, 1971

Increased rates and other rates under investigation between Gulf of Mexico ports of the United States and ports of Puerto Rico found just and reasonable and not shown to be unlawful.

Mark P. Schlefer and John Cunningham for respondent, Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.


Edward Schmeltzer, Frederic Moring, and Mario F. Escudero for intervener, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

R. Stanley Harsh, Norman Kline, Ronald D. Lee, and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel.

INITIAL DECISION OF CHARLES E. MORGAN, PRESIDING EXAMINER

The subject two proceedings were consolidated for hearing by the Commission in its order, served on August 7, 1969, and its order served November 6, 1969. By notice of reassignment and consolidation by the chief examiner, served October 6, 1969, these proceedings also were consolidated for the issuance of an initial decision. There are two respondent ocean common carriers. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (Lykes), is respondent in docket No. 69-13, and Gulf-Puerto Rico Lines, Inc. (Gulf-Puerto Rico), is respondent in docket No. 69-23.

1 The decision in Dkt. 69-13 became the decision of the Commission March 4, 1971. The decision in Dkt. 69-23 was remanded to the examiner by Commission Order dated May 13, 1971.
Hearings were held in New Orleans, La., and in Washington, D.C.

In No. 69-13, by order of investigation, and by supplemental orders, served April 11, 1969, May 7, 1969, and November 25, 1969, certain increased rates and all of the rates already in effect as well as all future changes in rates filed during the course of this investigation, of Lykes Bros., in this U.S. Gulf/Puerto Rico trade were placed in issue.

In No. 69-23, by order of investigation and by supplemental order, served May 9, 1969, and June 8, 1970, certain increased rates of Gulf-Puerto Rico Lines, Inc., in this U.S. Gulf/Puerto Rico trade were placed in issue.

In both subject proceedings the rates are under investigation to determine whether they are unjust, unreasonable or otherwise unlawful under section 18(a) of the Shipping Act, 1916, and sections 3 and 4 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933 (the acts). The rates in issue were not suspended and have gone into effect.

These are so-called general revenue cases. In such cases, two principal matters for determination are whether a respondent common carrier by water is operating at a profit in a trade, and if at a profit whether it is earning a reasonable rate of return on its investment.

Lykes' vessels in this trade make calls at Port Arthur, Lake Charles, Houston, and Galveston among other ports on the Gulf and at San Juan, Mayaguez and Ponce in Puerto Rico. Lykes' operations in this Puerto Rico trade are conducted at a loss.

Lykes' past losses continued in 1969 notwithstanding that most of the rates under investigation herein were in effect for most of 1969. It was stipulated that Lykes' loss in 1969 was "not less than it was in 1968." The 1968 loss was $1,246,192.

A question was raised as to whether Lykes' losses in the Puerto Rico trade were due to "the kind of ships that they are operating in the trade." Evidence introduced by Lykes comparing the results of operating C-2 vessels, as at present, with its newer vessels of the Gulf Pride class, at May 31, 1969, cost levels and at the increased rates under investigation, shows that Lykes would suffer a greater loss from the operation of Gulf Pride vessels than from use of the C-2's.

It is concluded and found that the increased rates and other rates of Lykes under investigation herein are just and reasonable and not shown to be unlawful under the acts.

Gulf-Puerto Rico's operation in this trade has been primarily of the break-bulk type. The same is true of its competitors, Lykes and more recently Delta Steamship Co. No shipper or receiver has indicated any dissatisfaction with the increased rates of Gulf-Puerto Rico so far as this record shows.

14 F.M.C.
Even under the increased rates, the operation of Gulf-Puerto Rico in this trade has been unprofitable. This respondent hopes to replace its two break-bulk vessels with containerships, and is hopeful that this projected containership service will be profitable, but its effect on revenues and expenses will not be known until there has been sufficient experience with a full containership operation.

Gulf-Puerto Rico now offers service between Mobile and New Orleans, and San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez. This respondent lost $810,000 in 1969 in this trade, and it shows a projected loss for 1970 of $1,132,651. Certain evidence was adduced by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico designed to show the future profitability of an all-containership operation by Gulf-Puerto Rico, but this evidence was not at all persuasive, and is irrelevant to the main controlling issue in this proceeding of the profitability of the existing service. A common carrier cannot be compelled to offer service in this trade, and it follows that its management cannot be told to provide a particular type of ship or other equipment to service the trade.

If the Commission were to withhold approval of this rate increase because the respondent, Gulf-Puerto Rico, has not placed full containerships into the service, the Commission in effect would be dictating the type of vessels to be used and usurping a management prerogative or function. Of course, on the other hand, the Commission may if it wishes as suggested by hearing counsel in No. 59-23, encourage Gulf-Puerto Rico to convert to containership service as soon as feasible.

It is concluded and found that the rates of Gulf-Puerto Rico under investigation herein are just and reasonable and not shown to be unlawful under the acts.

Orders should be entered in both subject proceedings (No. 69-13 and No. 69-23) discontinuing the proceedings.

Charles E. Morgan,

Presiding Examiner.

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 68-48
INDEPENDENT OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDER LICENSE No. 790
NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, FORT WAYNE, IND. 46801

Decided March 4, 1971

License revoked. Respondent, found to be owned and controlled by a shipper in the foreign commerce of the United States by oceangoing common carriers, no longer qualifies for a license as an independent ocean freight forwarder within the meaning of sections 1 and 44 of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Martin A. Weissert for respondent.
James L. Malone and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel.
Gerald H. Ullman for intervener, New York Foreign Freight Forwarders and Brokers Association, Inc.

REPORT

By the Commission: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, Vice Chairman; James F. Fanseen and George H. Hearn, Commissioners)

We instituted this proceeding to determine whether we should revoke North American Van Lines' license as an independent ocean freight forwarder because it is owned and controlled by PepsiCo Inc., which through its controlling interest in the Pepsi-Cola Corp., and Frito-Lay Corp., is a shipper of goods in the foreign commerce of the United States.

Permission to intervene was granted to the New York Foreign Freight Forwarders and Brokers Association, Inc. Subsequently, on March 10, 1969, North American voluntarily suspended operations under its license pending the outcome of these proceedings.

Examiner Richard M. Hartsock, in his initial decision, concluded that, "North American Van Lines is controlled by a corporation exporting cargo in the foreign commerce of the United States by oceangoing common carriers and that continued operation by North American
Van Lines as an independent ocean freight forwarder is, because of such control, inconsistent with sections 1 and 44 of the Shipping Act, 1916.”

Respondent has filed exceptions to which hearing counsel have replied. We heard oral argument.

FACTS

North American Van Lines, respondent, has been an ocean freight forwarder since 1958. It operated pursuant to Grandfather Rights until it was issued license No. 790 by the Federal Maritime Commission on June 8, 1965. On June 14, 1968, PepsiCo, Inc. acquired 100 percent of the capital stock of North American. PepsiCo also owns all of the stock of Pepsi-Cola and Frito-Lay corporations. Both of these corporations export cargoes in the foreign commerce of the United States by oceangoing common carriers. On March 10, 1969, North American voluntarily submitted its license for suspension and ceased ocean freight forwarding operations pending the outcome of this investigation.

While in 1946 respondent was incorporated as an Indiana corporation, on June 14, 1968, it was reincorporated as a Delaware corporation pursuant to the plan of acquisition by PepsiCo.

Respondent has engaged in the business of transporting or arranging for the transportation of household goods and related commodities since 1933. Surface operations are conducted within the United States under motor carrier certificates issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The certificates authorize the transportation of “household goods,” as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission, between points in the United States. They also authorize the transportation of certain other commodities such as new furniture, store fixtures, and household appliances not contained within the household goods definition.

A total of 90 percent of North American domestic surface operations consists of the transportation of “household goods” as opposed to the other authorized commodities. During 1968, the company transported 122,823 shipments of household goods and 40,725 of other authorized commodities such as new furniture. The latter operations constitute only 10 percent of the company’s volume in terms of gross revenues.

Respondent’s domestic motor carrier fleet consists of 230 company-owned tractors and 1,201 company-owned semitrailers. It also leases an additional 2,581 tractors, 3,214 semitrailers and 864 straight trucks. The book value of company-owned equipment exceeds $5 million.
The company also provides for the transportation of household goods by air. It solicits shipments for direct air carriers under I.A.T.A. agency contracts. During 1968 it arranged for 292 international household goods shipments in that capacity. Respondent also provides a service to the Department of Defense for overseas household goods shipments in its capacity as an air freight forwarder approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Under this system North American performs the necessary surface movement and arranges for the intermediate air carriage. This "through-bill-of-lading" service in 1968 resulted in the movement of 479 household goods shipments.

Respondent also furnishes services from and to overseas points as an NVO and as an ocean freight forwarder. The latter operations were commenced some time in 1950. On June 13, 1958, it was issued FMB Freight Forwarder Registration No. 2329. Following the amendment to the Shipping Act in the early 1960's, the company filed an application for freight forwarder license in January 1962. The Commission assigned No. 790 to the application, authorizing continued operations pending disposition of the proceeding. A license was issued on June 8, 1965.

Respondent never completely exploited the potential of the freight forwarder license because during the pendency of the application it could not risk substantial capital for that operation because there was no assurance that a license would ultimately be granted, and on May 31, 1966, shortly after the license was issued, the company entered into the purchase agreement with PepsiCo. North American thereafter was reluctant to expand until the potential conflict posed by the PepsiCo affiliation was resolved. The company did conduct some activity under the license; for example, during 1966 through 1968 it handled some 395 shipments. Gross revenues from those shipments including advanced charges for land and ocean freight was $159,088; of this only approximately $1,000 constituted forwarding fees. Ocean freight commissions aggregated $195.

Of the commodities which respondent is certified to transport as an ICC surface carrier, only "used household goods" are moved onward as an NVO. The company's ocean freight forwarder activities are therefore confined to authorized surface commodities which are not considered as "used household goods" such as computers, exhibits and displays and new furniture, fixtures, etc. In its freight forwarder operations its customers can really fall into two categories. First,

1 Nonvessel operating common carrier.

14 F.M.C.
colleges and universities which were in the process of establishing educational facilities in foreign countries. In this operation the university would assign instructors to foreign countries and call upon North American to move the person's "used household goods" to his new overseas residence. This movement was handled as a combined surface movement and as NVO. In addition to the used household goods the college would also desire to ship project or educational supplies to the same foreign facility and ask North American to provide a service for the transportation of those commodities as well. North American declined to assume full through-liability for those shipments as an NVO but would assist the shipper by making arrangements to move the shipments in its ocean freight forwarder capacity.

The second type of customer consisted of manufacturing firms which North American already served as a domestic carrier for the transportation of products other than "used household goods." These products consisted of electronic equipment, exhibits and displays, and new furniture and fixtures. Customers became aware of North American because of its surface motor carrier operations. Occasionally, these companies had a need to ship certain of their manufactured goods overseas and, since they were not skilled or experienced in the export business, they turned to North American to make the necessary arrangements. These needs were accommodated by providing services as an ocean freight forwarder.

PepsiCo, a Delaware corporation having its principal offices in New York City, owns 158 subsidiary corporations which in turn are organized into five operating groups or divisions: Pepsi-Cola Division, Frito-Lay Division, PepsiCo International, PepsiCo Leasing Division and PepsiCo Transportation Division. The Pepsi-Cola Division sells soft drink concentrates, advertising and marketing matter to 500 independent and 25 company-owned bottling plants within the United States. The Frito-Lay Division manufactures and distributes snack and convenience products in the United States. PepsiCo International performs for the parent corporation the same as is done by Pepsi-Cola Division and Frito-Lay in the domestic market. It sells concentrates to approximately 500 independent and 25 company-owned bottling plants located overseas. The PepsiCo Leasing Division leases items such as automobiles, trucks, aircraft, office equipment, plant equipment to lesses located principally in the United States. The PepsiCo Transportation Division engages in the carriage of household goods, mobile homes and certain other products. North American operates under the latter division in its transportation activities.
PepsiCo exports equipment and supplies for bottlers, finished snack foods and beverages and household goods. All such arrangements are provided by the Traffic Department of PepsiCo International. The principal products for export are equipment and supplies for bottlers such as plant equipment, vending machines, advertising materials, which products are actually purchased by overseas franchisers from third party sources in the United States as PepsiCo neither sells nor leases equipment to overseas bottlers. Overseas bottlers may request PepsiCo International to assist it in purchasing and making shipping arrangements, in which case such assistance is granted. All shipments of equipment, supplies and finished goods exported in the name of PepsiCo International are tendered to ocean freight forwarders, in recent years utilizing services of Maron Shipping and Cobal International in New York City, International Expeditors in Los Angeles and San Francisco, Calif. Those from the New York area are tendered to Maron, from the Gulf area to Cobal and from the West Coast to International Expeditors. The North American freight forwarders service has never been used.

PepsiCo International also ships used household goods of its employees and in recent years has tendered most of this traffic to North American. In 1969, North American handled eight overseas shipments of household goods for PepsiCo.

No director of PepsiCo serves as director of North American, but one of North American’s directors is a PepsiCo officer. Victor DeMaras is a vice president of PepsiCo in charge of all the activities of the transportation division and also serves as a North American director Harold E. Rome is assistant secretary for both North American and PepsiCo, and Edward V. Lahey, Jr., is assistant general counsel for PepsiCo and a vice president for North American. They have been so placed ostensibly for housekeeping purposes, that is, to have someone in New York as well as Fort Wayne to sign corporate documents. While PepsiCo may be termed a “holding company with respect to its subsidiaries,” North American represents that it is to be run as a separate and autonomous company and it is a policy of PepsiCo to procure goods and services at the best price irrespective of subsidiary operations. Thus, it is stated further that it has a policy against “cross fertilization,” “tie-in sales,” and “reciprocity.” Each division or subsidiary is operated as a profit center, and each is responsible for operating in an efficient and profitable manner. While subsidiaries may deal among themselves, were an affiliated company’s product or services advantageous, all intercompany transactions must be approved

14 F.M.C.
by PepsiCo and justified for some substantial reason. While the parent, of course, holds veto power, the subsidiary is left to its own resources to pursue its projected profit goal, the parent function being to provide management expertise to assist in reaching those goals, such as legal advice and counsel in systems analysis and computer application.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

North American has taken some eight numbered exceptions, the first five of which are directed to “the examiner's finding that the alleged prohibition against forwarder shipper relationships is absolute, his reasons therefor, and the conclusion that * * * license No. 790 must be revoked.” We think the examiner's conclusion that the prohibition is absolute was correct.

Section 1 of the Shipping Act, 1916, states:

An “independent ocean freight forwarder” is a person carrying on the business of forwarding for a consideration who is not a shipper or consignee or a seller or purchaser of shipments to foreign countries, nor has any beneficial interest therein, nor directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by such shipper or consignee or by any person having such a beneficial interest.

This definition found in S. 1368 and H.R. 2488, 87th Congress, first session, became law in Public Law 87–254, 87th Congress, September 19, 1961, and is clear and unambiguous. Thus, it requires no statutory interpretation. *Caminetti v. United States*, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916). The legislative history, for the greater part, is silent as to the particular language employed although the vices sought to be corrected are clear and apparent. The language “directly or indirectly controlled or is controlled by such shipper or consignee or by any other person having such a beneficial interest” has its genesis in the statement:

Forwarders occupy a dual status. They are independent contractors as to shippers, and brokers as to carriers. (H.R. Report No. 2939, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 38)

In H.R. Report No. 2333, 85th Congress second session, respecting H.R. 8382, the first like definition is found and reads:

An independent foreign freight forwarder is a foreign freight forwarder who in connection with shipments dispatched by such forwarder is not a shipper or consignor or seller or purchaser or common carrier by water of such shipments nor has any beneficial interest therein, nor directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by the shipper or consignor, common carrier by water or by any person having a beneficial interest in such shipments.
The report states:
Our interest here is to have every person, firm or corporation who holds itself out as a forwarder to be fully competent and qualified to act in the *fiduciary relationship* which such business necessitates. (Emphasis supplied)

The report continues—pages 8–9:
This would make it clear that *all* shippers, consignees, sellers, purchasers, and carriers of ocean export cargoes are to be prohibited from obtaining a license regardless of whether these groups forward only their own cargoes or the cargoes of others. (Emphasis supplied)

H.R. Report No. 5068, 86th Congress, first session, considering S. 2300, 86th Congress, first session, deletes from the above definition the terms “or common carrier by water of such shipments” and “common carrier by water,” and adds after the words “beneficial interest” the words “other than a lien.”

In Senate Report No. 1682, 86th Congress, second session, the language, page 4, reads:
The definition of the term “*independent* ocean freight forwarder” made it clear that only those persons who engage in ocean freight forwarding on behalf of others “will come within the licensing provisions” and only independent ocean freight forwarders may be compensated for services by water common carriers. (Emphasis supplied)

All of the legislative history points out clearly that exceptions to the *clear and unambiguous* language of the statute were to be excluded and that the inherent prohibition vis-a-vis control is absolute and we have so held in numerous proceedings. (See: *Application for Freight Forwarding License—Louis Applebaum*, 8 FMC 306 (1964); *Application for Freight Forwarding License—Wm. V. Cady*, 8 FMC 352 (1964); *Application for Freight Forwarding License—Del Mar Shipping Corp.*, 8 FMC 493 (1965); *Application for Freight Forwarding License—York Shipping Corp.*, 9 FMC 72 (1965).

We further agree with the examiner’s conclusion that there is no question that North American is or can be controlled by PepsiCo, a shipper in the foreign commerce of the United States by oceangoing common carriers. Thus, it cannot qualify as an independent ocean freight forwarder by definition, and therefore is not entitled to conduct the business of a freight forwarder.

Finally, respondent excepts to the examiner’s failure to exercise the Commission’s “discretionary power” and permit license No. 790 to continue in existence, subject to an appropriate restriction. Here respondent would distinguish between cases involving new or initial licenses and those involving licenses already issued. In the latter cases, says respondent, the Commission may by using its power to “amend or
modify in whole or in part any license previously issued," allow respondent to continue its forwarding business subject to the limitation that it would not serve its owners as a forwarder.

The Commission consistently has held that forwarders who control or are controlled by shippers in the oceangoing commerce of the United States are absolutely disqualified from licensing. It is immaterial that such control arises after a license is issued rather than prior to the application therefor. The Commission settled this issue in Application for Freight Forwarding License—York Shipping Corporation, supra, when it held that it lacked statutory authority to allow continuance of a license on condition that the licensee will not ship for the exporter controlling it, saying at page 76:

There is no proviso in Public Law 87-254 exempting from the ban on licensing shipper-controlled forwarders who do not forward shipments for their shipper-employees • • •.

The factual difference of an application for an initial license involved in York and an existing license in the instant proceeding, while significant in some respects, is not pertinent when, as here, the question is one of whether the statutory requirement of "independence" has been met. Shipper control negates the Commission’s authority not only to issue a license in the first instance, but to allow it to continue, regardless of any condition that the licensee may propose. Indeed, section 510.9(d) of General Order 4 would appear not to import what respondent claims, but rather that not only to initially qualify for a license but also to prevent a discretionary revocation, a licensee must undergo no "* * * change of circumstances whereby * * * [it] no longer qualifies as an independent ocean freight forwarder."

We have considered all of respondent’s arguments, and any which are not specifically dealt with are rejected as without merit or as immaterial to our decision. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, we hold that the ultimate conclusions reached by the examiner are well-founded and proper. The adoption of restrictions to the license, as an alternative, to revocation should not be employed.

We hold that North American Van Lines is controlled by a shipper in the foreign commerce of the United States by oceangoing common carriers and that the continuance of its license is inconsistent with the provisions of sections 1 and 44 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and therefore it is hereby revoked.

An appropriate order will be entered. 14 F.M.C.
Commissioner James V. Day Dissenting:

The facts here are simple and the applicable law easily determined. Further, while the case is one of first impression, the key issues are concise and clear.

Factually, North American Van Lines commenced operations as an ocean freight forwarder 20 years ago. Since that time it has operated pursuant to various authorities including the license granted it by this Commission in 1965. In 1968 its stock was acquired by PepsiCo, Inc., which (by virtue of holdings in other companies) is a "shipper."

In view of such acquisition North American consulted with this Commission and voluntarily surrendered its license pending determination of its qualifications to continue as a licensed forwarder. The respondent's action was specifically prompted by the statutory restriction against initially granting licenses to shipper-connected entities.

Section 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916 defines a forwarder as:

* * * a person carrying on the business of forwarding for a consideration who is not a shipper or consignee or a seller or purchaser of shipments to foreign countries, nor has any beneficial interest therein, nor directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by such a shipper or consignee or by any person having such a beneficial interest.

The statute states in section 44(b) that:

A forwarder's license shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor it is found by the Commission that the applicant is, or will be, an independent ocean freight forwarder * * * and that the proposed forwarding business is, or will be, consistent with the national maritime policies declared in the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 * * *.

The statute also declares in section 44(d) that:

Any such license may * * * in the discretion of the Commission, be amended or revoked, in whole or in part * * *.

While we have denied licenses to shipper-controlled forwarder applicants in other cases we have not before determined a case like this one—where the respondent is already licensed and seeks appropriate remedy in order that it may conform to what the law intends.

There are only two key issues. First, where respondent, as holder of an existing license, is acquired by a shipper, can the Commission amend respondent's license to comport with the statute permitting operations by a forwarder who is independent of a shipper.

The second issue is, merely, if the Commission can amend such license, should it.

14 F.M.C.
In my opinion the Commission can and should.
The power to amend an existing license is explicit in section 44(d),
any such license may * * * in the discretion of the Commission, be amended * * *

The power to amend an existing license is also implicit under the
Shipping Act. The act is to be interpreted and implemented in order
to foster commercial services and commerce, not to stifle services and commerce. Cf. *Tariff Filing Practices, etc., of Container Ships, Inc.,

The 1961 freight forwarder amendments to the Shipping Act are
otherwise to be interpreted and implemented for the same overall
purposes. Their objectives more specifically stated are to preserve
sound forwarder operations (by permitting brokerage) and to pre-
vent a distortion of forwarder operations (by prohibiting shipper
control of forwarder operations which could result in illegal rebates).

The particular means of implementing the forwarder amendments
are spelled out in section 44. In the case of existing licenses, the Com-
mission has been given the power to amend or revoke. The Commission
has thus been provided with an option to achieve statutory goal and
purpose. This has been granted because as the court said in *New York
Foreign Freight F. & B. Association v. FMC*, 337 F. 2d 289, 295
(1964):

Congressional legislation does not undertake to deal with every specific evil
for some are unforeseeable; instead Congress often creates an administrative
agency to allow application of experts' familiarity with the problems involved.
Likewise, the court said in *State of California v. United States*, 320
United States 577, 584 (1944):

Finding a wrong which it is duty bound to remedy the Maritime Commission * * *
may, within the general framework of the Shipping Act, fashion the tools for so doing.

Thus, by virtue of the explicit language of section 44(d) and the
power implicit in the general objectives of the Shipping Act and the
subject amendments, the Commission can amend the existing license.
The law is clear. Yet if anyone could doubt it let them seek clarifying
legislation. This has been done before and could be done again.

1 This general amending authority is not restricted by such language as appears in
sec. 44(b): "a license shall be issued [only] if * * * the applicant is * * * an inde-
pendent freight forwarder as defined [under sec. 1] * * *." There is, furthermore, no
basis for applying such language in sec. 44(b) to the wording in sec. 44(d). To do so
would negate the very purpose of this latter section expressly giving the Commission
clear discretion to revoke or amend existing licenses.

14 F.M.C.
We hence come to the second issue—whether we should amend this license. Initially we note the statutory goal is certainly to preserve sound forwarder operations. North American has long been licensed and has been providing a flexible, multimodal shipping service to the public (including forwarding), and a service on which the public has come to rely. To preserve this operation would conform to statutory objective.

But now the subject operation has become shipper-controlled. Finding this wrong, the Commission is duty bound to fashion a remedy. To accomplish this we may, first, again recall just what Congress was seeking to accomplish in saying that new applicants for forwarder licenses could not be shipper-controlled.

One of the principal purposes of Public Law 87-254 was to authorize payment of so-called brokerage by ocean carriers to freight forwarders, but only under such circumstances as not to result in any benefit to a shipper such as to constitute a rebate. To prevent the possibility of such indirect rebating the definition of an “independent ocean freight forwarder” was established and conformity therewith made a condition to the granting of a license; and carriers were permitting to compensate only licensed forwarders. The definition was intended to exclude indirect as well as direct interests, including so-called dummy forwarders—concerns organized for the sole purpose of collecting compensation from carriers which would find its way back in whole or in part to the shipper.2

Thus, as H.R. Report No. 2333, 85th Congress, second session, states the congressional intent was:

* * * to have every person, firm or corporation who holds itself out as a forwarder to be fully competent and qualified to act in the fiduciary relationship which such business necessitates.

Hence, it would seem that what Congress wished to avoid was a situation where a shipper might exercise undue control over a forwarder, e.g., where the shipper had the power, and the situation was susceptible to the use of that power, to distort the operational functions of the forwarder. In sum, Congress wished to avoid a control which could be contrary to the public interest.

Such need not be the situation here.

We do not have here the situation where a company seeks coercive control over a forwarder to distort the captive operations to its own ends.

On the contrary we have here quite a different situation. The record indicates that the affiliation between PepsiCo and North American was not accomplished in order for North American to serve its parent or affiliated subsidiaries as an ocean freight forwarder. PepsiCo has never

---

2 *Freight Forwarding License—Wm. V. Cady, 8 FMC 352, 358 (1964).*

14 F.M.C.
utilized its subsidiary's freight forwarder service. Further, there is no suggestion that PepsiCo coerces North American to do business with it or to otherwise conduct forced intraorganization commerce. The record leads us to believe that North American is operated autonomously for its own profit purposes, and not as a captive customer or supplier for its affiliated companies. There appears no management incentive, therefore, for either organization to breach any restrictive condition we might impose in the license.

Further, both North American and PepsiCo have fairly demonstrated their ability to conform to regulatory prohibitions. When PepsiCo acquired North American, a condition was imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission against either organization soliciting for the other.\(^3\)

Of course, to avoid illegal rebates, a shipper cannot be allowed the power to order the forwarder to handle his cargo.

Further, still, a shipper should not have the power to control the forwarder's business with others—any of its day-to-day operations. Such a prohibition would bar the subject shipper from any real chance (inadvertently or by design) to weaken in any way a sound forwarder operation benefiting the shipping public.

Hence I would exercise the power present in section 44(d); preserving an existing public service and removing at the same time any potential for public harm.\(^4\)

---

\(^3\) Since PepsiCo already controlled other surface carriers at the time of the acquisition, it was required by sec. 5(2)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 U.S.C. sec. 5(2)(a)] to seek approval from the Interstate Commerce Commission to control North American. That approval was issued and has not been revoked.

\(^4\) Such action is not without precedent and analogous support. The Interstate Commerce Commission restricted a motor carrier's certificate against serving its affiliated shipper, as an alternative to revocation or denial, where such action was sufficient to guard against the possibility of "undue preference" which that act prohibits. See \textit{K Lines, Inc.—Purchase—Shannon Transport, Inc.}, 1967 Fed. Car. Cases sec. 36, 091, at sec. 36, 091.02.

This Federal Maritime Commission has exercised similar discretion. Following the passage of the 1961 forwarder provisions in the Shipping Act a question was raised as to whether NVO's should be licensed as freight forwarders in view of the fact they would have the dual status of "shippers" as well as being carriers. That issue raised such questions as should NVO's be absolutely prohibited from acting as forwarders to avoid any possibility of rebating to themselves or affiliates as "shippers," or should some less drastic remedy be devised, such as a restriction in their forwarder licenses which would accomplish the desired legislative purpose short of an absolute prohibition against licensing under any circumstances. The Commission was faced with such indications of statutory intent as set forth in H.R. Report No. 2333, 85th Cong., 2d sess., at pp. 8–9: "... shippers ... and carriers of ocean export cargoes are to be prohibited from obtaining a license regardless of whether these groups forward only their own cargoes or the cargoes of others."

