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MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
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DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, AND
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Farrell Lines Incorporated granted written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its owned vessel, the SS African Pilgrim, presently under time charter to State Marine Lines, Inc., to be subchartered to Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc., for one intercoastal voyage carrying general cargo from the San Francisco Bay area to North Atlantic ports, commencing on or about April 26, 1960, since granting the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Ronald A. Capone for applicant.
Robert B. Hood, Jr., as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

Farrell Lines Incorporated filed an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1223) (the Act), for its owned vessel, the SS African Pilgrim, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to be subchartered to Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc. (Luckenbach), for one intercoastal voyage carrying general cargo in Luckenbach's intercoastal service, commencing San Francisco Bay area on or about April 26, 1960, for discharge at North Atlantic ports. The vessel is to be redelivered by subcharterer at an east coast port. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register of April 14, 1960 (25 F.R. 3227). No one appeared in opposition to the granting of the application.
Luckenbach is a common carrier of general commodities in the intercoastal trade. It needs a vessel for an April sailing but has been unable to obtain any other than the *African Pilgrim*.

It is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.
Continuation of bulk service until December 31, 1961, between United States ports on the Great Lakes by T. J. McCarthy Steamship Company, limited to a coal and ore movement, in the event it is awarded an operating subsidy contract, found not to constitute unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, or to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act 1936, as amended, and written permission for the continuation of such service, in the event subsidy is awarded, granted.

Paul D. Page, Jr., and Arthur Tarantino for applicant.
John H. Eisenhart, Jr., for Great Lakes Ship Owners Association, and Donald A. Brinkworth for Eastern Territory Railroads, interveners.
Edward Schmetzer as Public Counsel.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE BOARD

Clarence G. Morse, Chairman, Thos. E. Stakem, Jr., Vice Chairman

BY THE BOARD:

In our original report herein (5 F.M.B. 666 (1959)), we found and concluded that (1) the continuation by T. J. McCarthy Steamship Company (McCarthy) of its automobile-carrying service from Detroit to Cleveland and to Buffalo, in the event it was awarded an operating-differential subsidy contract, (a) would not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, and (b) would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 6 F.M.B.
as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1223 (the Act), and (2) the continuation of its bulk-trade service, in the event subsidy was awarded, would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Thus, section 805(a) permission was granted only for the continuation of the automobile service.

On January 4, 1960, applicant filed with the Board a petition for reconsideration and modification of its report, praying for section 805(a) permission to cover its bulk-trade service for a period not to extend beyond December 31, 1961. Interveners filed replies in opposition to the petition. Public Counsel did not file a reply.

The principal reason advanced by McCarthy for the permission appears to be that applicant is "firmly obligated" to carry ore for Wilson Transit Company and that McCarthy "is forced by the Board to breach its contract with Wilson or abandon its subsidy application." This argument is a pristine example of an "operation boot strap." The requirements of statutes are not subservient to the provisions of private contracts. The Government is not a party to the McCarthy-Wilson contract. Applicant's chief argument is totally without merit and we comment upon it merely because it was put forth with such stress.1

We are disposed, however, to modify our earlier decision on entirely different grounds. McCarthy's four bulk vessels have a combined deadweight capacity of slightly less than 30,000 tons, or about 3 percent of the total deadweight capacity of all the independent bulkers on the Great Lakes. The remaining independents operate 97 bulk carriers with a total available deadweight of 985,000 tons. In 1957, when McCarthy moved about one million tons in this service, about one-half was Wilson ore and the other half consisted chiefly of coal, stone, sand, salt, and grain. It is to be noted that Wilson does not oppose the application, and it is reasonable to assume that, absent McCarthy's participation, Wilson itself would undertake to move the ore. It also follows that if Wilson handled the ore (which moves south from Duluth-Superior), it would carry a substantial portion, if not all, of McCarthy's northbound coal movement. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Wilson would capture the remaining bulk cargoes—particularly grain, the domestic movement of which, on the Great Lakes, is declining. While we reason that the termination of McCarthy's ore and coal business would result in little, if any, benefit to the primarily domestic interveners, we are of the view that modifying our earlier report so as to permit McCarthy—in the event it becomes subsidized—to continue to engage solely in the ore and coal trades, only through December 31, 1961, thereby freeing to the pri-

1 Further, applicant's "belief" that it can reach an agreement with Wilson relating to this contract is entirely immaterial.
marily domestic operators the remaining bulk cargoes heretofore carried by McCarthy, would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

We found originally that none of the interveners operates an exclusively domestic service on the Great Lakes within the meaning of section 805(a) of the Act, hence that portion of the section is inapplicable.

We therefore grant section 805(a) permission for the continuation of this bulk service limited to ore and coal in the event of the award to McCarthy of an operating-differential subsidy contract, for a period not to extend beyond December 31, 1961. Upon that date the written permission, if it ever becomes operative, shall terminate.

This report shall serve as written permission to continue the service under consideration.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-78

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)

Submitted November 4, 1959. Decided April 28, 1960*

American President Lines, Ltd., granted written permission under section 805(a), Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to operate its proposed “superliner” SS President Washington (and in the interim the SS President Hoover) in the California/Hawaii passenger trade, subject to certain limitations.

“Grandfather” rights of American President Lines, Ltd., under the proviso of section 805(a), in re the operations of its transpacific passenger vessels in the California/Hawaii passenger trade, determined.

Warner W. Gardner, Vern Countryman, and Peter N. Teige for applicant.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

Clarence G. Morse, Chairman, and Thos. E. Stakem, Vice Chairman

BY THE BOARD:

This is a proceeding under section 805(a), Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the Act), to ascertain whether American President Lines, Ltd. (APL), a subsidized operator, should be granted permission to carry passengers and cargo between California ports and Hawaii in its transpacific Trade Route No. 29, Line A-1 service, on the SS President Hoover, and, subsequently, on its proposed “superliner” SS President Washington.

APL seeks permission for the Hoover to make eight calls annually on one leg of the transpacific voyage and carry about 20 passengers a voyage, and for the Washington (scheduled to replace

*See also 6 F.M.B. 95.
the *Hoover* in late 1962) to make 11 voyages a year carrying about 4,000 passengers and 1,350 L/T of cargo annually.

As a subsidized operator APL requires permission under section 805(a) of the Act before it may engage in the domestic trade between California and Hawaii.

Section 805(a) provides in part:

The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act; *Provided*, That if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

Hawaiian Textron, Inc., and Matson Navigation Company, operating as nonsubsidized domestic water carriers between California and Hawaii, intervened in opposition to the application. Textron, whose predecessor entered the trade in 1957, withdrew its passenger ship SS *Leilani* from the trade shortly after the hearing and did not file a brief.

Hearings were held before an examiner. In his recommended decision the examiner concluded:

1. APL or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic coastwise trade in 1935 in its transpacific passenger and freight service between California and Hawaii and has so operated since that time except as to interruptions of service over which APL or its predecessor had no control.

2. Subject to a limit of 4,300 and 3,320 L/T of cargo a year, the service proposed with the addition of the *Hoover*, to be replaced by the *Washington*, is in substantial parity with that maintained by APL or its predecessor in 1935.

3. A. Granting APL permission for the *Hoover* to carry 160 passengers and 491 L/T of cargo annually between California and Hawaii will not result in unfair competition to any person operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, and will not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

3. B. Granting APL permission for the *Washington* to carry 4,000 passengers and 1,353 L/T of cargo annually between California and...
Hawaii will result in such unfairness and prejudice, except (a) to the extent cargo (1,353 L/T) is involved, and (b) to the extent that carriage of passengers by the Cleveland, Wilson, and Washington will not exceed 4,332 passengers annually.

3. C. Since the public interest and convenience will be served by the operation as limited above, permission should be granted to such extent.

Exceptions to the recommended decision and replies thereto were filed, and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified by the facts or related to material issues in this proceeding.

APL has served Hawaii regularly in transpacific voyages since 1879, except for (1) a five-year period from 1885–1890 and (2) the period 1942–1946. In 1925 Dollar Steamship Lines, Ltd., commenced a fortnightly service from San Francisco to Honolulu, Yokohama, Kobe, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Manila, returning by way of the same ports, and in 1927 Los Angeles was added as a port of call. In 1935 the service was provided by seven vessels—the Coolidge and the Hoover and five ships of the so-called 535 class. The Hoover and the Coolidge sailed from California over the route described above to Manila and returned to California. The 535's operated in what was called the New York/Manila service, calling at San Francisco and Hawaii in both directions.

The 1931–1935 service provided by APL is shown in column (1) of the following table:

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</table>

1 Columns (4) and (5) estimates are proposed carryings of the Hoover and Washington, respectively, added to 1951–57 averages in column (3).

Since 1948 APL has served its transpacific trade on Trade Route No. 29 with the Cleveland and Wilson. In 1957 the Hoover was

1 Dollar was incorporated August 2, 1929. In November 1938 the name was changed to American President Lines, Ltd.
added, and as far as this record is concerned, the Washington is scheduled to replace the Hoover in late 1962.

APL has concentrated on booking Far East passengers, serving the California/Hawaii trade only as space is available because the transpacific trade is its primary trade and is more profitable. It expects to follow this course in the future. Since it has to book transpacific passengers several months in advance, any space unoccupied approximately three weeks prior to the sailing will not be sold transpacific. Unoccupied first class space is then offered for California/Hawaii bookings. This space, it is argued, is the only space competitive with that of domestic lines.2

APL claims (1) that it has “grandfather” rights in the California/Hawaii trade and (2) that, in any event, the service it proposes to Hawaii would not amount to unfair competition to any person operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

We will first consider APL’s claim of “grandfather” rights.

It is clear that in 1935 APL was providing service between California and Hawaii. Matson argues that APL really had two services in 1935—one, termed by APL its transpacific service, was provided by the Coolidge and the Hoover, which operated between California and the Far East, the other provided by five ships serving San Francisco and Hawaii in both directions only in connection with the service from New York to the Far East. Matson contends that APL’s “grandfather” rights, if any, must be confined to the service provided by the Coolidge and the Hoover in 1935, a service which conformed to APL’s present-day transpacific service.

We disagree with Matson. APL in 1935 actually maintained fortnightly service between California and the Orient via Hawaii. The fact that such service consisted partly of operations over a segment of an entire route or service is inconsequential. Service between California and Hawaii was provided by the vessels in the so-called New York/Manila service just as much as the service provided by the Hoover and the Coolidge in the transpacific service. In determining the “grandfather” rights both services should be included.

Matson contends that APL was not in bona-fide common carrier operation between California and Hawaii from 1935 to 1938, because under the Dollar-Matson Agreement, APL carried passengers and cargo as agent of Matson and paid to Matson half the gross domestic revenue. During that period, APL did not advertise for or solicit

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2Tourist class is available and is booked earlier.
2See Dollar-Matson Agreements, 1 U.S.M.C. 750 (1933), 2 U.S.M.C. 387 (1940).
cargo and passengers; it turned inquiries and requests for transportation over to Matson; calls were made at Honolulu, with passengers and cargo to Hawaii obtaining the space unsold to the Far East; and APL did not have a California/Hawaii cargo tariff on file until 1938. However, APL maintained its own offices, held itself out to the public, issued its own tickets and bills of lading, paid its own claims, filed its own passenger tariff, and carried passengers and cargo—all in the same manner as before and after the Agreement. These acts show that APL held itself out as a common carrier between California and Hawaii to the extent its space was not needed for transpacific trade, and that it did carry passengers and cargo between California and Hawaii.

Matson also contends that APL failed to resume regular post-war service to Hawaii, and that this amounted to a voluntary interruption of service within APL’s control and, therefore, resulted in the abandonment of its “grandfather” rights. APL called at Hawaii with only one of its first six post-war passenger sailings which started in May 1946; its first call at Honolulu was in December 1946; there was a lapse of 45 days between this call and its second call in February 1947; and APL devoted the other five voyages to the urgent post-war needs of carrying displaced persons, repatriates, and other passengers to the Far East. We conclude that such an interruption in its service to Hawaii did not amount to an abandonment of any “grandfather” rights which APL might have had.

We find that APL, or its predecessor in interest, was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic coastwise trade in 1935 in its transpacific passenger and freight service between California and Hawaii, and has so operated since that time except as to service over which APL, or its predecessor, had no control.

We now look to see whether APL’s proposed service is in substantial parity with that maintained by it in 1935. Referring to table I, we find that APL proposes a passenger service for 1959–1962 with the Cleveland, Wilson, and Hoover and the carriage of some 2,119 passengers on 40 one-way voyages, which is substantially less than that provided in 1935 when it carried 2,852 passengers with seven vessels on 26 round voyages (52 one-way voyages). In 1963, however, when the Washington replaces the Hoover, the proposed service contemplates the carriage of 5,959 passengers on 27 round voyages—more than double the number of passengers.

APL claims a right to grow with the trade. Matson, on the other hand, argues that the addition of the Hoover and the Washington

* Such a tariff was also unfilled during the period before the Dollar-Matson agreement and was apparently due to an oversight which was remedied as soon as it was discovered.
would exceed substantial parity with APL's 1935 operations, and contends APL's "grandfather" rights should be limited to the 1935 operations of the Coolidge and Hoover and to the carriage of 1,782 passengers.

Section 805(a) was inserted in the Act "to protect those companies already interested in the coastwise or intercoastal service." (S. Rept. No. 1721, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.) In disposing of the question of section 805(a) "grandfather" rights, we are guided by two considerations: (1) substantial parity must exist as between proposed and past operations, for the protection of domestic operators already interested in the trade, and (2) the "grandfather" clause cannot be so strictly read as to permit absolutely no flexibility in equipment. *American President Lines, Ltd.—Subsidy, Route 17, 4 F.M.B.—M.A.* 488, 502 (1954). See also *Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Calls at Hawaii, 5 F.M.B.—M.A.,* 287, 297 (1957). This principle is followed by us in contractual dealings with APL and other subsidized operators and, as recognized by APL under Article I–2(e)(7) and II–15 of its subsidy contract, we can reexamine and impose limitations upon the operations of a subsidized operator in the domestic trade.

As indicated in table I, in 1935 with a seven ship operation, APL made 26 round voyages (52 one-way voyages) and carried 2,852 passengers and 3,204 tons of cargo between California and Hawaii. It argues that the limitation on its "grandfather" rights is the space left available upon completion of its transpacific bookings. This, it says, was the service offered in 1935. Although the burden of proving "grandfather" rights rests on the party claiming such rights, applicant was unable to show the amount of salable space available to passengers between California and Hawaii on voyages in 1935. "Substantial parity must exist as between proposed and past operations." *American President Lines, Ltd., supra.*

We find that subject to a limit of 2,852 passengers and 3,204 L/T of cargo a year and not in excess of 26 round voyages, the proposed service of APL is in substantial parity with that maintained by it or its predecessor in 1935.

Table I shows that during the period 1959–62 APL proposes to make some 40 one-way voyages between California and Hawaii, carrying 2,119 passengers and about 2,456 tons of cargo. During that period service would be provided with the Wilson, the Cleveland, and the Hoover. The Wilson and Cleveland would make about 16 round voyages a year calling at Hawaii in both directions, while the Hoover, owing to its slower speed, would call at Hawaii on one leg only of its
round voyage. In 1963, when the Washington takes the place of the Hoover, APL proposes 54 one-way voyages each year. All three vessels, the Cleveland, Wilson, and Washington, would call at Hawaii in both directions for a total of 27 round voyages, and it is estimated they would carry 5,959 passengers and 3,318 tons of cargo. The "grandfather" rights found herein appear to take care of APL's proposed service during the period 1959–1962. The proposed service in the period after 1962, when the Washington takes the place of the Hoover, is in excess of APL's "grandfather" rights.

In estimating the level of future travel, APL's witnesses John F. Child and P. B. Clover relied chiefly on studies made by Hawaiian Visitors Bureau (HVB) and/or by Stanford (University) Research Institute (SRI). These and other estimates, projected to 1962 and 1965, are as follows:

**Table II**

*Estimated travel between California and Hawaii during 1962 and 1965*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visitors to Hawaii,</td>
<td>Westbound travelers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 days and over</td>
<td>2 days and over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVB:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1955 estimate</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1958 estimate</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Clover estimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1955 estimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td>179,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVB:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1955 estimate</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>(Child estimate)</td>
<td>415,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Clover estimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1955 estimate</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Assuming sea travelers equal 25 percent of sea and air travelers shown in column (4).
2 Interpolated.
3 Assuming sea travelers equal 32% percent of sea and air travelers shown in column (4). (Residents and intended residents excluded by SRI in 1965.)
4 Assuming sea travelers equal 20 percent of sea and air travelers shown in column (4).
We agree with the examiner that there will be approximately 125,000 potential ocean passengers in 1962 and 150,000 in 1965. These figures compare with vessel capacities as follows:

**Table III**

*Estimated travel California/Hawaii compared with vessel capacities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity of vessels</th>
<th>Including Leilani</th>
<th>Excluding Leilani</th>
<th>(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Present 1.</td>
<td>123,139</td>
<td>89,339</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. a. Plus Hoover</td>
<td>123,399</td>
<td>89,499</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. b. Plus Washington</td>
<td>127,139</td>
<td>93,339</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Present—Textron and Matson</td>
<td>123,520</td>
<td>89,720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. a. Plus 2,882 (APL's g.f. rights)</td>
<td>124,968</td>
<td>91,168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. b. Plus APL, incl. Washington</td>
<td>126,627</td>
<td>92,827</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential passengers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Lurline, Matsonia, Matson freighters, Oceanic, Leilani, Cleveland, Wilson, APL-R/W, States/PTL.

We take official notice, under Rule 18(g), that the *Leilani* was withdrawn from service subsequent to the hearing. It will be noted that with the elimination of the *Leilani* the remaining vessel capacity is far less than the projected surface passenger movement between California and Hawaii for both 1962 and 1965. If Matson's own estimate of 93,593 surface passengers between California and Hawaii in 1963 be accepted, the demand for space will exceed the space offered. Vessel capacity, exclusive of the *Leilani*, plus the proposed carryings of the *Washington*, would amount to only 93,339.

On the basis of the foregoing, we find that granting permission to APL for its proposed service in 1963 and thereafter, i.e., the carriage of no more than 6,000 passengers and 3,320 L/T of cargo, would not, on this record, result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service.

Since this record demonstrates that without the proposed carryings of the *Washington* in 1963 and thereafter there would be insufficient capacity to carry the potential surface passengers, we find that the proposed service would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the service involved.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 807

ATLANTIC AND GULF-PUERTO RICO GENERAL INCREASE IN RATES AND CHARGES

Submitted December 3, 1959. Decided April 28, 1960

Rates between North Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States and Puerto Rico, as increased 15 percent or 6 cents per cubic foot or 12 cents per 100 pounds, whichever produces the greater increase in revenue, and as further increased 12 percent, found just and reasonable.