The Commission chose the alternative course of conditional license rather than no license. It held that NVO's could be licensed, subject to the condition they could not act as a forwarder and collect brokerage in instances where they or "related persons" acted as the shipper. Thus did the Commission act to permit NVOs to provide the shipping public with flexible services which included both forwarder and NVOCC operations. See freight forwarder regulation 510.22(c).
I would amend the existing license to prohibit North American handling shipments for PepsiCo or its affiliates. Further, I would prohibit PepsiCo or its affiliates from having any managerial power over the forwarder operations of North American. Furthermore, I would enforce the above prohibitions through audit and through sworn affidavit reports from key personnel of PepsiCo and North American.

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

ORDER

This proceeding having been instituted by the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Commission having fully considered the matter and having this date made and entered of record a report containing its findings and conclusions thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof;

It is ordered, That Independent Ocean Freight Forwarder License No. 790, issued to and now held by North American Van Lines, is hereby revoked pursuant to section 44(d), Shipping Act, 1916, and rule 510.9 of general order 4.

By the Commission.

[seal]

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

-Freedom to operate (as opposed to loss of license) would certainly appear worth prompt consideration by respondent, particularly since even now "North American operates as a separate and autonomous company, responsible only for maintaining its projected profit goals." See respondent's memorandum of exceptions at p. 5. Responsibility for profits to stockholder PepsiCo (after operating periods are concluded) is, of course, only appropriate.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

INFORMAL DOCKET No. 76(I)

HETEROCHEMICAL CORP.

v.

PORT LINE, LTD.

Decided March 8, 1971

Reparation in the amount of $37.12 granted to claimant based upon a shipment on October 9, 1967, of 10 drums of a poultry feed additive called Hetrazeen.

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, Vice Chairman; James F. Fanseen, James V. Day, George H. Hearn, Commissioners)

Pursuant to the Commission’s informal procedure for adjudication of small claims (46 CFR 502, subpart s), Heterochemical Corp. (hereinafter designated as claimant), filed with the Commission on October 6, 1969, a claim for reparation in the amount of $45.22 based upon a shipment, October 9, 1967, of 10 drums of a poultry feed additive called Hetrazeen. The claim was based on an error in the bill of lading description wherein Hetrazeen should have been described as “feed, cattle, poultry or dairy, containing not more than 1-percent antibiotics.”

On December 17, 1969, the examiner’s initial decision was served. The examiner granted reparation in the amount of $45.22 based on the contract rate of the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf/Australia-New Zealand Conference for “feed, cattle, poultry or dairy, containing not more than 1-percent antibiotics.”

Due to a question as to whether the claimant was in fact entitled to a contract rate, the original decision of the examiner was remanded to him on November 13, 1970, for reconsideration.

On January 20, 1971, the examiner, finding the claimant not to be a contract rate agreement signatory, reversed his earlier decision and dismissed the original complaint as being “fatally defective and, having arisen more than 2 years ago, now time barred.”

228
We are unable to accept the examiner’s ultimate decision on remand and, therefore, grant reparation to the claimant as set forth below.

Heterochemical Corp. duly presented the Commission a claim for reparation based on a misdescription of goods. The misdescription was certified by the claimant, recognized by the respondent in its letters to the Commission of October 17, 1969, and February 13, 1970, and subsequently upheld by the examiner. Therefore, the claimant was entitled to reparation based on a noncontract rate for “feed, cattle, poultry or dairy, containing not more than 1-percent antibiotics.”

Under the facts as they developed herein, we are unable to accept the examiner’s conclusion that the claimant, by requesting reparation under a nonexistent contract rate agreement, originally submitted a fatally defective claim which is now time barred by the Commission’s period of limitations. The fact that the claimant asserted reparation based on a contract rate does not go, in this case, to the substance of the complaint which is a misdescription. The rate on which recovery should be awarded concerns only the selection of the appropriate remedy. Dismissal of the complaint as “time barred” assumes the continued running of the period of limitations during the pendency of the present proceeding, an assumption that we think is unwarranted where as here the gravamen of the complaint, a misdescription, has been established. Where a complaint is defective only as to a question of the appropriate remedy, or in any other manner not involving the substance or gravamen of the claim, the 2-year period of limitations is tolled once a claim is submitted to the Commission for adjudication.

The small claims procedure was established to facilitate the settlement of claims with a minimum amount of administrative or regulatory action. Therefore, it is incumbent upon claimants to be meticulous and precise in the submission of their claims as well as prompt in compliance with Commission inquiries or requests.

The claimant herein has been reticent in enabling the Commission to promptly dispose of this matter. However, in the interest of insuring just charges between shippers and carriers, and in the interest of terminating this proceeding in as equitable a manner as possible, the claimant is granted reparation in the amount of $37.12 from the respondent based on a noncontract rate for “feed, cattle, poultry or dairy, containing not more than 1-percent antibiotics.”

It is so ordered.

By the Commission.

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

SPECIAL DOCKET NO. 427

AMERICAN TRADE SALES A/C CONSULATE OF INDONESIA

v.

LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC.

April 19, 1971

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER PERMITTING WAIVER OF CHARGES

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on April 19, 1971.

It is ordered, That applicant is authorized to waive $9,929.88 of the charge previously assessed American Trade Sales A/C Consulate of Indonesia.

It is further ordered, That applicant publish promptly in its appropriate tariff the following notice.

Notice is hereby given that as required by the decision of the Federal Maritime Commission in Special Docket 427, that effective March 8, 1971, the rate on Item No. 2270, cotton yarn, for purposes of refunds or waiver of freight charges on any shipments which may have been shipped during the period March 8, 1971, to March 9, 1971 is $172.00 WT (including $2.00 bunker surcharge), subject to all other applicable rules, regulations, terms, and conditions of said rate and this tariff.

It is further ordered, That waiver of the charges shall be effectuated within 30 days of this notice and applicant shall within 5 days thereafter notify the Commission of the date and manner of effectuating the waiver.

By the Commission.

[SEAL]

FRANCIS C. HURNEY, Secretary.
Application to waive a portion of freight charges granted.

**INITIAL DECISION OF STANLEY M. LEVY, PRESIDING EXAMINER**

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (applicant/respondent) seeks permission to waive to American Trade Sales A/C Consulate of Indonesia (shipper) a portion of the freight charges on four shipments of cotton yarn from New Orleans to Djakarta, Indonesia, and Soerabaya, Indonesia.

Because the conference permits shipments under an open rate, respondent prior to shipment quoted the shipper a tariff rate of $172 per ton including the $2 bunker surcharge, which rate was somewhat lower than the current tariff. Due to inadvertence Lykes failed to notify the conference of the rate change.

The rate on file at the time the shipments were delivered to the carrier was $73.50 W/M (per page 190A 13th revised, effective Nov. 30, 1970, Item No. 270, Atlantic and Gulf/Indonesia Conference No. 14, FMC-3) which includes a bunker surcharge of $2. The carrier assessed the shipper $35,981.94 based on 302,931 pounds/19,582 cu. ft. aggregate weight/measurement. Payment was to be against Bank Indonesia letter of credit, No. 0103/1101. Because of the error in charges and the pendency of this application Lykes has not exercised its claim for freight charges against the letter of credit.

The conference, because of lack of notice from Lykes, failed to file a tariff amendment reflecting the reduction. If the new tariff had been filed and had been in effect at the time of the shipment the aggregate

---

1 This decision became the decision of the Commission Apr. 19, 1971.
freight charges would be $26,052.06, or $9,929.88 less than the tariff then actually on file. It is this amount of $9,929.88 that Lykes seeks to waive.

Prior to the submission of this application, the conference on March 9, 1971, filed with the Commission a corrected tariff page 190A setting forth a reduced rate of $172 WT, including a $2 bunker surcharge, which is in accordance with the rate quoted by Lykes.

Public Law 90–298, 75 Stat. 764 authorizes the Commission to permit a common carrier by water in foreign commerce to waive a portion of the freight charges billed a shipper where there is shown to be an error in a tariff of a clerical or administrative nature, or due to inadvertence in failing to file a new tariff.

The application involves a situation within the purview of Public Law 90–298 and the application was filed within 180 days of the shipments. No other shipments of the same or similar commodity moved on respondent's vessels during approximately the same period of time at the rate applicable at the time of the shipments involved in this application, and no other applications or proceedings involving the same rate situation are pending.

Applicant having complied with the legal requirements and good cause appearing, respondent is permitted to waive $9,929.88 of the charges previously assessed the shipper.

Notice of waiver shall be published in the conference tariff within 30 days of this decision. Within 5 days of effecting the waiver of charges applicant shall notify the Commission of the date and manner of effecting the waiver.

Stanley M. Levy,
Presiding Examiner.


14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 69-5

IN THE MATTER OF AGREEMENT No. T-2227 BETWEEN THE SAN FRANCISCO PORT AUTHORITY AND STATES STEAMSHIP CO.

(Decided April 21, 1971*)

Minimum annual rentals provided for in a public terminal lease agreement, such as Agreement No. T-2227 between the Port of San Francisco and States Steamship Co., will be deemed to be compensatory if they recover fully distributed costs.

Interest expense attributable to revenue bonds issued to provide moneys for the construction or improvement of a terminal facility is an expense which must be considered, along with the other operating costs involved, in determining the compensatoriness of a minimum annual rental.

Examiner's determination that agreement No. T-2227 recovers costs and is therefore compensatory is not justified or supportable on the basis of the present record.

Respondents requested to furnish additional financial information relating to the bonded indebtedness incurred and to be incurred by the Port of San Francisco.


Robert H. Tell, James N. Albert, Joseph L. Di Tomo, Jr., and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel.

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, Vice Chairman; James V. Day, George H. Hearn, James F. Fanseen, Commissioners):

This proceeding was instituted to determine whether agreement No. T-2227, a marine terminal lease between the San Francisco Port Commission (San Francisco) and States Steamship Co. (States) should

be approved under section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The investigation was "*** confined to whether the rentals contained in Agreement No. T-2227 are noncompensatory resulting in unlawful discrimination to other ports or terminals." San Francisco and States were made respondents in the proceeding, and the Port of Oakland, which protested the proposed agreement on the grounds that it was noncompensatory, was designated petitioner. Hearing counsel also participated.

Hearings have been held and an initial decision has been issued, to which exceptions and replies thereto have been filed.

FACTS

Agreement No. T-2227, a nonexclusive preferential assignment or lease, encompasses an area which is approximately 26.7 percent of what is known as the Army Street Terminal, also called pier 80. The lease, which extends for a period of 10 years and is cancellable by either party after the end of the fifth year, will not commence until it is approved by the Commission and until certain improvements are placed on the premises.

Under the terms of the lease, States guarantees San Francisco \(^1\) a minimum of $310,000 per year for the terminal area, charged against San Francisco's tariff charges for dockage, wharfage, wharf storage, and wharf demurrage. The minimum charge for the terminal area, based on the full tariff charges for the first 5-year period, is therefore $1,550,000. Above minimum, all tariff charges will be divided, 40 percent accruing to San Francisco and 60 percent to States. There is no maximum limit on the payment of compensation to San Francisco under the proposed agreement, and San Francisco also retains the right to secondary use of the premises. In the sixth year, and every year thereafter, the minimum guarantee may be changed upwards by San Francisco, taking into consideration percentage of change in the Bay area for wharfage, dockage, storage, and demurrage, and for changes in the cost of living indices. After the fifth year, the division of revenue over the minimum will be on a yearly basis.

In addition to the minimum guarantee of $310,000 and its share of the revenues above the minimum, San Francisco will also receive approximately $20,000 for the rental of some 8,000 square feet in the Administration Building. This is at the rate (20 cents per square foot per month) which has been charged all tenants of the building.

\(^1\) Until February 7, 1969, the port of San Francisco was an agency of the State of California. After that date, the port facilities and lands were transferred to the city of San Francisco on that date, and the port became a department of the city of San Francisco, city and county of San Francisco.
utility charges, janitor service and upkeep of the common areas, including gardening maintenance for the extension of the building, are the responsibility of the tenant.

For approximately 12 years, States has been located at piers 15–17 under a license or preferential assignment, which is the standard 30-day cancellable license arrangement set forth in the San Francisco tariff. In the latter part of 1967, it advised San Francisco that these facilities had become inadequate for its container cargo. The volume of such cargo had increased beyond the capacity of the container yard which, being located on the other side of the Embarcadero, is inefficient at best. The 16-foot stringers are too narrow to accommodate the 20-foot containers used by States which must be placed lengthwise in a single row. Moreover, the containers are too large and too heavy for the wharf stringers. States further advised that it was obtaining five modified mariner-type vessels, at a cost of $15 million each, and that changes would have to be made to piers 15–17 to accommodate the vessels and new methods of cargo handling. The estimated cost to San Francisco of effecting the required changes was found to be on the order of $6 million (in October 1967) and it was anticipated that the piers would not be available for occupancy during the period of rebuilding, perhaps as long as 5 years.

Army Street Terminal, on the other hand, is a nine-berth complex built on 63 acres of land containing four cargo sheds and totaling approximately 1 million square feet in clear and span-covered space and about 40 acres of more open area. It is a general purpose facility built for handling breakbulk and containerized cargo. The new Army Street facility has 50-foot stringers which will permit container and breakbulk operations to be carried on simultaneously, and will enable States to work from rail cars while performing its other terminal operations. The facility also includes an adequate marshaling and storage area for containers, and a larger container yard to permit both the storage and repair of containers.

There are also disadvantages in the new facility, however. States has three berths at piers 15 and 17 and will have only two at Army Street, and thus will lose one berth in the move. Furthermore, the inside covered area at piers 15 and 17 is 235,000 square feet, while States’ covered area at Army Street will be less, approximately 220,000 square feet.

*Under its present license arrangement States is not guaranteed the full use of the facility, and the port has the privilege of letting other vessels use the berths and of putting other cargo through the facility when space permits. The port has made such secondary use of piers 15 and 17 on several occasions during the past 10 years.

*As the tenants who will replace States at piers 15–17 will not require substantial modifications, this expense and displacement will be avoided.

14 F.M.C.
In determining the minimum acceptable guarantee for the terminal area portion of the proposed Army Street lease, the San Francisco port director took into consideration the total revenue received from States' occupancy of piers 15–17 which, for the 5-year period through fiscal 1967, the latest year then available, was between $223,000 and $321,000 per year. This revenue represents dockage, wharfage, wharf demurrage, wharf storage, and wharf rental. The value of the premises to the users was therefore figured to be in the neighborhood of $310,000. The $20,000 per year rent for space in the Administration Building brings the total to $330,000.

By the time of the hearing herein, figures for fiscal 1968 had become available. These showed a total revenue from States' occupancy of piers 15–17 of $412,143, which could be broken down as follows: dockage—$32,109; wharfage—$262,678; demurrage—$10,782; wharf rental—$106,574. The substantial increase over prior years is said to be due to an abnormal amount of cargo moving to Southeast Asia generated by the Vietnam war.

Army Street is not a specialized facility, and it was not built for any particular user. It is a general cargo facility and, as such, a part of the total San Francisco complex. Financing for all such developments, revenue and nonrevenue producing, is arranged through general obligation bonds. Pier 80 itself was financed by two bond issues, totaling $25 million, with a total annual bond interest of $819,500.

In addition to the aforementioned $25 million indebtedness, San Francisco has outstanding other revenue bonds for the construction of other marine terminal facilities at the port. One of the exhibits submitted into evidence during the course of the hearings in this proceeding estimates that the port's bond servicing requirements will cost the port between $1 million and $1,770,000 per year in interest in the next 10 years.

Agreement No. T-2227 is an integral part of a detailed and thoroughly considered redevelopment plan of the port of San Fran-

---

4 The revenue derived from States' occupancy of piers 15–17 for each of the 5 years in question is set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal years</th>
<th>Dockage</th>
<th>Wharfage</th>
<th>Demurrage</th>
<th>Wharf rental</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>26,402</td>
<td>178,644</td>
<td>6,295</td>
<td>106,574</td>
<td>319,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25,119</td>
<td>154,857</td>
<td>6,862</td>
<td>106,574</td>
<td>293,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>27,239</td>
<td>155,736</td>
<td>8,338</td>
<td>106,574</td>
<td>298,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>31,089</td>
<td>173,444</td>
<td>10,709</td>
<td>106,574</td>
<td>321,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>40,881</td>
<td>155,152</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>90,776</td>
<td>296,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-year average</td>
<td>25,700</td>
<td>155,559</td>
<td>6,488</td>
<td>103,414</td>
<td>291,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 One bond for $15 million was issued in 1960 and carries an interest rate of 3.31 percent. Another for $10 million at 3.28 percent was issued in 1965.

6 Exhibit No. 12 sets forth the "interest paid" on bonded indebtedness for the 10-year period between 1970 and 1979 as follows: 1970—$1,720,000; 1971—$1,700,000; 1972—$1,620,000; 1973—$1,540,000; 1974—$1,480,000; 1975—$1,321,000; 1976—$1,290,000; 1977—$1,210,000; 1978—$1,130,000; and 1979—$1,050,000.
Agreement No. T-2227

The request of San Francisco, Arthur D. Little, Inc., one of the largest research and consulting firms in the country, conducted two studies for the port, in 1966 and 1967, to examine San Francisco's future development of cargo and the redevelopment of the port for nonmaritime commercial activities. It was concluded that the port has a strong economic future provided it carries out a redevelopment program that will provide additional revenues as well as up-to-date cargo handling facilities—especially for container and LASH (lighter aboard ship) operations. This eventually involves phasing out about three-fourths of the old finger piers on the northern waterfront, that is, those lying between the Ferry Building and Fisherman's Wharf, and the use of the approximately 41 acres of land thus made available for nonmaritime commercial developments including hotels, apartments, office buildings, ships and parks. Phased out would be piers 1, 3, 5, 7, 37, 39, 41 and 45. The release of this land will provide San Francisco with substantial revenues from ground rents, thereby contributing funds for the provision of more suitable marine terminal facilities.

Briefly, what the port director plans to do is: move States from 15-17 to Army Street; move the present users of piers 7, 37, and 92 into 15-17; and construct an import automobile facility at pier 90 which will enable him to move the user at pier 45, the Fisherman's Wharf area, to pier 90. American President Lines will move from pier 50 and share Army Street with States. The present California Maritime Terminal tenants at Army Street will move into piers 50, 39, and 41, which will permit them to break up their unsatisfactory joint venture and go back into an autonomous business. These moves would not only permit the existing tonnage of San Francisco to continue to the port, but would allow automobile import tonnage now moving through Fort Mason to come through San Francisco port facilities. All potential users have been contacted by San Francisco and have agreed to the moves if States' move to Army Street is approved by the Commission.

The port director's future plans also include building a LASH facility for Pacific Far East Line, which would then vacate piers 27, 29, 31, and 33. He would then move the present tenants from piers 37 and 39 into the complex vacated by Pacific Far East Line and would

---

*At the present time, pier 1 is used as a parking area. In fact, piers 1, 3, and 5 are now available for commercial development. Pier 7, which is adjacent to pier 5, will be available as soon as the tenant can be moved.

*All the moves described herein which the port director proposes are in accordance with the Arthur D. Little report.

14 F.M.C.
have the whole area from pier 35 to pier 45 available for commercial development. Piers 35 and 33 would be used for passenger ships.

The lease was let by public advertisement in daily newspapers of general circulation and an "Information for Bidders," which clearly set forth the minimums San Francisco was willing to accept. There were no other bidders except States, nor has there been any complaint by any competitor of the tenant. The sole complaint has been filed by Oakland.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

Despite contentions to the contrary advanced by Oakland, there is but one issue to be resolved in this proceeding and that is whether the rentals contained in agreement No. T–2227 are compensatory. Recognizing that agreement No. T–2227 is a long-term lease, we should also like to make it clear at the outset that, in the words of the hearing examiner in agreements Nos. T–2108 and T–2108A, 12 FMC 110, 120 (1968), a decision adopted by the Commission, the minimum established therein must be "sufficient to assure that the port will not furnish the facilities at less than cost during any year of the pendency of the agreement." (emphasis added). Unlike the situation that existed in agreement No. 2214, 13 FMC 70, 74 (1969), where the Commission permitted a 10-year lease to be "less than fully compensatory" the first year because of the "substantial investment" in terminal equipment, no justification has been demonstrated here for waiving the requirement that the minimum guarantee must be compensatory for each year of the term of the lease.

The examiner, in his initial decision, found that the $330,000 minimum yearly rentals were in fact "compensatory of fully distributed costs," and accordingly approved agreement No. T–2227. He predicated this conclusion on the finding that the $330,000 minimum yearly revenue derived from the States' lease less the fully distributed operating expenses of $239,000 results in a net revenue of $91,000, which provides a return on investment of 1.31 percent. On the theory that

---

9 For example, it is estimated that the release of piers 7, 37, and 45 will provide San Francisco with $330,000 a year in ground rents and the city a like amount in possessory interest taxes.

10 While Oakland claims the examiner erred in refusing to consider the subject agreement's alleged unlawfulness under sections 16 and 17 of the act, we find that his summary dismissal of these issues was both proper and well founded. The Commission's order of investigation in this docket specifically directed that "* * * the issues in this proceeding be confined to whether the rentals contained in agreement No. T–2227 are noncompensatory resulting in unlawful discrimination to other ports or terminals." The implication is clear. If the agreement is compensatory, then there can be no "unlawful discrimination." If, on the other hand, the lease is found to be noncompensatory, it will be disapproved and thereby denied effectiveness. In either event, the question of the unlawfulness of the agreement under other sections of the act need never be reached.

14 F.M.C.
“interest is considered return on investment and not expense,” the examiner excluded all interest expense on bonded indebtedness in arriving at the “fully distributed operating expenses.” Alternatively, he did find, however, that even if interest attributable to the bonds which provided construction moneys for the Army Street pier is taken into consideration, “* * * the $330,000 minimum guarantee under the agreement continues to exceed all fully allocated expenses.” In so ruling, the examiner expressly found favor with San Francisco’s method of allocating port-wide interest expense against all revenue producing facilities and rejected the “stand-on-its-own-feet” method of allocation advocated by Oakland and hearing counsel.

Oakland and hearing counsel challenge the examiner’s approval of agreement No. T–2227. Their position essentially is that the lease as approved by the examiner has not been shown to be compensatory in that it allegedly fails to (1) take into consideration, in determining the minimum rentals, the total interest charges on the revenue bonds. San Francisco was required to issue to construct pier 80; and (2) provide an “adequate” or “sufficient” return on investments.

Setting aside for the moment the question of what costs are to be included in computing a compensatory rental, we will first take up the only other major issue raised by the excepting parties. Both Oakland and hearing counsel are of the opinion that a terminal facility does not meet the standards established by the Commission when it limits its earning capacity to the recoupment of operating expenses as, they allege, San Francisco has attempted to do in the present case. In support of their argument that in order to be compensatory any terminal lease executed by San Francisco must return to the port not only all legitimate allocable costs of investment and operation but also a reasonable return on investment, hearing counsel cite a number of Commission decisions, relying principally on Terminal Rate Structure—California Ports, 3 U.S.M.C. 57 (1948). Hearing counsel interpret that decision of our predecessor as standing for the proposition that terminal operators of publicly owned facilities must realize a return on investment, and that the amount of this return must be sufficient to generate a surplus in excess of operating expense to carry out the port’s responsibilities, including harbor promotion, construction of new facilities and the acquisition of land. Whatever may be the merits of hearing counsel’s arguments as regards privately owned terminal leases, they clearly have no application to leases of public terminals.

The issue raised in that particular portion of the opinion in Terminal Rate Structure—California Ports, supra, to which hearing counsel allude, went to the “right” of publicly owned terminals to include a
reasonable allowance for return on investment in their charges. Addressing itself to this issue, the Commission merely acknowledged the fact that the California ports were "authorized" to collect revenues sufficient to perform their duties, "among which are promotion of the harbor, construction of new facilities, and purchase of additional land." Thus, while the Commission recognized that terminal operators of publicly owned facilities are "entitled to a fair return on investment" and accordingly can, if they so desire, allow for such a return in their leases, it imposed no requirement on them to actually do so. The decision in Terminal Rate Structure—California Ports, supra, does not support hearing counsel’s argument that publicly owned terminals must provide in their leases for a reasonable rate of return on investment for the particular facilities in question.

Hearing counsel’s reliance on Terminal Lease Agreement at Long Beach, Calif., 11 FMC 12 (1967) and Lease Agreements at Long Beach, Calif., 11 FMC 35 (1967), is equally misplaced since these decisions merely bear out the fact that a public terminal may provide for a reasonable return on investment in its terminal leases. In both these cases the Commission was concerned only with the lawfulness of the particular rate of return provided for in the leases. In neither decision is there even the slightest suggestion that the port of Long Beach was required to provide in its leases for any return on investment. Manifestly, the Commission has never made mandatory an allowance for return on investment in public terminal leases. On the contrary, the Commission has always proceeded on the theory that public terminals are in essence public utilities, and that, as such, they are only required to set their rentals at a level which will provide revenues to cover the economic costs of doing business, which includes, but need not be limited to, operating expenses, maintenance, and depreciation. As a general principle, therefore, a public terminal lease, such as the one before us here, is compensatory if the annual minimum rentals provided for therein cover all fully distributed costs.\(^{12}\)

---

\(^{12}\) Investigation of Free Time Practices—Port of San Diego, 9 F.M.C. 525, 547 (1966).

\(^{14}\) In its exceptions Oakland reasserts that, although under the agreement States is required to pay charges accruing for dockage, wharfage, wharf storage, and wharf demurrage, it is not required to pay the wharf assignment rental presently being assessed by San Francisco at piers 15 and 17 at the rate of $0.02 per square foot per month for all areas including outside container storage areas. The result, according to Oakland, is that the minimum guarantee is not based upon tariff revenues at piers 15–17, but only part of such revenues, and that by not having to pay the wharf rental charge, States is given an unfair advantage. Clearly, it is wholly immaterial what tariff factors San Francisco based its minimum rental on so long as that minimum is compensatory in terms of recouping all applicable direct and prorated port costs for States’ portion of pier 80. That the proposed agreement does not specifically include the wharf rental charge is not controlling if the lease is otherwise compensatory.
With this principle in mind, we can more clearly focus on the examiner's conclusion that agreement No. T-2227 was compensatory. All parties to this proceeding are essentially in accord as to the value of the pertinent assets and improvements involved in the present case and are also generally in agreement with the examiner that the fully distributed operating expenses, less interest charges, attributable to States' portion of pier 80 would be $239,000. At issue then is the question of whether interest expense attributable to construction bonds should be considered a cost in arriving at a compensatory rental.

Oakland and hearing counsel take the position that the cost of servicing construction bonds is a legitimate expense allocable to States' facility at pier 80, which must be accounted for and recouped through the minimum rental. Further, they submit that if the total interest expense on revenue bonds allocable to States' portion of pier 80 were included in the compensation base, the minimum rental would have to be increased. This argument raises two important issues. In addition to the obvious challenge to the examiner's ruling that "interest is considered return on investment and not expense" and need not be included in the base, the position taken by Oakland and hearing counsel also calls into question the propriety of San Francisco's system of accounting and expense allocation.

Clearly, the cost of the construction bonds cannot be ignored. Compensation must be related to the cost of the entire facility. Agreements Nos. T-2108 and T-2108-A, supra. Financing costs do indeed constitute a basic and undeniable element of total development costs which must be considered in ascertaining the compensatoriness of a terminal lease. It follows, therefore, that to properly establish whether the disputed minimum annual rental is compensatory, it is essential that the total bonded indebtedness, allocated to pier 80 and, more specifically, States' portion of pier 80, be taken into consideration, along with the other costs involved, in arriving at a minimum rental. As hearing counsel have so succinctly pointed out, it matters little whether interest is considered in this instance as an operating expense or a charge against the return, "for interest expense constitutes a very real charge, and the net return that the port realizes must be sufficient to meet this charge." The Commission itself has always considered the cost of servicing bonds which fund the construction or improvement of terminal facilities as being relevant to a determination of a minimum rental.13

Having determined that interest on bonded indebtedness is a very real expense which should be included in the actual costs of the facility

13 See Terminal Lease Agreement at Long Beach, Calif., supra; Agreements Nos. T-2108 and T-2108-A, supra; and Lease Agreements at Long Beach, Calif., supra.
in arriving at a compensatory rental, we move now to the consideration of how this interest expense should be allocated. Hearing counsel and Oakland advocate the use of the so-called "stand-on-its-own-feet" method of allocation, whereby interest on a bond is chargeable to the particular facility in the port complex for the construction or improvement of which the particular bond was issued. San Francisco, on the other hand, following a uniform accounting system established by the State of California, Department of Finance, would allocate bond interest, as it does all other costs, among all the revenue producing facilities not of a specialized nature built for a special user. Since pier 80 is a general purpose, rather than a specialized facility, and was not built for States or any other specific user, they submit that it would be "grossly unfair" to require States to pay the entire bond interest costs on pier 80 when no other tenant of the port pays such costs. In any event, respondents see no reason why San Francisco must forsake a long-established, and State-authorized, accounting procedure to adopt here, for the first time, the "stand-on-its-own-feet" accounting method urged by Oakland and hearing counsel. We agree.

The accounting system adopted by the State of California is a valid and widely recognized and utilized system. It is the one that was imposed on the port when it was a State agency, and it has been carried over by the port under its city status. Accordingly, we have no objection to San Francisco's use of this system in allocating portwide interest expense against all revenue producing facilities. So long as a particular system of accounting is generally acceptable and all legitimate costs and expenses are considered and properly allocated thereunder, we shall not require its abandonment to adopt another "acceptable" accounting system.

This brings us to the question of the total amount of interest expense on bonded indebtedness that should be allocated to States' portion of pier 80 in arriving at a compensatory rental for that facility. Pier 80 itself was financed by two bond issues, totaling $25 million, with a total annual bond interest of $819,500. This much is clear on the record. Although San Francisco has taken the position in this proceeding, for much the same reason as the examiner, that revenue bond service costs are "irrelevant" to a determination of a minimum annual compensatory rental, they have nevertheless submitted into evidence an exhibit which purports to allocate $36,937 in bond interest costs to States' portion of pier 80. While exactly what the basis for this allocation is or how it was arrived at is not at all clear on the record, the implication is that the $36,937 interest allocation is attributable to the $25 million bond issues.
In addition to the existing $25 million indebtedness, however, San Francisco has also committed itself in its reconstruction program to incur an additional $100 million in debt. Since pier 80 is in fact a revenue producing facility, it would follow that in accordance with the system of accounting utilized by the State of California, it should be assigned its proportionate share of the portwide interest on this additional indebtedness when incurred. It may very well be, as hearing counsel have alleged, that the proponents of agreement No. T-2227 and the examiner have completely overlooked this fact in determining a compensatory minimum rental for States' portion of pier 80. Certainly, the record in this proceeding contains no indication whatever that the cost of repaying the additional $100 million indebtedness was among the expenses considered in establishing a compensatory rental. Thus, while San Francisco itself has admitted that it would incur other bonded indebtedness in developing other facilities at the port, we have no way of determining the fair share of the interest charges on this indebtedness which will be allocable to pier 80 under San Francisco's method of allocating portwide interest against all revenue producing piers.

Our inability to arrive at the amount of interest expense allocable to States' portion of pier 80 is further complicated by the fact that San Francisco intends to phase out a number of revenue producing marine piers. Since, as a result of this proposed deactivation, pier 80's interest allocation will be increased proportionately to defray the interest expense which presently should be allocated to those revenue producing piers which are scheduled to be phased out, it is essential that the Commission know the full extent of this reallocation of interest costs. This also cannot be determined either from the testimony or exhibits of record.

It is clear from the foregoing then that the total amount of interest costs that is allocable to States' portion of pier 80 and must be considered in arriving at a compensatory rental for that facility cannot be determined from the present record. As a result, we are unable to reach any conclusion regarding the compensatoriness of agreement No. T-2227. Accordingly, while we may not ultimately disagree with the examiner's determination that agreement No. T-2227 recovers costs and is therefore compensatory, we do not believe that his conclusion is justified or supportable on the basis of the present record.

Specifically, we believe the following financial information relating to the interest costs incurred and to be incurred by San Francisco is vital to a final resolution of the issues in this proceeding:

14 F.M.C.
1. The full extent of the port of San Francisco's present and contemplated (within the next 5 years) bonded indebtedness;
2. The total interest expense which will be incurred to service the above indebtedness;
3. The portion of the total port-wide interest which must be allocated to the port's revenue producing marine piers and specifically to States' portion of pier 80; and
4. The basis upon which the interest allocations were made, taking into consideration the possible deactivation of any revenue producing marine piers.

If this information can be furnished directly to the Commission by the proponents of Agreement T-2227 and stipulated to by the other parties to this proceeding, then the Commission will, in order to expedite what has already been a long proceeding, review and consider this supplemental information and attempt to make a determination as to the compensatoriness of the disputed agreement on the basis thereof as well as on the basis of the existing record. Failure of the parties to so stipulate within the time provided for in the order attached to this report will in all probability result in the proceeding being remanded to the examiner for further hearings in accordance with the principles set forth in this decision.

An appropriate order will be entered.

[seal]  
S/ Francis C. Hurney,  
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Docket No. 69-5

In the Matter of Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co.

ORDER

The Federal Maritime Commission instituted this proceeding to determine whether the rentals contained in agreement No. T-2227, a marine terminal lease between the San Francisco Port Commission and States Steamship Co., are compensatory and, accordingly, whether agreement No. T-2227 should be approved under section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The Commission has this day entered its report in this proceeding, which is hereby made a part hereof by reference, and has found, inter alia, that, because of the paucity of financial information regarding the port of San Francisco's total bonded indebtedness, no conclusions can be reached regarding the compensatoriness of agreement No. T-2227. The Commission advised in its report, however, that if certain financial information could be furnished to it by the proponents of agreement No. T-2227, and stipulated to by the other parties to this proceeding, the Commission would attempt to make a determination as to the compensatoriness of the disputed agreement on the basis thereof, as well as on the basis of the existing record.

Therefore, it is ordered, That the port of San Francisco has 30 days from the date of service of this order within which to supply the Commission with the following information, which must be agreed to by the other parties to this proceeding:

1. The full extent of the port of San Francisco's present and contemplated (within the next 5 years) bonded indebtedness;

2. The total interest expense which will be incurred to service the above indebtedness;

3. The portion of the total port-wide interest which must be allocated to the port's revenue producing marine piers and specifically to States' portion of pier 80; and
4. The basis upon which the interest allocations were made, taking into consideration the possible deactivation of any revenue producing marine piers.

It is further ordered, That if the financial information specified in the preceding paragraph is not provided to the Commission, and stipulated to, within the time specified, a further order will be issued remanding this proceeding to the Chief, Office of Hearing Examiners, for further hearings in accordance with the principles set forth in the Commission’s report.

By the Commission.

[seal]                                     S/ Francis C. Hurney,
                                             Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

---

DOCKET No. 69-5

IN THE MATTER OF AGREEMENT NO. T-2227 BETWEEN THE SAN FRAN-
CISCO PORT AUTHORITY AND STATES STEAMSHIP CO.

---

Decided July 28, 1971

Minimum rentals provided for in terminal lease agreement No. T-2227 between
the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. found to be
compensatory. Agreement No. T-2227 accordingly approved.

Miriam E. Wolff for respondent San Francisco Port Commission.
Robert Fremlin and Edward D. Ransom for respondent States
Steamship Co.
John E. Nolan and J. Kerwin Rooney for petitioner port of
Oakland.
Robert H. Tell, James N. Albert, Joseph L. D. Tomo, Jr., Ronald D.
Lee and Donald J. Brunner as hearing counsel.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; Ashton C.
Barrett, Vice Chairman; James V. Day, George H. Hearn and
James F. Fanseen, Commissioners):

On April 23, 1971, the Commission entered a report and order in
this proceeding 1 wherein it found that the rentals contained in agree-
ment No. T-2227, a marine terminal lease between the San Francisco
Port Authority (San Francisco) and States Steamship Co. (States),
had not been shown to be compensatory.

In setting aside the examiner’s approval of the proposed lease as
being “neither justified nor supportable on the basis of the existing
record,” the Commission explained that while it “may not ultimately
disagree with the examiner’s determination that agreement No.
T-2227 recovers costs and is therefore compensatory,” its “inability to
arrive at the amount of interest allocable to States’ portion of pier
80” prevented it from reaching any conclusion regarding the compen-

1 In the Matter of Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority
and States Steamship Co., 14 F.M.C. 233 (1971).
satoriness of the proposed lease agreement. In so ruling, the Commission, in its report, made the following specific finding:

1. ** As a general principle ** a public terminal lease, such as ** [agreement No. T–2227], is compensatory if the annual minimum rentals provided for therein cover all fully distributed costs.

2. ** [T]he minimum established ** [in the lease] must be “sufficient to assure that the port will not furnish the facilities at less than cost during any year of the pendency of the agreement” **.

3. ** Financing costs do indeed constitute a basic and undeniable element of total development costs which must be considered in ascertaining the compensatoriness of a terminal lease. It follows, therefore, that to properly establish whether the disputed minimum annual rental is compensatory, it is essential that the total bonded indebtedness, allocated to pier 80 and, more specifically, States’ portion of pier 80, be taken into consideration, along with the other costs involved, in arriving at a minimum rental ** [I]t matters little whether interest is considered in this instance as an operating expense or a charge against the return, “for interest expense constitutes a very real charge, and the net return that the port realizes must be sufficient to meet this charge” **.

4. ** [T]he total amount of interest costs that is allocable to States’ portion of pier 80 and must be considered in arriving at a compensatory rental for that facility cannot be determined from the present record **.

In lieu of remanding the proceeding forthwith to the examiner for further hearings in accordance with the principles set forth in its report, however, the Commission requested that certain financial information relating to the interest costs incurred and to be incurred by San Francisco, which could not be determined either from the existing testimony or exhibits of record, be furnished directly to it by the proponents of agreement No. T–2227. Specifically, the Commission requested the following information which it considered “vital to a final resolution of the issues in this proceeding”:

1. The full extent of the port of San Francisco’s present and contemplated (within the next 5 years) bonded indebtedness;
2. The total interest expense which will be incurred to service the above indebtedness;
3. The portion of the total port-wide interest which must be allocated to the port’s revenue producing marine piers and specifically to States’ portion of pier 80; and
4. The basis upon which the interest allocations were made, taking into consideration the possible deactivation of any revenue producing marine piers.

The Commission explained that if such information could be supplied to it as requested “and stipulated to by the other parties to this proceeding,” namely, the port of Oakland (Oakland) and hearing counsel, it would consider this supplemental information and attempt to make a determination as to the compensatoriness of the disputed agreement on the basis thereof as well as on the basis of the existing record.
In accordance with the Commission directives, San Francisco has now submitted detailed data schedules bearing on the port's bonded indebtedness. Covering the fiscal years 1971–72 through 1975–76, inclusively, these schedules relate to the following: (1) Interest Expense Exclusive of Revenue Bonds; (2) Explanation of Interest Income Computations; (3) Interest Expense Including Revenue Bonds; (4) Modification of Bond Interest Expense When Allocated Only to Revenue Producing Marine Piers; (5) Revision of Expenses at Pier 80 if LASH Terminal Is Included.

In its supporting materials, San Francisco explains that the basis for the allocation of bond interest expense is the value of the facilities and that while it has submitted the interest schedules in various combinations as requested by the Commission, it nevertheless remains of the opinion that bond interest should not be one of the costs to be considered in determining whether a minimum return is compensatory.

All other parties to the proceeding have now stipulated to the accuracy of the data schedules entered by San Francisco. The stipulations submitted by Oakland and hearing counsel evidence some disagreement between the parties, however, as to which portions of the information offered by San Francisco should be utilized in making a determination as to the compensatoriness of the proposed lease agreement. While Oakland “stipulate[s] to the accuracy of the figures contained in the various compilations submitted” and in so doing makes it clear that it “would agree” if the Commission deems the information submitted to be adequate to make a determination in this matter without further hearings, it nevertheless submits that only portions of the information are responsive to the Commission’s order and that only those portions should be considered in determining whether the subject agreement is compensatory. Specifically, Oakland would utilize those schedules which (1) allocate a portion of the interest expense incurred by reason of the construction of the LASH facility to pier 80, and (2) limit the allocation of net bond interest expense including revenue bonds (LASH facility) to only the revenue producing marine piers at the port.

Hearing counsel in their response to the information supplied by San Francisco also “stipulate that it is sufficiently accurate and respon-

---

*We are advised that recent revenue bonds were not included (although relevant financial information relating to these bonds is supplied) in their computations of the interest expense allocable to the revenue producing marine piers, and more specifically pier 80, because such bonds were sold to build a specialized facility for one tenant (the LASH facility for Pacific Far East Lines), which was covered by a lease with sufficient revenue to pay all expenses and approved by the Commission.”

*States has also submitted a letter stipulating as to the correctness of the figures supplied by San Francisco.

14 F.M.C.
sible.” But while hearing counsel also advocate the use of particular interest schedules, or portions thereof, in making a determination as to the compensatoriness of the subject lease, they do not agree with Oakland that bond interest expense should include interest on revenue bonds issued to construct the LASH facility, or that net bond interest expense should be allocated between only revenue producing marine piers.

Actually, if bonded interest is in fact taken into consideration, as it must be, hearing counsel are in agreement with San Francisco’s suggested utilization of the information submitted in all but one respect. Hearing counsel would exclude from interest income, which is set-off against interest expense, that portion related to “other surplus funds.” Essentially, their position appears to be that interest income from “other surplus funds” is not directly related to the bonds for which interest expense is incurred.\(^4\)

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Before directing ourselves to the schedules submitted and in order to make clear the basis for our evaluation of the proposed lease in light of the data supplied, it is necessary at the outset to consider certain issues raised by San Francisco in its response to the Commission’s inquiries, and by Oakland and hearing counsel in their “stipulations.”

To begin with, San Francisco’s contention that “bond interest should not be considered in fully distributed costs” is but a reiteration of an argument that has already been considered and rejected by this Commission in its earlier report in this proceeding. As we stated therein:

Clearly, the cost of construction bonds cannot be ignored. Compensation must be related to the cost of the entire facility. Financing costs do indeed constitute a basic and undeniable element of total development costs which must be considered in ascertaining the compensatoriness of a terminal lease.

San Francisco has presented nothing which would persuade us to a different view. Its suggestion that we ignore interest expense must again be rejected.

Likewise, Oakland’s argument that bond interest should include interest on revenue bonds issued to construct the LASH facility must also be dismissed. The LASH facility is a specialized facility built

\(^4\) On the basis of the interest data submitted and the position they have taken relative to the use of such data, hearing counsel have arrived at a computation table bearing on the compensatoriness of the proposed lease. This table purports to indicate that while the lease will be compensatory during the last 3 years of its pendency, it will not be so compensatory during the first 2 years.

14 F.M.C.
for a particular user (Pacific Far East Lines) and under San Francisco’s accounting procedure, which we expressly endorsed in our report, all items relating thereto, including the revenue bonds, should be maintained in an account separate from the general accounts and dealing solely with that facility. Thus, San Francisco’s position that the interest paid by it on the LASH bonds should not be included in the net interest expense is entirely consistent with the Commission’s earlier report and, accordingly, proper.

Despite contentions to the contrary advanced by hearing counsel, San Francisco’s system of using interest income from “other surplus funds” in conformity with the long established bookkeeping practice at the port is also proper. We see absolutely no reason to exclude, as Hearing Counsel have done, interest income derived from “other surplus funds” in setting off interest income against interest expense. As San Francisco has pointed out, these funds, invested as are bond funds, are not ordinary income of the port, but reserves that are put with the bond funds to protect the bond funds in the event of delays of sale or other contingencies. Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that San Francisco’s consideration of interest earned on “other surplus funds” is entirely justified.

Further, we find that San Francisco’s method of allocation whereby the net interest expense is allocated 76.8 percent to revenue producing marine piers, 9.2 percent to other piers, and 14 percent to other facilities such as the World Trade Center, appears to be wholly valid and unobjectionable on the basis of the data furnished and stipulated to by the parties. To allocate all interest incurred on construction costs at all facilities at the port only to revenue producing marine piers, as Oakland would do, is totally unrealistic. As hearing counsel have so recently pointed out, “it is absurd to deny allocation of the net bond interest expense to nonrevenue producing facilities (such as the World Trade Center) when the bonds for which such interest expense is incurred were used, in part, to build such facilities.”

---

5 In affirming the examiner’s finding and rejecting the “stand-on-its-own-feet” method of allocation (where every pier or facility must pay for itself), advocated by Oakland and hearing counsel, the Commission stated:

* * * San Francisco * * * following a uniform accounting system established by * * * California. Department of Finance, would allocate bond interest, as it does all other costs, among all the revenue producing facilities not of a specialized nature built for a special user * * *.

The accounting system adopted by the State of California is a valid and widely recognized and utilized system. It is the one that was imposed on the port when it was a State agency, and it has been carried over by the port under its city status. Accordingly, we have no objection to San Francisco’s use of this system in allocating port-wide interest expense against all revenue producing facilities. So long as a particular system of accounting is generally acceptable and all legitimate costs and expenses are considered and properly allocable thereunder, we shall not require its abandonment to adopt another “acceptable” accounting system.

14 F.M.C.
Evaluating the relevant information submitted by San Francisco in light of the foregoing, we find that the rentals contained in the proposed lease agreement are in fact compensatory in all years of its pendency. As a matter of fact, our computations indicate that the $310,000 minimum rentals provided for in the proposed lease not only recover operating plus interest expense but return earnings to the port of some $81,450 over 5 years. Agreement No. T-2227 is accordingly approved.

For the sake of clarity and to facilitate an understanding of the basis of our decision here, we have prepared and attached to this report (and made a part hereof) a table setting forth what we considered to be the data pertinent to the proposed lease in question and detailing our computations made on the basis thereof. In arriving at this table, we have relied on that information supplied by San Francisco which we deemed to be responsive to the directives of our earlier report and order in this proceeding.

An appropriate order will be entered.

[SEAL]  
S/ FRANCIS C. HURNEY,  
Secretary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total bonded indebtedness at beginning</td>
<td>$49,497,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of fiscal year</td>
<td>1,755,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Total bond interest expense</td>
<td>683,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interest income</td>
<td>1,071,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Net bond interest expense (item 2 less</td>
<td>216,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>item 3)</td>
<td>57,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pier 80 interest expense (20.183% of</td>
<td>229,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>item 4)</td>
<td>296,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. State of pier 80 interest expense (20.78% of item 5)</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Operating expenses*</td>
<td>13,243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Administration, operation, maintenance, depreciation.

It will be noted that our computations are based on a minimum rental of $310,000 per year, as provided in article 3 of the proposed agreement, and not the $329,000 figure advocated by San Francisco. The latter figure includes an amount for the rental of space in the port's Administration Building which we do not consider germane to our consideration here.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 69-5

IN THE MATTER OF AGREEMENT No. T-2227 BETWEEN THE
SAN FRANCISCO PORT AUTHORITY AND STATES STEAMSHIP CO.

ORDER

This proceeding having been instituted by the Federal Maritime
Commission, and the Commission having fully considered the matter
and having this date made and entered of record a report containing its
findings and conclusions thereon, which report is hereby referred to
and made a part hereof;

Therefore, it is ordered, That terminal lease agreement No. T-2227,
between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co.,
be, and hereby is, approved.

It is further ordered, That the proceeding be, and hereby is,
discontinued.

By the Commission.

[seal]                      S/ FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
                           Secretary.

14 F.M.C. 253
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

No. 70-44

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

HELLENIC LINES LIMITED

May 14, 1971

NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on May 14, 1971.

It is ordered, That reparation in the amount of $6,034.15 is awarded claimant with interest at 6 percent per annum if not paid within 30 days from the date of this notice.

It is further ordered, That respondent, within 5 days from the date of payment of reparation, notify the Commission of the date and manner of payment.

By the Commission.

[seal] (Signed) FRANCIS C. HURNEY, Secretary.

254
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

No. 70-44

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

HELlenic Lines LIMITED

Reparation awarded.

Roderick H. Potter for complainant.
Stanley O. Sher and Alan S. Davis for respondent.

INITIAL DECISION OF STANLEY M. LEVY, PRESIDING EXAMINER ¹

The complainant United States seeks reparation in the amount of $6,034.15 for alleged overcharges by the Hellenic Lines Ltd. (respondent) for a shipment of goods from Bayonne, N.J., to Piraeus, Greece, aboard respondent’s ship M/V Hellos.

On August 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13, 1968, the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne, N.J., tendered to respondent cargo consisting of 320 cases of new clothing weighing 233,305 pounds and with a cubic measurement of 15,572 cubic feet (cu. ft.). Respondent billed at the rate of $86.50 per 40 cu. ft. per item 0420 of the North Atlantic Mediterranean Freight Conference Freight Tariff 10 (FMC-3) for Clothing N.O.S. whereas the claimant asserts that it is entitled to a rate of $71 per 40 cu. ft. per item 0424 of the tariff for clothing in cases.

The description of the cargo in the shipping documents is clear. Whatever the characterization of the cargo might be for the purposes of the application of a tariff the parties do not dispute that the shipment was new clothing of an unspecified type and that it was packed in 320 “cases” as opposed to any other method of packaging.

The issue herein centers on whether “in cases” is a tariff subdivision of the old clothing category—as contended by respondent, or whether “in cases” is a separate tariff subdivision embracing both old and new clothing—as contended by claimant.

¹ This decision became the decision of the Commission May 14, 1971.
Under the general heading of “Clothing, viz.”; original page 64 of the tariff, effective April 1, 1968, lists three items under three subheadings: N.O.S.—Item No. 0420; Old or Used (NOT Effects, Personal) in bags, bales, bundles;—Item No. 0422; in cases—Item No. 0424.

On August 19, 1968, a first revision of page 64 of the tariff became effective. This revision under the general heading of “Clothing, viz.” again listed three items under three subheadings: N.O.S.—Item No. 0420; Old or Used (NOT Effects, Personal) in bags, bales, bundles;—Item No. 0422; (c) in cases/cartons (NOT Barrels, Drums, Suitcases, Trunks)—Item No. 0424.

Thus, both in the tariff in effect at the time of shipment, and the one put into effect a few days after the shipment, the classification of clothing “in cases” appears, although by August 19, 1968, item 0424 was clarified to include cartons, but not barrels, drums, suitcases, or trunks.

At page 8 of the Commodity Index of the tariff, fourth revision, effective July 15, 1968, and fifth revision, effective August 19, 1968, reference is made to Clothing, N.O.S.—Item No. 0420; Clothing Old or Used in Bags, Bales, Bundles—Item No. 0422; Clothing, in Cases/Cartons Only * * * (C)—Item No. 0424.

Hellenic, in support of its assessed charges, asserts that the construction of the tariff as claimed by the United States would lead to an absurd, unjust and improbable result which tariff construction should avoid. It points out that if the classification “in cases” is not restricted, and is applicable alike to old and new clothing, then the distinction and rationale in shipping costs relating to the value of the shipment disappear. Hence, old clothing having possibly little value would cost as much to ship in cartons as would new clothing shipped in cartons, though presumably a much higher value would attach to new clothing. Hellenic points out that the rationale of shipping costs relating to value is evidenced when clothing is shipped in bags, since new clothing in bags at $86.50 is rated nearly $40 higher than old clothing in bags shipped to certain base ports. This, it says, shows that the conference clearly intended to distinguish between old and new clothing.

It is undisputed that value of the goods shipped is an element in establishing rates. But it is not the only element. Among other considerations are method of packaging, volume, weight, perishability, hazardousness, and distance freighted. In any given circumstance one or more of these elements may be given more weight in establishing the tariff than they would under other circumstances. The weight to
be given any factor is to be determined by the drafter of the tariff. But whatever factor or factors are determinative, the tariff as published must make the end result clear.

There is no doubt that the conference intended to distinguish between old and new clothing. Item 0422 of the tariff clearly refers only to old clothing. But by distinguishing between old and new clothing insofar as item 0422 is concerned is not to say that the other clothing items in the tariff are necessarily restricted to either old or new clothing. For example, old clothing which might be personal effects or not in bags, bales, bundles would go in item 0420 if in cases or cartons but would go in N.O.S. item 0420 if in barrels, drums, suitcases or trunks. Similarly, new clothing would clearly go in N.O.S. item 0420 if in bags, bales, bundles, barrels, drums, suitcases, or trunks. And it remains to be determined whether new clothing in cases or cartons might go in item 0424, as might old clothing.

The tariff is clear as to what shipment is eligible under item 0422. It must be old or used clothing, excluding personal effects, and it must be packed in bags, bales, or bundles. The conference has no difficulty in clearly designating the conditions necessary to obtain the rates set forth in item 0422. It also has no difficulty in designating certain conditions necessary to obtain the rate set forth in item 0424. It must be shipped in cases or cartons. It cannot be shipped in barrels, drums, suitcases, or trunks. There are no other restrictions, prohibitions, or classifications set forth in the tariff for item 0424.

If the conference desired or intended to exclude new clothing or personal effects or to exclude any other type of clothing or method of packaging or to affirmatively limit the item to any particular type of clothing it could easily set forth such additional exclusions or limitations in item 0424. It failed to do so. Having the ability in the first instance to control and designate the coverage of particular items in its tariff, the fair and reasonable interpretation of the conference's failure to further limit or exclude is that except for the limitations or exclusions set forth there are no other limitations to that item of the tariff.

Respondent cites FMC-2, the predecessor tariff of FMC-3, in support of its contention that the conference carriers intended only the N.O.S. rate to apply to new clothing in cases. It says that on page 80 of FMC-2 "in cases" is indented to modify old or used clothing, and is restricted thereby. Since new clothing is not specifically rated, respondent says it would have been N.O.S. rated in FMC-2. Respondent claims that the failure to indent in FMC-3 was the result of an inadvertent or typographical error.
This is an ingenious argument but for a number of reasons is without substantial support. In the first place, an interpretation of FMC-2 is not in issue and, if it were, it cannot be said what classification would ultimately be determined for new clothing in cases. Further, whether the different indentation in FMC-3 was the result of an inadvertent clerical or typographical error is material only if it is first presumed that the answer to whether item 0424 is or is not separate and distinct from item 0422 depends on whether it is or is not indented. Tariff classification determination, however, should not be dependent on typesetting.

Hellenic also argues that inasmuch as "in cases" is not capitalized the item is within the scope of "Old or Used" category. This argument, however, is refuted on the very same page of the tariff by reference to "Coffee, viz." For this commodity there are 3 items—in bags; Instant; and N.O.S. The "in bags" item 0426 is not a category of either of the other two items although it is not capitalized and the others are.

Respondent's argument of typographic or inadvertent error is also weakened by reference to the numerous revisions of page 64. If original page 64 of FMC-3, dated April 1, 1968, is to be deemed the successor to FMC-2, the typographic or inadvertent error, if any, occurred at that time. Yet the conference failed to correct the alleged typographic error until the sixth revision, effective June 18, 1970, which indented and capitalized item 0424.

The record shows that the claimed overcharge was brought to the carrier's attention by the Government's notice of overcharge, dated January 5, 1970. By letter dated February 4, 1970, Hellenic rejected the Government's claim. Thereafter there ensued a series of letters between the parties culminating on June 9, 1970, with the carrier's continued rejection of the claim. In the interim, and after notice of the Government's claim of overcharge, the conference issued fifth revision, effective January 14, 1970, which continued the format of the original and four revisions of page 64. It took the conference, however, over 5 months after notice to one of its members to change the tariff format to correct what is alleged to be a typographical error.

That page 64 tariff revisions can be accomplished very quickly is evidenced by the time differential of sixth revision, effective June 18, 1970, and seventh revision, effective June 22, 1970; eighth revision, effective July 30, 1970, and ninth revision, effective August 17, 1970; fourth revision, effective December 19, 1969, and fifth revision, effective January 14, 1970.

The N.O.S. classification is a catchall which, by definition, is applicable if no other classification is or can be specified. While one should
not unduly strain to find a classification for goods, nevertheless, an N.O.S. classification is a classification which should not be resorted to if a reasonable classification can otherwise be found in the tariff. Whether a classification is reasonable and not inconsistent with another classification we look to the inclusionary or exclusionary language of the item in conjunction with the inclusionary or exclusionary language of other items in the tariff.

In this case, by utilizing the inclusionary and exclusionary language of both item 0422 and item 0424 it can readily be seen that a finding that new clothing in cases is within item 0424 is not violative of nor inconsistent with any of the language of that item or of item 0422. To recapitulate, new clothing in cases is within "clothing in cases or cartons (NOT Barrels, Drums, Suitcases, Trunks)" and nothing in the classification "Old or Used (NOT Effects, Personal) in bags, bales, bundles" is inconsistent with nor precludes such classification for new clothes in cases. Nor, in the language of the commodity index, is there anything which precludes or is inconsistent with a finding that new clothing in cases is within the scope and purview of item 0424.