Odell Kominers, Mark P. Schlefer, and Sterling F. Stoudenmire, Jr., for respondents.


Robert E. Mitchell and Edward Aptaker as Public Counsel.
REPORT OF THE BOARD

CLARENCE G. MORSE, Chairman, and THOS. E. STAKEN, JR.,
Vice Chairman

BY THE BOARD:

On December 4, 1956, United States Atlantic & Gulf-Puerto Rico Conference (the Conference), then comprised of Bull-Insular Line, Inc., Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., Waterman Steamship Corporation, and Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. (Bull, Lykes, Waterman, and Alcoa), filed with the Board Tariffs FMB F-No. 14, Homeward Freight Tariff No. 7, and FMB F-No. 13, Outward Freight Tariff No. 7, naming increases in commodity rates over the applicable rates then in effect, to become effective January 5, 1957, between United States Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico ports and ports in Puerto Rico. On December 20, 1956, J. W. de Bruycker, agent for the Conference, filed special permission application to modify on short notice the increases in rates to reflect an adjustment not in excess of 15 percent or 6 cents per cubic foot or 12 cents per 100 pounds, whichever produces the greater increase in revenue, over the applicable rates then in effect. This increase will be referred to as the 15-percent increase.

On January 4, 1957, pursuant to section 18 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 817 (the 1916 Act), and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 843 et seq. (the 1933 Act), we ordered an investigation into the reasonableness and lawfulness of the rates, charges, regulations, and practices stated in the tariff schedules filed December 4, 1956, and ordered the operation of these schedules suspended until midnight January 8, 1957, unless otherwise ordered. On January 8, 1957, we amended our order of January 4, 1975, and granted special permission to publish the rate increases, as modified, to be effective not earlier than January 9, 1957, on one day's notice. We also ordered an investigation of the 15-percent increase, and directed (a) that the carriers keep an account of all freight moneys received by reason of the rate increases for the period commencing January 9, 1957, and terminating May 5, 1957; and (b) that the carriers, upon final determination by the Board, pay to shippers, out of the carriers' general funds, the sums if any to which the respective persons who pay the freight might be entitled. The 15-percent increase became effective on January 10, 1957.

The orders of January 4 and January 8, 1957, made the Conference, agent de Bruycker, Bull, Lykes, Waterman, and Alcoa respondents. Notice of investigation and hearing was published in the Federal Register of January 17, 1957 (22 F.R. 355), and hearing was held
in New York, N.Y., April 16 through May 3, 1957. After hearing on the 15-percent increase, but before briefs were due, respondents published on July 18, 1957, a 12-percent additional general rate increase (the 12-percent increase), to become effective September 14, 1957. On August 14, 1957, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Pan-Atlantic), an affiliate of Waterman, filed revisions to its Homeward Tariff No. 1, FMB. F-No. 1, to become effective September 18, 1957, naming local commodity rates from Puerto Rico to United States Atlantic ports based on the same pattern as the conference rates.

By supplemental order of September 5, 1957, we (a) expanded the proceeding to include an investigation into the lawfulness of the rates as further increased by 12 percent; (b) suspended the operation of the conference and Pan-Atlantic schedules naming the 12-percent increase, until January 14, 1958; (c) made Pan-Atlantic a respondent; and (d) ordered a further hearing. Notice of the expanded investigation and further hearing was published in the Federal Register of September 12, 1957 (22 F.R. 7291), and further hearing was held in New York from October 21 through 28, 1957, and concluded in Washington, D.C., November 1, 1957. The 12-percent increase became effective on January 15, 1958.

During the course of the hearings the examiner denied requests by interveners that respondents be required to produce or make available underlying books, records, and accounts for the purpose of cross-examination in order to test the accuracy of certain of respondents' exhibits in the form of financial and statistical summaries based upon allocations and computations derived from underlying documents. In an initial decision served February 3, 1958, the examiner considered those exhibits as reliable, probative, and substantial, based on the sworn testimony of the witnesses through whom they were introduced as to their correctness and accuracy.

After oral argument upon exceptions to the initial decision, in an order entered June 13, 1958, we overruled the examiner as to these issues, and stated (5 F.M.B. 426, 429, 430):

We do not agree with the examiner that the summary evidence presented by respondents, without reasonable access to supporting and underlying books, records, and accounts by which the accuracy and sufficiency of the evidence may be tested, is "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" as required by section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The record is insufficient for the Board to make proper findings as to the lawfulness of the rates under section 18 of the 1916 Act and under the 1933 Act.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

We conclude that this proceeding should be remanded to the examiner for further hearing, and, in order that the full record herein shall contain probative
and substantial evidence sufficient for the Board to make valid determinations
as to the lawfulness of the rates under investigation, respondents should pro-
duce at such further hearing, or make available to interveners and Public
Counsel, such original and underlying books, records, accounts, and worksheets,
including corporate profit and loss statements and balance sheets, as are required
to determine the probative value of the evidence, the accuracy of computations
and allocations between regulated and nonregulated activities, and the scope
and accuracy of intercorporate transactions. Further, there should be full
disclosure of data with respect to any sales or transfers of corporate assets
which would be relevant and material in determining accurately the fair value
of properties and assets devoted to this Puerto Rican service.

The proceeding was remanded to the examiner for the purpose of
receiving further evidence. Further hearings were held during the
period October 6 to 28, 1958. Interveners in opposition to the rate
increases, or as their interests may appear, were the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico (the Commonwealth), the Administrator of General
Services, Asociacion de Industriales de Puerto Rico (Manufacturers
Association of Puerto Rico), Commonwealth Manufacturers Associ-
ation, Paula Shoe Company; Caribe Shoe Corporation, Coastal Foot-
wear Corp., Bata Shoe Company, Inc., Association of Sugar Pro-
ducers of Puerto Rico, Cooperative Grange League Federation, Inc.,
Atlantic Industries, Inc., Louisiana State Rice Milling Company,
Inc., The Rice Millers' Association, Trailer Marine Transportation,
Inc., and Cigar Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.

In his initial decision on further hearing the examiner found and
concluded that the 15-percent and 12-percent increases under investi-
gation were just and reasonable and that the proceeding should
be discontinued. Exceptions to the initial decision and replies
thereto were filed, and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and
proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our
findings have been considered and found not justified by the facts or
not related to material issues in this proceeding.

**Carrier Respondents**

1. **Alcoa.** Alcoa offers weekly service from New York and Balti-
more, Md., and weekly service from Mobile, Ala., and New Orleans,
La., to Puerto Rico. Each sailing serves all ports in Puerto Rico.
The vessels in the North Atlantic service, after discharge at Puerto
Rico ports, proceed into other trades, generally contract services.
In the Gulf service, the vessels return from Puerto Rico to the Gulf
ports, a service inaugurated in March 1958.

2. During 1956, 1957, and the first six months of 1958, average
vessel utilization on a cubic basis by Alcoa in the North Atlantic
service ranged from 39.5 percent in the second quarter of 1956 to
84.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 1957, and in the Gulf service from 44.4 percent in the second quarter of 1956 to 66.6 percent in the second quarter of 1957. The average southbound voyage in 1957 from the North Atlantic consumed 14.5 days, and from the Gulf, 12.7 days.

3. **Bull.** Bull provides three sailings per week from North Atlantic ports to Puerto Rico. One sailing proceeds from Baltimore and Philadelphia, Pa., to Puerto Rico and return. Another sailing proceeds from New York to Puerto Rico and return (the Thursday sailing), and the third from New York to Puerto Rico, thence to the Dominican Republic and return (the Friday sailing). Basically the services are provided with six C-2 type vessels, operated on a strict two-week turnaround. In addition, Liberty-type vessels also are employed to lift stators, generators, ammunition, and other specialized cargo destined to Puerto Rico which cannot be handled on the regular C-2 vessels. Liberty ships also have been utilized in some instances to carry full cargoes of bagged raw sugar under the tariff, but this movement declined rapidly in 1957 due to conversion of the raw sugar movement to bulk movement under contract, and has since come to a virtual halt. Caribbean Dispatch, Inc., an affiliate of Bull, is a major contract carrier of bulk sugar.

4. In a transaction closed December 18, 1956, characterized in the brief for the Conference as “an irrefragibly [sic] arm’s-length transaction between completely unrelated interests,” Olympia Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, acquired substantially all of the stock of A. H. Bull Steamship Co., a New Jersey corporation (A. H. Bull New Jersey). Prior to the transaction, the purchaser and the sellers had no stockholders, directors, or other interests in common, or any similar relationship. Olympia had been organized by its parent, American Coal Shipping, Inc. (ACS), which paid $100,000 for all of Olympia’s outstanding stock, as the instrument designed to facilitate the consummation of the transaction. ACS and its own stockholders also loaned to Olympia about $5 million, at interest of 5 percent. Between December 18, 1956, and January 21, 1957, Olympia’s name was changed to A. H. Bull Steamship Co. (A. H. Bull Delaware). The transaction contemplated purchase by Olympia of all of the outstanding stock of A. H. Bull New Jersey for a total consideration of $40 million (which was not finally accomplished until February 28, 1957), the liquidation of A. H. Bull New Jersey, and the transfer of all of its assets to A. H. Bull Delaware.

5. On December 18, 1956, A. H. Bull New Jersey had over $18 million in cash, obtained from surplus, liquidation of quick assets representing in part depreciation funds, release of vessel replacement
funds, and receipt of the repayments of advances and dividends from subsidiary companies, among others. On the closing date of the stock purchase, this $18 million was declared by A. H. Bull New Jersey as a dividend, paid principally to Olympia, and the remainder of the purchase price of $40 million was met from the proceeds of the loans from ACS and its stockholders of the $5 million mentioned above, and bank loans of some $17 million at interest rates ranging from 4 1/4 to 5 percent, guaranteed by ACS.

6. The net purchase price paid by Olympia for A. H. Bull New Jersey was therefore about $22 million. The book net worth of A. H. Bull New Jersey at the time of closing was about $12,330,000. Incident to the purchase, the physical assets of A. H. Bull New Jersey and its subsidiaries had been independently appraised. About January 21, 1957, in partial but almost complete liquidation of A. H. Bull New Jersey, its assets were transferred to the books of A. H. Bull Delaware, and in the process the vessel book values were raised from $5,160,421.85 to $12,892,610.21, effective as of the closing date, the latter figure representing about 70 percent of the appraised values of the vessels. The ascribed values of certain other assets were changed also for consolidated statement purposes, but on the corporate books only the vessel values were changed. Thus, on the books of A. H. Bull Delaware the vessel book values are carried presently at amounts, less accrued depreciation since the closing date, representing a pro rata share of the total purchase price paid by A. H. Bull Delaware for the assets of A. H. Bull New Jersey.

7. Corporate entities affiliated with Bull, so far as is here pertinent, include A. H. Bull Delaware, of which Bull is a subsidiary; A. H. Bull & Co., which provides continental United States overhead services for Bull and others in the corporate family in return for management and operating commissions composed principally of a percentage of revenues and a per diem husbanding charge; several separate corporations which own and operate pier facilities in Puerto Rico; Caribbean Dispatch, Inc., mentioned above; and Dafton Realty Co., owner of office facilities in New York utilized by Bull.

8. For 65 days between August 19 and October 22, 1957, Bull's operations were immobilized by a strike arising out of a jurisdictional dispute between seafaring unions. The strike was not unrelated to the fact that ACS, the new owner of the Bull properties, was in part owned by the United Mine Workers. Other strikes which have affected the operations of Bull at various ports, for varying reasons, and for periods of time ranging from 2 to 44 days, totaled 33 days in 1951, 1952, and 1956; 12 days in 1953; 101 days in 1954; 78 days in

6 F.M.B.

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1955; 14 days in February 1957; and 20 days in the first 6 months of 1958.

9. Lykes. Lykes operates its weekly service between the Gulf ports of Lake Charles, La., and Houston and Galveston, Tex., and occasionally other western Gulf ports, and Puerto Rico, as a part of its subsidized service on Trade Route No. 19 (Line A service) between Gulf ports of the United States and Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. No voyages are operated to or from Puerto Rico exclusively. The number of vessel days operated by Lykes in the Puerto Rican portion of its Line A service is less than that in the service to and from foreign ports. During 1956, 1957, and the first 6 months of 1958, average vessel utilization on a cubic basis achieved in the combination Puerto Rican service ranged from 66.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 1957 to 90.9 percent in the first quarter of 1957.

10. Waterman. Waterman is a subsidiary of McLean Industries, Inc. At the outset of this proceeding it operated a weekly service between New Orleans and Mobile and Puerto Rico, utilizing two vessels on a 14-day turnaround, with additional vessels for relief purposes and when extra cargo demanded. Beginning in October 1957, Waterman also inaugurated weekly sailings, utilizing two vessels on a 14-day turnaround in regular break-bulk service, between New York, Baltimore, and Puerto Rico. Waterman intended to provide a permanent North Atlantic-Puerto Rico service, at first with regular break-bulk vessels, and later converting to trailership service.

11. Effective February 4, 1958, Waterman withdrew from the Conference and simultaneously ceased all operations in the Puerto Rican trades, which were taken over without break in service by Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico (Waterman P.R.). The latter is a wholly owned subsidiary of Waterman, is not a respondent, and is not a member of the Conference, although its rates are in all respects the same as those of the Conference. When filing its initial tariffs with the Board, and in subsequent pleadings herein, Waterman P.R. has agreed to be bound by the results of this proceeding so far as its rates are concerned. Statistical and financial data reflecting the combined Waterman and Waterman P.R. operations are of record, although no recent data were presented forecasting operating results for the entire year 1958 as was the case with the other Conference respondents.

12. On February 28, 1958, Waterman P.R. inaugurated its North Atlantic-Puerto Rico trailership service, with the sailing of the Bienville. This vessel, upon arrival in Puerto Rico, was prevented from discharging because of labor difficulties. After some delay
the Bienville proceeded to New Orleans, where her cargo was discharged and that which had not spoiled was transferred to a ship regularly employed in the Waterman P.R. Gulf-Puerto Rico break-bulk service. The voyage consumed 34 days in all. After this experience, Waterman P.R. discontinued its North Atlantic-Puerto Rico service, which has not since been resumed either on a break-bulk or trailership basis.

13. Pan-Atlantic. Pan-Atlantic is an affiliate of Waterman, and as such was required to maintain the same rates as the Conference by the terms of the conference agreement to which Waterman was a party. Between April 1957 and early 1958, Pan-Atlantic provided a northbound service from Puerto Rico to Miami and Jacksonville, Fla., in conjunction with its intercoastal and west coast-Puerto Rico services, which was suspended at the end of this period and has not been resumed. The tariff under which such service was operated was canceled effective August 22, 1958. As far as the record discloses, this service was minimal since the cargo carried averaged only 51 tons per voyage, with gross revenue per voyage of $1,506. These data are so insignificant as to warrant their exclusion from consideration herein, although the rates under investigation will remain subject to the findings.

14. Pan-Atlantic instituted a trailership service between New York and Puerto Rico on July 30, 1958, which is presently being operated. On October 27, 1958, we denied a petition by the Conference requesting that this investigation be broadened by naming Waterman P.R. as a respondent, and bringing in issue the current tariffs of Pan-Atlantic and Waterman P.R.

PUERTO RICAN ECONOMY AND THE TRADE

15. Puerto Rico is a small island, 100 miles long and 25 miles wide, separated from the nearest point in the United States by over 1,000 miles of open water. The economy of the island has never been self-sustaining, and it has few natural resources. It is one of the most densely populated areas of the world. Its external trade is almost entirely with the United States. About 40 percent of all goods produced, and about 54 percent of all goods consumed, by its people are destined to, or originate in, the United States. Average income per capita in 1954 was $446, as compared with $1,770 in the United States. The percentage of the labor force of unemployed or only partial employed has consistently exceeded that in the United States. These data indicate that increases in the cost of shipping
such as are here involved affect the economy of Puerto Rico and the living standards of its populace more sharply than would similar increases elsewhere in the nation.

16. The conference rates in the Puerto Rican trade are determined by three-fourths majority vote of the members. Therefore, no one carrier can dominate the making of rates. Waterman P.R., presently operating in the Gulf-Puerto Rico trade, is not a member of the Conference and its rates can be made by individual action, subject only to the competitive impact of the rates maintained by the Conference. As is indicated by the statistics shown in table I, Bull is the dominant carrier in the trade, receiving approximately 50 percent of the revenues even in the year 1957, when its operations were immobilized for more than 65 days.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>First half 1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td>$24,993,850</td>
<td>$21,646,383</td>
<td>$11,682,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterman</td>
<td>6,534,389</td>
<td>9,416,267</td>
<td>4,651,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa</td>
<td>6,244,854</td>
<td>9,175,949</td>
<td>4,215,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykes</td>
<td>3,843,308</td>
<td>3,774,843</td>
<td>1,940,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>41,616,471</td>
<td>44,013,342</td>
<td>22,489,003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. The most recent traffic and revenue projections of the respondents, where given, were based on an extension of their most recent experience—the first half of 1958—subject to adjustments for known or contracted cost increases. Although there is testimony to the effect that a gradual increase may be expected in the movement of general cargo between Puerto Rico and the mainland, the statistics disclose a decline in volume carried of cargo subject to the tariffs here involved. This decline is attributed in large part to the conversion of the raw sugar movement from bag under the tariffs to bulk under contract, and to the construction of a fertilizer plant in Puerto Rico, which virtually eliminated the movement of prepared fertilizer and substituted therefore the movement of fertilizer raw materials in tramp vessels. Table II shows the cargo data submitted for the years 1955-57 and the first half of 1958, and the projections for the full year 1958, where given. Weight tons are computed on the basis of the weight of the cargo carried, and freight payable tons on the basis on which the freight charges were paid, either weight or measurement. The data for the full year 1957 in tables I and II reflect the impact of the long strike in that year against Bull, and the consequent diversion to Alcoa and other carriers of substantial amounts of traffic normally carried by it. They show the dominant position of Bull in the trade.

6 F.M.B.
18. Taking into consideration the factors mentioned in paragraph 17, above, and the entry into the trade of Pan-Atlantic with its new and attractive trailership service, which no doubt will succeed in diverting some traffic from the services maintained by the other respondents, it is found that the projections of the respondents as to the year 1958 are reasonable.

**Specific Commodity Rates**

19. In the first initial decision the examiner found as follows:

60. The shipper interveners, generally, are those who ship commodities under so-called "promotional rates." These rates have been maintained by the carriers, prior to the proposed increases, at comparatively low levels designed to promote the movement of the commodities so rated. The promotional rates apply primarily to northbound traffic, and most of them have been used since 1946 in cooperation with and at the request of the newly-developing industries in Puerto Rico. This traffic, in gross tons, in 1955, amounted to approximately 20,000 tons northbound and 1000 tons southbound. In 1956 it amounted to approximately 25,000 tons northbound and 2000 tons southbound. The revenue from this traffic in relation to total revenue was perhaps less than \(\frac{1}{2}\) of 1 percent.

61. Selected commodities from those transported at promotional rates, stated by the carriers to be typical, were northbound: shoes, paperboard, chinaware, coffee, cigars, rugs, artificial flowers, boxes kd, scrap metal, scrap tobacco and confectionary; and southbound: tin cans, iron and steel articles, glass jars, bottles n.o.s., paper and paper products, and tiles. Two shippers, understood to be representative of shippers of such commodities, testified at the first hearing. One was a shipper of candy and the other of shoes, both shipping from Puerto Rico to the United States mainland. Their main objections were that the first rate increases on the commodities were greater than 15 percent. This is so because of the 6 cents per cubic foot or 12 cents per 100 pounds aspect of the first increase.

62. The shippers gave important consideration to the relatively low shipping rates for their products, it is stated, in their decisions to establish business in Puerto Rico, since transportation charges are vital factors in their business prospects. The record shows that the 15 percent rate increase raised footwear costs 1.13 percent of the value of the product, and candy 1.78 percent. These increases, it is stated, seriously limit the possibilities of expanding mainland business, and discourage people from establishing business in Puerto Rico.

6 F.M.B.
63. The record shows that the promotional rates are too low, and appear to be noncompensatory, even with the 15 percent increase, and there is some question as to whether the further 12 percent increase renders said promotional rates compensatory.

20. No exceptions were taken to the above findings. They are borne out by the record, and no additional evidence was presented at the second hearing relating to these issues. We adopt such findings.

**Cost Increases**

21. The cumulative rate increases under investigation aggregate about 29 percent. The last prior general rate increase in the Puerto Rican trade was made effective November 12, 1951. Since that date the expenses of respondents have increased substantially. For example, Bull shows that stevedoring wages in the United States have increased 46 percent and in Puerto Rico about 63 percent; fuel oil costs have increased 23 percent; vessel operating costs as a whole, 54 percent; crew wages, 62 percent; vessel repair costs, 50 percent; and insurance, 52 percent. Comparable cost increases are shown for the other three carriers in the trade.

22. There is evidence that the carriers, through increased efficiency of operations, have endeavored to minimize the impact of the stated cost increases. Stevedoring expenses account for a substantial proportion of total operating expenses. Bull shows that from 1951 to the end of 1957 loading costs in New York increased from $4.06 per ton to $4.69 per ton, and discharge costs at the same port from $4.80 per ton to $5.74 per ton, increases of 15.5 percent and 19.6 percent, respectively, far lower than the wage increases shown. This favorable result is attributed to increased efficiency in loading and discharging operations, the leasing of modern improved terminal facilities, and in some degree the use of containers and vans. Loading and discharge costs at San Juan, P.R., however, reflect more closely the wage increases, attributed to the lesser efficiency of port arrangements and labor. Loading costs at that port in the same period increased from $2.02 to $3.07 per ton, and discharge costs from $2.79 to $4.71 per ton, increases of 52 percent and 68.8 percent, respectively.

23. Waterman shows, in addition to the cost increases stated above, that effective in October 1958 longshore wage increases at Puerto Rican ports will, after that date, increase stevedoring expenses by about 92 cents per ton, and that known prospective wage increases will, by the end of 1958, increase crew wage costs by $160,000 annually over the wage levels for 1957.
Allocation Methods

24. Of the principal respondents, Waterman is the only one which operates an exclusive Puerto Rican service. The remaining respondents, as shown in paragraphs 1-9, above, operate their services to and from Puerto Rico either wholly or partially on a joint basis with other services. This has necessitated allocation of the joint service expenses of the respondents and of the assets devoted to these services so as to ascertain as nearly as possible the proper apportionment of expenses and assets between the regulated and nonregulated trades in order to determine the adequacy of revenue in the regulated trade. For this purpose, respondents have made their allocations principally on ton-mile prorate formulae.

25. Where possible, such as in the case of port and cargo handling expenses incurred in Puerto Rico, the expenses were directly assigned. Most other expenses, including vessel operating expenses, cargo and port expenses in the United States, vessel depreciation, and overhead were subject to allocation. The need for allocation does not alter the basic factors contributing to vessel operating expenses, the volume and the distance carried. In applying the ton-mile prorate, the respondents used the straight-line distances between ports of loading and discharge, since a vessel sailing toward Puerto Rico is also sailing toward foreign ports of call. Vessel operating expenses and certain other expenses were then allocated to the Puerto Rican service in the proportion that Puerto Rican ton-miles bore to total ton-miles operated in the joint services.

26. Where the ton-mile prorate involved too heavy a burden, as where the allocation was between the Puerto Rican trade and the entire company operation, a revenue prorate was used for convenience, using as factors the proportion that Puerto Rican revenue bore to total revenue. In the case of loading costs, distance is not a relevant factor and allocations were generally made on the basis of the number of tons handled. In the case of Bull's substantially equidistant Puerto Rican and Dominican destinations, its use of a ton-mile prorate in the allocation of loading and stevedoring costs in the United States resulted in an approximately equal allocation of loading expense per ton.

27. Strike expenses incurred by Bull in 1957 were allocated by it on the basis of a revenue prorate, because the development of a ton-mile formula would have made necessary a port-to-port analysis of volume and distances for a minimum of 155 sailings, a burden-
some task. Since the Dominican revenue is substantially higher per ton than Puerto Rican revenue for approximately the same distance, as shown below, this actually allocated a higher proportion of strike expenses to the Dominican traffic and a lower proportion to Puerto Rican traffic than would have resulted from the use of a ton-mile prorate.

28. Vessel assets were assigned to the Puerto Rican services of the respondents on the proportion of the vessel operating days in those services, allocated where necessary on the basis of a ton-mile prorate. Assets in Puerto Rico were directly assigned to the Puerto Rican service, and terminal property in the United States was generally allocated on a revenue prorate.

29. At the request of other parties, respondents in most instances also computed their expenses on the basis of revenue prorate formulae. Interveners contend that for the purposes of this proceeding revenue prorate allocations should be used. For example, the Commonwealth argues that segregation of the joint voyage results on the Friday sailings of Bull gave inordinately excessive profits to the Dominican portion and exceptionally large losses to the Puerto Rican portion in 1957, as to which on a ton-mile prorate Bull shows a combined net revenue on the joint sailings, after depreciation and overhead but before taxes, of $46,345, with allocation of a loss of $244,973 to the Puerto Rican portion and a profit of $291,318 to the Dominican portion.

30. In 1957, total traffic carried by Bull on the joint voyages was 311,699 tons, of which 36,784 tons were Dominican cargo. In the same year total joint voyage freight revenue was $5,367,625, of which Dominican revenue was $924,140. The Commonwealth characterizes as anomalous the results of the ton-mile prorate which attributes to the Dominican trade net revenue equal to 30 percent of each dollar of revenue. Bull's revenue per ton in the Dominican trade in 1957 was 36 percent higher than in the Puerto Rican trade ($27.04 as against $19.94), and costs of discharge in the same year in the Dominican Republic were only 22.5 percent of like costs in Puerto Rico ($1.06 as against $4.71). These data indicate that the profit results derived through use of ton-mile prorate formulae reflect with a reasonable degree of accuracy the inherent differences as between the Dominican and Puerto Rican trades. The Commonwealth also argues that the use of the ton-mile prorate results in somewhat higher unit costs on the joint service voyages than on the Thursday sailings of Bull which serve Puerto Rico only. These results are fully explained by the facts that there were more sailings in 1957 in the joint service with about the same amount of total traffic, and
consequently lower volume per voyage and higher costs per ton, and also that the joint voyages were subject to overtime costs because of late sailings not incurred on the Thursday sailings.

31. Manufacturers Association of Puerto Rico contends that allocation of expenses for the Friday joint service sailings of Bull should be made on a so-called "known-cost-per-ton" method. By this method, allowable expenses on the joint service voyages would be confined to the unit costs incurred on the Thursday sailings which serve Puerto Rico exclusively, which costs can be computed without the necessity for allocations. Such a method bears no relation to the realities of the situation and is clearly erroneous.

32. The Commonwealth alternatively suggests that in lieu of allocation in the case of Bull's Friday sailings, the total profit results on the joint voyages should be included, on the grounds that the Dominican operation is a by-product of the Puerto Rican trade which could not stand on its own feet; that only 13 percent of the cargo on the joint voyages is Dominican; that Dominican cargo is less than one-half of one percent of the total Bull Puerto Rico traffic; and that the carrier itself recognizes the incidental nature of the Dominican operations by failing to allocate out of its asset statements any portion of vessel and other property values attributable to the Dominican operation. The issue here is not the profit accruing to Bull as a result of its joint service operations, but the justness and reasonableness of the rates under investigation, which, in the nature of the case, must be decided on the basis of the adequacy of the revenues derived therefrom. There is no suggestion that allocation is not necessary in the case of the other respondents which operate joint services, and no good reason appears why Bull should be accorded special treatment in this respect. The authorities cited clearly support agency action in general rate proceedings in adopting appropriate means of effectuating a separation of the regulated and nonregulated portions of an integrated enterprise. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com'n, 155 F. 2d 694, 704-5 (1946), cert. den. 329 U.S. 773; and Colorado Interstate Co. v. Comm'n., 324 U.S. 581, 586-92 (1945). The record clearly indicates that dissimilar rates and cost factors as between the Puerto Rican and Dominican operations make allocation necessary in order to avoid distortion of the operating results in the Puerto Rican trade and the use of the resulting data in assessing the lawfulness of the rates under the jurisdiction of the Board.

33. In the light of the findings in paragraphs 23-31, above, we agree with the examiner that the use of the ton-mile prorate formulae, where
DEPRECIATION AND BULL'S VESSEL BOOK VALUES

34. In general, the vessel book values maintained by respondents represent the cost of acquisition, plus additions and betterments, depreciated on the basis of a 20-year vessel life down to a residual scrap value amounting to 2.5 percent of acquisition cost. In the discussion immediately to follow, vessel acquisition costs and book values are stated as approximations since precision is not necessary for disposition of the issues here raised and since precise data, after allocations, are shown, infra.

35. Alcoa's C-1 vessels, utilized in its Gulf service, were acquired in 1941 and 1942 at costs ranging from $1,000,000 to $1,250,000, and by December 31, 1956, had been depreciated down to net book values ranging from $223,000 to $322,000. Its C-2 vessels used in the North Atlantic service were acquired in 1946 and 1947 for $1,200,000 to $1,333,000, and by the same date had been depreciated down to $535,000 to $635,000.

36. Waterman's C-2 vessels used in its Gulf service were acquired in 1947 and 1948 for $984,000 to $1,100,000, and by December 31, 1956, had been depreciated down to about $500,000. Lykes' C-1 vessels were acquired between 1943 and 1949 for $943,000 to $1,000,000, and by the same date had been depreciated down to slightly less than 50 percent of original cost.

37. In the case of Bull, most of the C-2 vessels had been acquired in 1947 at costs of $948,000 to $1,006,000 by A. H. Bull New Jersey, and by December 18, 1956, had been depreciated down to about $750,000. Two of the C-2 vessels were acquired in 1954 by A. H. Bull New Jersey in exchange for fully depreciated Liberty vessels and modest amounts of cash, and entered on the books at about $208,000 and $248,000. These two C-2's, by December 18, 1956, had been depreciated down to about $173,000 and $203,000. Annual depreciation charges in 1957, if taken by A. H. Bull Delaware on the basis of the vessel book values maintained on the books of A. H. Bull New Jersey, on the portion of the fleet allocated to the Puerto Rican trade, would have amounted to $396,887.

38. As of December 18, 1956, and as a result of the transaction detailed in paragraphs 4-6, above, the C-2 vessels utilized by Bull in its Puerto Rican services were entered on the books of A. H. Bull Delaware at acquisition costs of about $853,000 to $979,000, representing, as there stated, about 70 percent of their then appraised values. As a
result, depreciation charges claimed by Bull in 1957, and actually taken on the books of A. H. Bull Delaware, amounted to $929,514, or $322,627 more than would have been claimed by A. H. Bull New Jersey in the event the transaction had not taken place. Similarly, the increased depreciation taken in the first six months of 1958 amounted to $364,540, as against $194,456 had the transaction not occurred.

39. Domestic market value for C-2 vessels, exclusive of extras, in April 1957 is shown in the record as $1,350,000, which by October 1958 had declined to $875,000. The earlier value reflects the high market values which were the result of the Suez Canal crisis which created a sudden shortage in available vessels. The later value reflects the decline in vessel market values resulting from the depression in the shipping industry which occurred between the dates given. For C-1 vessels, exclusive of extras, the domestic market value in April 1957 was $1,100,000, which declined by October 1958 to $575,000.

40. The Commonwealth contends that, with respect to depreciation generally, respondents’ vessels have already been depreciated below realistic economic residual values as reflected by the market values shown; that residual values based on nominal scrap value are unrealistic and do not represent an accurate measure of the actual residual value of the vessels, which can be presumed to have a service life of more than 20 years and will, at the expiration of that time, either be sold or traded in at prices much higher than scrap value; that the residual service value of the vessels is at least equal to their book values at the end of 1955; and that as a consequence, depreciation charges taken by respondents should be disallowed in their entirety as an item of expense in determining the results of respondents’ operations in the Puerto Rican trade.

41. The depreciation practices of respondents and the estimated residual value are recognized for tax purposes and are in conformity with the Board’s General Order 24 (46 CFR sec. 284.2(f)). Contrary to the contention of the Commonwealth, this record affords no basis for conjecture as to the possible residual value of the vessels utilized in the Puerto Rican trade, other than the traditional and long-accepted residual value used by respondents. To adopt the suggestion of the Commonwealth would substitute speculation for certainty, since depreciation charges allowed would fluctuate with varying judgments as to possible future residual values which may be affected by unforeseen circumstances. We reject the contention of the Commonwealth.

42. Public Counsel and interveners also contend that for the purposes of this proceeding the depreciation charges claimed by Bull
on the basis of vessel acquisition costs entered on the books of A. H. Bull Delaware must be disallowed, depreciation allowed only on the book values maintained prior to the ACS transaction by A. H. Bull New Jersey, and vessel book values determined on the basis of projections of the books of A. H. Bull New Jersey. The arguments are based in the main on the rule propounded by the Supreme Court, particularly with regard to public utilities such as power and light and telephone companies, that the proper guide to book value of a utility's property is the cost as of the time when the property to be valued was first acquired by a public utility or dedicated to the public use. See A. T. & T. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 239 (1936), and cases there cited. That case, upon analysis, is also authority (pp. 240-4) for the proposition that acquisition cost of the last owner in a bona fide arm's-length transaction properly may be entered on the books of the acquiring utility and is the proper depreciation base.

43. There is no suggestion here that the ACS purchase was anything other than an arm's-length transaction between unrelated interests, that there was any attempt at collusion so as to arbitrarily inflate the values of the Bull properties, or that the purchase was an improvident one. In fact, based upon vessel market values shown in the record, the Bull assets were acquired at bargain prices, and the vessel acquisition costs entered upon the books of A. H. Bull Delaware represent the true acquisition costs incurred by that corporation. The Board has no jurisdiction over financial transactions involving carriers such as are here involved, and the decision here must be based on the facts as they exist.

44. It is found that the depreciation charges claimed as expenses by respondents, including those claimed by Bull on the basis of vessel acquisition costs incurred by A. H. Bull Delaware, are reasonable and proper for the purposes of this proceeding, and that the vessel book values maintained by A. H. Bull Delaware reflect the true acquisition costs of the vessels utilized by Bull in its Puerto Rican services.

Valuation and Rate Bases

45. General. The Conference advocates rate bases calculated as of June 30, 1958, notwithstanding that the first increase here involved became effective in January 1957. Waterman individually contends for rate bases compiled as of December 31, 1957. Public Counsel and Manufacturers Association of Puerto Rico contend that rate bases should be constructed as of December 31, 1957, applicable to the 1957 rate increase, and as of June 30, 1958, applicable to the 1958 rate
increase. The Commonwealth assigns values based on a composite analysis of the totality of the exhibits submitted. In *General Increase in Hawaiian Rates*, 5 F.M.B. 347, 354-5 (1957), we stated that carriers are entitled to a fair return on the reasonable value of the property at the time that it is being used for the public, and that in ascertaining the “reasonable value” we are not bound by any artificial rules or formulae, citing *San Diego Land Company v. National City*, 174 U.S. 739 (1899), and *The Minnesota Rate Cases*, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).

46. This proceeding involves two separate rate increases, the second superimposed upon the first. The record includes data concerning the actual operations of respondents for almost a full year under the first of these increases and for almost six months under the combined increases. In the usual rate-increase case, determination of the lawfulness of the increases proposed is necessarily predicated upon projections of revenues and expenses expected in the future, and the property values for the purpose of calculating the expected rate of return are most readily determinable as of the time the rate increases are proposed. Here, however, particularly with regard to the 15-percent increase, the results of operations under the increased rates can be ascertained with some degree of certainty. The most precise method of resolving the issues presented by this proceeding would be to determine average values of respondents’ property employed during 1957, applying operating results for the year 1957 to the resulting figures to determine rates of return actually earned during that year, and then to ascertain values as of December 31, 1957, applying projected operating results for the year 1958, based upon actual operations during the first six months of that year, to the ascertained values as of December 31, 1957, the approximate date when the 12-percent increase became effective, so as to compute expected rates of return for the year 1958. Such extreme precision is not required, however, and it is doubtful that the different values arrived at would be substantially at variance with each other. For the purposes of this proceeding, therefore, property values will be determined as of December 31, 1957, and the resulting rate bases applied to the actual operating results, so far as they can be determined on the record for the year 1957, and the projected results for the year 1958. While this may have a tendency to lessen somewhat the values applicable to the year 1957 because of depreciation, it is deemed that the results will not be unreasonable.

47. In table III are set forth the rate bases claimed by the Conference, and in table IV the rate bases claimed individually by Waterman.