Hellenic utilizes FMC-2 in support of its position herein by claiming that inasmuch as FMC-3 was published to effect a general increase in rates the Government's interpretation of FMC-3, insofar as new clothing in cases is concerned, would thwart that intent and would produce a rate decrease from $81.50 to $48.25. This presumes, necessarily, that under FMC-2 new clothing in cases could be rated only under the N.O.S. classification. No such ruling has been made. Further, since clothing in cases would under FMC-3 not be charged less than clothing in cases under FMC-2 there is no thwarting the intent of FMC-3 to effect a general increase in rates. National Van Lines v. United States, 355 F.2d 326 (7th Cir., 1966).

Respondent contends that to find that the carriage of new clothing in cases should be rated under item 0424 of the tariff is to engage in an unnatural or strained construction. To the contrary, only by engaging in an unnatural or strained construction can one find that new clothing in cases/cartons is to be classified only under a catchall N.O.S. Such a classification on the theory that the tariff never intended under any circumstances to carry new clothing at other than an N.O.S. rate would indeed require an unnatural or strained construction of the tariff as published. Buckley Dumton Overseas, S.A. v. Blue Star Shipping Corp., 8 F.M.C. 137 (1964).

Section 18(b) (3) of the Shipping Act of 1916 recognizes that error in a tariff may occur by reason of clerical or administrative error. But, in such case, the statute only provides retroactive relief for the ship-
per; none for the carrier. Recognizing the possibility of tariff error the intent of the statute appears to be that if the error causes a lesser tariff to be published than intended, no more than the published rate can be charged; whereas, if the error results in the publication of a higher tariff than intended, a refund or waiver of the excess may be permitted. Correction of error in a tariff of a clerical or administrative nature which will result in an increase in cost to a shipper can only be accomplished by publication of a new tariff. Section 18(b) (2).

It is not only incumbent upon the drafter of the tariff to be precise—it is vital to the interest both of the carrier and the shipper that the tariff be free from ambiguity or doubt. While conciseness is to be striven for it should not be achieved at the sacrifice of preciseness. Where a tariff is ambiguous or doubtful it should be construed against the carrier who prepared it. *Peter Bratti Associates, Inc. v. Prudential Lines, Ltd.*, 8 F.M.C. 375 (1964). See also *United States v. Strickland*, 200 F.2d 234 (5th Cir., 1952).

Respondent also contends that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The clothing was shipped under Government Bill of Lading D-2721289, dated August 7–13, 1968. On October 17, 1968, Hellenic submitted a voucher, Carrier's Bill No. 68–465, for transportation charges (standard form 1113) certifying that the account stated thereon in the amount of $33,674.45 was correct and just. Freight charges of $32,895.88 were paid on November 12, 1968, by complainant’s check No. 945463 as shown on the same voucher, schedule No. 1506. In making payment the carrier’s bill was reduced by $778.60 which represented discharge costs for the account of the recipient Government. The complaint was filed herein on November 10, 1970. Whether the claim is barred by the statute of limitations is dependent on whether the cause of action accrued at the time the shipment was received or delivered by the carrier, August 1968; at the time of billing, October 17, 1968; or at the time when the freight charges were paid, November 12, 1968. If it accrued at the time the shipment was tendered or delivered, or at the time of billing, the claim is barred by the 2-year period within which the statute requires that claims be filed. If it occurred at the time when the freight charges were paid, then the claim is not barred until November 12, 1970. The rule of law is that “the cause of action of the shipper * * * shall be held not to have occurred until payment has been made of the unreasonable charges. * * *” *U.S. ex rel Louisville Cement Company v. I.C.C.*, 246 U.S. 638, 644 (1917). See also *Aleutian Homes, Inc. v. Coastwise Line, et al.*, 5 F.M.B. 602, 611. The cause of action having accrued on November 12, 1968, when payment was made, the filing of the complaint on Novem-
November 10, 1970, was within the 2-year period of time set by section 22 of the Shipping Act of 1916 and is not barred.

The evidence supports, and I find, that the proper freight rate to be applied to the shipment herein is set forth on original page 64 of the tariff item 0424, effective April 1, 1968. Reparation in the amount of $6,034.15 is awarded claimant with interest at 6 percent per annum if not paid within 30 days.

Stanley M. Levy,
Presiding Examiner.

Washington, D.C.
April 2, 1971.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

No. 70-47
UNION CARBIDE INTER-AMERICA
v.
NORTON LINE

June 1, 1971
NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF INITIAL DECISION

No exceptions having been taken to the initial decision of the examiner in this proceeding and the Commission having determined not to review same, notice is hereby given that the initial decision became the decision of the Commission on June 1, 1971.

It is ordered, That reparation in the amount of $1,514.50 is awarded claimant with interest at 6 percent per annum if not paid within 30 days from the date of this notice.

It is further ordered, That respondent, within 5 days from the date of payment of reparation, notify the Commission of the date and manner of payment.

By the Commission.

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.
The complainant, Union Carbide Inter-America seeks reparation in the amount of $1,514.50 for alleged overcharges by the Norton Line (respondent) for a shipment from Norfolk, Va., to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, aboard respondent's vessel Dorotea.

The shipment of 174 metal drums, measuring 1,865 5' cu. ft. and weighing 83,520 lbs. was assessed a total of $4,217.30 at the rate of $87.50 plus $3 surcharge W/M per 40 cu. ft., as per item 1, 4th revised page 92 of the Inter-American Freight Conference Tariff No. 1 (FMC No. 1) for Chemicals, N.O.S., Nonhazardous, value $1,500–$3,000 per 2,240 lbs.

Claimant contends that the shipment should have been assessed a total of only $2,702.80 at the rate of $55 plus $3 surcharge W/M per 40 cu. ft. as per rate item 9, 3d revised page 96 of the tariff for compounds, surface active (wetting agents or emulsifiers).

The bill of lading described the shipment as "Amine 220 F.P. 465° F, not inflammable." The export declaration listed the goods as "schedule B No. 512.0943.—amines n.e.c."

Claimant claims now that it misdescribed the goods on the bill of lading and export declaration. It contends that the bill of lading...
should properly have described the shipment as "Amine 220—wetting agent," and the proper schedule B number should have been 554.203—surface active wetting agents.

Amine 220 is Union Carbide's trade name for 1-hydroxyethyl 2-heptadecenyl Glyoxalidine. Amine as described in *The Condensed Chemical Dictionary*, 7th edition Reinbold, 1966, is a class of organic compounds of nitrogen. Amine 220 is further described as a cationic wetting agent.

In defense of its assessed charges respondent asserts that there is no commodity listing in the tariff for "Amine 220" and thus in rating the shipment it merely followed complainant's own classification of its trade name product which it described as "chemical N.O.S." Also the charges are in accordance with the description in the export declaration. Respondent notes out that a rating clerk is not a chemist and depends on the description of the commodity as submitted by the shipper. Hence, Norton argues that it should not be held accountable for an error made by the claimant.

This case presents the classic dilemma between the concept that what was actually shipped determines the applicable rate rather than what is declared on the bill of lading and the carrier's need to have the shipper accurately describe the shipment in order that the carrier may assess the lawful rate. Here the shipper admits it misdescribed the shipment yet complains that the carrier charged a rate in accordance with the misdescription. The resolution of the dilemma necessarily must redound to the detriment of an otherwise fault free carrier or ignore the concept that charges must be based on what was actually carried. Accordingly, the Commission has held that claims for reparation involving alleged errors of description can be allowed only if the claimant meets the "heavy burdens of proof" once the shipment has left the custody of the carrier.4

In this case the claimant's description on the bill of lading and invoices5 relating to this shipment establish that the goods carried were in fact 1,864 cu. ft. of Amines 220 packed in 174 metal drums. The record also establishes that Amine 220 is a trade name of an organic compound of nitrogen demulsifier and it is a surface active (cationic) wetting agent. At the time of the shipment 3d revised page 96 of the respondent's tariff provided a specific rate for compounds, surface

---

3 Cationic: surface-active positively charged ion.

14 F.M.C.
active (wetting agents or emulsifiers) at $55 plus $3 surcharge W/M. Accordingly, the evidence in this record supports, and it is so found, that the shipment should be rated at $55 plus $3 surcharge W/M.

Claimant is awarded reparation on the claim herein in the amount of $1,514.50 with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum if not paid within 30 days.

STANLEY M. LEVY,
Presiding Examiner.


14 F.M.C.
Tariff rule 10 and proposed amended rule 10 of the Pacific Coast European Conference, limiting the number of loading terminals in the San Francisco Bay area, are subject to section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and not having been approved are unlawful.

Tariff rule 10 and proposed amended rule 10 are unapprovable under section 15 as contrary to the public interest since they prevent or attempt to prevent carriers from serving federally improved ports in contravention of section 205, Merchant Marine Act, 1936.

Tariff rule 12, providing for equalization of shippers' inland transportation costs from point of origin in California to loading terminal, is not required to be filed for approval under section 15 as it is authorized by the terms of the Conference's presently approved agreement.

Neither tariff rule 12 nor the deletion thereof is unlawful.

Leonard G. James and F. Conger Fawcett for respondents.
Thomas C. Lynch, Walter S. Rountree, and Denis Smaage for Governor of California.

J. Richard Townsend and Albert E. Cronin, Jr., for Stockton Port District; J. Kerwin Rooney and John E. Nolan for Port of Oakland; and Clarence Morse and John Hamlyn, Jr., for Sacramento-Yolo Port District, intervenors.

Margot Mazeau, R. Stanley Harsch, and Donald J. Brunner, hearing counsel.

REPORT

BY THE COMMISSION: (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, Vice Chairman; James V. Day, George H. Hearn and James F. Fanseen, Commissioners)

We instituted this proceeding to determine whether tariff rules 10 and 12 of the Pacific Coast European Conference (hereinafter "the Conference" or "respondents"), in their present form, or the proposed charges therein, are authorized by respondents' agreement No. 5200
and are otherwise lawful under sections 15, 16, and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the act). Rule 10 generally limits the number of terminals in the San Francisco Bay area at which conference members may call to pick up cargo to two, and the proposed change in rule 10 would limit such terminals to one. Rule 12 establishes a system of port equalization between San Francisco Bay area ports, which the Conference proposes to terminate. In addition, pursuant to a protest filed by the Governor of the State of California under section 16 of the act, respondents were directed to show cause why the proposed changes in rules 10 and 12 should not be set aside as unjustly discriminatory against the State of California and its products moving in foreign commerce to Europe within the meaning of sections 15 and 17 of the act and contrary to section 205, Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (section 205). Stockton Port District (Stockton), Port of Oakland (Oakland), and Sacramento-Yolo Port District (Sacramento) intervened. Hearings were held in San Francisco from April 7 through 17, 1970. Opening briefs were filed by all parties and reply briefs by Stockton, Sacramento, and respondents. Chief Examiner C. W. Robinson issued an initial decision, in which he found rule 10 in both its present and proposed forms unauthorized by the Conference's basic agreement, but approvable if filed in its present form as an agreement modification pursuant to section 15 of the act. He found the proposed one-terminal limitation unapprovable as violative of section 16 first and parts of section 15. Finally, he determined that rule 12 (port equalization system) is authorized by the conference agreement, that it is not otherwise unlawful, and that its termination likewise would not be unlawful. Exceptions to the initial decision have been filed by the Conference, Stockton, Oakland, Sacramento, and hearing counsel, and replies thereto were filed by all of the above except Oakland.¹ We have heard oral argument.

FACTS

Agreement No. 5200 covers the transportation of cargo from "Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California to ports in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland, the Scandinavian Peninsula, continental Europe, including ports on and in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, as well as the seas bordering thereon, and Morocco and to the Atlantic Islands of the Azores, Madeira, Canary, Morrocco and to the Atlantic Islands of the Azores, Madeira, Canary,

¹ The Governor of the State of California had maintained before the examiner that the single terminal limitation was unlawful and was especially injurious to the State when coupled with the elimination of the port equalization system. He also suggested that the Commission consider declaring the two-terminal limitation unlawful. However, he urged retention of the equalization system if the Commission held the two-terminal limitation to be lawful.

14 F.M.C.
and Cape Verdes and by transshipment at the aforementioned ports to ports in Iceland and West, South and East Africa.”

Amended rule 10 of the tariff, now scheduled to become effective June 30, 1971, provides as follows:

*Shifting of vessels.*—Shifting of vessels is permitted within loading ports but, except as otherwise provided, there shall be no absorptions for bringing cargo to, from or within such ports. Each member shall be limited to a single terminal in the San Francisco Bay area, designated semiannually, July through December and January through June, except that vessels may shift to additional terminals for military cargo and cargo loaded in bulk. A Member without a sailing from the San Francisco Bay area for a period of 60 days or more may redesignate its terminal. Calls at additional terminals may be made to load a minimum quantity of 750 short tons from one shipper. For the purposes of this rule, Members participating in a joint service shall be treated as a single Member.

The provisions of this rule do not preclude the loading of cargo at the vessel’s discharging terminal on the inbound call, provided that the inbound call does not also constitute the occasion for vessel to additionally load at its designated terminal.

For the purpose of this rule, the San Francisco Bay area includes all terminals and/or ports inside the Golden Gate.

To coincide with the effectiveness of amended rule 10, respondents propose to delete rule 12, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

*Port equalization.*—For cargo destined to Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, Carriers may absorb a shipper’s extra delivering transportation cost (based on the lowest available published rate(s)) between point of origin in California to nearer declared San Francisco Bay Area loading berth and point of origin in California to other declared San Francisco Bay Area loading berth defined in Rule 10 as the limited two loading berths. For the purpose of this rule, San Francisco Bay Area loading berths are limited to berths at Alameda, Oakland, Redwood City, Richmond, Sacramento, San Francisco, or Stockton.

If the carrier unloads and loads at the same time in the Bay area and then proceeds to the Northwest for unloading and loading, it may return to the Bay area for loading at a terminal other than the one at which it previously unloaded and loaded. On the other hand, where the vessel completes its unloading in the Bay area and does not proceed to the Northwest, it cannot load at its discharging berth and must proceed to its designated loading berth.

Where one shipper at a second terminal offers 750 tons, cargo of other shippers can be loaded at that terminal, but if there are two or more shippers whose aggregate volume exceeds 750 tons but whose individual total is less than 750 tons, no call can be made at the second terminal. A vessel calling for bulk cargo may not pick up general cargo of other shippers; the same is true in the case of military cargo. There is no required minimum for bulk cargo, which generally is not

14 F.M.C.
sought after by the lines unless the quantity justifies the carriage, a space needs to be filled, or a bottom cargo is needed for stability purposes. Bulk cargoes usually are open-rated and the lines feel that they do not need a protective rule for such cargo.

The provision that a "Member without a sailing from the San Francisco Bay area for a period of 60 days or more may redesignate its terminal" is designed to cover situations where a carrier serves the Bay area less frequently and usually goes where some cargo is offered; it is not likely to use more than one terminal.

In 1927, the conference tariff contained a general prohibition against the shifting of vessels within terminal loading ports. This proscription was removed in 1929, and thereafter some of the lines began to call at East Bay terminals (Oakland, Alameda, Richmond) in the San Francisco Bay area for minimum quantities of 100 short tons. The individual terminals competitively solicited shippers to use their respective facilities. This forced many vessels to call at terminals at all three East Bay ports in addition to their regular loading berths in San Francisco. Where the East Bay terminal failed to offer 100 short tons for a sailing, the terminal delivered the cargo to another East Bay terminal of the carrier's choice. Fresh fruit was loaded only at San Francisco berths.

The minimum volume to shift to an East Bay terminal was increased by the individual carriers comprising the Conference to 150 short tons during World War II, and the terminals transferred lesser quantities to the carrier's berth if the carrier failed to solicit and receive the minimum. At about this time the loading of European cargo at San Francisco had all but stopped. Unsuccessful attempts were made in the early 1950's to increase the minimum for which vessels would shift to East Bay terminals. The lines tried to adopt a rule for alternate loadings in the East Bay, or to require each member to nominate a single such terminal for loading. An agreement was reached in October 1957, and a rule was adopted limiting calls to two loading terminals in the Bay area, excluding San Francisco and Stockton. In August 1964, upon the emergence of Sacramento as a port, the rule was revised to permit calls at three loading terminals, excluding San Francisco.

The rule was altered, substantially to its present form, on January 1, 1965, to limit calls to two loading berths (or "terminals," as they are now called) in the Bay area; however, vessels could shift to additional berths for military and bulk cargoes as well as for a minimum of 750 short tons of general cargo from one shipper. In June 1969, 14 F.M.C.
the Conference voted to adopt the one-terminal rule here under consideration and to cancel rule 12.

To help stem their increased costs of operation in the Bay area, the Conference has explored, in recent years, the possibility of a single loading terminal for use by all members. Equalization also has been tried in an effort to minimize the shifting of vessels, and this has resulted in a decrease in the number of additional calls.

A competitive factor as well as possible economies was involved in the amendment of rule 10. Some of the lines have weekly sailings, some every 2 weeks, and some only once a month. Those with monthly sailings would not agree to confine their loading to one terminal while others had the privilege of utilizing four different terminals during a month, hence the compromise on one terminal.

There is no single-terminal provision in the tariff applicable to ports other than those located in the Bay area because the traffic pattern at the latter has certain peculiarities. Furthermore, the Bay area does not have industrial activities which produce specialized cargo movements. In contrast, and as an example, the nature of the cargo in the Puget Sound and Columbia River areas is such that there is no pull-and-tug effort to compel calls at specific terminals; the carrier usually can either control where the cargo will be lifted or will call at the port or ports to which the cargo is naturally tributary. The number of regularly scheduled ports in the Northwest has been reduced, the main consideration being the type and volume of the offering. No pressure upon the lines comparable to that exerted in the Bay area is found in the southern California ports served by the lines.

Operations in this trade, like those in many other trades, are becoming more containerized. One respondent utilizes containerships entirely and switched its general operations from Alameda to Oakland in 1969. Some of its ships are of the converted and jumboized variety, with their own cranes. Some of the other respondents are either building or have announced plans for containerships. New, larger, more costly ships, both containerized and breakbulk, are being substituted for older, smaller vessels. Whereas smaller ships can call at Stockton, some of the newer ones cannot do so as the port does not have container facilities to service them. However, in the case of one newly announced joint service, the containerships designed for the trade will be able to serve both Stockton and Sacramento in most instances.

Containerships require special loading facilities, and a single place of loading in an area is generally essential for the success of their operation.
The many requirements built into containerships add to the already high cost of their construction, but some of the new conventional-type ships are as costly as containerships.

Stockton and Oakland are the two most competitive ports in the Bay area, at least for the agricultural products originating in the San Joaquin Valley (the Valley) and moving on the conference lines. The lines have indicated that they will designate only Oakland or Alameda for the first 6-month period under amended rule 10, and that the same designation would have been made in 1969 had the proposed rule been in effect.

Only two Conference vessels in each of the years 1967, 1968, and 1969 called at Stockton for a 750-ton minimum, yet the port is the nearest one, in most instances, to the Valley, with its rich agricultural out-turn. Millions of dollars have been spent by the Government for the development of the waterway from San Francisco Bay to Stockton, the present channel being 30 feet deep with a proposed depth of 35 feet. The waterway was opened to navigation in 1933. Stockton itself has spent and continues to spend large sums of money on its port facilities and improvements.

Aside from the East Bay ports, Stockton in recent years has handled more cargo for the Conference than any other port in the Bay area, and stands to be affected more than any other port by the proposed change in rule 10. Conference loadings at Stockton, as well as vessel calls, have decreased markedly since 1965, the decline being caused primarily by competition in Europe of other food-producing countries, notably Australia and South Africa. Some of the loss, of course, stems from the routing of cargo to other ports under the equalization rule.

Oakland is the only Bay area port that can handle the largest fully containerized vessels, and more cargo of the Conference lines moves through that port than any other Bay area port. Much money has been and continues to be spent on the improvement and enlargement of Oakland’s terminals, some of which are leased to private companies that have their own tariffs but whose rates cannot be changed without the consent of Oakland. The port itself and not the lessee assesses wharfage, dockage, wharfage demurrage, and storage charges. Where stevedores travel from San Francisco to Oakland the travel time is an added expense; to this extent, Stockton has an advantage over Oakland. Oakland has the largest container facility in the Bay area, and all of it is not being used. If the Conference lines were to use a common terminal, Oakland could take care of their needs. Truck traffic at Oakland apparently experiences some delay at times, but port officials are confident that any problems brought about by an increase in traffic can be readily solved.

14 F.M.C.
There were only 61 calls by Conference vessels during 1966–69 to load 750-ton shipments. The Conference would be willing to change the minimum to have it apply to the total to be offered by all shippers, provided a way could be found to determine where the responsibility would lie among the shippers for not tendering 750 tons since it is felt that the basic shipper cannot be penalized for the failure of the other shippers to perform. Some of the lines might feel justified in calling at Stockton for as little as 750 tons, depending upon competition, but the consensus of the testimony placed the figure at 1,000 tons or more. One joint service would not designate Stockton as the single terminal unless it was assured of between 1,500 and 2,000 tons 20 times a year.

Had amended rule 10 been in effect in 1969, Oakland would have gained 32 sailings, Alameda would have lost 31 sailings, San Francisco would have lost one sailing, and Stockton would have lost 63 sailings. Stockton would have lost 43,829 tons and the port itself would have lost revenue of $498,325. The 63 calls eliminated at Stockton represent a reduction from 274 to 211.

If a vessel proceeds to Stockton after loading at an East Bay terminal, there would be pilotage and other fees plus the loss of about 30 hours’ time in the vessel’s itinerary. These general figures would also be true of Sacramento. When computed on the value of new vessels in the trade, the total additional cost to the carrier in serving Stockton or Sacramento is about $5,000. For vessels of lesser value, the cost would be lower. Shifting a full containership to another terminal could cost as much as $7,500–$8,500, based upon the value of the ship and not actual cost.

Between 1968 and 1970, the lines paid shippers the sum of $53,786.34 as equalization, or an average of $1.71 a ton. Most of the payments were to shippers of raisins and canned goods. In 1969, 94.4 percent of such payments affected Stockton; 5.5 percent involved Sacramento; and 0.1 percent related to Oakland.

Eight shippers of various agricultural products to Europe testified against the amended rule. It was generally agreed by them that most shipments to that area are on an FAS or FOB basis, with the buyer paying the ocean freight. The examiner summarized this testimony as follows:

Exporter of canned peaches and fruit cocktail.—Needs an up-river port as well as an East Bay port; half of the 1969 peach pack moved through Stockton, the remainder through the East Bay; Stockton is more advantageous because of its location to points of production; packs of 500 tons originating in the Sacramento Valley should go through Sacramento rather than Stockton; made several shipments of 1,000 tons via Sacramento in 1969, and the amended rule would not affect such shipments; shipments via the East Bay entail an additional inland transportation cost, and since any increased costs must be accounted for in
the selling price, there is a possibility that its exports to Europe may be affected under the amended rule; has received no refusal from a carrier for as little as 300 tons at Stockton if the ship is scheduled; distributes cargo among all the lines, and about seven have accepted Stockton calls; it is recognized that a rule permitting calls for an aggregate minimum of 750 tons from more than one shipper might raise problems when shippers other than the principal one fail to supply the volume promised; it is not necessarily made whole by the payment of equalization since the cost incidental to preparing papers for submission to the carrier make the process uninviting.

Walnut growers association.—Its plant formerly was in southern California but was moved to Stockton because of the latter's truck and rail facilities; about 80 percent of the walnut production in California is within 50 miles of Stockton; exported approximately 200 tons to Europe in fiscal 1969, and expects to increase this figure to between 1,500 and 2,000 tons in 1970 as the crop is increasing; present shipments are in 100-pound bags, but efforts are being made to develop a market for the shelled product, thus permitting a denser commodity under better loading conditions; the industry is not able to offer sufficient volume to attract some of the ships to Stockton, hence there must be delivery to whatever ports are called by the lines; being forced to ship via East Bay ports would increase costs considerably and control of shipments would be lost, as would the liaison with Stockton; any increase in cost would affect the competition in Europe from growers in France and Italy; the world price currently is below the domestic price but the export price cannot be increased; there would be no insurance available on shipments as large as 750 tons; a study is being made as to the possibility of shipping by rail to Gulf and Atlantic ports, and any increased cost of inland transportation to East Bay ports possibly could be the determining factor as to whether overland routing could be used; the retention of equalization would lessen the financial sting of shipping via ports other than Stockton.

Agricultural cooperative.—Shipped about 10,000 tons of food products principally canned peaches and fruit cocktail, to Europe in 1969, this being more than in 1968 because of the rotation of the stockpile in Germany every 3 years; has four plants in the Valley; about half of the volume moves through Stockton; unavailability of that port would necessitate the use of East Bay ports, at extra cost, where congestion occurs, a situation not encountered at Stockton; the short distance from Stockton enables a better utilization of their own trucks, particularly since they are used for the backhaul of their own cans, cartons, et cetera, thus reducing the unit cost; most cling peaches and fruit cocktail are processed in northern California; it is doubtful whether a 750-ton minimum could be assembled more than twice a year; on account of the European competition from processors in Australia and South Africa, it is problematical whether the association can stand any further increases in cost; inquiry is being made as to the feasibility of shipping overland and thence out of Gulf and Atlantic ports; there is competition between Valley canners and those in the Santa Clara Valley (south of East Bay terminals) and Oakland itself, and the latter would not be affected if Oakland were designated as the single terminal; if rule 10 were changed from a 6-month basis to a ship-to-ship basis, Stockton would have a chance of vessels calling there.

Fruit cooperative.—Ships table grapes primarily, and some pears and plums, to Europe; fruit is placed in area cold storage and shipped out as sold; even

---

1 I.e., the cost for insurance on such shipments would be prohibitive.

14 F.M.C.
though it might desire to use Stockton, which is somewhat closer and has ample storage facilities, it must haul the fruit to East Bay ports in refrigerated trucks to be loaded at a time specified by the carrier; weather conditions at East Bay ports ordinarily are more favorable for shipping fresh fruit, but this fact is offset at times by delays encountered by the trucks; the association does not expect the lines to call at Stockton for fresh fruit only, but it does not subscribe to the opinion of the carriers that they can do a better job of loading it at one terminal; it is not possible for the association to assemble a minimum of 750 tons of grapes at one time; the amended rule would not change appreciably the present pattern for the shipment of grapes.

Shipper of canned foods.—Ships canned peaches, fruit cocktail, and white asparagus to Europe, but competition from suppliers in other countries, especially Formosa in the case of white asparagus, has cut into its exports; about 2,600 tons of peaches go to Europe every year, principally to Germany, as well as about 2,200 tons of white asparagus; main processing plant is located a very short distance from Stockton, and across the street therefrom the company manufactures its own cans; its own trucks haul cans to its plants and return with processed food; except in peak seasons, its own trucks are used from plant to port; trucking to the East Bay area would eliminate all the benefits, advantages, and efficiencies of its total operation since about 75 percent of its combined pack moves through Stockton; Stockton would be preferred even if the equalization rule remained as much as the main plant was erected at Stockton because of the existing port facilities at that place; any added expense reduces the effort to compete in foreign countries.

Raisin cooperative.—Represents the largest segment of the raisin industry and ships about 13,000 tons a year to Europe, about half moving through Stockton, which is the nearest port to the processing area; prefers to use the nearest port or to equalize via other ports; shipments can be delivered to Stockton on short notice, and this is very helpful where the raisins may not have been packed but must be shipped quickly to fill orders; the buyer specifies the ship about 80 percent of the time; the association would try to pass on to the buyer any increase in costs resulting from a change in the rule, but in that case there would be a reasonable possibility that sales in Europe would drop, there being competition from Greece, Turkey, Australia, and South Africa; it is seldom that as much as 750 tons could be assembled at one time for export (there was only one such instance in 1969); European buyers prefer smaller quantities and more frequent shipments; common carriers are used for delivery to the port where needed; applying for equalization payments takes time, the shipper's money is tied up from the time the inland freight is paid, the shipper's organization may be handicapped because of the unavailability of personnel, the carrier's office may be busy, and payment may be held up for several months.

Almond cooperative.—Handles about 70 percent of the almond production of California and exports about 17,000 tons a year to Europe; its central plant is in Sacramento, and although it would prefer to use that port, it has been shipping through Stockton and Oakland; congestion sometimes causes trouble at Oakland, which makes the use of that port particularly undesirable since the association does not use its own trucks; almost all shipments exceed 42,000 pounds but no shipment has been as much as 750 tons; the almond crop is expanding and at present there is a seller's market; the quality of California almonds is superior to that of Spain, Italy, and the Mediterranean area, but the pricing situation is quite close; the California price is higher than those of the
competitors but buyers cannot always obtain almonds from the association's competitors; any increase in costs resulting from the carriers' proposals would decrease the association's competitive ability to some extent; equalization is undesirable because of the time involved and the need for personnel to prepare the papers connected therewith, plus the fact that money must be borrowed to pay the members of the association, all of which may result in no net return.

*Shipper of seeds.*—Exports about 750 tons a year to Europe, using commercial vehicles for transportation to the port; many 10,000-pound parcels may go to the piers, consisting of as many as five shipments in a package; the company's freight forwarder, in seeking bookings on vessels, is requested to use Stockton, Sacramento being the second choice (the use of the latter port has about ceased); has about 200 shipments a year, with an exceptional maximum of 150 tons; for pricing purposes an effort is made to have a minimum of five tons; when less-than-truckloads are shipped to the port there is a heavy trucking penalty; the proposed changes in the rules would penalize the company because it may or may not be able to pass on to the buyer the increased costs; it would be difficult to ship via one port since the company's plants are located in various areas; equalization payments on such small shipments are not worth the effort to recoup.

Military cargo no longer moves through Stockton, and many longshoremen, most of whom live in the Stockton area, have been thrown out of steady employment. The union has been working with port officials to see if production can be improved to the point that it will be attractive for ships to call at the port. A loss of 63 calls a year at Stockton would mean a loss of $1,000 for each vessel and a corresponding hardship on the longshoremen. The union admits, however, that the Conference may have made a wise decision on its part in limiting calls to one terminal.

**The Examiner's Decision**

The examiner determined that the basic authority granted the Conference by agreement 5200 is not broad enough to permit the Conference to limit the terminals at which its member lines may call in the Bay area and that tariff rule 10 and any changes therein are unauthorized and that conference operations thereunder are violative of section 15.

The examiner also found that the equalization system established by tariff rule 12 is authorized by the language in the conference agreement empowering the members collectively to absorb inland transportation changes, since he concludes that the Commission and its predecessors have considered the terms "absorption" and "equalization" as interchangeable.

The examiner, in considering the effects of rules 10 and 12, concluded that a limitation of conference members' calls generally to a single terminal in the Bay area during any 6-month period, as in the proposed amendment to rule 10, could not be approved even if
submitted for approval under section 15 as a modification of the conference agreement since it would violate section 16 first of the act by subjecting Stockton and possibly other Bay terminals, the State of California and shippers in the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage and by giving undue and unreasonable preference to shippers in Santa Clara County and Oakland. The examiner also finds that proposed rule 10 unjustly discriminates and is unfair between shippers, exporters, and ports in violation of section 15 and could work disadvantageously against U.S. exporters as compared with their foreign competitors.

The examiner concludes that proposed rule 10 does not run afoul of section 17 since he finds it is not applicable to the rule. The first paragraph of section 17, he maintains, is restricted to differences in rates and the terminal limitation rule does not create difference in rates. The second paragraph of section 17, he asserts, is concerned solely with forwarding and the operation of terminal facilities, which are not involved here.

The examiner, however, concluded that rule 10 in its present form is lawful, aside from the fact that it is not authorized by the Conference's approved agreement. He bases this conclusion on the following factors: (1) The rule has been in effect for over 5 years without complaints against it; (2) Stockton concedes that it "has not caused any appreciable hardship to the port of Stockton"; (3) hearing counsel admit that "there is no evidence of record whether the present rule 10 accomplished any significant reduction in port calls during the earlier years of its existence"; and (4) the witness for one of the largest exporters of foodstuffs stated twice that his company has no objection to a two-terminal rule.

The examiner also determined that section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, is not applicable to the terminal limitation provisions since he holds that provision relates only to differences in "rates," not to the curtailment of service, and that the 750-ton minimum contained in the rules as a condition for calls at additional terminals does not change the rate.

The examiner ends his consideration of rule 10 by concluding that the 750-ton minimum, if not coupled with the single terminal limitation contained in proposed rule 10, is lawful.

Lastly, the examiner concludes that neither the equalization system embodied in rule 12 nor its termination is unlawful. He notes, however, that it seems unlikely that the Conference would desire to delete the system if it could not limit to one its lines' loading berths in the Bay area.
Discussion and Conclusions

I. Authorization to Limit Number of Terminals Served Under Approved Conference Agreement

The Conference and Oakland maintain that the examiner erred in concluding that the Conference's actions in limiting the number of terminals at which its members' vessels may call within the San Francisco Bay area is unauthorized by the approved Conference agreement. They contend that the practice of limiting the number of terminals at which Conference members may call is authorized by the Conference's approved agreement since only Conference actions creating "new relationships" require specific approval by the Commission prior to their effectuation, and the Conference's practice of limiting berths is over 40 years old. The Conference also alludes to general language in the approved agreement as authorization for the limitation rules.

We agree with the examiner's conclusion that the Conference's collective action in limiting the number of terminals served by its members requires specific approval pursuant to section 15 of the act, which has never been granted.

We have traveled much this same road with these respondents before, and we are prompted to retrace some of our steps here only by the vigor with which respondents renew old arguments. In Pacific Coast Port Equalization Rule, 7 FMC 623 (1963), aff'd sub nom. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines v. Federal Maritime Commission, 334 F. 2d 185 (C.A. 9, 1964), respondents sought to establish the authority in the basic agreement for a system of port equalization whereby the respondents would substitute the payment of overland freight differentials between ports for direct vessel calls at certain ports. Neither we nor the court could find any such authority. Thus, it seems to us perfectly clear that an agreement which fails to authorize equalization between ports cannot under any reasonable construction provide authority for the more severe system of explicit limitations on the number of ports served by the parties to that agreement. But it is asserted by respondents that we have injected a new criterion into the determination of whether a particular course of action is authorized by a Conference agreement.

Citing our decision in Investigation of Overland/OCP Rates and Absorptions, 12 FMC 184 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Port of New York Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission, 429 F. 2d 663 (C.A. 5, 1970), cert. den. February 22, 1971, respondents contend that now the question of whether particular activity is authorized by the basic agreement hinges upon the "newness" or "novelty" of that activity.
Respondents have misread the OCP decisions. The determination that the particular rate structure there in question was authorized by the basic agreements of the conferences employing the rates did not depend upon the length of time those rates had been in effect. Rather, it was concluded that the rate-fixing authority expressly spelled out in the agreement could reasonably be construed to include the authority to fix rates, and further that since the rates in question had been widely used continuously from a time preceding approval of the agreements, the approval when granted could be naturally interpreted to allow a continuation of that activity.

It is not the “newness” of an activity which determines whether that activity is within the scope of an approved agreement. Only the language of the agreement and its reasonable interpretation can do that. This insistence on adherence to the terms of an agreement is crucial to the continued existence of the right of persons dealing with conferences and other groups enjoying antitrust exemptions under section 15 to know how they may reasonably expect to be affected by the concerted activity of such groups. It is an important feature of our responsibility for a continuing surveillance over the activities of groups operating under agreements we approve.

Finally, contrary to respondents’ insistence, the Conference’s limitation on loading terminals has not been uninterruptedly practiced since 1927. Between 1929 and 1957, there was no Conference-imposed limitation on terminals. As shown in the record here, and as observed in Sun-Maid Raisin Growers Association v. Blue Star Line, Ltd., 2 U.S.M.C. 31, 38 (1939), the Conference’s practice seems to have been to allow “individual carriers to establish rates to Stockton and other ports which have not been designated as terminal ports.”

In seeking to establish that their basic agreement does indeed cover limitations on loading berths, respondents offer the first three articles of the agreement, which provide:

1. This agreement covers the establishment, regulation and

---

2. See Persian Gulf Outward Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime Commission, 375 F. 2d 335 (C.A.D.C., 1967), where the court held that the fact that the system of disparate rates based on vessel nationality may have been “previously used in the trade” was irrelevant to the question of whether the rates were authorized by the agreement. Respondents' seizure of the phrase "new relationship" from our decision in the Port Equalization case, supra, turns upon the happy accident that in that case the activity in question was indeed new. Needless to say, we do not feel that the decision was based on the fact, nor, in our opinion, did the court.

3. Other examples of activity found not authorized by a general ratemaking and tariff authority are found in Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F. 2d 51 (C.A.D.C., 1954), establishment of a dual rate system and in Pacific Coast European Conference—Payment of Brokerage, 4 FMB 696 (1955); 5 FMB 65 (1956); and 5 FMB 225 (1957), prohibition against the payment of brokerage to freight forwarders who dealt with nonconference lines.
maintenance of agreed rates and charges for or in connection with
the transportation of all cargo in vessels owned, controlled, char-
tered and/or operated by the parties hereto in the trade covered
by this agreement, and brokerage, tariffs and other matters directly
relating thereto, members being bound to the maintenance as be-
tween themselves of uniform freight rates and practices as agreed
upon from time to time.

2. No party hereto shall engage, directly or indirectly, in the
aforementioned transportation under terms, conditions and/or
rates different from those agreed upon by and between the members
hereto * * *.

3. All freight and other charges for, or in connection with, such
transportation shall be charged and collected by the parties hereto
based on actual gross weight or measurement of the cargo or per
package, according to tariff and strictly in accordance with the
rates, charges, classification, rule and/or regulations adopted by
the parties. There shall be no undue preference or disadvantage,
nor unjust nor unreasonable discrimination, or unfair practices
against any consignor or consignee by any of the parties hereto.

It is all too obvious that these provisions deal only with that general
ratemaking authority found in virtually every conference agreement.
They are the same provisions in which we earlier were unable to find
any authority for equalization in the Port Equalization case, supra. At
the risk of unduly prolonging this discussion, we would point out that
the words “tariffs and other matters” in article 1 relate only to “agreed
rates and charges * * * and brokerage,” and the words “freight rates
and practices” are similarly conditioned. Article 2, in requiring adher-
ence to the “terms and conditions and/or rates * * * agreed upon
* * *” obviously refers back to article 1. Lastly, the words “classifica-
tion, rule and/or regulations * * *” in article 3 relate back to the
words “freight and other charges” at the beginning of that provision.

While the Conference’s terminal limitation rules do not limit service
to specifically designated ports, they do limit the number of ports
at which members may call. Thus, they are agreements “allotting ports
or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of
sailings between ports,” agreements which section 15 itself distin-
guishes in kind from those agreements, such as respondents’, which
deal primarily with the “fixing and regulating of transportation rates
or fares.” As an agreement which at the least regulates the character
of the member’s sailings, it must be approved under section 15, and
this approval cannot be implied from any “awareness” on the part of

14 F.M.C.
the Commission of the Conference's activities. There is no room in section 15 for theories of "tacit" or "implied" approval. Joint Agreement—Far East Conference and Pacific Westbound Conference, 8 FMC 553 (1965). Antitrust exemptions may be enjoyed only with express Commission approval.

II. LAWFULNESS OF THE CONFERENCE'S TERMINAL LIMITATION PRACTICE
APART FROM THE QUESTION OF SECTION 15 AUTHORIZATION

Stockton, Sacramento, and hearing counsel contend that the examiner erred in failing to find the Conference's terminal limitation provisions unlawful as contrary to section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, and Sacramento in addition maintains that they are unreasonable practices within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The Conference, on the other hand, asserts that the examiner erred in finding their terminal limitation provisions unlawful in any respect.

The Conference has maintained throughout the proceeding that the Commission cannot declare its limitation rules unlawful under section 205 since the authority to administer that section was not specifically given to the Commission under reorganization plan No. 7 of 1961. The plan did not repeal section 205, and so long as it continues to be a part of "the law of the land * * * [it] must be considered by the Commission in exercising its delegated functions." Stockton Port District v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 9 FMC 12, 29 (1965).

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California, in Sacramento-Yolo Port District v. Pacific Coast European Conference, No. C-70-499RFP, in its order filed May 15, 1970, took the same view of section 205 pointing out that:

Even if the FMC does not have responsibility for § 205, it must take account of it in its deliberations * * *. That which would contravene § 205 of the Merchant Marine Act would surely be grounds for disapproval under § 15 of the Shipping Act.

That activity which contravenes the prohibitions of section 205 may not be approved under section 15 is made clear by the legislative history of section 205, which shows that the purpose of the act was to

---


5 There is nothing unusual or unique about such an approach. For a similar treatment of section 8 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, yet another provision of law not specifically administered by the Commission, see Port of New York Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission, supra, at 670.
remove the agency’s power to make determinations with respect to the lawfulness of the conference restrictions against federally improved ports on a case-by-case basis under sections 15 and 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and to make all such restrictions illegal per se. See for example, Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, Pursuant to S. 5035, 72d Congress, 2d session (1933), 87-90, 114.

Thus, it remains only to determine whether respondents’ terminal limitation rules are prohibited by section 205, which provides:

Without limiting the power and authority otherwise vested in the Commission, it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, either directly or indirectly, through the medium of an agreement, conference, association, understanding, or otherwise, to prevent or attempt to prevent any other such carrier from serving any port designed for the accommodation of ocean-going vessels located on any improvement project authorized by the Congress or through it by any other agency of the Federal Government, lying within the continental limits of the United States, at the same rates which it charges at the nearest port already regularly served by it.

There is no dispute with the plainly established fact that all the ports invoking section 205 here are “port[s] designed for the accommodation of ocean-going vessels located on any improvement project authorized by the Congress or through it by any other agency of the Federal Government, lying within the continental limits of the United States.”

It is equally clear that both proposed and present rule 10 “prevent or attempt to prevent * * * directly or indirectly, through the medium of a * * * conference * * * [common carriers by water] from serving” Sacramento and Stockton. A simple reading of the rules shows that they restrict service to a limited number of ports (or more exactly, terminals within such ports, which is an even more severe limitation). In addition, the record shows, and counsel for respondents admit, that the terminal limitation rules were designed as a solution of the problem of the alleged high costs of serving Stockton. The fact that certain exceptions are built into the limitations (i.e., for bulk and military cargo and for shipments of a single shipper of at least 750 short tons) does not change the essential character of the rules as restrictions on service. The exceptions only indicate differences in the degree of the restrictions, and this appears to have been recognized by our predecessor. Moreover, the exceptions appear to be

---

*In Grays Harbor Pulp & Paper Co. v. A. F. Klawenas & Co. A/S, supra, at 369-70, the U.S. Maritime Commission, although finding it unnecessary to rule on the point, treated a tonnage minimum as falling within the kind of restriction outlawed by sec. 205, as did the parties to that proceeding. San Diego Harbor Commission v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 2 U.S.M.C. 661 (1937), and Harbor Commission of San Diego v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 2 U.S.M.C. 23 (1939), in which certain conference-imposed tonnage minimums at certain*
largely immaterial insofar as Sacramento and Stockton are concerned.  

Even if all of the lines favor the terminal limitations, as the Conference asserts, this attitude would not mean that the Conference limitations themselves did not restrict port service. But for the existence of the limitations, each member line would be free to serve particular ports in the Bay area or not, as it chose in the exercise of its managerial discretion, subject, of course, to such limitations on this discretion which may be validly imposed by law. The limitations, however, prevent the exercise of such discretion, and it was just such a limitation on the exercise of the discretion of individual lines that convinced the Federal Maritime Board of the illegality under section 205 of the conference restrictions imposed in Encinal Terminals v. Pacific Westbound Conference, supra. In fact, as Stockton observes, if it were not the purpose of the rule to prevent the lines from exercising their discretion as to what ports they desired to serve, there would be no need for the rule at all.

The record, on the contrary, however, shows that all lines do not favor the Conference-imposed terminal limitations. The proposed version of rule 10 is contrary to the desires of some of the lines and would have, had it been in effect in 1969, actually resulted in the loss of sailings, cargo and revenue to the Port of Stockton. The single terminal limitation does not reflect the unanimous view of the member lines but was adopted as a compromise between those lines which favored continuing the two-terminal rule and lines favoring a single terminal rule, the obvious result of which is that the latter are foreclosed from serving ports which they desire to serve. Moreover, had the single terminal rule been in effect in 1969, as the examiner found, none of the member lines would have designated Stockton as their single loading terminal and that port would have lost 63 sailings, 43,829 tons of cargo, and $498,325 in revenue. In addition, testimony of witnesses for some of the member lines indicates that they would call at Stockton for cargo in the absence of amended rule 10.

---

ports were not held to be unlawful, are not controlling or indeed relevant here. These cases, cited to us by respondents, were complaint proceedings in which the agency was limited to the resolution of only those issues raised by the complaints and answers therein, which involved no contentions of illegality under section 205.  

7 The record herein shows that Stockton handles no bulk or military cargo, and only two vessels called there for 750 tons for one shipper in each of the years 1967, 1968, and 1969. Sacramento had only four calls in 1969 under the 750-ton minimum exception.  

8 The record, as all parties agree, fails to show whether present rule 10, in actual practice, eliminates any terminals which would be used by the member lines in its absence. This is immaterial, however, insofar as sec. 205 is concerned since the language of the rule and evidence of record show it is designed to restrict service to certain ports, and sec. 205 makes unlawful "the attempt" to prevent service as well as the actual prevention of service.
It is clear at this point that the respondents' terminal limitations do prevent conference members from serving certain ports within the Conference range, but respondents still contend that this is permissible under section 205 since the service prevented is not service "at the same rates." As respondents read section 205, they would agree that the Conference may not impose a higher rate on one port, say Sacramento, than another, say San Francisco, and then prevent a member from serving Sacramento at the same rate as San Francisco, but they may prevent members from serving Sacramento at any rate whatsoever. It is always difficult to come to grips with such a reductio ad absurdum, and we would hope that respondents' position here is prompted by that venerable but irksome penchant of advocates to use every argument a free-reined imagination can muster. The phrase "at the same rates" was obviously included to preclude the use of "ratemaking" authority as the means by which a conference concertedly refused to serve a port. Section 205 is a clear bar to any artificial limitation on service by a conference.

As the legislative history of 205 shows, its purpose was not only to prevent collective action designed to create discrimination in the form of a difference in rates at which federally improved ports are served, but more importantly to forbid conferences to impose restrictions on their member lines which would interfere with the free exercise of the lines' discretion in the determination of which ports they choose to serve. The so-called Allin amendment, which was the basis of section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, was enacted in response to the plea of the Port of Stockton to stop conferences from engaging in allegedly discriminatory practices against the port. The hearings on the amendment disclose on page after page the intention of the Congress to outlaw Conference regulations designed to impose limitations on the free choice of their members with respect to the ports they may serve. Representative excerpts from the testimony of Colonel Allin, the chief proponent of the legislation, clearly show this:

It is our desire that this legislation be enacted which, is purely permissive, simply enabling any steamship company which desires to go to any port which has been approved by Congress without hindrance of any other steamship company or combination of steamship companies.9

** * * * We believe that a steamship company, if it so desires of its own free will and accord, should have the right to go there [any federally improved port] and pick it [a shipment] up without being hindered.10

9 Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, pursuant to S. 5035, 72d Cong., 2d sess. (1933), at p. 6.
10 Ibid, at p. 7.
We merely desire a line, if it so desires, to extend its service and make use of the Government waterway.\textsuperscript{11}

We do not believe in compelling a ship to go anywhere. We would like the ship to have the right to go there without hindrance of competing steamship companies, if that particular steamship line desires to do so.\textsuperscript{12}

And all we ask is that if the shipper has a shipment a boat be allowed to come in and get it; this is all.\textsuperscript{13}

The committee chairman, in interpreting what became section 205, stated:

It simply says that a steamship company may, notwithstanding any conference agreement, if it desires—it is purely permissive in character—may go to a port and attend to the business of that port.\textsuperscript{14}

What I am driving at is this—We start, then, there with what you might term a prohibition, that is, that the steamship company shall not be denied the right, that is all, the inherent right that the carrier has to go to a particular place.\textsuperscript{15}

The question of the rates at which federally improved ports were to be served was also important, but the question was viewed as separate from, and subsidiary to, the question of service. The intent of section 205, as shown by the Senate hearings, was first of all to protect against Conference restrictions preventing service at federally improved ports, and then, if the individual member lines of the Conference desire to serve such ports, to allow them to serve them at Conference-established rates, so long as the same rates apply to all such ports. (See hearings, supra, note 19, at pp. 89–90.)

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondents' present and proposed limitations on terminals served by Conference members are in direct contravention of section 205, and as such are contrary to the public interest within the meaning of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The rules embodying the number of ports served, including minimum tonnages or types of cargo which can be lifted at such ports, must be stricken from the tariff. Our conclusions here are not to be construed as a requirement that any particular line serve any particular port, or indeed that any line serve any port. Although the record herein does not indicate that it would be uneconomical for individual carriers to serve Stockton or Sacramento,\textsuperscript{16} such matters are beyond the scope of this proceeding and we do not require them to serve these ports so long

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid, at p. 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid, at p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid, at p. 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid, at p. 88.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid, at p. 89.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Although the record herein indicates that shifting of vessels to serve different terminals entails added expense for the lines, it does not indicate either that the lines will be unduly burdened financially by such added expense or indeed that the shift may not prove desirable from the viewpoint of added revenues to be derived from cargoes supplied by the additional ports to which shifts are made.
\end{itemize}
as they are free to exercise their business judgment with respect to port service absent Conference-imposed restraints. The record shows that at the time of the adoption of the single terminal limitation, some lines desired to continue to serve more than one terminal. We merely preserve their ability to do so. In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary for us to consider other challenges to the legality of the Conference’s terminal limitation rules.

III. CONFERENCE AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF PORT EQUALIZATION

No party specifically excepts to the examiner’s conclusion that the Conference is authorized by its presently approved agreement to establish a system of port equalization, and such conclusion is clearly proper. Subsequent to the decision in our docket No. 1102, Pacific Coast European Conference—Port Equalization Rule, 7 F.M.C. 623 (1963), affirmed, sub nom., American Export Isbrandtsen Lines v. Federal Maritime Commission, 334 F. 2d 185 (9th Cir. 1964), which held that, at that time, the Conference lacked authority to establish such a system, the basic agreement was amended to authorize the Conference to allow “absorption[s] at loading and discharging ports of rail, truck, or coastal steamer freights or other charges directly or indirectly * * *” upon the agreement of three-fourths of the member lines. In our order approving the amendment, we noted, “This [absorption] provision will permit the filing by the Conference of a port equalization tariff rule.”

IV. LAWFULNESS OF RESPONDENTS’ EQUALIZATION SYSTEM AND PROPOSED TERMINATION THEREOF

We need not dwell at length on the matters relating to the Conference’s equalization system as embodied in its tariff rule 12. The Conference’s contention that competitive pressures will force lines to serve terminals which they do not desire to serve is unconvincing. One of the lines operates large ships which the record indicates can only be served at Oakland. Further, the container lines, whose operations would most benefit under the rule because of the higher costs involved in shifting their larger, newer, more costly vessels, will in all probability be unaffected by it since as the examiner found, these vessels would call at one Bay area terminal, irrespective of any conference-imposed terminal limitation. Nor do we believe that the lines will call at terminals if they feel such calls are unprofitable, Conference rule or no conference rule. The record shows that in 1969, four lines declared only a single terminal in the Bay area for their vessels, two lines declared a second terminal on only two out of 13 and 14 sailings, respectively, no line came close to making the two terminal calls authorized with all its vessels, and one line, of its own managerial discretion, withdrew service to Stockton in the case of individual vessels and was considering withdrawing it altogether. The effect of the Conference’s terminal limitation rules, rather than protecting the lines against wasteful competition, would be, as the examiner observed, the prevention of the noncontainerized lines, which the record herein shows to be the overwhelming majority of the Conference, “from serving other terminals where containerization might not be desirable or feasible.”

14 F.M.C.
ence had proposed elimination of the system to be effective concurrently with the single terminal limitation. No party excepted to the examiner’s conclusion that the Conference may lawfully terminate its system by the deletion of rule 12, and we agree that nothing has been presented to indicate that such deletion would be unlawful. In the light of our holding with respect to terminal limitations, however, the Conference may desire to retain its port equalization system. We similarly conclude that nothing has been presented herein to convince us that the retention of the system is unlawful.

Only Stockton contends that the examiner erred in failing to find that the Conference’s equalization system is unlawful. That port maintains that the East Bay ports and the up-river ports are in effect two different harbor complexes and geographic areas and their “naturally tributary” cargoes originate in different areas. The holding in *Stockton Port District v. Pacific Westbound Conference*, 9 F.M.C. 12 (1965), affirmed sub nom., *Stockton Port District v. Federal Maritime Commission*, 369 F. 2d 380 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 386 U.S. 1031 (1967), that equalization between East Bay ports and up-river ports was unlawful was based upon the findings in that proceeding that the up-river and East Bay ports were all in the same port complex and geographic area and that the same cargo was “naturally tributary” to all of them. These findings are not controlling here, Stockton asserts, because evidence of record in this proceeding shows that the East Bay ports and up-river ports are not part of one port complex. Stockton places particular reliance for this conclusion upon the Conference’s determined effort to prevent calls at Stockton, and the alleged testimony of Conference members that they do not regard Oakland as being in the same harbor as Stockton and of shippers that they consider the East Bay ports and Stockton as separate ports. The products affected by the rule, Stockton contends, also originate in separate geographical areas (i.e., the San Joaquin Valley, where Stockton is located, and Oakland and the Santa Clara Valley south of San Francisco Bay) whose shippers compete with each other and will be differently affected by the Conference’s one-terminal limitation. The examiner’s finding that the natural gateway for San Joaquin and Sacramento Valley products destined for Europe is Stockton and Sacramento shows that such cargoes are “naturally tributary” to those ports, and Stockton can offer adequate service to shippers of equalized cargo. Thus, under the principles established in *Pacific Westbound, supra*, it maintains the Conference’s equalization system is unlawful in unduly prejudicing and unjustly discriminating against the Port of Stockton and unduly preferred and unjustly discriminating in favor of the East Bay ports.

14 F.M.C.
Lastly, Stockton contends that the Conference’s equalization rule is detrimental to commerce and contrary to the public interest because it diverts cargo “naturally tributary” to the Port of Stockton contrary to the policy of section 8 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.

Contrary to the contentions of Stockton, the record herein does not show that the situation with respect to the equalized ports is other than we found it to be in Stockton Port District v. Pacific Westbound Conference, supra. It is clear from the examiner’s discussion of the shipper witnesses’ testimony, which we have reproduced at pages 272–275, supra, that he does not use the term “natural gateway” as synonymous with “naturally tributary.” As an examination of this discussion shows, when the examiner spoke of Sacramento and Stockton as the natural gateways for agricultural products from the San Joaquin and Sacramento valleys, destined for Europe, he meant only that the inland transportation rates and mileages are less to Sacramento and Stockton for such products than they would be to other ports. The concept that inland transportation rates and mileages alone determine which areas are naturally tributary to which ports was specifically rejected in Stockton Port District v. Pacific Westbound Conference, supra, at pages 23–24, as well as in other equalization cases. As we ruled in Stockton, areas are naturally tributary to ports if they are “centrally, economically and naturally” served by such ports (at 24). Nothing has been shown herein to indicate that the entire Bay area is not naturally tributary to all the ports concerned herein, as we found it to be in Stockton, and there is nothing in the record herein to show that the East Bay ports and up-river ports constitute two different harbor complexes and geographic areas. The Conference’s attempts to prevent calls at Stockton, rather than suggest it is in a different harbor complex or geographic area, could equally well be said to suggest that it is in the same area since both ports must compete for the same cargo, otherwise there would be no reason for the Conference to attempt to restrict service at Stockton. Furthermore, the testimony of both the Conference lines and shippers herein shows, contrary to Stockton’s assertions, that they consider the East Bay and up-river ports to be in the same geographic area and competitive for the same cargo, and the Conference’s practice has been to define the Bay ports in its tariff to include all of the ports involved in this proceeding. Although we do not hold that, with changes in transportation circumstances, the East Bay ports and up-river ports could never constitute separate geographic areas with different tributary cargo, we conclude

that nothing has been presented herein to convince us that they are such at the present time.