6 F.M.B.
### Table III.—Rate bases claimed by the Conference

#### Bull:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>$12,048,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working capital</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn terminal, nonowned</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia terminal, do</td>
<td>3,064,916</td>
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<td>Baltimore terminal, do</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico terminals</td>
<td>4,062,194</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other property</td>
<td>747,387</td>
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<td>Claims pending</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,945,665</strong></td>
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#### Alcoa:

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<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>5,183,638</td>
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<td>1,233,955</td>
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<td>New York terminal, nonowned</td>
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<td>Baltimore terminal, do</td>
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<td>Mobile terminal, do</td>
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<td>New Orleans terminal, do</td>
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<td>Puerto Rico terminal, do</td>
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<td>Equipment</td>
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<td>Spare parts</td>
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#### Lykes:

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<td>Other property</td>
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<td>Statutory reserve funds</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,348,320</strong></td>
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#### Waterman:

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<td>New Orleans terminal, do</td>
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<td>Puerto Rico terminal, do</td>
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<td>Furniture, fixtures, and other equipment</td>
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<td>P.R. stevedore equipment</td>
<td>23,863</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.R. wharf equipment</td>
<td>1,239</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,858,860</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Grand total: 62,680,000**

1. This figure does not include any value assigned for Liberty ships, and because of an error in calculation in the conference brief, should be $12,288,581 on the basis claimed by the Conference.
Table IV.—Rate bases claimed by Waterman

Method 1:

| Vessels, average of reproduction cost depreciated, and net book value | $4,066,171 |
| Other property | 3,474,913 |
| Working capital | 1,892,107 |
| **Total** | **10,033,191** |

Method 2:

| Vessels, market value | 3,070,500 |
| Other property | 3,474,913 |
| Working capital | 1,892,107 |
| **Total** | **8,437,520** |

This figure, although labeled average of reproduction cost depreciated and net book value, embraces as an element the depreciated value of replacement vessels rather than reproduction cost depreciated of the vessels employed.

48. The items listed in table III designated as other property, structures, equipment, spare parts, terminal property, furniture, fixtures, and other equipment, office building, and stevedore and wharf equipment represent allocations of owned property carried into the claimed rate bases at net book value, and there is generally no dispute concerning the propriety of including such asset values. There is little justification for the inclusion of the item called “claims pending,” in Bull’s rate base, and it will not be further considered.

49. Lykes alone among the respondents does not claim as a part of its rate base the values of any nonowned terminals, on the ground that its vessels utilize a number of different public terminals, and the ratio of its use of any particular terminals would be minimal and difficult to determine. Accordingly, it claims as expense items in its profit and loss statements the full rentals paid for terminal use. It includes in its claimed rate base statutory reserve funds amounting to $2,022,488, made up of capital reserve funds of $1,734,919 representing accumulated depreciation on the portion of its vessels allocated to the Puerto Rican services, and special reserve fund amounting to $287,569. Both of these reserve funds are required to be maintained in connection with Lykes’ subsidized foreign operations, under section 607 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1177. We are not impressed with the argument that these statutory reserve funds should be considered as property devoted to the Puerto Rican service, and no further consideration will be given to this item.

50. Vessels. In table III, the vessels allocated by respondents to the Puerto Rican trade are valued by weighting original and reproduction costs, depreciated, using as factors 70 percent of reproduction cost, depreciated, and 30 percent of acquisition costs, depreciated. These percentages were rejected by us in General Increases in Alaskan 6 F.M.B.
Rates and Charges, 5 F.M.B. 486, 498 (1958). Respondents argue that Bull has in the distant past built its own ships and operated in the Puerto Rican trade with newly constructed tonnage, and has developed plans for replacement vessels although there are no present indications that new ship construction will be embarked upon in the near future; that Alcoa has likewise had naval architects prepare designs for replacement vessels; and that Lykes is contractually committed to a ship replacement program in connection with its subsidized operations. For these reasons, the Conference contends that the circumstances here present differ from those in the Alaskan case and justify the use of the 70-percent/30-percent weighting. The examiner used an average of original costs and reproduction costs, citing Rates of Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 2 U.S.M.C. 253 (1940); Alaskan Rates, 2 U.S.M.C. 558 (1941) and 2 U.S.M.C. 639 (1942); General Increase in Hawaiian Rates, supra; and General Increase in Alaskan Rates and Charges, supra.

51. Table V shows, after allocation, the original and reproduction costs, depreciated as of December 31, 1957, the averages thereof, and the market values of the vessels employed by respondents. The market values are averages of the domestic market values stated in paragraph 39, above; taken so as to eliminate extremes of value occasioned by the special circumstances detailed. As in the case of table III, the vessel values in the case of Bull do not include assigned values for Liberty-type vessels which the record indicates will occupy a diminishing role in its operations.

Table V.—Vessel values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original cost, depreciated</th>
<th>Reproduction cost, depreciated</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Domestic market values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td>$4,875,905</td>
<td>$16,890,740</td>
<td>$10,883,318</td>
<td>$7,620,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa</td>
<td>1,421,166</td>
<td>7,487,084</td>
<td>4,454,124</td>
<td>3,913,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykes</td>
<td>903,900</td>
<td>5,409,900</td>
<td>3,201,585</td>
<td>2,339,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerman</td>
<td>1,152,132</td>
<td>6,435,356</td>
<td>3,843,744</td>
<td>3,167,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>8,442,493</td>
<td>36,323,146</td>
<td>22,382,771</td>
<td>17,061,953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. We disagree with both the Conference and the examiner as to the fair and reasonable value of respondents' vessels. What respondents are entitled to is "a fair return on the reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for the public." San Diego Land Company v. National City, supra. We find that the value of the vessels on the domestic market at or about the time the rate increase is requested, with adjustments to eliminate short term peaks in vessel values, is the proper method for determining the reasonable value of the property being used for the public. We do
not feel that we should assume for rate-making purposes that a carrier has reproduced its vessels. When the carrier has reproduced a vessel and placed it in service he is entitled to a fair return on its value. Until then, the shipping public should not be forced to pay rates based even in part on the conjectural value of some phantom vessel which may never serve it. To the extent the conclusions set forth in prior cases disagree with those expressed herein, they are overruled.

53. We find the fair and reasonable values of respondents' vessels devoted to the Puerto Rican service to be those set forth in table V under the heading "Domestic market values."

54. Working capital. The examiner found that a fair and reasonable allowance for working capital as an element of the rate bases would be approximately one-twelfth of the annual operating expenses experienced in 1957 of the respective carriers, exclusive of depreciation, or $1,800,000 for Bull, $860,000 for Alcoa, $360,000 for Lykes, and $615,000 for Waterman.

55. The Conference excepts to the finding in paragraph 54 contending that the carriers are entitled to (1) a buffer fund equivalent to one-twelfth of annual operating expenses, exclusive of depreciation, plus (2) an amount sufficient to cover the lag in revenue collections behind the related disbursements, citing Alaskan Rates, supra. Under this method they say Bull is entitled both to the "buffer of one-twelfth of operating expenses or $1,800,000 and the collection lag of $1,000,000", and that the other respondents are entitled to a similar working capital determination.

56. Interveners and Public Counsel also except to the examiner's finding, contending that working capital should be computed on the basis of the requirements laid down in General Order 31, 46 CFR sec. 286.3(a)(1).¹

57. In General Increases in Hawaiian Rates, supra, we used General Order 71 as the method for computing working capital as an element of the rate base. In General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, supra, we disallowed claimed working capital computed by the formula detailed in the Alaskan Rates cases, supra, and allowed working capital calculated in accordance with General Order 71 (superseded by General Order 31), and we characterized that General Order as basically consisting of the average voyage expenses for each vessel in the carrier's fleet.

58. The examiner concluded that use of the formula was inappropriate in this proceeding, pointing out that under Limitation 3 the

¹Limitations 3 and 4 of that order, which relate to the computation of working capital, are set forth in the appendix.
inclusion by Bull in its current liabilities of annual installments due on its debt and annual interest payments would leave it with a negative balance for working capital. We find nothing in this record to warrant a reversal of our holding in *General Increases in Hawaiian Rates, supra,* and *General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, supra.* We will clarify those two decisions in one respect, however. In determining a fair and reasonable allowance for working capital as an element of rate bases in proceedings such as these, we will limit the amount to that determined under Limitation 4 of General Order 31 and give no consideration to Limitation 3.

59. We find that the fair and reasonable allowance for working capital would be the amount computed under Limitation 4 of General Order 31, or $1,087,000 for Bull, $264,100 for Alcoa, $222,100 for Lykes, and $285,800 for Waterman.

60. *Property used but not owned.* As is indicated in table III, Bull, Alcoa, and Waterman claim as elements of their rate bases substantial amounts representing the value of terminals and terminal equipment used by them in their Puerto Rican services which are owned by others. In conjunction with these claims, Bull has adjusted its operating expenses to substitute owners' expenses detailed on the record in the case of the Brooklyn and Philadelphia terminals for terminal rentals, and has credited its revenues with the profits derived from the operation of the Puerto Rican terminals by its subsidiaries; Alcoa has adjusted its operating expenses to eliminate rental costs for terminals; and Waterman has adjusted its operating expenses to eliminate profits from the operation of its Puerto Rican terminal owned by Waterman P. R. However, Waterman claims as operating expenses the rentals paid for terminals at Mobile and New Orleans, and the record affords no basis for determining the amount of such rental payments. The Baltimore terminals used by Bull and Alcoa are leased to them free by the owners as an inducement to increase the amount of traffic moving over the piers, and Bull's rental payments for its Philadelphia pier are substantially less than owner's costs.

61. The examiner found that in the case of Bull and Alcoa the inclusion in their allowable rate bases of the value of property used but not owned, with the concurrent elimination from operating expenses of rentals paid for such property and the substitution of owners' expenses therefor, is reasonable and proper. In the case of Waterman, however, he found that since it was impossible to determine on the record its rental payments for the use of its Mobile and New Orleans terminals or the expenses of the owners thereof, that the value of such property should not be included in its rate
base. In arriving at the value of property used but not owned, he found the proper valuation to be the net book value where ascertainable, or if not, a value on the basis of other evidence of record. The examiner concluded that prior decisions of the Board had allowed for rate base purposes the value of property used, although not owned by the carriers, which he states is in accord with the accepted theory of valuation.

62. In our most recent ruling on this point in General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, supra, we included the value of a chartered vessel in the carrier's rate base but excluded certain non-owned shoreside property, since it was difficult if not impossible to determine its proper value. We think we were in error in including the value of the nonowned assets. We are not impressed with the arguments of the Conference that such assets should be included in the rate base of some of the respondents. We note that Lykes did not claim as part of its rate base such nonowned property, and it appears that Bull did not include piers owned by the Commonwealth. Further, in the case of Waterman, the examiner refused to include the value of such property in its base. Again, in the case of Alcoa, in arriving at a value to be included in that company's rate base, the examiner, because of insufficient data, reduced the amounts claimed by the same percentage he had reduced Bull's claimed values. These same problems led us to conclude in General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, supra, that certain nonowned property was not properly includable in the carrier's rate base.

As indicated above, such assets were claimed by some of the carriers and not by others, were excluded by the examiner in the case of Waterman, and Bull apparently did not claim all of such property. Thus we are asked to arrive at rate bases of various carriers containing different elements, depending in some cases on the claims of the carrier and in others on the evidence submitted by it as to the value of the property. This we will not do. Proceedings such as this are difficult enough without adding to the problems. Respondents present no binding precedent that requires us to include such property in a carrier's rate base. We do not feel that either logic or law necessitates the inclusion of nonowned property. The carriers are not devoting their capital to the shipping public insofar as such property is concerned. It is proper, of course, to include in allowable expenses the rental paid and other expenses of the carriers which arise by reason of the use of such facilities, but to include the value of nonowned property in the rate bases in our opinion would grant the carriers a windfall at the expense of the shipping public.

6 F.M.B.
63. Bull's Puerto Rican terminal. The examiner included in the rate base of Bull $2,144,572, the net book value as of December 31, 1957, of certain Puerto Rican terminals owned by Bull and devoted to the trade. Public Counsel excepts to this inclusion and the Commonwealth contends that the amount should be reduced by some $475,000, representing the total acquisition cost of certain property adjoining one of the terminals on which is located a building which occupies about one-twelfth of the area and which is leased for purposes not related to the Puerto Rican trade. The remainder of the property admittedly is used for terminal services and the building rentals are credited to the Puerto Rican services of Bull. We agree with the examiner that $2,144,572 should be included in the rate base of Bull as representing the value of Bull's Puerto Rican owned terminals. This property is owned by Bull and devoted to the trade, and rentals from the building as well as any profit realized from the operation of the terminal will be credited to Bull's Puerto Rican service. Under such circumstances there is no justification for excluding the terminals in whole or in part from Bull's rate base.

64. Recapitulation. Table VI sets forth the total values of respondents' property devoted to their Puerto Rican services, as found for the purposes of this proceeding, reflecting the findings specifically made above concerning the valuation of vessels, working capital, and terminals and terminal equipment as of December 31, 1957, and reflecting also the net book values of all other property as of December 31, 1957, as found in the record. In the case of Lykes, net book values for such other property were not submitted as of December 31, 1957, and the values included are the averages of net book values shown in the record as of June 30, 1957, and as of June 30, 1958.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Values</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td>$11,491,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa</td>
<td>4,570,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykes</td>
<td>2,680,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterman</td>
<td>5,350,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Revenues and Expenses**

65. General. As stated in paragraph 46, above, in the present posture of this proceeding it is possible to determine with reasonable accuracy the actual operating results experienced by respondents during 1957 in the performance of their Puerto Rican services, and thus to make findings concerning the lawfulness of the 15-percent increase. Reasonable projections for the future may be made based upon revenue and expense data submitted by respondents covering the first six months of operations in 1958 under the combined 15-
percent and 12-percent increases, by which the lawfulness of the combined increases may be gauged. Numerous issues are raised by the parties concerning the revenues to be assigned to the Puerto Rican trade, and the expenses allowable. Certain of these, relating to allocation methods employed by respondents, depreciation claimed by them, and the adjustment of expenses to eliminate rental costs for nonowned terminals or to substitute owners’ costs therefor, have been treated separately above and need not be restated here. In restating the assignable revenues and allowable expenses, the findings there made will govern. Generally, disposition of the issues raised concerning 1957 expenses and revenues will suffice, and later data restated accordingly.

66. Interveners and Public Counsel contend that the revenues of respondents for 1957 should be restated so as to give effect to a full year’s operations under the 15-percent increase, which became effective on January 10 of that year. It is also contended that the expenses of Bull for that year should be adjusted so as to eliminate the expenses incurred during the strike mentioned in paragraph 8, above, of which $643,037 of general operating expenses and $146,483 of depreciation are allocable to the Puerto Rican services, on the ground that this strike was unique in character and occurred for reasons not related to the Puerto Rican trade. As to the strike expenses, the examiner concluded that the effect on the revenue position of Bull was no different except in degree from that of any other strike for which no claim was made. We disagree with the examiner. This strike was unrelated to the ordinary labor-management controversies, and the general operating expenses incurred during the strike should be excluded from Bull’s expenses for 1957, but no sound reason is shown for the elimination of depreciation expenses incurred during that period. With respect to the restatement of revenues to cover a full year of the 15-percent increase, we agree with the examiner that the operating results for 1957 do not enter into projections for the future, and restatement thereof so as to reflect a full year’s operation would serve no useful purpose.

67. 1957 revenues and expenses. Bull shows operating revenues for 1957 of $21,646,383, which are adjusted to include amounts of $117,954 covering interest revenue from a mortgage on the Brooklyn terminal held by Bull, $86,018 covering net profit of the Puerto Rico terminal companies, and $68,187 covering top wharfage collected in Philadelphia. Public Counsel and interveners contend that the revenues should be further adjusted so as to include $38,335 of the net profits of Caribbean Dispatch, Inc., earned in carrying bagged raw sugar under contract terms which normally would have
been transported by Bull at tariff rates, and $60,069 of profits earned by Bull in conducting independent stevedoring operations in Puerto Rico for other carriers during the strike period. Of these adjustments, the examiner found that only the inclusion of the interest revenue is improper, that it is included only for the reason that the value of the Brooklyn terminal is claimed in Bull’s rate base and that it is no more a part of the earnings derived from the Puerto Rican service than the revenue from any other unrelated investment. We agree with the examiner as to the interest revenue but are of the opinion that elimination of the strike expense for 1957, as found above, requires also that the bagged raw sugar and stevedoring profits should be excluded from the assigned revenues.

68. Bull shows total allocated operating expenses of $22,644,027. Adjustments upward include $95,872 covering costs incurred as a result of actions brought in Puerto Rican courts for overtime wages by stevedore foremen, and $69,273 covering the excess of actual Puerto Rican overhead expenses over budget provisions therefor. Adjustments downward include a credit of $145,299 for stevedore overhead charged into the stevedoring account; $72,319 to substitute owners’ expenses for terminal rentals; $3,813 to cover a correction in the allocation of 1957 strike expenses; and a stipulated correction of $35,232 in management and operating commissions. Manufacturers Association of Puerto Rico contends that the adjustment of expenses to cover the foremen’s overtime suits is improper on the ground that the expense is attributable to a violation of law by Bull. The suits arose from a difference of opinion as to Bull’s liability for overtime payments, and the costs incurred by Bull are operating costs properly includable.

69. Manufacturers Association of Puerto Rico also contends that Bull’s 1957 expenses should be adjusted downward by $6,398 to reflect an allocation of inactive vessel expense and depreciation of other equipment to the Dominican traffic, which allocation was not made by respondents, and this adjustment is considered proper. We agree with the examiner that operating expenses should be reduced by $139,404 to cover the excess of commissions paid to A. H. Bull & Co. over and above the costs of the latter as allocated on a revenue prorate.

70. Aloca shows gross operating revenues in 1957 of $9,175,949. Operating expenses after allocation were $10,615,037, adjusted downward by $423,120 to exclude pier rentals.

71. Lykes shows gross operating revenues in 1957 of $3,774,843. Operating expenses after allocation were $4,540,813.
72. Waterman shows gross operating revenues in 1957 of $9,416,267, covering both its Gulf and North Atlantic operations. Expenses were $8,771,685. Interveners contend that the expenses should be adjusted to eliminate charter hire of $32,400 on a vessel included in the rate base, and to eliminate $13,770 interest on a vessel mortgage. Since the vessel is not included in the rate base the charter hire paid is a proper expense. Interest payments are not operating expenses as such, but are rather costs of capital employed which should be borne out of profits earned, and an adjustment is proper. It is also contended that Waterman's revenues and expenses for 1957 should be restated so as to eliminate the results of its North Atlantic service, which was conducted in that year at a loss, for the reason that such service was only temporarily operated. As stated above, operating results for 1957 do not enter into projections for the future, and the service was instituted by Waterman with the full intention of making it permanent. To eliminate the results of this service would distort the actual revenue position of Waterman in defiance of the facts of record.