In conclusion, we hold that, on the basis of the record before us, the Conference may lawfully either retain or discontinue its equalization system now embodied in its tariff rule 12.

All exceptions to the initial decision or requests for findings not specifically ruled upon herein have been found to be improper or immaterial, cumulative, or otherwise unnecessary to the decision.

An appropriate order will be entered ordering both present and proposed tariff rule 10 stricken and requiring the Conference to cease and desist from in any way restricting the number of U.S. ports or terminals at which their member lines may call or the tonnage or character of cargo which may be lifted at such ports.

[Seal] (Signed) FRANCIS C. HURNEY, Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 70–11

PACIFIC COAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE—RULES 10 AND 12,
TARIFF No. FMC 14

ORDER

The Federal Maritime Commission has this day served its report
in the subject proceeding which we hereby incorporate herein, in which,
inter alia, it found unlawful any regulations imposed by the Pacific
Coast European Conference restricting the U.S. ports or terminals
served by its member lines, or the tonnage or character or cargo to be
lifted at such ports.

Therefore, for the reasons enunciated in said report,

It is ordered, That both present and proposed tariff rule 10 of tariff
No. FMC 14 of the Pacific Coast European Conference be stricken
from the Conference's tariff; and

It is further ordered, That said Conference cease and desist from in
any way restricting the number of U.S. ports or terminals at which
its member lines may call or the tonnage or character of cargo which
may be lifted at such ports.

By the Commission.

[SEAL] (Signed) Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

289
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

DOCKET No. 70-41

INDEPENDENT OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDER LICENSE APPLICATION—KEY AIR FREIGHT, INC.

Decided June 10, 1971

ORDER ON STIPULATION

On April 8, 1971, the presiding examiner served his decision in this proceeding, finding that Key Air Freight violated section 44(a) of the Shipping Act, 1916, by functioning as an ocean freight forwarder of 24 shipments between February 23, 1970, and March 13, 1970. He concluded that respondent was presently "fit" to carry on the business of forwarding and that it should be licensed conditioned upon one of its minority stockholders, Mr. Arthur B. Davidson’s, continued total disassociation from respondent and disposal of his 9.5 percent stock interest in respondent within 60 days. Hearing counsel filed no exceptions to the initial decision. Respondent filed exceptions urging principally that the requirement that Davidson dispose of his stock in respondent is inappropriate, unnecessary to accomplish the objectives sought and, in any event, is a condition beyond the control of respondent.

Subsequently, a joint motion was filed by hearing counsel and respondent, the only parties to this proceeding, urging that the Commission license Key Air Freight and discontinue the proceeding on condition that Mr. Davidson will not in the future become an employee, officer, or director of respondent nor will he become involved in the day-to-day management of the business; that Mr. Davidson will not increase his stock interest in respondent beyond his existing 9.5 percent ownership; and that Mr. Davidson’s stock shall be placed in a trust with an independent trustee who shall have the power to vote such stock on the basis of its independent judgment until Mr. Davidson determines to dispose of his holdings.

After careful review and consideration of the record and pleadings in this proceeding, we agree with the examiner’s factual analysis and concur that the case at bar is quite similar to Independent Ocean
Freight Forwarder License Application—Violet A. Wilson doing business as Transmares, 13 FMC 30 (1969). The examiner stated that it would be unfair to punish the present officers, directors, employees, and stockholders of Key for the misdeeds of Davidson who is no longer active in the affairs of respondent. We agree and are of the opinion that the conditions proposed by hearing counsel and respondent in their joint motion are reasonable and proper under the circumstances.

Therefore, it is ordered, That Key Air Freight, Inc., be issued an independent ocean freight forwarder license subject to the following conditions:

1. That Mr. A. B. Davidson will not in the future become an employee, officer or director of respondent, nor will become involved in the day-to-day management of respondent;
2. That Mr. Davidson will not increase his percentage stock interest in respondent beyond his existing 9.5 percent ownership; and
3. That Mr. Davidson’s stock shall be placed in a trust with an independent trustee who shall have the power to vote such stock on the basis of its independent judgment. A copy of the executed trust agreement shall be filed with the Commission and the entire matter will be reviewed 1 year from date of issuance of said license to determine the necessity for continuing the trust arrangement.

It is further ordered, That this proceeding be discontinued.

By the Commission.

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
Bunker surcharge imposition found to be violative of clause 9 of the wine and spirits contract between National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers, Inc. and North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association. Rising bunker costs, under the facts herein, do not constitute an "extraordinary condition" within the meaning of clause 4 of the wine and spirits contract, nor do such increased costs unduly impede, obstruct or delay the carriers' service within the context of said clause.

Thomas E. O'Neill, for National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers, Inc.


Ronald D. Lee and Donald J. Brunner, Hearing Counsel.

REPORT

By the Commission (Helen Delich Bentley, Chairman; Ashton C. Barrett, Vice Chairman; James V. Day, James F. Fanseen, George H. Hearn, Commissioners):

This proceeding was initiated by the National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers, Inc. (hereinafter NAABI) against the North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association (hereinafter NAWFA).

NAABI charged that NAWFA filed with the FMC a rate surcharge of $3 per ton for the carriage of alcoholic beverages. Rates between NAABI and NAWFA are governed by the conference's wine and spirits contract, which is a dual-rate contract, the use of which was permitted by the Commission under section 14b of the Shipping Act, 1916. Clause 9 of the contract provides that "no change in rates *** is to be made without prior consultation" with NAABI.

It is claimed that the imposition of the surcharge, having been made without prior consultation, is therefore in violation of clause 9
of the wine and spirits contract. NAABI therefore requested the Commission issue an order to NAWFA to show cause why the surcharge imposed by NAWFA should not be rescinded. NAWFA in its reply requested that the Commission deny the NAABI petition for the show cause order and hold that NAWFA’s surcharge is proper and lawful on the grounds that the rising cost of fuel is an extraordinary condition, necessitating the surcharge.

On March 29, 1971, the Commission issued an order directing NAWFA to show cause why its bunker surcharge should not be canceled as violative of clause 9 of the wine and spirits contract, and not supported by clause 4 of the contract, which permits rates to be changed at any time in the event of “extraordinary conditions.” As of April 16, 1971, both parties, as well as hearing counsel, had submitted briefs, and in the interest of expediency requested that no oral hearing be held.

On April 26, 1971, NAABI filed with the Commission a petition for oral hearing. Thereafter, NAWFA and hearing counsel both filed replies in opposition to the request for oral hearing.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

**The Petition for Oral Hearing**

In its petition for oral hearing, NAABI claims that the intervention of hearing counsel, via their reply of April 16, 1971, in support of NAWFA’s position, makes this proceeding something other than a “two-party controversy.” Further, it is alleged that hearing counsel introduced new matters not strictly within the scope of the Commission’s show cause order; i.e., that the conference has an obligation to levy surcharges against all its shippers aside from the wine and spirits contract.

NAABI argues that the issue of the foreseeability of escalating costs of bunker C fuel is an evidentiary question, best answerable through a hearing. NAABI itself, however, introduces the issue of the reasonableness of the $3 per ton surcharge, which again it contends is best resolved at an evidentiary hearing. It is also urged that hearing counsel introduced the question of the fundamental legality of the wine and spirits contract. Lastly, NAABI claims that since hearing counsel’s reply supports that of NAWFA, it should have been filed by the April 9 deadline rather than by the April 16 deadline. Because of the latter filing date, NAABI was precluded from answering hearing counsel’s reply and would otherwise not have conceded that an evidentiary hearing was not desirable.

14 F.M.C.
Hearing counsel, in their reply to the petition for oral hearing, argue that this was never a two-party proceeding since under rule 3(b) of the rules of practice and procedure, hearing counsel automatically became a party to this proceeding when the Commission granted the original petition and issued the order to show cause.

It is contended by hearing counsel that NAABFI knew that foreseeability of the price increases of fuel would be an issue when it originally petitioned the Commission. In general, the argument of hearing counsel is that NAABFI has failed to show a dispute as to the relevant facts which would necessitate an evidentiary hearing.

The issue of the reasonableness of the $3 per ton surcharge, it is contended, is not within the scope of the order to show cause and it would be inequitable to permit NAABFI to expand the scope of this proceeding through an evidentiary hearing. Hearing counsel vociferously deny having raised the issue of the fundamental legality of the contract.

NAWFA, in its reply to the petition for oral hearing, argues along the same lines as hearing counsel. It claims that hearing counsel have not set forth any new facts or issues which would justify an evidentiary hearing.

We conclude that NAABFI has failed to demonstrate why its petition for oral hearing should not be denied. The argument that this proceeding was a “two-party controversy” is specious. It is clearly stipulated in section 502.42 of our rules of practice and procedure that hearing counsel “shall be a party to all proceedings governed by the rules in this part * * *” [rule 3(b)]. Regardless of the merits of that contention, NAABFI has failed to show a dispute as to relevant facts, the only justification for an evidentiary hearing.

We have before us all the relevant facts necessary for the disposition of this controversy. The “ancillary question” of the reasonableness of the $3 per ton surcharge is not properly before us in this proceeding, and clearly the scope of this proceeding should not be expanded by the introduction of extraneous matter through an evidentiary hearing.

As for the issue of the fundamental legality of the contract, hearing counsel have not raised it and it is not of concern to us in this proceeding. The issue of whether the conference has an obligation to levy the $3 per ton surcharge against all its shippers, despite the contract, is a question of law and not one of fact; this too is an issue not raised by the pleadings.

The facts concerning the issue of foreseeability are before the Commission and are no different from those in docket No. 70-43, Atlantic
and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day Tariff Filing Notice, 14 FMC 166 December 21, 1970, in which the same issue was resolved.

We therefore conclude that the information before us is dispositive of this controversy and there is no need for resort to an oral hearing.

The petition for oral hearing is hereby denied.

THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Under the wine and spirits contract, although clause 9 provides that no rates shall be changed without prior consultation, clause 4(c) allows for an increase in rates "in the event of any extraordinary conditions * * * which conditions may unduly impede, obstruct, or delay the obligations of the carrier or carriers."

Thus, the issue becomes one of determining whether the rise in bunker fuel costs (an admitted fact) constitutes an extraordinary condition which unduly impedes, obstructs or delays the carrier's service.

It is NAWFA's contention that there is no question that increases in the cost of bunker fuel are just such conditions as would justify the imposition of a surcharge. These increases are referred to as "startling" and "violent" and are therefore claimed to have been unforeseeable and thus extraordinary. In a curious argument, NAWFA contends that clause 4(c) has no application where 90 days' notice of the increase has been given.

NAWFA further argues that clause 9 has no application to surcharges but refers only to "rates", and NAWFA did not intend to restrict its rights to institute surcharges by clause 9.

In countering NAWFA's argument that increased fuel costs are an extraordinary condition, NAABI contends our decision in docket No. 70-43 stands for the principle that increased fuel costs are not extraordinary conditions.

Further, NAABI claims that even if the increased costs do constitute an extraordinary condition, they are not such conditions as unduly impede, obstruct, or delay service, and therefore NAWFA has failed to sustain the burden of proof as to the legality of the surcharge.

NAABI argues that under the particular wine and spirits contract, the ordinary dual rate contract provision for increases upon 90 days' notice is not applicable.

The argument that an imposition of a surcharge is not an increase in rates is termed a legal fiction by NAABI. It is claimed that if the
carriers can vary the terms of their obligation under the contract to stand by rates specified as effective until September 30, 1971, through the use of fuel surcharges, then there is no reason why surcharges for any other costs could not likewise be imposed.

Hearing counsel in this case take a position diametrically different from that advocated in docket No. 70-43, which involved similar circumstances. In the instant proceeding, it is claimed that the increased fuel costs (no greater or different from those found in 70-43) constitute extraordinary conditions that unduly impede, obstruct, or delay service.

Curiously, hearing counsel claim that the position they advocated and the conclusion consequently reached by the Commission in 70-43 are now not applicable to this proceeding. This is said to be due to the fact that in that proceeding the issue of extraordinary conditions was treated in the context of the 30-day/90-day notice rule discussed below.

Lastly, it is claimed that NAWFA, at the inception of the contract, had no tangible evidence of "tremors" in the market for bunker fuel, and since the contract had fixed rates, nothing could be done about "tremors" even had they been perceived.

Hearing counsel's contract argument seems to conceive of the contract as something separate and apart from the intent of the parties. Had the "tremors" existed at the inception, the parties could easily enough have provided in their contract for contingencies of this nature. They didn't do it, and now NAWFA wants to rewrite its contract. Moreover, hearing counsel largely ignore the importance of the fixed rates to NAABI.

In Surcharge at U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 10 F.M.C. 13, 22 (1966), the Commission set forth the criteria for extraordinary conditions: "The condition must be outside or beyond the carrier's control, the condition must impede or delay the carrier's service, and there must be an emergency, or abnormal condition, or an extraordinary circumstance."

We conclude that NAWFA has failed to show cause why its bunker surcharge should not be canceled.

In the Surcharge at U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Ports case, supra, the test for extraordinary conditions was set forth by the Commission. It is clear that the test reduces to one of foreseeability. That is, should the carrier, "in the exercise of a high degree of diligence in the exercise of business judgment' have foreseen or anticipated the conditions upon which the surcharges are based." An affirmative answer to this question leads one to conclude that the condition is not extraordinary.
In the instant case, the issue of whether the condition of increasing bunker costs is extraordinary need not be reached. Conceding, arguendo, that such a condition is extraordinary (although, as we have stated on the facts of docket No. 70-43, it is not), we conclude that such a condition does not unduly impede or delay the carrier’s service.

The only difference between the present case and docket No. 70-43 is that in 70-43 the issue was whether 90 days’ notice was required for a surcharge due to the increased fuel costs. This provision was a part of the conference’s dual-rate contract, just as in the instant case the contract provides for no increase at all, save for the existence of extraordinary conditions unduly impeding or delaying the obligations of the carrier. (Clause 4(c) of the wine and spirits contract.)

Thus, in 70-43, the existence of an extraordinary condition unduly impeding and delaying service would result in the imposition of a surcharge upon 30 days’ notice as opposed to 90 days’ notice, lacking such a condition. In the instant case, the existence of such a condition would allow for the surcharge in accordance with clause 4(c) of the contract (upon 30 days’ notice) as opposed to no surcharge imposition, lacking the extraordinary condition, and lacking prior consultation with NAABI under clause 9.

The wording of the contracts in both cases is precisely identical; the only distinction between the two situations lies in the results which follow a determination of whether an extraordinary condition exists. In the one, docket No. 70-43, the surcharge will be imposed either upon 30 days’ notice or 90 days’ notice. In the other, docket No. 71-28, the surcharge will either be imposed upon 30 days’ notice or not at all.

There would appear no reason to interfere with the parties’ fundamental right to freedom of contract; the bounds of consistency and logic call for the wording of the contracts to be interpreted in a like manner. Thus, the issue presented—what is an “extraordinary condition which may unduly impede or delay the obligations of the carrier”?—should be resolved in the same way as docket No. 70-43.

In that proceeding, as pointed out above, we concluded under similar circumstances that a rise in bunker fuel costs was not such an extraordinary condition as to unduly impede or delay service. We are compelled to reach that same conclusion in this case as well.

We therefore conclude that the rise in fuel costs does not justify the imposition of a surcharge in this case in violation of clause 9 of the wine and spirits contract.

We find NAWFA’s remaining arguments lacking merit. We cannot believe that NAABI would enter into a contract which specifically
stated that rates were to be fixed for a period of time, but which would allow for the imposition of surcharges at will by NAWFA simply because the contract refers to "rates" and a surcharge is not part of a rate as claimed by NAWFA. The surcharge here is but a rate increase by another name.

We argree with NAABI that the ordinary dual rate contract provision for increases upon 90 days' notice is not applicable. This is a contract freely negotiated by the parties thereto, and such a provision is clearly lacking as pointed out in hearing counsel’s brief.

NAWFA has failed to meet its burden of proof in showing cause why its bunker surcharge should not be canceled. Accordingly, an appropriate order will be issued prescribing that NAWFA cancel its surcharge forthwith, retroactive to its imposition on March 21, 1971.

[seal] (Signed) FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

14 F.M.C.
ORDER

This proceeding was instituted by the National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers, Inc. (NAABII), by a complaint filed against the North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association (NAWFA). A show cause order was issued by the Commission on March 29, 1971, directing NAWFA to show cause why a bunker surcharge imposed upon NAABII should not be canceled as violative of clause 9 of the conference's wine and spirits contract. NAWFA's response to the order to show cause, and replies of all other interested parties have been considered. The Commission has this day issued its report in this proceeding, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference, in which it determined that NAWFA has failed to show cause why its surcharge should not be canceled.

Therefore, it is ordered, That the petition for oral hearing be denied.

It is further ordered, That NAWFA forthwith cancel its surcharge of $3 per ton for the carriage of alcoholic beverages.

It is further ordered, That this order is effective retroactive to the imposition of the surcharge on March 21, 1971.

By the Commission.

[seal] (Signed)  FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

299
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

INFORMAL DOCKET No. 99(I)

JOSEPH AND SYBIL JAMES

v.

SOUTH ATLANTIC & CARIBBEAN LINE, INC.

July 24, 1970

ADOPTION OF DECISION

On June 8, 1970, the presiding examiner served his decision in this proceeding, finding that South Atlantic and Caribbean Line, Inc. (SACAL) had engaged in an unreasonable practice in violation of section 18(a) of the Shipping Act, 1916, by failing to give adequate notification to complainants of the arrival of their cargo. Based on this finding, complainants were awarded reparation in the amount of $198.45. On June 23, 1970, we served notice of our intention to review the decision.

While the examiner’s ultimate conclusion appears fully supported by the record, his method of reaching this conclusion has given rise to a procedural difficulty. The original claim alleged a violation by SACAL of section 14 Fourth; no mention was made of section 18(a). Thus, in reaching his conclusion, the examiner has relied upon a section of the act which complainants have not alleged was violated. This was error. If section 18(a) was to be relied upon, complainants should have been required to amend their claim.

As noted previously, however, the examiner’s conclusion appears to be eminently proper. It is to be noted that SACAL has informed the Commission that the reparation was made to complainants shortly after the examiner’s decision. Accordingly, we adopt the examiner’s ultimate conclusion as our own.

We wish to emphasize that it is not the intention of the Commission to scrutinize every minute aspect of the record in informal complaints. Such a policy would seriously distort the purpose of the small claims procedure. In the instant case, however, we have taken this action in order to provide guidance for the future.

By the Commission.

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

INFORMAL DOCKET No. 99(I)

JOSEPH AND SIBYL JAMES

v.

SOUTH ATLANTIC & CARIBBEAN LINE, INC.

Adopted July 24, 1970

INITIAL DECISION

Respondent's arrival notification found to be an unreasonable practice. Reparation awarded.

Joseph and Sibyl James for themselves.
Bradley R. Cowry for respondent.

DECISION OF RICHARD M. HARTSOCK, PRESIDING EXAMINER

The essential facts involved in this complaint are not in dispute. On July 15, 1969, Mrs. Joseph James delivered a Chevrolet automobile to respondent for shipment to San Juan, P.R., on respondent's vessel Floridian on July 30. The carrier's bill of lading (No. 58 C), dated July 30, 1969, shows total freight charges of $218. On the lower right-hand corner of the bill, and superimposed over a part of the written matter thereon, including the name of the shipping line and a signature on behalf of the master of the ship, appears the following somewhat faint impression of a rubber stamp:

ESTE VAPOR LLEGARA

EN 8/2

AL MUELLE 8

CARGA ALMACENA
EL 8/8 4:00 P.M.

CARRIER not responsible for condition of cargo on outturn if consignee fails to take delivery of charge immediately upon trailer being made available by carrier.

The Spanish portion of the stamp translates as follows: "This ship will arrive in 8/2 at Pier 8. Cargo will begin accumulating storage charges the 8/8 at 4:00 p.m."

14 F.M.C. 301
An invoice dated July 30, forwarded by respondent to Mrs. James in Juana Diaz, P.R., contained the total charges for the transportation service, the bill of lading number, the name of the vessel, the ports of loading and discharging, the invoice date, the voyage number, and the sailing date. The arrival date was left blank.

The invoice and the bill of lading were received by Mrs. James during the first week of August. When, by August 25, no arrival notice had been received, Mrs. James checked at San Juan and found that the automobile had arrived on August 8 and had been placed in storage for complainant's account. The automobile was released upon payment of the freight and $198.45 storage charges assessed by the local port authority. While the automobile was clean and in good condition at the time of delivery to the carrier in Miami, when it was taken possession of in San Juan the upholstery had been soiled, a cigarette lighter was missing, and the outside was encrusted with salt. No money claim is made for the physical condition of the automobile.

Mrs. James asserts that at the time she tendered the automobile to the carrier its representative advised her that she could expect it to be delivered in San Juan in approximately 4 weeks, and that she would be notified of its arrival. Further, that when she received the envelope containing the invoice and the bill of lading she examined the papers but was unable to find an arrival date and concluded that an arrival notice would come later. This conclusion was strengthened by her knowledge that friends who had shipped automobiles by other carriers had first received the shipping documents and later a clear notification of arrival, with the words "Important, Arrival Notice" printed in English on the envelope and at the head of the notice itself. Mrs. James contends that the carrier should have provided some meaningful notice of arrival and that the assessment of storage charges was the direct result of inadequate notice.

Respondent's position is that the bill of lading contained a clear notification of arrival, that the stamp has been in use since 1962, that no complaints have been received regarding its use, that Spanish is the predominant language in Puerto Rico, that pleadings in the Commonwealth court, if filed in English, must be accompanied by a Spanish translation, that road and traffic signs in Puerto Rico are in Spanish, and that utility bills to residents of Puerto Rico are in Spanish irrespective of whether they are mailed to Spanish- or English-speaking residents. It is inconceivable, respondent maintains, that the language of a foreign locale must bend to the needs or inabilities of American citizens traveling in that country. Respondent concludes that the storage charges accrued because the inability of claimant to
read Spanish, which is not the fault of the carrier. In short, it is urged that actual notice was given in the official language of Puerto Rico and that nothing further is required. As to the condition of the vehicle when received by complainants, respondent alleges that to its best knowledge and belief the vehicle was properly handled during all stages of transit.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Complainants assert that the circumstances establish a violation of section 14 Fourth of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the act), which proscribes unfair treatment of a shipper in the loading and landing of freight in proper condition. As previously noted no money claim has been asserted for the condition of the automobile. The thrust of the claim is for recovery of storage charges resulting from respondent’s inadequate arrival notice. The claim for storage charges is not cognizable under section 14 Fourth, because it does not concern the loading and landing of freight in proper condition.

In contrast to section 14 Fourth, section 18(a) provides:

> That every common carrier by water in interstate commerce shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, classifications, and tariffs, and just and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto * * * and all other matters relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, transporting, storing, or delivering of property.

Both the bill of lading and the invoice bear the same date, July 30, 1969. Both were addressed to Mrs. Joseph James and were received by her early in the first week of August. The invoice, in English, shows a blank entry after “arrival date.” The bill of lading contains in the right bottom corner a rubber stamp imprint barely legible, which provides in Spanish that “the ship will arrive in 8/2 at Pier 8. Warehouse cargo the 8/8 4:00 P.M.”

The stamp impression was placed over provisions of the bill of lading which provided that the conditions on the reverse side thereof were continued on the face of the bill of lading, the typed signature of SACAL of Florida Inc. signing the bill of lading as agents and the written signature of someone signing the bill of lading for the master of the ship. To persons not acquainted with the procedures of respondent in providing notification, the stamped notification would have appeared to bear some relationship to authentication of the bill of lading or some other purpose unconnected with the arrival of the vessel. The stamp itself, as placed, would

---

2 This verbatim translation differs from respondent’s translation, presumably because respondents’ is a “free” translation carrying with it certain understanding of the words in the trade.

14 F.M.C.
not put an ordinary, prudent person on notice that the matters therein were of importance.

As noted, the invoice had left blank the arrival date. Mrs. James had been advised by a representative of the respondent when tendering her automobile that it would take approximately 4 weeks for delivery from Miami to San Juan. Friends and acquaintances of hers who had shipped automobiles to Puerto Rico had first received the bill of lading and other papers and later received a clear notification of arrival by separate correspondence. For Mrs. James to have waited until August 25 before making inquiry concerning the arrival of her vehicle, in the circumstances, was not unreasonable.

It was not unreasonable for Mrs. James to have overlooked the notice of arrival in Spanish stamped on the bill of lading. While it is understood that everyday social and business affairs in Puerto Rico are conducted in Spanish, here the transaction was between an English-speaking resident of the United States and an American common carrier operating in the offshore domestic commerce of the United States. Respondent's notification of arrival was an unreasonable practice in delivering property and was the proximate cause of the accrual of storage charges.

Complainant is awarded the sum of $198.45 as reparation. Interest at the rate of 6 percent per year will be added if reparation is not paid within 30 days after the service of this decision.

Richard M. Hartsock,
Presiding Examiner.

Washington, D.C.
June 8, 1970.

14 F.M.C.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dehydrated apples. Argentina to U.S. Pacific</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General. U.S. Atlantic and Puerto Rico–Virgin Islands</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General. U.S. Gulf and Puerto Rico</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX DIGEST

[Numbers in parentheses following citations indicate pages on which the particular subjects are considered]

ABSORPTIONS

Agreement among Japanese lines to maintain containership service between Japan and ports in Washington and Oregon will not be modified by prohibiting issuance of bills of lading to ports other than those ports specified in the bills of lading which are served directly by the vessel on the voyage on which the cargo is carried. The purpose of the modification requested by Hearing Counsel is to insure that Portland's growth potential as a container port is not arrested by absorption practices which divert cargo. However, the validity of port-to-port absorption practices was not in issue. Absorption between Seattle and Portland is under investigation in another proceeding to which Seattle, Portland and the Japanese lines are parties. The public interest is adequately safeguarded because of that proceeding. It is not necessary to modify the "Sailings" clause of the agreement to substitute "by unanimous assent" for "agreement." The terms of the agreement contemplate the unanimous action of the parties. Agreement No. 9885—Japanese Lines' Pacific Northwest Containerships Service Agreement, 203 (209).

Approved agreement authorizing a conference to allow "absorption[s] at loading and discharging ports of rail, truck or coastal steamer freights or other charges directly or indirectly" permits the filing by the conference of a tariff rule providing for equalization of shippers' inland transportation costs from point of origin to loading terminal. Retention of the system would not be unlawful. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14, 266 (285-286).

The record does not show that the situation with respect to equalized ports in the San Francisco Bay area is other than the Commission found it to be in a prior case [9 FMC 12]. When the examiner spoke of Sacramento and Stockton as the natural gateways for agricultural products from the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys, he meant only that the inland transportation rates and mileages are less to Sacramento and Stockton for such products than they would be to other ports. The concept that inland transportation rates and mileages alone determine which areas are naturally tributary to which ports has been specifically rejected by the agency in other equalization cases. Areas are naturally tributary to ports if they are "centrally, economically, and naturally" served by such ports. The record does not show that the entire Bay area is not naturally tributary to all ports involved in the proceeding, and there is nothing to show that the East Bay ports and up-river ports constitute two different harbor complexes and geographic areas. Conference attempt to prevent calls at Stockton, rather than suggest it is in a different harbor complex or geographic area, could equally well be said to suggest that it is in the same area since both ports must compete for the same cargo, otherwise there would be no reason for the confer-
ence to attempt to restrict service at Stockton. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (287).

AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 15: See also Terminal Leases.

—In general

Every agreement filed with the Commission for approval must be tested under the criteria of section 15. When prior to approval of an agreement one party repudiates or withdraws from the agreement, a completely new set of relationships arises, and normally a new beginning is required. Should the remaining parties to the agreement desire approval even without the withdrawing party, it is incumbent on them to reformulate the terms of the agreement so that it may be tested under the criteria of section 15. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 58 (62).

On the basis of a literal interpretation, any agreement falling within any one of the seven categories of activity enumerated in section 15 is subject to filing and approval, notwithstanding the degree or extent of its involvement or the subjective intent of the parties in entering into the agreement. The Supreme Court has held that section 15 requires the filing of every agreement in any of the seven categories. The legislative history supports this literal interpretation. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order to Show Cause, 82 (85).

A stipulation entered into during a hearing before the Maritime Subsidy Board and consisting of promises by a subsidy applicant that it would not seek or accept operating-differential subsidy for military carryings and that it would seek to have included in any new agreement a formula for abatement of subsidy similar to that for domestic interconnected service; and of promises by an unsubsidized carrier and an association whose membership includes unsubsidized carriers that they would withdraw their objections to the subsidy application and would not oppose any use by the applicant of any unsubsidized vessel in any nonsubsidized service, provided for an exclusive preferential, or cooperative working arrangement, constituted a special privilege or advantage, and controlled, regulated, prevented, or destroyed competition. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order to Show Cause. Id. (86).

Stipulation entered into during a hearing before the Maritime Subsidy Board, providing for nonacceptance of subsidy for military carryings by a subsidy applicant in return for withdrawal from the hearing by nonsubsidized interests and a promise not to oppose use by the subsidy applicant of any nonsubsidized vessel in any nonsubsidized service was a section 15 working arrangement. The promise not to oppose use of unsubsidized vessels accorded the subsidy applicant a “special privilege or advantage” not available to others. The agreement also came within the provision of section 15 on competition. The subsidy applicant’s promise not to seek or accept subsidy for military carryings affected competition for such cargoes. Inter alia, the competitive positions of both subsidized and unsubsidized carriers would be restructured to some extent. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order To Show Cause. Id. (86–87).

To interpret section 15 as applying only to those agreements enumerated therein which are restrictive, anticompetitive operating arrangements is not in accord with the literal language of the section or with recent judicial interpretations. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order To Show Cause. Id. (87).

Stipulation concerning subsidies for military carryings, entered into during a hearing before the Maritime Subsidy Board, was not constitutionally exempt
from Commission control or interference on the basis that it was joint or several representation to the government. The stipulation did not involve the "concerted action" envisioned in the constitutional right to petition the government or its representatives, and did not involve the right to join together to obtain judicial redress of constitutionally guaranteed rights. It involved instead individual understandings or agreements which were not submitted to the government with any specific intent of exerting influence to obtain an objective from the government. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order To Show Cause. Id. (87-88).

Agreement providing merely for the sale of four vessels by one carrier to another, with no commitments, understandings or undertakings of any nature between the parties, is approved. The agreement appears to afford substantial benefits to foreign commerce and to the public interest. Inter alia, the high speed of the vessels will permit the purchaser to increase its port coverage, thus allowing shippers a more comprehensive direct service and benefitting added ports as well. Agreement No. 9905, 163 (164-165).

The Commission is charged with disapproving a section 15 agreement based on the following four standards: unjust discriminations; detriment to commerce; contrary to the public interest; and violation of the 1916 Act. The Commission must be presented with substantial evidence to support a finding under one or more of these standards. Substantial evidence cannot be found on the record to justify disapproval of an agreement among Japanese lines to maintain containership service between Japan and ports in Washington and Oregon. A proper judgment on balance must be that operations under the agreement will not be unjustly discriminatory in any true sense of the word, will be beneficial to commerce, in keeping with the public interest, and not a violation of the Act. Agreement No. 9835—Japanese Lines' Pacific Northwest Containerships Service Agreement, 203 (207).

Agreement among Japanese lines to establish and maintain a three vessel containership service between Japan and ports in Washington and Portland was full and complete as filed. Matters such as schedules, advertising, space charters, mutual accounting procedures and container interchanges do not speak to the essence of the agreement. Formalization of remaining details will not constitute creation of a new agreement or arrangement requiring separate section 15 approval. Rather, they are "interstitial sort of adjustments." Agreement No. 9835—Japanese Lines' Pacific Northwest Containerships Service Agreement. Id. (208).

Collective action of conference in limiting the number of terminals served by its members in the San Francisco Bay area requires specific approval pursuant to section 15. An agreement which fails to authorize equalization between ports cannot under any reasonable construction provide authority for the more severe system of explicit limitations on the number of ports served by the parties to that agreement. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14, 266 (277).

The question of whether a particular activity is authorized by the basic conference agreement does not hinge on the "newness" or "novelty" of that activity. The determination that the particular rate structure in the Overland/OCP case was authorized by the basic agreements of the conferences employing the rates did not depend on the length of time those rates had been in effect. Rather, it was concluded that the rate-fixing authority expressly spelled out in the agreement could reasonably be construed to include the authority to fix rates, and further that since the rates in question had been widely used continuously from a time preceding approval of the agreement, the approval when
INDEX DIGEST

309

ganted could be naturally interpreted to allow a continuation of that activity. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (277–278).

It is not the “newness” of an activity which determines whether that activity is within the scope of an approved agreement. Only the language of the agreement and its reasonable interpretation can do that. This insistence on adherence to the terms of an agreement is crucial to the continued existence of the rights of persons dealing with conferences and other groups enjoying antitrust exemptions under section 15 to know how they may reasonably expect to be affected by the concerted activity of such groups. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (278).

Provisions of its agreement, cited by the conference as authority to limit loading berths, deal only with that general ratemaking authority found in virtually every conference agreement. Pacific European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (279).

While the conference’s terminal limitation rules do not limit service to specifically designated ports, they do limit the number of ports at which members may call. Thus, they are agreements “alloting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports,” agreements which section 15 itself distinguishes in kind from those agreements which deal primarily with the “fixing and regulating of transportation rates or fares.” As an agreement which at least regulates the character of the members’ sailings, it must be approved under section 15, and approval cannot be implied from any “awareness” on the part of the Commission of the conference’s activities. There is no room in section 15 for theories of “tacit” or “implied” approval. Antitrust exemptions may be enjoyed only with express Commission approval. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (279–280).

Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961 did not repeal section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and so long as the section continues to be a part of the law it must be considered by the Commission in exercising its delegated functions. The legislative history of section 205 makes it clear that activity which contravenes the prohibitions of the section cannot be approved under section 15 of the 1916 Act. The purpose of section 205 was to remove the agency’s power to make determinations with respect to the lawfulness of conference restrictions against federally improved ports on a case-by-case basis under sections 15 and 16 of the 1916 Act, and to make all such restrictions illegal per se. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (280–281).

Conference tariff rules limiting the number of loading terminals in the San Francisco Bay area to one or two, resulting in prevention of service to Sacramento and Stockton, violate section 205 of the 1936 Merchant Marine Act which makes it unlawful for a conference to prevent carriers from serving any port designed for the accommodation of ocean-going vessels located on any improvement project authorized by the Congress or through it by any other agency of the government, lying within the continental limits of the United States, “at the same rates” which it charges at the nearest port already regularly served by it. The phrase “at the same rates” was obviously intended to preclude the use of “rate making” authority as the means by which a conference concerntedly refused to serve a port. Section 205 is a clear bar to any artificial limitation on service by a conference. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (281–283).
As the legislative history of section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 shows, its purpose was not only to prevent collective action designed to create discrimination in the form of a difference in rates at which federally improved ports are served, but more importantly to forbid conferences from imposing restrictions on their member lines which would interfere with the free exercise of the lines' discretion in the determination of which ports they choose to serve. The question of the rates at which federally improved ports were to be served was also important, but the question was viewed as separate from, and subsidiary to, the question of service. The intent of section 205, as shown by the Senate hearings, was first of all to protect against conference restrictions preventing service at federally improved ports and then, if the individual lines desire to serve such ports, to allow them to serve them at conference-established rates, so long as the same rates apply to all such ports. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (283–284).

Present and proposed conference rules limiting the numbers of loading terminals in the San Francisco Bay area are in direct contravention of section 205 of the Mercant Marine Act of 1936, and as such are contrary to the public interest within the meaning of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The rules embodying the number of ports served, including minimum tonnages or types of cargo which can be lifted at such ports, must be stricken from the tariff. This is not to be construed as a requirement that any particular line must serve any particular port, or, that any line serve any port. Pacific Coast European Conference—Rules 10 and 12, Tariff No. FMC 14. Id. (284).

—Antitrust policy

Agreement of the New York Shipping Association, providing for a man-hours/tonnage assessment formula to meet fringe benefit obligations in union contracts, is not violative of the antitrust laws. The agreement is not a price-fixing arrangement as it merely provides an assessment arrangement to meet the costs of a separate labor contract. If the agreement were to be considered one of a nature contemplated by the antitrust laws, it would nevertheless have to be approved under the Shipping Act, because there is such a compelling transportation need for the agreement to avert chaos at the Port of New York. Agreement No. T–2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement, 94 (145).

Agreement to permit six Japanese lines to establish and maintain a three vessel containership service between Japan and Ports in Washington and Oregon affords transportation benefits, including regularity of service and efficient utilization of high cost equipment, which far outweigh any relevant antitrust considerations which could be marshaled against its approval under section 15. The agreement merely provides for a cooperative working arrangement covering space chartering and interstitial agreements on future sailings and administrative details. Agreement No. 9835—Japanese Lines' Pacific Northwest Containerships-Service Agreement, 203 (207).

—Assessment formula

Although there is no trade between the Port of New York and Alaska, it is advisable to place cargo between those places in the excepted category under the agreement of the New York Shipping Association providing an assessment formula to meet fringe benefit obligations in union agreements, in order to encourage such cargo to move if and when some trade develops. Agreement No.
T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement, 94 (101, 133, 148).

Excepted status is proper for cargoes in the trade between New York and Hawaii in connection with the assessment formula of the New York Shipping Association. Westbound trade is not extensive at present and there is no eastbound common carrier service. There is substantial justification for considering the trade between New York and Hawaii as consisting of marginal cargoes highly subject to diversion to other routes and therefore these cargoes should be placed in the excepted status. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (101, 133, 134, 148).

Excepted status is proper for cargoes in the southbound as well as in the northbound segment of the trade between New York and Puerto Rico, in connection with the assessment formula of the New York Shipping Association. The trade, fully containerized, has provided a steady growth for years in increased work opportunities. The assessment under excepted cargo status provides for rate of reimbursement to the IIA for every item of increased labor costs with the exception of "shortfall" which is that item of annual expense attributed to the failure of the Port of New York to obtain a total of 40 million man-hours of labor. The trade between New York and Puerto Rico did not cause the shortfall. In partially exempting the trade the examiner was properly concerned with the employment and economy of Puerto Rico and with the "Fomento" industrialization program. These factors and the record as a whole clearly establish the adverse effect the assessment formula would have upon the entire trade, both northbound and southbound. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (97-99, 134-136).

Approval of the agreement of the New York Shipping Association, providing for a combined man-hours/tonnage assessment formula to meet fringe benefit obligations in union contracts is conditioned on modification of the agreement to expand the definition of who may request modification of the tonnage definitions to include persons substantially affected thereby, rather than limiting review by the Tonnage Review Committee to requests by members of the Association. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (102, 136-137, 148).

Agreement of the New York Shipping Association providing for a combined man-hours/tonnage assessment formula to meet fringe benefit obligations in union contracts, need not be amended in its tonnage definition of tons of automobile, trucks, and buses to specify calculation at 18 percent instead of 20 percent of the cubic measurement of the vehicles. Review of the record does not convince the Commission that the 20 percent of measurement tonnage is unfair. The prime factor is the significantly higher productivity in the handling of automobiles vis-a-vis breakbulk operations. Furthermore, the additional costs to the motor vehicle carriers under the agreement are not substantial and are offset by the substantial benefits applicable to automobile carriers. Automobiles, trucks, and buses as treated under the agreement should be approved as submitted. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (100–101).

Agreement of the New York Shipping Association providing for a combined man-hours/tonnage assessment formula to meet fringe benefit obligations in union contracts should be modified to provide that bananas be calculated at 55 percent of cubic measurements of the boxes in which they are shipped as part of the tonnage definition of the agreement. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (101, 145, 148).
Agreement of the New York Shipping Association, providing for a combined man-hours/tonnage assessment formula (to replace the old man-hours formula) to meet fringe benefit obligations in union agreements, is approved with modifications. The agreement has not been shown to be, and is not, unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, and as modified, will not operate to the detriment of United States commerce or be contrary to the public interest. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (102, 146, 148).

—Burden of proof

The burden of proof with respect to approval of a section 15 agreement ultimately rests with the Commission. The burden of proof has not been transferred to protesting carriers by the issuance of a show cause order. The proponent of an agreement may be required to come forward with information concerning the agreement. Requirement that protestors show cause why the agreement should not be approved merely places them under obligation to come forward with information in support of allegations made in their protests. Agreement No. 9905, 163 (165).

—Conference membership

Section 15 and General Order 9 impose two obligations: on the one hand, conferences are obliged to allow their members to withdraw from conference membership “without penalty” when the withdrawing member gives “reasonable notice”; while on the other, the withdrawing member, if it desires to avoid penalty, is obliged to give the conference the required notice of its intention to withdraw. The conference conclusion that under no circumstances may a withdrawal be effective until the expiration of the notice period completely writes out of the statute and the General Order the words “without penalty.” If a line could not effectively withdraw from a conference until the expiration of the notice period, it would be impossible for it to breach the agreement by failing to give adequate notice of withdrawal and thus a withdrawing line could never be subjected to a penalty for improper withdrawal. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order, 46 (49-50).

Examination of the legislative history of section 15 and the rulemaking proceeding in which General Order 9 was promulgated reveals no indication whatsoever that the requirement of reasonable notice of withdrawal from conference membership was to act as a bar on withdrawal on less than such notice. The power to withdraw was necessary to preserve nonconference competition since former conference members, as well as new carriers and presently operating independents, were viewed as necessary sources of nonconference competition. Absent the expression by the Congress of an intention to allow parties to conferences to bargain away their historic right to operate in any lawful fashion they feel to be in their best interests, the legislature preserved the right of members to resign from conferences at will. This does not negate or cast doubt on the obligations of a member line fully to perform strictly in accordance with the conference agreement so long as it remains a conference member. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order. Id. (50).

The addition of the words “for such withdrawal” to the section 15 provision that “any member may withdraw from [conference] membership upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal” can only be explained as intended to relate back to withdrawal upon reasonable notice, and hence the conclusion is
INDEX DIGEST

inescapable that a penalty was to be permissible for withdrawal on other than reasonable notice. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order. Id. (51).

In General Order 9 the Commission gave content to the abstract statutory requirement of "reasonable notice" for withdrawal from conference membership by specifying "at least 30 days" as the notice period and providing that "any party may withdraw from the conference without penalty by giving at least 30 days' written notice of intention to withdraw." The contention that this provision of General Order 9 was intended to forbid the assessment of any penalty for withdrawal has the same defect as the contention that no penalties were to be assessed under the general withdrawal authority set forth in section 15—it reads the language "without penalty" out of the provision. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order. Id. (52).

There is no necessary relationship between the 90-day notice provision in a conference agreement for withdrawal from conference membership and the 90-day notice which is required under section 14b of the Shipping Act and the Commission's General Order 19 for certain changes in rates and charges subject to dual rate contracts. To the extent that rights of shippers under dual rate contracts could be affected by a carrier's withdrawal from a conference, they are protected by the specific requirements of section 14b and General Order 19. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order. Id. (52).

Conference suggestion that any conclusion which leaves lines free to withdraw from a conference on less than reasonable notice on payment of a penalty amounts to excusing the failure to perform a contractual duty by the payment of money is without merit since it rests on an incorrect assumption. It assumes that there has been a failure on the part of the withdrawing member to perform in accordance with the terms of the conference agreement, i.e., that the carrier had a duty to remain in the conference, or at least not operate an independent service, for 90 days following its notice of intention to withdraw. Rather, the duty of the withdrawing line is to give notice under section 15 and General Order 9, and if the line fails to give reasonable notice, here 90 days as stated in the approved conference agreement, the line has breached its agreement and is liable to a penalty. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order. Id. (52–53).

Once a conference member has withdrawn from conference membership, as authorized by statute, regulation and conference agreement to withdraw at any time, it was free to operate as an independent carrier, and nothing in connection with its operation from that date may be considered in setting a penalty for breach of the withdrawal provision of the conference agreement. Important considerations in assessing a penalty would include, inter alia, the amount of notice actually given and any adjustments that were required within the conference as a result of the withdrawal. If all of the activities of the withdrawing member prior to the expiration of period specified in the conference agreement for notice of withdrawal constituted breaches of the agreement, the conference could treat each shipment made under an individual bill of lading as a separate breach. The result could be astronomical and confiscatory penalties such as to drive the carrier from the trade to the detriment of commerce and contrary to the public interest. North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference—Petition for Declaratory Order. Id. (53).
—Jurisdiction

Stipulation concerning subsidy for military carryings, entered into during a hearing before the Maritime Subsidy Board, did not involve only matters within the sole jurisdiction of that Board. Admittedly, Subsidy Board settlement of litigation incorporating an agreement intended to be within the scope of the Shipping Act, 1916, would not be immune from review and approval by the Commission. The settlement agreement was subject to section 15. It is well settled that two separate government agencies may each have jurisdictional interests in the same event or transaction or series of events or transactions. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Order To Show Cause, 82 (59).

The Commission did not lack jurisdiction ab initio over the agreement of the New York Shipping Association because the agreement was opposed by three lines. Such contention was earlier rejected. The by-laws of the Association provide that a majority vote is sufficient to support adoption of the agreement. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement, 94 (101–102, 144).

Agreement of the New York Shipping Association, providing for a man-hours/tonnage assessment formula to meet fringe benefit obligations in union contracts, does not control or regulate labor and collective bargaining. It is an agreement between the Association members, in the form of a cooperative working arrangement and is clearly subject to section 15 and to the jurisdiction of the Commission under the standards of the Volkswagenwerk case. Agreement No. T-2336—New York Shipping Association Cooperative Working Arrangement. Id. (145).

The Commission has no jurisdiction over the payment of operating-differential subsidy and the use made by carriers of vessels operating pursuant to such subsidies. Agreement No. 9905, 163 (164).

—Modification of agreements

Position of the Commission that it has no jurisdiction under section 15 where a party has withdrawn from a new agreement prior to approval is not inconsistent with the Commission’s power to modify agreements under section 15. The power to modify is not the power to compel acceptance. When a new agreement filed for approval comports with section 15, save in one or a number of its provisions, the Commission is empowered to modify the objectionable provision and condition approval on acceptance of the modifications. The parties are free to reject the modifications and continue their operations as before. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 58 (62).

—Pooling agreements

Where a signatory withdraws from a pooling agreement prior to Commission action on the agreement, the Commission has no jurisdiction to act. Withdrawal of even one party presents a whole new picture and requires that the remaining parties present the Commission with the new agreement representing readjustments made necessary by the change in relationships. Where the agreement is repudiated in one form or another by all parties except one, the Commission does not have even the semblance of an agreement before it, and failing this it simply has no jurisdiction under section 15. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684, 58 (61–62).

The problems with which section 15 sought to deal were created by private (as opposed to governmental) arrangements between carriers. A country’s efforts
to foster the well-being of its merchant fleet did not at that point in history take the form of overt governmental intervention designed to acquire a given percentage of a country's import and export trade for carriage of its own lines. From its inception, section 15 presupposed an absence of overt governmental intervention into the otherwise private and economically motivated arrangements between competing steamship lines operating the United States foreign trade. The language of government-to-government dealings in foreign commerce now includes such terms as "emerging nations," the "national interest factor," and "bilateralism." The "national interest factor" is that concept which would give to the exporting and importing countries at either end of the trade route a "predominate" share of the water-borne traffic between the two countries. "Bilateralism" denotes the result of the application of the national interest factor. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreement Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684. Id. (67-68).

Where a party signs a pooling agreement under "duress" (of government decrees) to avoid governmental exclusion from a trade, there is a ab initio no "agreement" of the kind over which the Commission may exercise jurisdiction under section 15. There is no room under section 15 for approval of a pooling agreement which embodies discriminatory or unfair quotas dictated by governmental law, regulation, decree, ukase or fiat. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684. Id. (72).

Pooling agreements are the ultimate in anticompetitive combinations. It is thought that by assigning each carrier in the trade a percentage of the traffic which bears some reasonable relationship to his past carryings, and by penalizing carriage over that quota, the incentive to rebate is removed since the rebate is designed to secure more business. The injection of national interest, however, only further disrupts a trade since its sole aim is the preferment of the national flag lines over the other flag lines. National interest seeks to nullify all of the only valid considerations which are relevant to the Commission's deliberations under section 15. All of which inevitably destroys that equality of treatment, regardless of flag, on which the regulatory laws are based. Just as the Commission is not at liberty to "promote" our own merchant marine, it cannot, in the guise of approving agreements under section 15, acquiesce in the efforts of other nations to do the same when those efforts run counter to the laws administered by the Commission. Thus, so long as any nation attempts to utilize an "agreement" under section 15 as a vehicle for the enhancement of its own national fleet to the detriment of other carriers serving our foreign commerce, the Commission will be compelled to disapprove those agreements. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684. Id. (72-73).

Bilateralism, if it is to become the maritime policy of this country, must do so as the result of efforts other than those of the Commission. The Commission is precluded from participating in the kind of government-to-government negotiations which lead to adoption of bilateralism as national policy. The Commission must make its determination in controversial cases under section 15 only on the record after an opportunity for hearing has been afforded to all who would be affected by the decision. Inter-American Freight Conference—Cargo Pooling Agreements Nos. 9682, 9683, and 9684. Id. (73)

Pooling agreements between United States and Brazilian flag lines in the southbound trades from Atlantic and Gulf ports to ports in Brazil were approved. The agreements would contribute substantially to stability in the trades, and were necessary under present conditions in the trade. The agreements met the standards that the restraints interfering with antitrust law policies were required by
a serious transportation need, necessary to secure public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose. The agreements make participation in the cargoes otherwise largely inaccessible to non-Brazilian lines available to signatory lines. Third-flag lines remain free to compete on equal terms for carriage of nongovernment-controlled cargo. The evidence did not support the contention that third-flag carriers would be driven from the trades or irreparably damaged. Limitations on third-flag lines were caused basically by Brazilian and United States laws, not by the agreements. The agreements may be reexamined at a future date if changed conditions bring about changed results. Agreement Nos. 9847 and 9848—Revenue Pools, United States/Brazil Trade, 149 (155 et seq.).

Something more than a fear of increased competition is necessary to justify a finding that an agreement is unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, contrary to the public interest, or otherwise merits disapproval under section 15 of the 1916 Act. Agreements Nos. 9847 and 9848—Revenue Pools, United States/Brazil Trade. Id. (158).

Decision to approve pooling agreements is not in conflict with the guidelines established in the Commission decision in Inter-American Freight Conference, 14 FMC 163. It was not intended in that case to render a blanket prohibition against approval of all pooling agreements. It was intended to forewarn potential parties to such agreements that pools not grounded on economic or commercial reality and based instead on grounds of national interest without deference to shipper desires, or the efficiency of the operator, or the worth of the service rendered, would not meet the criteria under section 15 for Commission approval. There is no room under section 15 for approval of a pooling agreement which embodies discriminatory or unfair quotas dictated by governmental law, regulation, decree, ukase or flat. Agreement Nos. 9847 and 9848—Revenue Pools, United States/Brazil Trade. Id. (159–160).

DISCRIMINATION

Unlike section 16, first, which prohibits "any" unjust preference or prejudice between shippers and commodities "in any respect whatsoever," the first paragraph of section 17 of the 1916 Act concerns itself only with an unjustly discriminatory "rate, fare, or charge." To establish unjust rate discrimination within the meaning of section 17, there must be two shippers of like traffic over the same line between the same points under the same circumstances and conditions but who are paying different rates. Thus, where complainant was only shipper of the particular commodity involved, there could be no violation of section 17. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. et al., 16 (25–26).

A claim for storage charges resulting from a carrier's inadequate notice of arrival of a shipment is not cognizable under section 14 Fourth because it does not concern the loading and landing of freight in proper condition. Joseph and Sibyl James v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Line, Inc., 300 (303).

DUAL RATE CONTRACTS: See also Surcharges.

Conference is required to offer its dual rate contracts separately in each trade area served by it. The record does not support conclusions that the present contract rate system has resulted in improved service in the conference trade or rate stability. Nothing is shown in the way of transportation need, important public benefits to be secured or valid regulatory purpose to be achieved by the present system of requiring shippers to commit exclusive patronage in all the trade areas. Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System, 172 (176–185).
As to the contention that the present improved level of service provided by the conferences is a result of the present contract rate system which requires shippers to commit exclusive patronage to the conference in all five trade areas, it is just as easily concluded from the testimony that the establishment and approval of the "super conference" was the cause of the increased service level. The real difficulty lies in concluding that it was the present contract rate system that produced the alleged result. Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System. Id. (176–177).

Nothing in the record supported the conclusion that rate stability is dependent on the present contract system of the conference which requires shippers to commit exclusive patronage to the conference in all five trade areas. The choice is not between the present contract or no contract at all. The Commission does not insist that a shipper be allowed the choice of conference or nonconference within a "trade area," but only that a shipper be allowed to choose whether or not to sign a contract for each of the five trade areas. Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System. Id. (179).

As to the contention that the present contract rate system of the conference, requiring shippers to commit exclusive patronage in all five trade areas, acted as an inducement to a carrier to increase service and investment in the trade, the complete testimony does not demonstrate that the carrier's plans are dependent on continuation of the present system. Rather, they are tied to the continuing carriage of certain "base parcels cargo." Even without the single contract system if a nonconference carrier wishes to carry base cargoes, he would have to offer a lower rate and convince the base cargo shipper that regular and dependable nonconference service will be provided. Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System. Id. (179–180).

Testimony of record did not bear out the conclusion that requiring the conference to offer its contract rate separately in its five ratemaking areas would prove detrimental to the commerce of the United States and would adversely affect the public interest. The nonconference competition which the carrier members of the conference cry would wreak havoc and chaos in the trade, if its present system were modified to require that contracts be offered separately, reduces itself to some nine lines which might be "interested in joining" the conference if it appears that the members were "unable to cope with the tonnage moving" but which also remain ever ready to "lift an occasional parcel" when the offerings in their own trade become disappointing. Agreement No. 8660—Latin American/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System. Id. (180–182).

Nothing in the record causes the Commission to change its mind that the conference should be required to offer its contract rate separately in all five of the conference's trade areas. There was nothing offered in the way of transportation need, important public benefits to be secured or valid regulatory purpose to be achieved by the present system of requiring shippers to commit exclusive patronage to the conference in all five trade areas. The vast bulk of testimony was either speculative as the consequences of modifying the present system or led to the conclusion that factors other than the contract rate system had been the causes of rate stability, dependable service, etc. Agreement No. 8660—Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference and Proposed Contract Rate System. Id. (183).
FREIGHT FORWARDING

A freight forwarder which is neither an independent, nor a qualified ocean freight forwarder, cannot qualify to be licensed as such. Speed Freight Inc., 1 (9).

The freight forwarder licensing statute, like other licensing statutes, should be applied with a liberal attitude to the end that licenses may be granted to qualified applicants, but if the applicant is not fairly within the definition of ocean freight forwarder, there is no room for the exercise of liberality. Speed Freight Inc. Id. (9).

Where a freight forwarder maintained the closest imaginable cooperative and supporting relationship with a shipper of goods by water in foreign commerce, this alone was sufficient to revoke its license. Speed Freight Inc. Id. (9).

Where a freight forwarder was controlled by a shipper in foreign commerce, submitted false statements in connection with its application for a license, changed its personnel to the extent that it no longer qualified as an independent ocean freight forwarder, and failed to report such changes to the Commission, the forwarder's license was revoked. Speed Freight Inc. Id. (9-10).

Freight forwarder violated the Commission's rules and regulations by permitting his license to be used by another party. A fair and reasonable penalty is a 90-day suspension of license. Independent Ocean Freight Forwarder License No. 1132—Mario J. Macchione, 200 (202).

The prohibition of the freight forwarder law against forwarder shipper relationships is absolute. The definition of "independent ocean freight forwarder" in section 1 of the 1916 Act is clear and unambiguous, and requires no statutory interpretation. The legislative history points out clearly that exceptions to the clear and unambiguous language of the law were to be excluded and that the inherent prohibition vis-a-vis control is absolute and the Commission has so hold in numerous proceedings. Thus, where a freight forwarder is or can be controlled by a shipper, it cannot qualify as an independent freight forwarder by definition, and therefore is not entitled to conduct the business of a freight forwarder. Independent Ocean Freight Forwarder License No. 790—North American Van Lines, Fort Wayne, Ind. 46801, 215 (220-221).