73. Giving effect to the findings above, including elimination of strike expenses and adjustments relating thereto, and the adjustment in Bull's revenues as found in paragraph 67, above, and the inclusion of rental expenses and deletion of owners' expenses for nonowned property disallowed in the rate base, table VII shows respondents' operating results in 1957 as adjusted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table VII.—1957 operating results</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74. 1958 revenues and expenses. As stated in paragraph 17, above, respondents' revenue projections, where given, were based on an extension of their most recent experience, that for the first half of 1958, subjected to adjustments for known or contracted cost increases. Revenues for 1958 were calculated as twice those for the first six months, adjusted to give effect for the full year to the 12-percent increase which became effective January 15. Expenses for the first six months were adjusted upward by about 1 percent. Waterman did not submit future projections, basing its position on the fact that it

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ceased operations in the trade and its successor in the operation is not a respondent herein. Waterman contends, therefore, that no consideration may be given to the future operations of Waterman P. R. in the trade in determining the lawfulness of the rates here under investigation. Waterman P. R. is, however, an existing operator in the Gulf/Puerto Rico trade, its rates are identical with those under investigation, and it has agreed to be bound by the findings herein. Accordingly, for the purposes of this report, projected 1958 results for the combined Waterman and Waterman P. R. operation from Gulf ports to Puerto Rico are calculated below on the same basis as used by the other respondents. Revenues for the first six months are doubled, and adjusted upward by $54,000 as suggested by Public Counsel to reflect a full year’s operation under the 12-percent increase. Expenses for the first six months, as adjusted, are doubled and adjusted upward by 1 percent to reflect the cost increases expected by the other respondents. This will fail to give effect to the cost increases shown by Waterman individually as stated in paragraph 23, above, but it is expected that similar cost increases will also affect the other respondents, and they are disregarded here in order to treat all carriers similarly.

75. In computing operating expenses for the first six months of 1958, Bull included vessel repair expenses on a reserve basis in its voyage accounts. For the period these reserves totaled $197,428. Actual repair expenses during the period were $57,951 less than this amount, and Public Counsel and interveners contend that the excess should be credited to Bull’s expenses and only actual repair costs allowed. Bull’s actual repair expenses were $413,311 in 1957 and $562,795 in 1956, and it does not appear that the reserves are excessive. For the purpose of projecting expenses over the full year 1958, the reserves for repair expenses will be allowed.

76. The combined Waterman and Waterman P. R. expenses reported for the first six months of 1958 in their Gulf/Puerto Rico service include costs of $8,617 attributable to transfer of the Bienville cargo at New Orleans into a vessel regularly providing break-bulk service to Puerto Rico. Waterman contends that this amount should not be disallowed. It is an expense of a nonrecurring nature and for the purpose of projecting future operating results the contention has merit; the adjustment requested will be made.

77. Giving effect to the findings relating to 1957 revenues and expenses, and to those made specifically with regard to 1958, table VIII shows respondents’ revenues and expenses for the first six months of 1958, and the projected operating results for the full year 1958.

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Table VIII.—1958 operating results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First half 1958</th>
<th>1958 projected</th>
<th>1958 projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>Revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td>$11,700,918</td>
<td>$11,354,232</td>
<td>$23,650,643</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcoa</td>
<td>4,215,049</td>
<td>4,990,803</td>
<td>8,484,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykes</td>
<td>1,940,279</td>
<td>2,150,083</td>
<td>3,919,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterman and Waterman P. R.</td>
<td>4,121,323</td>
<td>3,417,080</td>
<td>8,290,646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

In our order remanding the proceeding for further hearing we directed that the record should be sufficient for consideration of the issues either through analysis of all carriers or through consideration of Bull as the rate-making carrier. The examiner treated respondents as a whole. We disagree. In *General Increases in Hawaiian Rates*, supra, and again in *General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges*, supra, we followed our prior decisions and adhered to the principle that the dominant carrier in a noncontiguous domestic trade will be taken as the rate-making line. We find nothing in the present record which warrants a different conclusion here. Bull is by far the dominant carrier in the trade and its gross revenues during the first half of 1958 exceeded those of the other three carriers. They were approximately two and one-half times those of the next largest carrier. Consideration of the issues will be made on the basis of Bull as the rate-making carrier.

On the basis of the findings set forth herein, Bull in 1957 suffered a loss of some $35,500 and the 15-percent increase has been shown to be fully justified. On the basis of the 1958 projection, which we have found to be reasonable, Bull, on a rate base of $11.5 millions, during 1958 would earn 5.0 percent before income taxes.

The Commonwealth contends that Bull's allowable return should be 5 percent. The Conference argues that a rate of 10 percent after taxes is reasonable. Public Counsel says 7.5 percent after tax is the proper rate of return. Our predecessors fixed 7 percent after taxes in *Rates of Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.*, supra, and 7.5 percent in *Alaskan Rates*, supra. Recently, in *General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges*, supra, we allowed rates of return of 5.22 and 8.90 percent upon two alternative methods of rate base valuation. We find that a rate of return of not in excess of 7.5 percent, after income taxes, of the rate bases determined as set forth in our findings is fair and reasonable.

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In view of our finding as to a fair and reasonable rate of return and the finding as to Bull’s earnings under the combined 15-percent and 12-percent increases, we find it unnecessary to give further consideration to the contentions of the Commonwealth with respect to the treatment of income taxes.

The Conference excepts to the examiner’s failure to include in the rate base a separate amount for going-concern value. As we said in General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, supra, at page 500, “Neither the Board nor any of its predecessors has ever included a separate ‘going concern value’ in a rate base.”

We see no reason to depart from the fair-return-on-fair-value standard which the Board and its predecessors have used, and we reject the contention of the Conference that the operating ratios experienced by respondents should be considered as a method of determining the reasonableness of the rates here involved.

**Ultimate Findings**

We find and conclude that the 15-percent and 12-percent increases here under investigation are just and reasonable.

An order discontinuing the proceeding will be entered.

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APPENDIX

General Order No. 31 provides in pertinent part as follows (46 CFR sec. 286.3 (a) (1) in part):

LIMITATION (3)

ADJUSTED WORKING CAPITAL

The excess, if any, of the balance of “Adjusted Working Capital” of the operator and its wholly-owned subsidiary companies as of the balance sheet date, after interim adjustments thereof, as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, and allocated to subsidized operations as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, over “Limitation of Adjusted Working Capital” in subsidized operations, as defined in Limitation (4), shall be deemed to be “Capital Held in Reserve” in the business and shall not be taken into account in determining “capital employed.”

For the purpose of applying this Limitation, “Adjusted Working Capital” shall include only the following accounts defined in Part 282 of this chapter:

Accounts
100-199 Current assets (less reserves and provision for accrued deposits in
(369) statutory reserve funds other than voluntary deposits, which shall
not be accrued for deposit).
200 Unterminated voyage expense.
375-389 Deferred charges (to operations) and prepaid expenses.

Less:
400-534 Current liabilities (excluding mortgage notes—vessels, and other
liabilities payable from statutory reserve funds).
495 Advance ticket sales and deposits.
500 Unterminated voyage revenue.

The provision for accrued deposits into the statutory reserve funds referred to in Accounts 100-199 hereinabove shall include, but is not limited to, the following:

(i) Accrued depreciation on vessels required to be deposited into the Capital
Reserve Fund;
(ii) Proceeds from sale or loss of vessels and other amounts which, upon
collection, are required to be deposited into the Capital Reserve Fund;
(iii) All accrued mandatory deposits into the Special Reserve Fund.

LIMITATION (4)

LIMITATION OF ADJUSTED WORKING CAPITAL

Adjusted Working Capital as determined under Limitation (3) shall be
allowed as “capital employed” to the extent of the Total Average Voyage Ex-
penses employed in subsidized operations determined as follows:

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Average Voyage Expenses shall be determined on the basis of the actual expenses of operating and maintaining the subsidized vessels (excluding lay-up expenses) for a period represented by the average length of time of all round voyages (excluding lay-up periods) calculated separately for each subsidized service (line). For the purposes of this Limitation, the term "line" shall be deemed to mean those described in Part I of the Operating-Differential Subsidy Agreement, or in instances where the routes or services described therein are not designated as "lines", then the trade routes referred to in Part I of the Subsidy Agreement shall for such purposes be deemed to be "lines"; Provided, That in any event passenger services shall be deemed to be "lines" separate and distinct from freight services: And provided further, That in instances where unsubsidized vessels are operated in subsidized services and are subject to the reserve and recapture provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be considered as a separate category but shall be included with the subsidized vessels for the line involved.

This determination shall be made in the following manner:

First: By dividing the sum of such expenses for the accounting period involved applicable to the subsidized vessels in each such service (line) by the aggregate number of days (excluding "lay-up" days) consumed in all voyages of such vessels in each such service (line) terminating during such period;

Second: By multiplying the quotient thus obtained by the number of days (excluding "lay-up" days) in the average voyage in each such service (line);

Third: By multiplying the resulting product by the quotient of the total number of days (excluding "lay-up" days) consumed in voyages of subsidized vessels in each such service (line) terminating during the accounting period divided by the number of calendar days within the accounting period.

The expense of operating and maintaining the subsidized vessels shall include overhead (Accounts 900-955 less Accounts 670 and 895) allocated to subsidized operations under § 286.4 and total Operating Expense—Terminated Voyages (Accounts 701-799 in Part 282 of this chapter). For the purpose of this Limitation (4), if, in any instance, the average subsidized voyage in any subsidized service (line), as determined above, is of less than ninety (90) days' duration, the expense of hull and machinery insurance (Account 755) and P & I insurance (Account 757) shall be determined to be that for a period of ninety (90) days: Provided, That such allowance for insurance expense shall not, in the aggregate, exceed the total actual insurance expense for the accounting period. Expenses used for this purpose shall be those included in the annual accounting for each calendar year, filed under Part 292 of this chapter, and shall not be adjusted thereafter.

6 F.M.B.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 28th day of April A.D. 1960

No. 807

ATLANTIC & GULF-PUERTO RICO GENERAL INCREASE IN RATES AND CHARGES

This proceeding having been instituted by the Board on its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report stating its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof, and having found that the proposed rates and charges under investigation are just and reasonable:

It is ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) JAMES L. PIMPER,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 867

PROPORTIONAL COMMODITY RATES ON CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO

Submitted February 9, 1960. Decided April 28, 1960

Proposed proportional commodity rates on cigarettes, cigars, and tobacco from New York, N.Y. (Port Newark, N.J.), to Ponce and San Juan, P.R., found unduly preferential of the port of New York and unduly prejudicial to the port of Baltimore, in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916. Proposed rates ordered cancelled and proceeding discontinued.

Warren Price, Jr., and W. C. Farnell, Jr., for respondent.

Frank Gormley, Robert E. Mitchell, and Edward Aptaker as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

CLARENCE G. MORSE, Chairman, THOS. E. STAKEM, Jr., Vice Chairman, SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

By its freight tariff No. 5, FMB–F No. 5, and supplements Nos. 1, 2, and 3, filed with the Board to become effective on August 25, 1959, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (respondent) proposes to establish proportional commodity rates on cigarettes and tobacco NOS, as defined in the tariff, from New York, N.Y. (Port Newark, N.J.), to Ponce and San Juan, Puerto Rico, when originating at Petersburg and Richmond, Va., and Durham, Greensboro, Reidsville, and Winston-Salem, N.C., and on cigars from and to the same ports when originating at Richmond. Upon protest, the Board by
order of August 24, 1959, instituted this investigation to determine the reasonableness and lawfulness of the tariff schedules pursuant to the Shipping Act, 1916 (the 1916 Act), 46 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, 46 U.S.C. 843 et seq., and suspended the operation of the schedules to and including December 24, 1959. Respondent voluntarily has extended the effective date of the suspended schedules until May 24, 1960, to permit disposition of this proceeding. United States Atlantic & Gulf-Puerto Rico Conference (the Conference), Maryland Port Authority (the Authority), and Baltimore Association of Commerce (the Association) intervened in opposition to the proposed rates. Cigar Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., intervened as its interests might appear but took no active part in the proceeding.

Hearing was held before an examiner, and in his initial decision he concluded and found that the proposed rates would unduly prefer the port of New York and would be unduly prejudicial to the port of Baltimore, in violation of section 16 First of the 1916 Act. Exceptions to the initial decision and replies thereto were filed, and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified by the facts or not related to material issues in this proceeding.

Respondent serves only New York in the North Atlantic, does not serve Baltimore, Md., and has no intention of extending its service to the latter port. Its weekly service to Puerto Rico is a new and modern concept of through motor-water trailership transportation, inaugurated in July 1958. Cargo is carried in standard-size highway trailer vans which are loaded on and discharged from the vessel by ship's cranes. Each trailer van is provided with a special chassis for its movement as a unit to and away from the vessel. A connecting motor carrier's truck-tractor may be attached to the chassis unit for haul of the trailer van to and from interior points. This method of operation eliminates intermediate handling of the shipment from the time it is loaded in the trailer van at point of origin until it is discharged at destination in Puerto Rico, and is suitable for a wide range of articles moving to Puerto Rico, especially for commodities having relatively high value and susceptibility to loss and damage in handling.

Despite solicitation of the traffic, respondent has carried only 108 cases of cigarettes, of which 25 originated at Richmond and Reidsville, and no cigars or tobacco from any of the six interior origins mentioned above. The cigarettes all moved in October 1958, during
a period when one of the conference carriers serving Baltimore was strike-bound. Sales efforts with the shippers involved have been unfruitful because of alleged lower total freight charges through the port of Baltimore than are applicable over respondent's line. Accordingly, the proposed rates have been designed to equalize the through motor-water charges via New York with those applicable via Baltimore.

The proposed rates are published in two parts in the suspended schedules. The first part names basic port-to-port commodity rates of 58 cents per cubic foot on cigarettes and cigars, and 55 cents per cubic foot on tobaccos NOS, both subject to minimum weights of 28,000 pounds. These basic rates are on the same level as respondent's present rates. They are also on the same level as the present rates maintained by the Conference. As in the case of all other commodities, the port-to-port rates on cigarettes, cigars, and tobacco of both respondent and the Conference are the same from all ports in the United States to Puerto Rico. The second part of the suspended schedules names proportional differentials by which to determine the amounts to be deducted from the ocean charges, calculated on the basis of the basic commodity rates and depending on the particular origin of the commodities shipped. These differentials are 10 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 25,000 pounds, on cigarettes and tobacco originating at Petersburg; 24 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 20,000 pounds, on cigarettes and tobacco originating at Durham, Greensboro, Reidsville, and Winston-Salem; and 26 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 30,000 pounds, on cigarettes, 6 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 20,000 pounds, on cigars, and 6 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 25,000 pounds, on tobacco when originating at Richmond.

The applicable tariff charges over respondent's line are computed by first ascertaining the total charges that would result by the application of the basic commodity rates, and then deducting the amounts determined by the use of the proportional differentials. For example, on a shipment of cigarettes of 30,000 pounds, measuring 1,579 cubic feet and originating at Petersburg, the basic rate of 58 cents per cubic foot would produce revenue of $915.82, but when reduced by $30 by application of the differential of 10 cents per 100 pounds, it will result in a net charge of $885.82. Similarly computed, net ocean charges on like shipments originating at Richmond and at the North Carolina points would be $837.82 and $843.82, respectively. The proportional differentials represent the exact amounts in cents per

1 The tariff also names a rate of 143 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 28,000 pounds, on all of the commodities, which is inapplicable because of the high cubic to weight ratio of the commodities involved.
100 pounds that the presently applicable motor common-carrier rates from the interior origins to New York exceed the rates to Baltimore, and a parity of through charges with Baltimore would be established on shipments over respondent's line through New York. The table below shows the present motor common-carrier rates on cigarettes from interior origins to New York and Baltimore and the highway distances.

**Motor common-carrier rates on cigarettes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To Baltimore</th>
<th>To New York</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petersburg</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reidsville</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greensboro</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winston-Salem</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each instance the highway distance from interior origins to New York exceeds that to Baltimore by 197 miles, and the most direct highway route from interior origins to New York lies through Baltimore. Respondent does not anticipate that the proposed rates will generate any new traffic, but expects that a portion of the traffic now moving through Baltimore will be diverted to move over its line through New York. No transit time advantage would be gained by the shippers on shipments moving through New York as against those moving through Baltimore. It was stipulated by the parties that respondent has the capacity to handle the traffic involved. Respondent shows numerous situations wherein rail inland export rates lower than domestic rates are equalized to different ports regardless of distance, as for example rates on cottonseed meal, cake, and related articles which are the same from Fort Worth, Tex., to New Orleans, La., 533 miles, as to Houston, Tex., 260 miles.

The membership of the Conference includes the principal carriers operating break-bulk services to and from Puerto Rico. Of these, Bull-Insular Line, Inc. (Bull), and Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. (Alcoa), provide service at Baltimore. Alcoa operates a weekly southbound service which originates at Philadelphia, calls at Baltimore and New York in that order, and then proceeds to Puerto Rico. For many years Bull operated a year-round weekly round-trip service which began at Philadelphia, proceeded to Baltimore, and then direct to Puerto Rico and return to Philadelphia. Bull thus was the only carrier which provided a direct service from Baltimore to Puerto Rico. In 1959, for the first time, in order to improve vessel

6 F.M.B.
utilization, Bull has had its vessels call at New York after leaving Baltimore during the summer months, eliminating the direct Baltimore-Puerto Rico service, although it is contemplated that winter schedules will resume the direct service because weather conditions will not permit the continuance of a call at New York in the Baltimore service and still maintain a weekly service with two vessels. In 1959, after leaving the last port of call, free space available in the vessels operating in the Baltimore service averaged 42 percent of the vessels’ cubic capacity under the direct winter schedules, as against 24.5 percent for the vessels which called at New York under the summer schedules. Free space on Alcoa’s vessels was also substantial, indicating that Bull and Alcoa have ample capacity to carry the traffic here involved.

Cigarettes constitute by far the major portion of the traffic originating at the interior points here involved (more than 95 percent), and about 85 percent of all cigarettes shipped originate at Richmond according to the data furnished by Bull. In 1958 and 1959 to date, from these interior origins, Bull carried 8,064,052 pounds of cigarettes, cigars, and tobacco measuring 494,891 cubic feet, and this volume represented about 2 percent of its total cargo out of Baltimore. Only about 25 percent of all cargo loaded by Bull at Baltimore originates in that city, the remainder being drawn from interior points. Alcoa’s share of the traffic is considerably smaller, aggregating 402,096 pounds measuring 24,529 cubic feet in 1958 and the first three quarters of 1959. Tobacco products are among the higher-rated commodities, and in the case of Bull annual revenue therefrom is about $160,000. Loss and damage claims for Bull are relatively insignificant, totaling $1,246 in 1957, $1,686 in 1958, and $1,096 in 1959 to date.

Practically all of the tobacco products moving to Puerto Rico through Baltimore are transported in container vans furnished by Bull and Alcoa, and sufficient numbers of such vans are held at that port for such traffic. These container vans are only about one-third the size of the trailer vans utilized by respondent. The container vans are loaded by the carriers at the port, and deliveries in Puerto Rico may be effected in the vans without unloading at the pier.