Forwarders who control or are controlled by shippers in the ocean-going commerce of the United States are absolutely disqualified from licensing. It is immaterial that such control arises after a license is issued rather than prior to the application therefor. The Commission lacks statutory authority to allow continuance of a license on condition that the licensee will not ship for the exporter controlling it. Shipper control negates the Commission's authority not only to issue a license in the first instance, but to allow it to continue, regardless of any condition that the licensee may propose. Section 510.9(d) of General Order 4 imports that not only to initially qualify for a license but also to prevent a discretionary revocation, a licensee must undergo "no change of circumstances whereby * * * [it] no longer qualifies as an independent ocean freight forwarder." Independent Ocean Freight Forwarder License No. 790—North American Van Lines, Fort Wayne, Ind. 46801. Id. (222).

Freight forwarder license application is granted on condition that a 9.5 percent stockholder, who had been guilty of violating the freight forwarder law, will not become an employee, officer, or director of the licensee; will not become involved in the day-to-day management of the business; will not increase his percentage stock interest; and that his stock will be placed in a trust to be voted on the basis of the independent judgment of the trustee. Key Air Freight, Inc., 290 (291).
GENERAL ORDER 9: See Agreements Under Section 15.

POOLING AGREEMENTS: See Agreements under Section 15.

PORT EQUALIZATION: See Absorptions.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

—in general

Where the Commission issued an order directing a conference to show cause why its bunker surcharge should not be cancelled as violative of its dual rate wine and spirits contract and not supported by a clause of the contract permitting rates to be changed at any time in the event of "extraordinary conditions," petition for oral hearing, sought by the alcoholic beverage importers, was denied. Argument that the proceeding was a "two-party controversy" was specious. The rules of practice and procedure clearly provide that hearing counsel is a party to the proceeding. Regardless of the merits of that contention the importers failed to show a dispute as to relevant facts, the only justification for an evidentiary hearing. The ancillary question of the reasonableness of the surcharge was not in issue in the proceeding. The issue of the fundamental legality of the contract had not been raised and was not of concern in the proceeding. The issue of whether the conference had an obligation to levy the surcharge against all shippers was a question of law and not one of fact. That issue was also not raised by the pleadings. The facts concerning the issue of foreseeability were before the Commission and were no different from those in a prior case, in which the same issue was resolved. Surcharge of North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association on Commodities Moving Under Wine and Spirits Contract, 292 (294–295).

The Commission does not intend to scrutinize every minute aspect of the record in informal complaints. Such a policy would seriously distort the purpose of the small claims procedure. Joseph and Sibyl James v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Line, Inc., 300.

PREFERENCE AND PREJUDICE

While an effective "competitive relationship" is a necessary part of liability under section 16 in situations where allegedly preferential or prejudicial rates or charges are geared to transportation factors or the differing characteristics of commodities, it is not required where the carrier's obligation to render a particular service is "absolute" and not dependent on such factors or differences. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. et al., 16 (21).

Where, in an effort to delete "paper rates," a conference and its members adopted a "sufficient volume" criterion for retention of specific rates, application of the criterion in a totally fair and impartial manner was required. Questions as to the characteristics inherent in a particular commodity were irrelevant as were questions of whether the particular commodity competed with any other commodity. The equality of treatment required in this situation was "absolute and not conditioned on such things as competition." The conferences and its members violated section 16 when they failed to adopt a commodity rate on a particular commodity, although rates were established on other items that had moved in smaller quantities. This established a clear situation of undue prejudice to a "description of traffic." Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. et al. Id. (21–23).
Where carriers and a conference violated section 16 of the 1916 Act by failure to adopt a commodity rate, the failure was not excused because it was ascribed to an inadvertent "oversight." Respondents' good faith will not save an otherwise unjustly prejudicial practice from condemnation. The equality of treatment required by section 16 is not conditioned on a carrier's intention. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al. Id. (23).

If the Commission were considering a request for reparation based on unlawful preference or prejudice in rates based on transportation factors or commodity characteristics, it would be inclined to agree that proof of the character, intensity, and effect of the competitive relationship would be necessary to prove the amount of damages and sustain an award of reparation. In such cases the injury sustained may be greater or less than the amount of the difference between the rates charged the prejudiced shipper and those charged for the preferred shipper. The Commission has historically recognized that the extent of damages in rate discrimination cases, being dependent largely on competitive factors, is a question of fact which must be clearly demonstrated by substantial proof. However, where the equality of treatment required is "absolute" and not conditioned on competition, the "character, intensity, and effect" of competition is irrelevant and the measure of damages is the difference between the rate charged and collected and the rate which would have applied but for the unlawful discrimination or prejudice. To the extent that the proper measure of damages is the amount of unlawful excess exacted, it is akin to an "overcharge" and the same principles apply. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al. Id. (24–25).

RATES: See also Discrimination; Preference and Prejudice; Reparation; Surcharges; Tariffs.

The Commission was not bound to follow the rule making method in investigating the lawfulness of rate increases of nonvessel operating common carriers in domestic offshore commerce. While rule making may be appropriate in proceedings designed to establish formulae by which the reasonableness of rates may be measured, it is not necessary to enable the Commission solely to investigate the reasonableness of rates of particular carriers without establishing any such formulae. Transconex, Inc.—General increase in Rates in the U.S. South Atlantic/Puerto Rico—Virgin Islands Trade, 35 (43).

Rates of NVOCC's in the Puerto Rican trade were not shown to be other than just, reasonable, and lawful. Income tax expenses of the carriers were properly taken into account. Failure to consider taxes as an expense creates an inaccurate picture of the earnings available to a corporation for distribution and capital investment and, consequently, its need for additional revenue. The Commission's treatment of taxes as an expense to be considered in determining reasonableness of rates accords with the general approach of courts and administrative agencies. Transconex, Inc.—General Increase in Rates in the U.S. South Atlantic/Puerto Rico—Virgin Islands Trade. Id. (43).

Considerations with respect to rates of NVOCC's must necessarily be somewhat different from those which are of prime importance in proceedings dealing with reasonableness of rates of vessel owning carriers. Generally, the reasonableness of the rate of return of equipment owning carriers has been based on that percentage of their "rate base," i.e., the property devoted to the relevant trade plus sufficient working capital, which is necessary to allow them to earn a reasonable return in light of the peculiar risks of the service involved. Where a carrier has little investment in equipment, an important factor is the "operating
INDEX DIGEST

ratio," i.e., the margin between revenues and expenses of operation. However, the ratio by itself fails to indicate the existence and degree of need for additional capital and revenue. The reasonableness of increased rates of NVOCC's was strongly suggested by increased costs of operation; sharp competition in the trade which is ordinarily a strong control over rates; and the substantial value of the services rendered to small shippers. There was no basis for finding that increased charges of NVOCC's were unlawful. No operating ratio derived from any of various computations exceeds the 93 percent which the ICC appears frequently to have approved when considering rate increases of carriers owning little or no equipment. There was no showing that a 93 percent operating ratio was necessarily proper or a standard for NVOCC's and the Commission is not implying that such ratio is in fact proper, or a standard. Since the traditional rate base approach cannot be applied to NVOCC's, at least where there has been no showing of any relationship between such rate base and the carrier's operating ratio, the rate increases cannot be disapproved. There was some indication of need for the increases, and no computation shows them to be improper. Those challenging rate increases where such increases have not been suspended must bear the consequences of the failure of the record to contain adequate support for their disapproval. Transconex, Inc.—General Increase in Rates in the U.S. South Atlantic/Puerto Rico—Virgin Islands Trade. Id. (43–45).

In so-called general revenue cases, two principal matters for determination are whether a respondent common carrier by water is operating at a profit in a trade, and if at a profit whether it is earning a reasonable rate of return on its investment. Lykes' operations in the United States Gulf/Puerto Rico trade are conducted at a loss. Past losses continued in 1969 notwithstanding that most of the increased rates under investigation were in effect for most of 1969. Lykes would suffer a greater loss from the operation of its newer Gulf Pride class vessels than from use of its C-2 vessels as at present. The conclusion is that the increased rates and other rates of Lykes are just and reasonable and not shown to be unlawful. General Increases in Rates in the United States Gulf/Puerto Rico Trade, 212 (213).

Increased rates of Gulf-Puerto Rico in the United States Gulf/Puerto Rico trade are just and reasonable and not shown to be unlawful. The operations were conducted at a loss in 1969 and the projected loss in 1970 was higher than in 1969. Evidence to show the future profitability of all-containership operation was not persuasive and was irrelevant to the main controlling issue of the profitability of the existing service. A common carrier cannot be compelled to offer service in the trade, and it follows that management cannot be told to provide a particular type of ship or other equipment to service the trade. Withholding of approval of a rate increase because Gulf-Puerto Rico has not placed full containerships into the service would be dictating the type of vessels to be used and usurping a management prerogative. The Commission may encourage Gulf-Puerto Rico to convert to containership service as soon as feasible. General Increases in Rates in the United States Gulf/Puerto Rico Trade. Id. (214).

REPARATION

Carrier was permitted to refund a portion of freight charges on shipments foreign of building material where the shipper's agent was erroneously informed that the conference tariff contained a project rate for the cargo; the conference had previously published a project rate but had canceled it because cargo for the project had not been offered to the conference or any of its members; and the conference had not been promptly notified by the carrier that the cargo had
been offered and, if it had been, it would have promptly reestablished the project rate. The carrier’s failure to notify the conference until after the bills of lading had been issued and the cargo had been shipped was an error due to inadvertence which prevented the timely filing of the new rate. The Eregli Purchasing Mission, Eregli Iron & Steel Works Co., Eregli Turkey v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., 12 (14–15).

In enacting section 18(b) of the 1916 Act, Congress did not intend to repeal the other substantive provisions of the Act and leave carriers free to charge unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory or prejudicial rates by the simple device of first filing such rates with the Commission. The distinction is between a rate that is lawful and one that is merely legal. In dealing with shippers the carrier is required under section 18(b) (3) to conform the freight charges actually collected to the amount fixed in its published tariffs. In that sense the published rate in effect at the time of the movement is the “legal rate.” But the rate may be unlawful if it violates other provisions of the Act. Thus, in publishing a rate, the carrier or conference acts under the admonition of the statute, and, if it establishes a rate which is unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or prejudicial, it may be subject to the payment of reparation for any injury caused by such rate. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. et al., 16 (19–20).

While the publication of rates by carriers and conferences operating in the foreign commerce of the United States in the manner required by section 18(b) (3) of the 1916 Act fixes the standard of legal rates for the time being and so long as such published rates are in effect, this standard is not conclusive of their reasonableness and justness under other provisions of the Act. The mere publication of a rate cannot make that rate lawful in the sense of being immune from attack, either with respect to past or future shipments, if it is otherwise unjust or unreasonable. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al. Id. (20–21).

The Commission does not agree with the examiner’s dismissal of respondents’ “oversight” in failing to adopt a commodity rate as not of the type falling within the scope of Public Law 90–298 which permits refund of freight charges in foreign commerce in cases of administrative or clerical error. It would appear that Public Law 90–298 would have permitted corrective action, but the Commission does not decide the merits of that issue. The issue is moot in view of failure timely to file a refund application. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al. Id. (23).

Once having found a violation of the Shipping Act, the Commission is empowered, under section 22 of the Act, to “direct the payment * * * of full reparation to complainant for the injury caused by [such] violation.” Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., et al. Id. (24).

If the Commission were considering a request for reparation based on unlawful preference or prejudice in rates based on transportation factors or commodity characteristics, it would be inclined to agree that proof of the character, intensity, and effect of the competitive relationship would be necessary to prove the amount of damages and sustain an award of reparation. In such cases the injury sustained may be greater or less than the amount of the difference between the rates charged the prejudiced shipper and those charged the preferred shipper. The Commission has historically recognized that the extent of damages in rate discrimination cases, being dependent largely on competitive factors, is a question of fact which must be clearly demonstrated by substantial proof. However, where the equality of treatment required is “absolute” and not con-
ditioned on competition, the "character, intensity, and effect" of competition is irrelevant and the measure of damages is the difference between the rate charged and collected and the rate which would have applied but for the unlawful discrimination or prejudice. To the extent that the proper measure of damages is the amount of unlawful excess exacted, it is akin to an "overcharge" and the same principles apply. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. et al. Id. (24–25).

Section 18(b)(5) of the 1916 Act does not by its terms forbid any specific activity. It merely empowers the Commission to disapprove a rate or charge which it finds to be so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States. The section is purely prospective in nature. Only after the Commission has determined a particular rate to be unreasonable under section 18(b)(5) may a carrier's continued assessment of that rate be considered a violation of section 18(b)(5) for which reparation may be awarded. Valley Evaporating Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. et al. Id. (26–27).

Carrier is authorized to refund a portion of freight charges on a shipment from Hong Kong to Los Angeles, where the carrier inadvertently left a blank space in the rate column after the commodity description which would have covered the goods involved. Air America Ltd., Hong Kong v. Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Hong Kong, 32 (33).

Carrier is permitted to refund a portion of freight charges for certain heavy lift services in the movement of specially fabricated parts for the Saudi Arabian (missile) program. Prior to formation of the conference, the heavy lift services involved were exempt as part of the project rate, and the conference staff in preparing and publishing a project rate failed, through oversight, to include the same exemption when the project rate was filed. This inadvertence was an error which prevented the timely filing of a new rate. Raytheon Co. Andover v. States Marine—Isthmian Agency, Inc., 78 (80–81).

Where conference members, at a regular meeting, voted to reduce the rate on commodities involved in certain shipments, but inadvertently failed to file a tariff amendment reflecting the reduction, the shipper was entitled to a refund of overcharges. Revell Inc. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 197 (199).

Where a claim for reparation based on a misdescription of goods was duly presented to the Commission and reparation was sought based on the contract rate and the claimant was found not to be entitled to the contract rate, reparation should have been awarded on the basis of the noncontract rate. The claim was not fatally defective and now time barred. Assertion of reparation based on a contract rate did not go to the substance of the complaint which was a misdescription. Dismissal of the complaint as time barred assumed the continued running of the statute of limitations during the pendency of the proceeding, an unwarranted assumption where the gravamen of the complaint, a misdescription, had been established. Where a complaint is "defective" only as to a question of the appropriate remedy, or in any manner not involving the substance or gravamen of the claim, the 2-year period of limitations is tolled once a claim is submitted to the Commission for adjudication. Heterochemical Corp. v. Port Line, Ltd., 228 (229).

The small claims procedure was established to facilitate the settlement of claims with a minimum amount of administrative or regulatory action. Therefore, it is incumbent on claimants to be meticulous and precise with submission of their claims as well as prompt in compliance with Commission inquiries or requests. Notwithstanding that claimant had been reticent in enabling the Commission to promptly dispose of its claim, reparation was awarded in the interest
INDEX DIGEST

of insuring just charges between shippers and carriers, and in the interest of terminating the proceeding as equitably as possible. Heterochemical Corp. v. Port Line, Ltd. Id. (229).

Waiver of a portion of freight charges previously assessed the shipper is permitted where the carrier failed to notify the conference of an open rate change due to inadvertence. The situation fell within the purview of Public Law 90-298 and the application was timely filed. American Trade Sales A/C Consulate of Indonesia v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., 230 (232).

Section 18(b)(3) of the Shipping Act, 1916, recognizes that error in a tariff may occur by reason of clerical or administrative error. But, in such case, the statute only provides retroactive relief for the shipper and none for the carrier. Recognizing the possibility of tariff error the intent of the statute appears to be that if the error causes a lesser tariff to be published than intended, no more than the published rate can be charged; whereas, if the error results in the publication of a higher rate than intended, a refund or waiver of the excess may be permitted. Correction of error in a tariff or a clerical or administrative nature which will result in an increase in cost to a shipper can only be accomplished by publication of a new tariff. United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 254 (259-260).

Claim for reparations was not time barred where it was filed more than 2 years after the shipment was received and delivered by the carrier and after the date of billing, but within 2 years of the time when the freight charges were paid. United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. Id. (260-261).

Where claimant misdescribed a shipment as "Amine 220 F.P. 465° F, not inflammable" on the bill of lading and on the export declaration as "scheduled B No. 512.0943—Amines N.E.C.,” and the carrier charged the rate for Chemicals, N.O.S., but Amine 220 is a trade name of an organic compound of nitrogen demulsifier and is a surface active (cationic) wetting agent and the carrier had a rate for Compounds, Surface Active (Wetting Agents or Emulsifiers), the shipment should have been rated at a lower rate and reparation is awarded. The case presented the classic dilemma between the concept that what was actually shipped determines the applicable rate and the carrier's need to have the shipper accurately describe the shipment in order that the carrier may assess the lawful rate. Claims for reparation involving alleged errors of description can be allowed only if the claimant meets the "heavy burdens of proof" once the shipment has left the custody of the carrier. Here, the claimant met that burden. Union Carbide Inter-America v. Norton Line, 262.

While the examiner's ultimate conclusion that complainants were entitled to reparation was fully supported by the record, the method of reaching the conclusion presented a procedural difficulty. The original claim alleged a violation of section 14 Fourth and no mention was made of section 18(a) which the examiner relied on. If section 18(a) was to be relied on, complainants should have been required to amend their claim. Reparation has been made. The examiner's ultimate conclusion is adopted. Joseph and Sibyl James v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Line, Inc., 300.

Where a shipper of an automobile to Puerto Rico receives an invoice in English, showing a blank entry after "arrival date," and also receives a bill of lading containing a rubber stamp imprint barely legible, which gave the arrival date in Spanish; the stamp, as placed, would not put an ordinary, prudent person on notice that matters therein were of importance; and friends of the shipper who had shipped automobiles to Puerto Rico had first received the bill of lading and later a clear notification of arrival, complainant was awarded reparation in the amount of storage charges which had accumulated between time of arrival and
the time (several weeks later) when complainant discovered that the automobile had arrived. The carrier's notification of arrival was an unreasonable practice under section 18(a) of the 1916 Act in delivering property and was the proximate cause of the accrual of storage charges. Joseph and Sibyl James v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Line, Inc. Id. (303–304).

Surcharges

Imposition of bunker surcharge on less than 90-day notice was a violation of Section 14b(2) of the 1916 Act and of the conference merchant's freighting agreement. Current conditions caused by increased bunkering costs were neither "extraordinary" within the meaning of the agreement, nor did they represent an undue impediment or obstruction to the carriers' obligations. The shortage of residual fuel oil had been developing since 1960, with the current crisis in supply starting at least 2 years ago. Price information showed that the behavior of the prices was such that a vessel operator using a reasonable degree of care could have foreseen that the prices were climbing to present levels. Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day Tariff Filing Notice, 166 (168–169).

Carriers must provide 90 days' notice of rate increase to dual-rate shippers if the conditions that give rise to the need for the increase are "normal," that is, foreseeable by the carriers. For example, where such conditions as rising salaries, costs of vessels, fuel, or increased stevedoring expense require additional freight revenue, then 90 days' notice is required because the carrier is expected to anticipate these needs. This is so because exporters need the stability afforded by a guarantee of 90 days' notice. Carriers have a strict duty to anticipate the need for rate increases and to give timely notice to dual-rate signatories. Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day Tariff Filing Notice. Id. (170).

Even if the Commission found an existing extraordinary condition for imposition of a bunker surcharge on less than 90 days' notice, the increased costs would not unduly impede, obstruct, or delay the carrier service as required by a provision of the conference freighting agreement for increasing rates. Without more facts, the Commission cannot treat the suggested relationship between the cost of fuel and withdrawal of service as anything more than conclusory and self-serving. Delays of long-awaited capital expenditures and delays in service as a direct consequence of the rise in fuel price were conclusory and self-serving statements. Increase in fuel prices was not a circumstance outside or beyond the control of the carrier. Carriers must be held to a high degree of diligence with regard to shippers and the implementation of rate increases after proper notice. Atlantic and Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference Imposition of a Bunker Surcharge on Less Than 90-Day Tariff Filing Notice. Id. (170–171).

Where the dual rate contract provided that no rates should be changed without prior consultation, and that an increase in rates was permitted "in the event of any extraordinary conditions • • • which conditions may unduly impede, obstruct, or delay the obligations of the carrier or carriers," the question of whether the conference could impose a surcharge for the carriage of alcoholic beverages depended on whether the admitted rise in bunker fuel costs constituted an extraordinary condition which unduly impeded, obstructed or delayed the carrier's service. The condition must be outside or beyond the carrier's control, must impede or delay the carrier's service, and there must be an emergency or abnormal condition, or an extraordinary circumstance. The test is one of foreseeability.
If the carrier, in the exercise of a high degree of diligence in the exercise of business judgment, should have foreseen or anticipated the conditions on which the surcharge is based, the condition is not extraordinary. Assuming that the condition is extraordinary in the present case, the condition does not impede or delay the carrier's service. Thus, the rise in fuel costs does not justify the imposition of a surcharge. The importers would not have entered into a contract which specifically stated that rates were to be fixed for a period of time, but which would allow the imposition of surcharges at will, simply because the contract refers to "rates" and a surcharge is not part of a rate. Surcharge of North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association on Commodities Moving Under Wine and Spirits Contract, 252 (295–298).

**TARIFFS**

The value of goods shipped is an element in establishing rates. But it is not the only element. Among other considerations are method of packaging, volume, weight, perishability, hazardousness, and distance freighted. In any given circumstance one or more of these elements may be given more weight in establishing the tariff. The weight to be given any factor is to be determined by the drafter of the tariff. But whatever factor or factors are determinative, the tariff as published must make the end result clear. United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 254 (256–257).

Where the conference had a tariff item for clothing in cases or cartons, the item covered new as well as old clothing shipped in cartons. If the conference desired or intended to exclude new clothing it could easily have set forth such exclusion. The fact that a predecessor tariff indented "in cases" to modify old or used clothing did not support the contention that the conference carriers intended only the N.O.S. rate for clothing to apply to new clothing in cases, and that the failure to indent in the new tariff was the result of an inadvertent error. An interpretation of the predecessor tariff was not in issue, and, if it were, it could not be said what classification would ultimately be determined for new clothing in cases. Tariff classification determination should not be dependent on typesetting: United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. Id. (257–258).

The N.O.S. classification is a catchall which is applicable if no other classification is or can be specified. While one should not unduly strain to find a classification for goods, nevertheless, an N.O.S. classification is a classification which should not be resorted to if a reasonable classification can otherwise be found in the tariff. Whether a classification is reasonable and not inconsistent with another classification depends on the inclusionary or exclusionary language of the item in conjunction with the inclusionary or exclusionary language of other items in the tariff. New clothing in cases is within "clothing in cases or cartons (NOT Barrels, Drums, Suitcases, Trunks)" and nothing in the classification "Old or Used (NOT Effects, Personal) in bags, bales, bundles" is inconsistent with or precludes such classification for new clothes in cases. United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. Id. (258–259).

It is vital to the interest of the carrier and the shipper that a tariff be free from ambiguity or doubt. While conciseness is to be striven for it should not be achieved at the sacrifice of preciseness. Where a tariff is ambiguous or doubtful it should be construed against the carrier who prepared it. United States v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. Id. (260).
TERMINAL LEASES

Minimum rentals contained in a terminal lease agreement must be sufficient to assure that the lessor will not furnish the facilities at less than cost during any year of the pendency of the agreement. Unlike the situation in Agreement No. 2214, 13 FMC 70, where the Commission permitted a 10-year lease to be “less than fully compensatory” the first year because of “substantial investment” in terminal equipment, no justification was demonstrated in the present case for waiving the requirement that the minimum guarantee must be compensatory for each year of the term of the lease. Agreement No. T--2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co., 233 (238).

The Examiner did not err in refusing to consider the alleged unlawfulness of a terminal lease agreement under sections 16 and 17 of the 1916 Act. The order of investigation specifically directed that the issues be confined to the compensatoriness of the rentals. The implication is clear. If the agreement is compensatory, there can be no unlawful discrimination. If it is not compensatory, it will be disapproved and thereby denied effectiveness. In either event, the question of the lawfulness of the agreement under other sections of the Act need never be reached. Agreement No. T--2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (238).

Whatever merit there may be to arguments that terminal operators must realize a return on investment, and the amount of the return must be sufficient to carry out the operator's responsibilities, they have no application to leases of public terminals. The Commission has recognized the right of terminal operators of publicly owned terminals to a fair return on investment, and such operators can, if they so desire, allow for such a return in their leases. Publicly owned terminals need not provide in their leases for a reasonable rate of return on investment for the particular facilities in question. Agreement No. T--2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (239--240).

Operators of publicly owned facilities are entitled to a fair return on investment and accordingly can, if they so desire, allow for such a return in their terminal leases, but they are not required to do so. Public terminals are in essence public utilities and are only required to set their rentals at a level which will produce revenues to cover the economic costs of doing business, which includes, but need not be limited to, operating expenses, maintenance and deprecation. A public terminal lease is compensatory if the annual minimum rentals cover all fully distributed costs. Agreement No. T--2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (240).

It was wholly immaterial what tariff factors the Port Authority based its minimum terminal lease rental on so long as that minimum was compensatory in terms of recouping all applicable direct and prorated costs for the lessee's portion of the pier involved. That the agreement did not specifically include the wharf rental charge was not controlling if the lease was otherwise compensatory. Agreement No. T--2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (240).

Interest expense attributable to construction bonds issued by a port authority must be considered a cost in arriving at a compensatory rental for terminal facilities. Financing costs constitute a basic and undeniable element of total development costs which must be considered in ascertaining the compensatoriness of a terminal lease. It follows, therefore, that to properly establish whether the minimum annual rental for pier facilities is compensatory, it is essential that the total bonded indebtedness, allocated to the pier, and more specifically to the
lessee's portion of the pier, be taken into consideration, along with other cost involved, in arriving at a minimum rental. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (241).

Whether interest on bonded indebtedness of a port is considered as an operating expense or as a charge against the return, it must be taken into consideration in arriving at a minimum rental for pier facilities, "for interest expense constitutes a very real charge, and the net return that the port realizes must be sufficient to meet this charge." The Commission has always considered the cost of servicing bonds which fund the construction or improvement of terminal facilities as being relevant to a determination of a minimum rental, Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (241).

Accounting system adopted by the State of California, which would allocate bond interest, as it does all other costs, among all the revenue producing port facilities not of a specialized nature built for a special user, is a valid and widely recognized and utilized system. So long as a particular system of accounting is generally acceptable and all legitimate costs and expenses are considered and properly allocated thereunder, the Commission will not require its abandonment to adopt another "acceptable" system. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (242).

In addition to taking into account interest on bonded indebtedness of a port in arriving at a minimum rental for pier facilities, the pier, being a revenue producing facility must be assigned its proportionate share of the portwide interest on additional contemplated indebtedness when incurred. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (243).

In order to determine whether the minimum rental under a terminal lease agreement is compensatory, the lessor is directed to submit information as to its present and contemplated bonded indebtedness; total interest expense to be incurred to service the indebtedness; the portion of the total port-wide interest which must be allocated to the port's revenue producing marine piers and specifically to the lessee's portion of the pier to be rented; and the basis on which the interest allocations were made, taking into consideration the possible deactivation of any revenue producing marine piers. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (244).

Interest expense attributable to construction bonds issued by a port authority cannot be ignored in evaluating the minimum rental under a terminal lease. Bond interest expense need not include interest on revenue bonds issued to construct a LASH facility. The LASH facility is a specialized facility built for a particular user and under the Port's accounting procedure which was expressly endorsed, all items relating thereto, including the revenue bonds, should be maintained in a separate account. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co., 247 (250-251).

The Port's System of using interest income from "other surplus funds" to offset interest expense, in conformity with the long established bookkeeping practice at the Port, is proper. The surplus funds, invested as are bond funds, are not ordinary income of the Port, but reserves that are put with the bond funds to protect the bond funds in the event of delays of sale or other contingencies. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (251).

The Port's method of allocation whereby the net interest expense is allocated 76.8 percent to revenue producing marine piers, 9.2 percent to other piers and 14 percent to other facilities, appears to be wholly valid and unobjectionable on
the basis of data furnished. To allocate all interest incurred on construction costs at all facilities at the port only to revenue producing marine piers, is totally unrealistic. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (251).

On the basis of additional information submitted, it is found that minimum rentals provided for in a terminal lease agreement are compensatory in all years of its pendency. The minimum rentals not only recover operating plus interest expenses but return earnings over the term of the lease. Agreement No. T-2227 Between the San Francisco Port Authority and States Steamship Co. Id. (252).