In order to counter the proposed rates, the Conference filed with the Board, to become effective on January 24, 1960, reduced port-to-port rates from the United States to Puerto Rico of 54 cents per cubic foot on cigarettes, 57 cents on cigars, and 50 cents on tobacco NOS. These reduced rates are predicated on the basis of equalizing, out of all ports, the lowest port-to-port ocean charges which would

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*The effective dates of these schedules have since been extended concurrently with those of respondent.*
result from respondent’s proposed proportional rates, and thus would undercut respondent’s proposed rates to some extent, but the Conference feels that in order to avoid the possibility of discrimination against any tobacco shippers not located at the Virginia and North Carolina origins here involved, equal port-to-port rates should be available to all. Bull is opposed in principle to the type of port equalization here proposed by respondent, because of its destructive nature to port interests, and would recommend to the Conference that further similar reductions made by respondent be met to the point that the rates cease to be compensatory.

It was stipulated that the rates proposed by respondent would be compensatory, and that rates resulting from further reductions by respondent in its port-to-port basic rates to the level of the reduced port-to-port rates filed by the Conference would likewise be compensatory. The record indicates that it is the intention of respondent to meet any rate reductions by the Conference on these commodities.

The port of New York has many advantages which attract traffic from all over the United States, including the area around and beyond Baltimore. Steamship lines offer many more direct sailings out of New York to all destinations than out of Baltimore. In addition to its preponderance of steamship services, New York has a far greater number of supplementary services, including international freight forwarders, customhouse brokers, international banking facilities, steamship line agencies, consular services, the only foreign trade zone in the North Atlantic, commodity exchanges, marine insurance brokers, foreign purchasing agencies, and foreign chambers of commerce. Among the North Atlantic ports, New York handles the great preponderance of general cargo in foreign trade. In 1957, 17,118,824 tons of general cargo in the export and import trades moved through New York as compared with 4,518,442 tons through Baltimore. As for general cargo, exclusive of bulk shipments, moving to Puerto Rico from New York and Baltimore, New York’s share increased from 65.7 percent in 1954 to 70.3 percent of an expanded volume in 1957. Exports of manufactured tobacco through New York in 1957 were 22,673 tons as compared with only 124 tons through Baltimore, indicating that even at unfavorable inland rates export tobacco shippers, including those at interior Virginia and North Carolina points, favor the port of New York.

Section 18 of the 1916 Act requires that carriers in interstate commerce shall establish and enforce just and reasonable rates, fares, and charges, and just and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto, and makes unlawful any unjust and unreasonable rates, etc. Section 16 provides, so far as pertinent:
That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or other person subject to this Act, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly—

First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.

Respondent contends that the proposed rates are just and reasonable in that they are compensatory and no lower than necessary to meet the competition; that proportional rates, and particularly the practice of port equalization, have been sanctioned by the Board and its predecessors; and that the proposed rates do not violate section 16 because that section does not embrace ports within its terms, and because respondent does not serve Baltimore, or participate in rates through that port, and therefore it cannot be accused of discrimination against the port of Baltimore, citing Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. U.S., 289 U.S. 627 (1933). The Conference contends that the proposed rates are unreasonable because they would result in destructive competition. The Authority and the Association contend that the proposed rates would result in undue and unreasonable preference to the port of New York and would unduly prejudice the port of Baltimore, in that they are designed to attract to the port of New York traffic which naturally is tributary to the port of Baltimore.

In Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. U.S., supra, the Supreme Court held, at a time when section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act was generally comparable to the present language of section 16 First of the 1916 Act, that ports as such were not “localities” with respect to export and import traffic routed through them, being nothing more than gateways or junction points, and therefore were not susceptible to undue preference or prejudice within the meaning of section 3(1). Respondent recognizes that in City of Mobile v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 2 U.S.M.C. 474 (1941), the Maritime Commission held that, with respect to a similar contention, ports are localities within the meaning of the 1916 Act, notwithstanding the holding of the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. U.S., supra, stating at p. 478:

Defendants fail adequately to consider one point influencing the court’s decision. With respect to traffic moving by rail en route to destinations beyond seaborne, ports are neither origins of the traffic nor shipping, producing or consuming areas affected by the rates; they are merely transshipping points. As to water transportation, a port also is a transshipping point, but it is something more. It is an area affected by the port-to-port rates established by the carrier. It is also the place at which, either actually or constructively, the contract of affreightment is executed. Therefore, a port becomes for the water movement
a point of origin and under the court's decision, is within the term "locality" even though shipments have received prior rail transportation under an independent contract.

Respondent argues that the quoted language does not apply with respect to its operations, which contemplate the movement in through service of shipments loaded in trailer vans at interior origins, without off-loading at the port. From the standpoint of the service which it performs, however, respondent's status is no different from that of any other ocean carrier, since it exercises no control over, nor participates in, the interior transportation. So far as respondent is concerned, the port of New York is the origin point of the shipments transported by it, whether or not the shipments have received prior motor transportation.

A contention like that of respondent here, that it cannot be accused of discrimination against the port of Baltimore in view of the fact that it does not serve that port, was considered and rejected in Beaumont Port Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 3 F.M.B. 556, 565-6 (1951), on the ground that injury to a port adversely affected by equalizing proportional rates is caused directly by the action of the carrier establishing such rates and is proscribed by the statute.

Insofar as respondent's services are concerned, the proposed rates would establish varying charges for identical services. Such rates are prima facie discriminatory (Contract Rates—Japan/Atlantic-Gulf Freight Conf., 4 F.M.B. 706, 735 (1955), and Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220, 225 (1939)) and are thus unreasonable in the absence of justification therefor. In City of Mobile v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., supra, at page 486, it was stated:

We recognize that proportional rates in water transportation may be proper in some instances, but it must not be presumed that every rate which is lower than the corresponding local rate is a lawful proportional rate. Except when delivery costs at ports are relied upon differentials between defendants' local rates and the alleged proportional rates do not reflect any competitive cost or other transportation factor in the transportation service which defendants actually perform. A carrier undertaking to establish proportional rates should be prepared to prove some such relationship.

In some earlier decisions the predecessors of the Board approved proportional rates which represented absorptions of inland rate differentials. Board of Commissioners L. C. H. & T. D. v. N. Y. & P. R. S. S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 154 (1929); Proportional West'd Intercoastal Rates on Cast-Iron Pipe, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 376 (1935); Intercoastal Rate Structure, 2 U.S.M.C. 285 (1940). Later decisions, however, have recognized the destructive nature of such absorptions to the right of ports to traffic originating in the areas naturally tributary to their port.
locations, in the absence of adequate ocean service available at the particular ports. See Beaumont Port Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 2 U.S.M.C. 500 (1941), and 2 U.S.M.C. 699 (1943); Beaumont Port Commission v. Seatrain Linés, Inc., supra; City of Portland v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 4 F.M.B. 664 (1955), and 5 F.M.B. 118 (1956). In City of Mobile v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., supra, the Maritime Commission required cancellation of all equalizing proportional rates then in effect in the Puerto Rican trade, and stated at pp. 486–7:

To permit continuation of unrestricted solicitation by carriers for business through condonation of a practice whereby unfavorable inland rates are overcome would wholly ignore the right of a port to traffic to which it may be entitled by reason of its geographical location. Such right appears fundamental under statutes designed to establish and maintain ports. Under section 8 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, we are required to recognize territorial regions and zones tributary to ports and should there exist rates to seaboard which, among other things, do not recognize the natural direction of the flow of traffic recommendations may be made to the Interstate Commerce Commission for such action as it deems necessary. The contention has been made that section 8 has no relation to rate regulatory provisions of the Shipping Act, 1916. But to wholly ignore basic policies of Congress would be unwarranted.

Respondent admits that the traffic here involved normally would move through the port of Baltimore, and that the proposed rates, if successful, would operate to divert such traffic away from its normal flow. It contends, however, that because of the small amount of traffic involved, such diversion would not cause substantial injury to that port, nor have any adverse effect upon the carriers serving Baltimore, and that any prejudice to the port of Baltimore resulting from the proposed rates could not therefore be found undue or unreasonable within the meaning of the 1916 Act. The revenues from such traffic are substantial, however. The record shows a gradual trend of traffic away from Baltimore and toward New York under the present differentials in inland rates, and the principal carrier of tobacco products has found it necessary to eliminate during the summer months its direct Baltimore-Puerto Rico service because of insufficient traffic, which situation will not be enhanced by the further artificial diversion of traffic such as is here proposed. It is true that through the proposed rates respondent is endeavoring to make available, at equalized transportation costs, a new and improved type of through sea-land service, but there is no evidence that the shippers of tobacco products located at Virginia and North Carolina interior points need or desire such service, or that the present service available to them through the port of Baltimore is inadequate or unsatisfactory in any respects.
We find that the proposed rates would unduly prefer the port of New York and would be unduly prejudicial to the port of Baltimore, in violation of section 16 First of the 1916 Act.

An order will be entered requiring cancellation of the proposed rates and discontinuing the proceeding.

6 F.M.B.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 28th day of April A.D. 1960

No. 867

PROPORTIONAL COMMODITY RATES ON CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO

This proceeding having been instituted by the Board on its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report stating its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is ordered, That Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation be, and it is hereby, notified and required to cancel, effective on or before May 31, 1960, the schedules under investigation herein, designated as follows:

Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation FMB F-No. 5, and Supplements Nos. 1, 2, and 3,

upon not less than one day’s notice to the Board and to the general public, by filing and posting in the manner prescribed by the Board, under section 18 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended; and

It is further ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) JAMES L. PIMPER,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-105

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)

Submitted April 21, 1960. Decided April 28, 1960*

American President Lines, Ltd., granted written permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for the Operation or Charter (upon time or bareboat terms) of Tanker Vessels by Signal Oil and Gas Company, or by any Division or Subsidiary thereof, for the Carriage of Petroleum Products in the Domestic Intercoastal or Coastwise service, since granting of the permission found: (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the Coastwise or Intercoastal service, and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

Warner W. Gardner, for applicant American President Lines, Ltd. Robert B. Hood, Jr., as Public Counsel.

INITIAL DECISION OF EDWARD C. JOHNSON, EXAMINER

In an application dated December 31, 1959, American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) requested written permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for the operation or charter (upon time or bareboat terms) of tanker vessels by Signal Oil and Gas Company (Signal), or by any division or subsidiary thereof, for the carriage of petroleum products in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service. The application further requested that the permission be granted as of September 23, 1959, and stated that there would be no objection if the permission were subject to review, modification or revocation upon reasonable notice—with any modification or revocation to be effective upon terms not involving a breach of any charter obligation.

*In the absence of exceptions thereto by the parties, and upon notice by the Board, the initial decision of the examiner became the decision of the Board on the date shown (Section 8(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act and Rules 13(d) and 13(h) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure).

6 F.M.B. 59
1. Signal owns 48 percent of the voting stock of APL, which has an operating-differential subsidy contract under the Merchant Marine Act, 1936. On September 23, 1959, Signal acquired by merger, Eastern States Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Eastern States), which has since operated as a division of Signal.

2. APL, having learned on November 26, 1959, that Eastern States had a tanker under time charter which was operating in the domestic service, on December 31, 1959, applied for the aforesaid written permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936.

3. Eastern States operates two inter-connected refineries located about a mile apart, connected by a pipe line system, at Houston, Texas. It specializes in the production of aromatic, intermediate and aliphatic solvents. These are obtained, by extraction and by fractionation, from the components of crude petroleum which lie roughly in the boiling-range of gasoline.

4. Eastern States manufactures about 50 different grades of solvents and will also manufacture any other type to the specification of a customer. The solvents have a wide variety of chemical and industrial uses: paints, insecticides, surface coatings, inks, varnishes, enamels, oil extraction, adhesives, degreasing, rendering and floor-wax are a few of their uses. The solvents are produced to and must retain exact specifications, including boiling points, color, odor, specific gravity and flash point. A very minute contamination or a solvent that is off-test will make the solvent useless and unacceptable. As implied by their name, the solvents contaminate very readily. A tanker which has ever carried black oil, for example, regardless of how long ago or what cleaning processes it has undergone, even including sand-blasting, will contaminate the solvents, while the usual small degree of leakage of valves and pipes will mean that two or more solvents may contaminate themselves and therefore become useless.

5. Eastern States sells its solvents through its terminals at Houston, Brownsville, Chicago, Madison, East Liverpool, Savannah, San Pedro, and San Francisco. It charters, as a shipper, space on barges to supply the Gulf and Mississippi terminals and the wing tanks of the SS Angelo Petri, a wine tanker, on its westbound voyages, to supply the California terminals. The Savannah terminal is supplied by, and frequently deliveries to customers are made with, the SS Spirit of Liberty.

6. The SS Spirit of Liberty is a T-2 tanker, under a 10-11 year time charter to Eastern States, commencing in June 1957, from the Key-
stone Shipping Company (Keystone). In 1958 its tanks 1 and 2 were remodeled for the carriage of solvents: additional compartments were made, and special pumping, segregated pipe lines and double block valves were provided. Eastern States uses tanks 1 and 2 for carriage of its solvents, and is careful that its other tanks be confined to clean service; no lube, vegetable or fatty oils have been carried. Eastern States would find it exceedingly difficult or well nigh impossible to obtain a tanker on the market which would meet its solvent needs. Even if liners with tanks were available, and would happen to have an itinerary which met the needs, Eastern States could not load into its deep tanks for fear of contamination from a prior product. Many of the solvents, moreover, have a flash point too low for carriage on dry cargo vessels.

7. The Spirit of Liberty has frequently been sub-chartered to others, for clean service, when not needed by Eastern States. Except for these occasions, it has carried only products owned by Eastern States. After delivery of its product, it ordinarily returns to Houston in ballast, since the commodity transported is ordinarily regarded as “a one-way cargo carriage operation.”

8. Eastern States was unable at the time of the hearing to predict whether the future needs of its solvents business would call for operation of one or more tankers fixed up to meet its needs under time charter.

9. There is no operating connection between APL and any tankers operated by Eastern States, nor is there any way to divert cargo one from the other. Eastern States’ witness, Manager of Product Handling, had never seen an APL vessel or officer (until he met the APL witness in this proceeding), and knew nothing of the APL services.

Discussion

The precise issue presented in this application appears to have been decided recently by the Board on February 9, 1960, in States Marine Lines, Inc.—Application under Section 805(a), S-57 (Sub. 4), when the Initial Decision of Examiner Gray became the decision of the Board. In pertinent part it reads:

With its numerous tank compartments of various sizes and capacities and special piping and pumping arrangements it [SS Texas] is equipped to and continuously since February 1957, has been carrying various liquid commodities shipped in bulk between all U.S. Pacific ports and U.S. Gulf and Atlantic ports.

As a subsidized carrier States Marine Lines, Inc., could not divert cargo from this intercoastal operation because its vessels are not equipped for the carriage of liquid commodities in bulk. Furthermore, U.S. Coast Guard regul-
lations prohibit standard dry cargo ships carrying such inflammable commodities in bulk. No exclusively domestic operator in the intercoastal trade has objected to continuation of the Texan’s operation.

On this record it is found that granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Then in American President Lines, Ltd., Section 805(a) Application, 4 F.M.B. 436 (1954), S-36, permission was granted for the operation in domestic services of 6 tankers owned by Independent Tankships, a subsidiary of American Independent Oil Company, in which Signal and Ralph K. Davies, an officer and director of APL, were shareholders. The tankers were subsequently sold, on the open market. One of them was the Spirit of Liberty, purchased by Keystone Shipping Company. The order in S-36 in relevant part reads:

* * * * * * *

(3) For Signal Oil and Gas Co. to be a holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of American President Lines, Ltd.; and

* * * * * * *

It is ordered, That written permission as required by section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, be, and it is hereby, granted, authorizing the existence of the relationships above described, retrospectively and prospectively, subject to the condition that none of the vessels owned, operated, or chartered by Independent Tankships, Inc., shall, after the date of this order, carry any lubricating oils, or vegetable oils (including cocoanut), or fatty oils (including tallow), or detergents, in the domestic intercoastal service.

Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register on January 29, 1960, and a hearing was held before the undersigned on February 16, 1960. No one appeared in opposition to the application. No operating or traffic connection between APL and Eastern States has existed or can develop. The manufacture and distribution of solvents by Eastern States—an important industrial operation—would be seriously, if not fatally handicapped by denial of the necessary permission to operate the specialized and rigidly controlled tanker space necessary for this solvent movement. Since Eastern States cannot predict the volume and nature of its demand sufficiently to specify whether it needs permission for one, two, or more tankers,
generalized permission, with power reserved to the Administrator to modify or revoke, should be given.2

There appears to be no reason of substance why permission, in effect granted Signal to operate the *Spirit of Liberty* when owned by a subsidiary, should be curtailed to preclude Signal from operating the same vessel when time chartered to a division. The *Spirit of Liberty* is covered by the permission granted in 1954.3 Public Counsel agree with the accuracy of applicant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and concur therein; and do not oppose the granting of permission to applicant for the operation or charter (upon time or bareboat terms) of tanker vessels by Signal Oil and Gas Company, or by any subsidiary or division thereof, for the carriage of petroleum products in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, such permission to be subject to review, modification or revocation upon reasonable notice.

**Conclusion**

On this record, it is found that the granting of the requested permission (subject to review, modification and termination by the Board/Administration upon a showing by any person that continuation of the permission would contravene Section 805(a)), will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as such written permission requested by applicant.

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2 In *American President Lines, Ltd.—Section 805(a) Application, supra*, the Board and Administrator on April 14, 1954 granted permission "retrospectively and prospectively" for a Section 805(a) relationship which had commenced in March 1948. The same rule which justified a 4-year retroactivity in that proceeding will justify a 6-month retroactivity in this present proceeding.

3 The effect of the 1954 permission reaches only to the retrospective issue—Eastern States needs flexible permission for its future operations.
Section 805(a):

It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, That, if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations; and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

No. S-110

PACIFIC FAR EAST LINE, INC.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)


Pacific Far East Line, Inc., granted written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for Long Island Tankers, Inc., a subsidiary, to charter the SS Kaimana to Matson Navigation Company for one round voyage between the west coast of the United States and British Columbia and the Hawaiian Islands, commencing on or about May 1, 1960, and a second like voyage not later than the date of arrival of the vessel in the Hawaiian Islands on the first voyage, since granting of such permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Odell Kominers for applicant.
Robert B. Hood, Jr., as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (PFEL), filed an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1223 (the Act), for Long Island Tankers, Inc., a subsidiary, to charter the SS Kaimana to Matson Navigation Company (Matson) for one round voyage between the west coast of the United States and British Columbia and the Hawaiian Islands, delivery of the vessel to be effected on or about May 1, 1960, at San Francisco, with an option by Matson in the charter for a second like voyage to be exercised not later than the arrival of the vessel in the Hawaiian Islands on the first voyage. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register
of April 23, 1960 (25 F.R. 3559). No one appeared in opposition to the application.

Matson requires a vessel for use in its regular service between the Pacific coast and the Hawaiian Islands during May. It is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage, and for a second like voyage provided the vessel is chartered for such second voyage prior to its arrival in Hawaii on the first voyage.

6 M.A.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. — Application Under Section 805(a)

Submitted May 17, 1960. Decided May 17, 1960

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., granted written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its vessel, the SS Robin Trent, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products from North Pacific ports to Atlantic ports, commencing on or about May 20, 1960, since granting of the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade; and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Ira L. Ewers for applicant.
Frank Gormley as Public Counsel.

Report of the Acting Maritime Administrator

By the Acting Maritime Administrator:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., filed an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1223 (the Act), for its vessel, the SS Robin Trent, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products commencing at North Pacific ports on or about May 20, 1960, for discharge at Atlantic ports. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register of May 7, 1960 (25 F.R. 4121). No one appeared in opposition to the application.

States Marine has cargo bookings of approximately six and one-half million feet of lumber and lumber products but has been unable
to obtain any other suitable vessel for a May sailing, which, according to its witness, is now scheduled to commence on or about May 20, 1960. The sailing of the Robin Trent would not increase the normal pattern of scheduling in States Marine's eastbound intercoastal service.

It is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.

6 M.A.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., granted written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its vessel, the SS Mormacsun, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products from North Pacific ports to Atlantic ports, commencing on or about June 1, 1960, since granting of the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade; and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Ira L. Ewers for applicant.

John E. Cograve as Public Counsel.

Report of the Acting Maritime Administrator

By the Acting Maritime Administrator:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., filed an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1223 (the Act), for its vessel, the SS Mormacsun, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products commencing at North Pacific ports on or about May 28, 1960, for discharge at Atlantic ports. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register of May 14, 1960 (25 F.R. 4331). No one appeared in opposition to the application.

States Marine has cargo bookings of approximately six and one-half million feet of lumber and lumber products but has been unable
to obtain any other suitable vessel for an early June sailing which, according to its witness, is now scheduled to commence on or about June 1, 1960. The sailing of the Mormacsun would not increase the normal pattern of scheduling in States Marine’s eastbound inter-coastal service.

It is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.

6 M.A.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-57 (Sub. No. 3)

STATES MARINE LINES, INC.—WAIVER UNDER SECTION 804 OF THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1936

Submitted April 26, 1960. Decided May 31, 1960

Special circumstances and good cause shown under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, to permit (1) ownership and/or operation by Global Bulk Transport Corporation of 21 specified vessels in specified bulk trades; (2) ownership and operation by Navegacion del Pacifico of certain Mexican-flag vessels to provide lighter services at Guaymas and La Paz, Mexico; (3) chartering by Isthmian Lines, Inc., of foreign-flag vessels for use as lighters in the Persian Gulf; and (4) Global Bulk Transport, Corporation to act as husbanding agent in the United States for Reardon Smith & Sons, Ltd.

Waivers will be granted under section 804 for a period of two years, subject to cancellation upon 90 days' notice to the operator.

Elkan Turk, George F. Galland, and Robert N. Kharasch for applicant.


Robert Blackwell as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, JR., Vice Chairman, and SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

States Marine Lines, Inc., a Delaware corporation (States Marine or applicant), filed an application for a waiver under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended \(^1\) (the Act), or alterna-
tively for a finding that certain specified foreign-flag vessel activities of its associates or affiliates do not compete with any American-flag service determined to be essential as provided by section 211 of the Act. Permission is sought, if required, for the continuance, by affiliates or associates, of such foreign-flag activities in the event the Board should award it an operating-differential subsidy under title VI of the Act.

Although not required, the Board ordered a hearing, at which American President Lines, Ltd. (APL), Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (PFEL), Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. Inc. (Lykes), United States Lines Company (U.S. Lines), and American Export Lines, Inc. (Export), intervened.²

Hearings were held and the examiner's recommended decision was served on January 28, 1960. Exceptions to the recommended decision and replies thereto were filed, and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified by the facts, or not related to material issues in this proceeding.

Section 804 of the Act provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any contractor receiving an operating-differential subsidy under title VI or for any charterer of vessels under title VII of this Act, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or such charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, to own, charter, act as agent or broker for, or operate any foreign-flag vessel which competes with any American-flag service determined by the Commission to be essential as provided in section 211 of this Act: Provided, however, That under special circumstances and for good cause shown the Commission may, in its discretion, waive the provisions of this section as to any contractor, for a specific period of time, by affirmative vote of four of its members, except as otherwise provided in section 201(a).

The foreign-flag vessels which applicant's associates³ propose to own, charter, act as agent or broker for, or operate are as follows:

A. Global Bulk vessels

1. Six Norwegian-flag combination ore carriers and tankers⁴ to operate (a) in world-wide trade carrying petroleum and its products in bulk, (b) in world-wide trade, not in the foreign commerce of the United States, carrying various types of ore in bulk, and (c) from Canada, Liberia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to United States

² The Joint Committee for American-flag Tankers also requested leave to intervene, but did not appear nor further participate in the proceeding.

³ The "associate" status of Global Bulk Transport Corporation, Navegacion del Pacifico (Mexico), and Isthmian Lines, Inc., was conceded by States Marine and is not controverted.

⁴ MV Bomi Hills, 23,870 DWT; MV Enduro, 23,870 DWT; SS Chataauguy, 23,860 DWT; SS Moosic Bay, 23,950 DWT; SS Free State, 29,050 DWT; SS Cuyahoga, 29,050 DWT.
Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying iron ore in bulk, and from Brazil to
United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying manganese ore in bulk.

2. Five Liberian-flag ore carriers to operate (a) in world-wide trade, not in the foreign commerce of the United States, carrying various types of ore in bulk, and (b) from Canada, Liberia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying iron ore in bulk, and from Brazil to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying manganese ore in bulk.

3. Two Norwegian-flag ore carriers (appr. 18,000 DWT) to operate (a) in world-wide trade, not in the foreign commerce of the United States, carrying various types of ore in bulk, and (b) from Canada, Liberia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying iron ore in bulk, and from Brazil to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying manganese ore in bulk.

4. Three Norwegian-flag ore carriers to operate (a) in world-wide trade, not in the foreign commerce of the United States, carrying various types of ore in bulk, and (b) from Canada, Liberia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying iron ore in bulk, and from Brazil to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying manganese ore in bulk, and (c) from Jamaica, B.W.I., to United States Gulf ports carrying bauxite in bulk, occasionally carrying supplies and equipment to and from Baton Rouge and Gramercy, Louisiana, and mining installations in Jamaica.

5. Two Norwegian-flag ore carriers (appr. 35,000 DWT) to operate (a) in world-wide trade, not in the foreign commerce of the United States, carrying various types of ore in bulk, and (b) from Canada, Liberia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying iron ore in bulk, and from Brazil to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying manganese ore in bulk.

6. One Norwegian-flag combination ore carrier and tanker to operate (a) in world-wide trade carrying petroleum and its products in bulk, (b) in world-wide trade, not in the foreign commerce of the United States, carrying various types of ore in bulk, and (c) from Canada, Liberia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying iron ore in bulk, and from Brazil to United States Atlantic and Gulf ports carrying manganese ore in bulk.

7. One Norwegian-flag converted “Liberty” ship to operate in

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6 MV Cerro Bolivar, 18,650 DWT; MV Cerro Altamira, 18,750 DWT.
7 SS Baumare, 34,970 DWT; SS Baune, 34,970 DWT; SS Bauta, 34,970 DWT.
8 SS Sigvik, 35,303 DWT; SS Sigborg, 35,400 DWT.
9 SS Sjob, 31,798 DWT.
10 SS Sokna, 10,800 DWT.
11 F.M.B.
service from Cuba to United States Gulf ports carrying cobalt and nickel slurry in bulk; from United States Gulf ports to Cuba carrying molten sulphur in bulk and liquefied petroleum gas in pressurized tanks; and from United States Gulf ports to Moa Bay, Cuba, carrying supplies for the mining and loading installation at Moa Bay.

8. One Norwegian-flag tanker \(^{11}\) to operate in world-wide trade carrying petroleum and its products in bulk.

Applicant also requests that any waiver granted include permission to the companies operating the 19 vessels described in paragraphs 1 through 6 to charter substitute or supplementary vessels, either American-flag or foreign-flag, to operate in the trades named, carrying the named bulk ore cargoes.

**B. Navegacion del Pacifico (Mexico) vessels**

1. One riverboat.
2. Six wooden lighters.
3. Two Sea-Mule type tugs.

These vessels are used to provide lighter service to vessels at Guaymas and La Paz, Mexico.

**C. Isthmian Lines, Inc., vessels**

1. A foreign-flag vessel to be time chartered for use as a lighter ship in the Persian Gulf.

The record shows that American-flag services had carried until recently some, and was still carrying other types of cargo now carried by the foreign-flag vessels which are described in the application. Iron ore moves in parcel loads. In the heaviest movement from Chile it is used by liners as bottom cargo. In 1958 American-flag liners carried 10 percent of the movement. Bauxite was carried by one of the interveners in 1956. Small loads moved on liners in 1957, in the described trades. Manganese ore moves in from Chile. In 1958 American-flag liners carried 1 percent of the movement. Some competition for Brazilian manganese ore comes from India ore. Manganese ore is carried regularly from South and East Africa to Gulf and Atlantic coast ports in liners.

Quantities of ore from competing areas were shown. The importation of iron ore has increased about six-fold from 1947 to 1959. Bauxite ore imports are now about 8,000,000 tons a year. Manganese ore now is imported at the rate of 2,000,000 tons a year. Reference was made to bidding for iron ore cargoes. The daily cost of operating various types of competing tankers was described. The records show that United States-flag liner vessels operating on essential trade routes

\(^{11}\) SS Sigdal, 33,320 DWT.
participate to some extent in carrying ores inbound to fill out their vessels.

Petroleum products of the type carried by Global Bulk vessels appear to be in far less competition with essential American flag service, although there was evidence that to the extent that lubrication oil and asphalt are carried there may be some liner competition. No other bulk cargo, such as grain, will be carried by these vessels.

There are two oil-ore bulk special purpose vessels, eight dry-bulk ore carriers, and one intercoastal coal carrier under United States registry amounting to 4 percent of the world fleet of dry-bulk carriers. The eight ore carriers are owned by one steel company subsidiary. There thus appear to be very few American-flag vessels, exclusive of tankers carrying petroleum products, engaged in carrying these cargoes in bulk lots.

**DISCUSSION**

The principal issues are:

1. the existence of competition between foreign-flag vessels and essential American-flag service; and

2. the presence of special circumstances and a showing of good cause for a waiver of the 804 prohibition.

We find that there is competition within the meaning of section 804. The section opposes "foreign-flag vessels" and "American-flag service". The testimony disclosed few American-flag vessels of the type (bulk cargo) applicant seeks to operate. A lack of American-flag vessels of this type does not preclude a finding of competition with American-flag service under section 804. The term "service" embraces much more than vessels; it includes the scope, regularity, and probable permanency of the operation, the route covered, the traffic handled, the support given by the shipping public, and other factors which concern the bona fide character of the operation.

The record disclosed that there is available transportation service by American-flag vessels to carry from time to time the same products to and from the same areas as proposed by applicants. The service does not have to be identical if the same products are carried to and from the same areas. Indeed, section 804 requires only that the American-flag service be determined to be essential under section 211 of the Act. Ore is carried in American-flag service liners as bottom cargo. Petroleum is carried in the deep tanks of the C-3 or Mariner-type of ship with a capacity of about 2,800 tons. In bulk-oil shipments known as "parcel trade", special types of oils (vegetable oil, lubricating oils, etc.) are carried in liner deep tanks.
Bulk cargo in specialized vessels may compete with liner services. Carryings by liners of such bulk cargoes were shown to be infrequent, however.

Under section 804 we are concerned with the existence, not the degree, of competition. The fact that there is no harm at this time to the particular interveners, or that some of them do not object, or that other carriers failed to intervene, is immaterial. The lack of vessel-to-vessel competition is equally immaterial. Our responsibility is to discover the existence or nonexistence of foreign-flag vessel competition with essential American-flag service. We find that these vessels would be competing with service found to be essential under section 211. Having so found, a waiver is required under section 804 if the activities are to be continued and States Marine enters into a subsidy contract. Applicant seeks to create an inference of lack of competition from the fact that there were no other interveners. This shows only lack of interest in the outcome of this hearing. Our responsibility exists regardless of any lack of interest, and conclusions premised on the default of others will not be reached.

A decision about the propriety of removing the prohibition by waiver requires a study of the purposes sought to be accomplished by the prohibition.

The legislative history of section 804 shows that Congress was concerned lest subsidy money to be paid to support foreign vessel activities detrimental to American-flag service. The forerunner of the present Act was first proposed by the President in a message to the Congress dated March 4, 1935, transmitting "Views and Two Reports on Subject of Adequate Merchant Marine." One of these, the "General Report of the Postmaster General", dated January 11, 1935, stated: "Too many of the contractors [operators under ocean mail contracts] have diverted these grants or subsidies, or by whatever name this aid may be called, to other than sound shipping operations * * *. Some of the contractors, up to this very time, have their principal interest in foreign-flag ships and have diverted millions of dollars of mail pay into foreign-flag operations." A remedial provision was proposed as follows: 15

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12 S. Rept. 898, 74th Cong., 1st sess., pages 16, 43.
14 Id. pages 1095, 1103.
15 79 Cong. Rec. 10125.
No contractor under a contract in force under this title, or any subsidiary, holding, or affiliate company connected with, or directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, such contractor, or any officer or director of such contractor or company shall own, operate, charter, or act as agent for foreign vessels or foreign interests, unless permission is first obtained from the Authority in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Authority.

Congressman Moran, speaking against the bill, said: "Under this section [534(b), later 804] the authority has discretionary power to permit an operator to use foreign-flag ships. The expenditure of American taxpayers' money to aid in operating foreign ships certainly will not build an American merchant marine." In other words, payments for the program would be ineffective. He moved to strike the words "unless permission is first obtained from the Authority in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Authority." Congressman Bland responded by saying that "* * * there are conditions that we cannot meet in legislation * * *. They have to be left to the maritime authority, and this vests them with discretionary authority." The Congressman also gave examples of the conditions which could not be met:

We are not in favor of the use of foreign ships, but there are conditions that arise sometimes in connection with the operation of certain lines where there are not sufficient vessels at this time of the proper draft to serve the purpose and until the purpose can be accomplished to have those ships [that is, ships with the proper draft, feeder line types] permission is given to the maritime authority to grant permission under these very limited circumstances.

The motion was defeated.

Against this background of legislative interpretation of section 804, we have concluded that the primary purpose of the section was to prevent contractors receiving operating-differential subsidies from paying their associates and affiliates for services involving the use of foreign-flag vessels which compete with American-flag services. The purpose was to stop the use of foreign-flag vessels which compete with American-flag service unless it could be shown that subsidy payments would not be affected by their operation or that there was no competition. As shown by the defeat of the amendment, the purpose was not to prohibit the use of foreign-flag vessels. In the light of such congressional action, we will not prohibit the use of foreign-flag vessels either, by refusing to grant waivers where the applicant can show special circumstances and good cause.

Authority to waive the prohibition was given (a) under special circumstances and (b) for good cause shown. The Act also required

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26 Id. page 10094.
27 Id. page 10181.
28 Id. page 10182.
6 F.M.B.
an affirmative vote of four of the five members of the agency, when for ordinary matters only three votes were sufficient, and that the waiver be for a specified period of time, thereby assuring a periodic reexamination of circumstances. These requirements point to restrictive policy in granting waivers. There appears to be no legislative history as to the meaning of the phrase "under special circumstances and for good cause". The restrictions therefore call for the exercise of the Board's "discretion", consistent with the declaration of policy of the Act.

Enough has been said, however, to indicate (1) that a special circumstance exists where (a) the proposed foreign-flag vessel use will not adversely affect subsidy payments or the subsidized service, and (b) the applicant would suffer a hardship if the prohibition is enforced, and (2) that good cause is shown (a) if the proposed vessel use will have an insignificant effect on American-flag service, (b) if ownership or operation of the vessels under United States registry by citizens is not practicable, and (c) there is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels of the right type to serve the purpose. Other special circumstances and good causes may exist. The present application presents these particular factors:

(1) There is a relative absence of competition between the 21 vessels and essential American-flag service. Berth liner services do not compete effectively with the large specialized bulk ore and petroleum vessels named herein;

(2) The named vessels are engaged in carrying raw materials that are vital to American industry;

(3) Global Bulk is operating the vessels under long-term contracts, made prior to October 1, 1959, the date of the application, with importers who require long-term, stable transportation;

(4) As a result of using the ore vessels, substantial savings are achieved, which are important to American industry;

(5) Successful operation of American-flag bulk-carryer vessels on these routes would require an operating-differential subsidy, which is not now being provided;

(6) If Global Bulk does not continue to control the operation of the vessels, they will have to forego valuable business arrangements;

(7) There is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels for these purposes;

30 Act sec. 804. By Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950 (64 Stat. 1273), except as otherwise provided in the Plan, the functions of the United States Maritime Commission and of its Chairman were transferred to the Secretary of Commerce. The function of approving waivers under section 804 was not excepted and was subdelegated to the Administrator of the Maritime Administration.

6 F.M.B.
8 The record shows that the foreign-flag operations would have an insignificant effect on American-flag service; and

9 Global Bulk was organized as a business entity separate from applicant, to meet requirements for a separation of foreign-flag activities from its requested subsidized operations. The Act prohibits any diversion of subsidy payments to meet costs or expenses of Global Bulk's operation.

The next major classification of vessels for which a waiver is sought involves a fleet (unspecified as to number or vessel name) of foreign-flag vessels. Global Bulk, or its predecessor organizations, has been agent since 1931 for Sir William Reardon Smith & Sons, Ltd., of Cardiff, Wales, which operates a fleet of British-flag tramp vessels in world-wide full-cargo trading. The agency services performed are the husbanding and handling of vessels during loading and discharging of cargoes that are fixed by the owners in London. Such services do not involve any cargo solicitation and are confined to the mechanics of servicing ships in port.

As special circumstances, applicants presented:

1. The agency began in 1931, has continued without interruption, and is confined to husbanding activities;

2. Smith provides general agency services to States Marine and to Global Bulk ships in Europe. The existing agency helps retain these services and maintain European contacts. As such it is a valued connection. Smith supervises the port agents and handles accounts with them in Europe. In the United Kingdom it acts as berth agent in soliciting and booking cargo.

The remaining classifications of vessels for which a waiver is sought apply to the vessels operated by Navegacion and those operated by Isthmian. Applicant showed as to these:

1. Navegacion

(a) Lighterage services are necessary for the use of the port by applicant's vessels;

(b) The lighterage services are purely local.

2. Isthmian

(a) Charter of a British-flag vessel as a lighter ship in the Persian Gulf reduced delays in port and brought about an average saving of over 14 days in turnaround time. The ship has been returned but may be needed again if port congestion recurs.

(b) The lighterage services are essentially local.

No evidence was presented, no charge was made, and we have no right to assume that unsubsidized associates will be milking the subsidized applicant through high charges for services under contracts
not negotiated in arms-length dealing. These are the basic evils section 804 sought to prohibit.

It has been suggested by interveners that they may inquire into the foreign-flag vessel operation of any other associates not named in the application. We deal only with the application which has been presented to the Board, that is, only to those matters specifically requested in the application and noticed for hearing. If there are other situations covered by section 804 and no waiver is granted, then the provisions of that section will be applicable.

It has been argued that the Smith agency should not be allowed to continue, on the basis of American Export Lines, Ino.—Section 804 Waiver 4 M.A. 379 (1954).

That decision applied the prohibition in section 804 by refusing to grant a waiver because Export and the foreign operator-agent were competitors in substantially parallel services (American Export was a passenger, soliciting agent for Italian Line). The facts in that case are quite different from the situation we have before us, where the owner of the vessels does its own solicitation and makes its own bookings and calls on the agency for clerical, mechanical, or housekeeping services when the vessel is in a United States port. Our action here is consistent with the past practice of granting waivers for husbanding agencies.²⁰

During the hearing it developed that applicant’s associate, Navegacion, used a personnel launch in operations at the Mexican ports as an incident of lighterage activities. The launch was not named in the application. Applicant has asked for a waiver with respect to the launch. Since section 804 does not require a hearing, we will act on such request outside the scope of this proceeding and grant the waiver following the prior practice in other similar cases.

Conclusions

We have concluded that the vessels named in this application compete with essential American-flag service because many of the commodities carried and the areas served have involved American-flag service. American-flag service of the liner type is in competition on essential trade routes with foreign-flag vessels providing bulk service. Consequently, the prohibitions of section 804 are in effect as to applicant and the vessels controlled by its associate, Global Bulk. The prohibitions have also been found to apply to the husbanding

²⁰ One of the intervenors had continuing waivers since 1940 to act as husbanding agent for foreign-flag nonliner operators, and a blanket waiver to act as agent for any foreign-flag tramp vessel. See exhibits 3, 4, and 5.
activities of Global Bulk, to the services performed by the foreign-flag vessels owned by Navegacion, and to the services to be performed by the foreign-flag vessel chartered by Isthmian.

The record disclosed (1) that the proposed foreign-flag vessel use would not adversely affect subsidy payments or the subsidized service; (2) that applicant would suffer a hardship through a disruption of long standing business arrangements if the prohibition is enforced; (3) that the proposed foreign-flag vessel use would have an insignificant effect on American-flag service determined to be essential; (4) that ownership and operation of the vessels under United States registry is not practicable because of the absence at this time of operating-differential subsidies; and (5) that there is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels of the right type to serve the purpose of economical bulk carriage of raw materials vital to American industry. For these reasons we have concluded that under special circumstances and for good cause shown a waiver of the prohibition of section 804 should be granted as to the foreign-flag vessels operated by Global Bulk.

The record further disclosed that the husbanding agency involved limited noncompetitive activities, had existed for a long time, and was a valuable business connection. The two lighterage service operations of Navegacion and Isthmian were both necessary to the efficient use of port facilities and were local in nature, having a minimum competitive effect. Here, too, we have concluded that under special circumstances and for good cause shown a waiver of the prohibitions of section 804 should be granted as to the foreign-flag vessels husbanded by Global Bulk and owned, operated, or chartered by Navegacion and Isthmian.

Waivers will be granted covering the above vessels and the specified services or activities in the particular trades, for a period of two years, subject to cancellation upon ninety days' notice to the operator thereof. These waivers will include permission to the companies operating the vessels to charter American-flag vessels or foreign-flag vessels as substitute vessels. Permission to use supplementary vessels must be applied for on an individual basis.

6 F.M.B.
Application by Grace Line Inc. for modification of Contract FMB-49 under section 606(4) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, denied, but relief requested is granted, under specified conditions.

Maritime Administrator requested to review essentiality of Trade Route No. 33.

_Odell Kominers_ for Grace Line Inc.
_Carl S. Rowe_ for Committee of American Steamship Lines.
_Louis Zimmet_ and _John E. Cograve_ as Public Counsel.

**REPORT OF THE BOARD**

_Thos. E. Stakem, Jr., Vice Chairman_, and _Sigfrid B. Unander, Member_

**BY THE BOARD:**

Grace Line Inc. (Grace), a Delaware corporation, filed an application pursuant to section 606(4) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the Act), and to Article II–32 of Operating-Differential Subsidy Agreement (Contract No. FMB-49), dated January 17, 1956, as amended (the contract), between the United States and Grace, requesting a modification of the contract and a recision of its provisions obligating Grace each year during the period of the agreement to maintain and operate vessels on the berth service designated “Line D—Trade Route No. 33—Great Lakes/Caribbean” (the route).

The application claims that Grace cannot maintain and operate its vessels on the route with a reasonable profit on its investment. Grace claims a loss of $1,657,000 in this service in 1959 and forecasts a loss of not less than $120,000 per voyage in 1960, plus pro rata of ballast and lay-up costs of about $250,000 for two vessels for such season.

Public Counsel responded with the contention that (1) “under normal circumstances the service could be conducted at a profit”
and (2) the petition for relief would force the Board into "an unnatural construction of Sec. 606(4)" in that the claim is not proved unless (a) no reasonable profit is shown in the investment on all services, routes, and lines covered by the contract (not just Trade Route No. 38), (b) a longer period of profit experience has elapsed, particularly since a profit is foreseeable if Maritime Administration staff estimates are used, and (c) all other rights in section 606 have been used. The issues were presented by briefs. The Committee of American Steamship Lines responded with a memorandum opposing contention (2) (a). Grace responded to all of the above contentions by brief and affidavits. Oral argument was heard, at the conclusion of which we declared the proceeding had been submitted for final decision pursuant to Rule 14(b) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, with the exception of the answers to questions which Member Unander had asked. The answers and Grace's memorandum in connection therewith have been reviewed. The resultant issues resolve themselves into a controversy over (1) the future profit prospects on the route, and (2) the interpretation of section 606(4). Public Counsel submitted a further "Supplemental Data Submission" in a memorandum of June 15, 1960, which, in essence, estimates that a carriage of 8,000 revenue tons outbound on one 50-day round voyage at the rate of $38.00 per ton will produce a net profit per voyage of $75,838. Grace responded further with a reply dated June 17, 1960, denying the validity of these estimates. The full record of the case is contained in the hearings, briefs, and supporting affidavits and memoranda.

We have decided that in passing on Grace's application and claim we must take into consideration the profit projection and experience under the entire operating-differential subsidy contract. Applicant does not prove its claim that it cannot maintain and operate its vessels on a service, route, or line with a reasonable profit on its investment unless it establishes that it cannot operate under the contract with a reasonable profit upon its entire investment devoted to the performance of the contract. Since there has been no claim nor is there any evidence of lack of profit on investment devoted to the performance of the contract and to the services, routes, or lines which are the subject of the contract, section 606(4) does not operate to establish a right in applicant to the requested modification of its contract. In this view of the case it is unnecessary to pass on the other contentions as to the profitability of the particular route, nor as to the period over which profitability must be determined. Grace's entire case is premised on the contention that the "investment" referred to in section 606(4)
relates only to a specified "service, route, or line." This contention is rejected.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, however, the contract will be modified to exclude the route from the contract pursuant to the provisions of Article II–33 permitting modification by mutual agreement, if Grace agrees to the amendment on the conditions set forth herein.

**DISCUSSION**

Section 606(4) of the Act provides as follows:

Every contract for an operating-differential subsidy shall provide (4) that if at any time the contractor receiving an operating-differential subsidy claims that he cannot maintain and operate his vessels on such service, route, or line, with a reasonable profit upon his investment, and applies to the Commission for a modification or rescission of his contract to maintain such service, route, or line, and the Commission determines that such claim is proved, the Commission shall modify or rescind such contract and permit the contractor to withdraw such vessels from such service, route, or line, upon a date fixed by the Commission, and upon the date of such withdrawal the further payment of the operating-differential subsidy shall cease and the contractor be discharged from any further obligation under such contract.

The words "such service, route, or line", when first used in subdivision (4), refer back to subdivision (3), which provides that if the Commission shall determine that a change in the service, route, or line receiving an operating-differential subsidy under this title is necessary in the accomplishment of the purposes of the Act, it may make such change upon readjusting the amount of subsidy.

Section 211 of the Act clearly indicates that the Act contemplates contracts covering American-flag service on routes and lines which may not be profitable. Such American-flag service could not be obtained if section 606(4) were interpreted as granting relief when a reasonable profit cannot be made on one particular trade route. Statutes such as the Act must be construed in a way that gives meaning to the over-all policy sought to be achieved. Each section must be read as a reflection of congressional intention to fit that section into the over-all objective of the statute in order to make an harmonious whole. Congress did not intend to guarantee a subsidized operator a profit on each trade route, nor on the whole contract for that matter. Grace's construction of section 606(4) would put that section at odds with the policy of Congress and out of harmony with other provisions of the Act.

Section 211(a) and (b) of the Act provides as follows:

The Commission is authorized and directed to investigate, determine, and keep current records of—
(a) The ocean services, routes, and lines from ports in the United States, or in a Territory, district, or possession thereof, to foreign markets, which are, or may be, determined by the Commission to be essential for the promotion, development, expansion, and maintenance of the foreign commerce of the United States, and in reaching its determination the Commission shall consider and give due weight to the cost of maintaining each of such steamship lines, the probability that any such line cannot be maintained except at a heavy loss disproportionate to the benefit accruing to foreign trade, the number of sailings and types of vessels that should be employed in such lines, and any other facts and conditions that a prudent business man would consider when dealing with his own business, with the added consideration, however, of the intangible benefit the maintenance of any such line may afford to the foreign commerce of the United States and to the national defense;

(b) The type, size, speed, and other requirements of the vessels, including express-liner or super-liner vessels, which should be employed in such services or on such routes or lines, and the frequency and regularity of the sailings of such vessels, with a view to furnishing adequate, regular, certain, and permanent service * * *. [Italics supplied]

The plain meaning of the above-quoted language is that a service or route may be determined to be essential even though operation thereon will result in substantial losses, if such losses are not disproportionate to the benefits accruing to the foreign commerce of the United States from such operation. Also, in determining what is an essential service, route, or line, consideration is to be given to the intangible benefit the maintenance of any such line may afford to the foreign commerce of the United States and to the national defense.

If an operator has the right under the Act to discontinue a service, route, or line upon a showing that he could not make a reasonable profit upon his investment in such service, route, or line, even though he could make a reasonable profit on his investment under the entire contract, the Act would provide no way of carrying out the foregoing purposes. It must be presumed that the provisions of the Act were intended to provide some way to accomplish the objectives thereof.

The words “upon his investment” in section 606(4) should be construed to mean upon the investment under the entire operating-differential subsidy contract. Section 606(4) provides for relief if the contractor establishes that “he cannot maintain and operate his vessels on such service, route, or line, with a reasonable profit upon his investment.” It does not say upon his investment in what. To carry out the purposes of the Act, these words must be construed to mean the investment under the entire operating-differential subsidy contract rather than the investment in the service, route, or line. Even if the words “upon his investment” refer back to “service, route, or line”, the requirement is that the contractor establish that he cannot make a reasonable profit on his entire investment under the contract. We
construe the words "service, route, or line" as "services, routes, or lines" in sections 601(2) and 603(a), and these words should be construed the same way in section 606(4).

Section 601(a) of the Act authorizes the Board "to consider the application of any citizen of the United States for financial aid in the operation of any vessel or vessels, which are to be used in an essential service in the foreign commerce of the United States." Section 603(a) provides that if the Board "approves the application, it may enter into a contract with the applicant for the payment of an operating-differential subsidy ** for the operation of such vessel or vessels in such service, route, or line **." Under these sections the Board, in carrying out the purposes of the Act, has interpreted the words "service, route, or line" as "services, routes, or lines", and has therefore included in some contracts more than one service, route, or line.

The foregoing interpretation and this way of contracting permit the averaging, for recapture purposes, of profits and losses from all of the services, routes, and lines included in the contract. To include all of the operator's services, routes, and lines in one contract carries out the purposes of the Act in that it permits the more profitable operations to help carry the less profitable operations and thus assists in obtaining service on the less profitable services, routes, and lines. The words "service, route, or line" should receive the same construction in section 606(4) as they receive in section 601(a) and 603(a), and for the same reason.

Operating-differential subsidy contracts, properly construed, provide for relief only if the operator cannot make a reasonable profit on his investment under the entire contract. Article II—32, Part II, of the contract is derived from section 606(4) of the Act. Part II is the same for each subsidized operator. Article II—32 is as follows:

II—32. Modification or Rescission, at Request of Operator. The operator may at any time make claim to the United States that it cannot maintain and operate the subsidized vessel(s) and service(s); route(s), or line(s), with a reasonable profit on its investment, and apply to the United States for a modification or rescission of this agreement, and if the United States determines that such claim of the Operator is proved, the United States shall modify or rescind this agreement and permit the Operator to withdraw the vessel(s) from the service(s), route(s), or line(s) upon a date to be fixed by the United States, and upon the date of such withdrawal further payments hereunder by the United States shall cease and the Operator shall be discharged from any further obligation under this agreement. Such discharge shall be without prejudice to any accrued rights of the United States and the Operator hereunder.

The evident purpose of "(s)" in "service(s), route(s) or line(s)" is to indicate that the words are in the singular if the contractor has
only one service, route, or line, and in the plural if he has more than one. Under the foregoing article, if the contractor had more than one service, route, or line, he would have to establish that he could not make a profit on his investment in all of them in order to be entitled to relief. The provisions of Part I of the contract, relating to financial accounting and replacement vessels, also indicate that the foregoing is the correct construction of Article II-32.

On the uncontroverted proofs before us, Grace in 1959, on all its subsidized services conducted under Contract No. FMB-49 (including the Trade Route No. 33 service), realized a substantial profit. In other respects its financial position appears strong. Grace's proofs established to our satisfaction, however, that it has suffered, and will for the foreseeable future suffer, a loss on its investment on this particular service, route, or line. In such circumstances, and in the absence of any objection having been received from any of the American shippers or exporters who will be affected by the discontinuance of such service, route, or line, we do not feel impelled to require the continuation of the losses even though Grace does not have a right under section 606(4) to a contract modification to so provide. Consequently, we have reconsidered Grace's letter of March 4, 1960, requesting modification of its operating-differential subsidy contract No. FMB-49 to discontinue the service required to be performed by it on the route, and will grant such request subject to agreement by Grace to the following conditions:

1. The withdrawal of the Ss Santa Alicia, Santa Cristina, Santa Regina, and Santa Mercedes from the operating-differential subsidy agreement (Contract No. FMB-49) will be authorized effective as of the last voyage of each such vessel, determined in accordance with paragraph No. 2:

2. For the purpose of determining eligibility for subsidy, the final voyage of each of the aforesaid vessels, in accordance with Article II-37(c), shall be deemed to terminate at midnight on the day of the completion of final discharge of cargo at an authorized United States port of discharge on the route, but in no event later than December 31, 1959:

3. No expenses incurred with respect to the aforesaid four vessels (including, but not limited to, depreciation and overhead allocation) for any periods subsequent to the date of termination of the last voyage of each vessel (determined in accordance with paragraph No. 2) shall be charged against subsidized operations for the purpose of determining earnings subject to recapture and deposits in the Special Reserve Fund;

4. The amount of depreciation applicable to the above vessels and to the SS Santa Marianna and the SS Santa Victoria shall continue to be deposited in the Capital Reserve Fund for periods after December 31, 1959, while such vessels are or were owned by Grace, regardless of whether the same was earned and whether the vessels were idle or under charter or otherwise engaged in non-subsidized operations; and

6 F.M.B.
5. In the event of sale or other disposition of the Santa Alicia, Santa Cristina, and/or Santa Regina within a period of three years from July 14, 1960, as to each such vessel, the proceeds therefrom shall be deposited in the Operator's Capital Reserve Fund.

We have requested that a review be made by the Maritime Administrator as to the essentiality of Trade Route No. 33 as one essential to United States commerce and defense.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-60 (Sub. No. 2)

Isbrandtsen Company, Inc.—Waiver Under Section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936

No. S-64 (Sub. No. 1)

Isbrandtsen Company, Inc.—Waiver Under Section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936

Submitted July 1, 1960. Decided July 18, 1960

Special circumstances and good cause shown to justify waiver of the provisions of section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, permitting Jakob Isbrandtsen, a director of Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., to retain ownership in shares of stock of Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, a British company operating foreign-flag vessels.

Waivers will be granted under section 804 of the Act for a period of two years, subject to cancellation upon ninety days' notice to the operator.

Richard W. Kurrus for applicant.
Robert J. Blackwell as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

Thos. E. Stakem, Jr., Vice Chairman, and Sigfrid B. Unander, Member

BY THE BOARD:

We adopt the examiner's recommended decision, to which no exceptions have been filed. The recommended decision is as follows:

"Under date of April 14, 1960, Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., applied for a waiver to the extent required by section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the Act), to permit the retention by Jakob Isbrandtsen, President and Director of applicant, of an interest held personally in Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, in the event the Board should award Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., oper-
ating-differential subsidies under section 601 of the Act. A public hearing was held but there were no intervenors.

"Section 804 of the Act provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any contractor receiving an operating-differential subsidy under title VI or for any charterer of vessels under title VII of this Act, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or such charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, to own, charter, act as agent or broker for, or operate any foreign-flag vessel which competes with any American-flag service determined by the Commission to be essential as provided in section 211 of this Act: Provided, however, That under special circumstances and for good cause shown the Commission may, in its discretion, waive the provisions of this section as to any contractor, for a specific period of time, by affirmative vote of four of its members, except as otherwise provided in section 201(a).

"Jakob Isbrandtsen owns approximately 42 percent of the outstanding common stock and is a director of Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited (Canforship), a firm organized under the laws of Great Britain and domiciled in Nassau. With three Dutch-flag, specially designed bulk carriers listed as "combination ore-oil carriers" of approximately 26,500 deadweight tons each bareboat chartered in 1956 for 15 years, it is engaged in the transportation of iron ore, generally in lots of a minimum of 15,000 tons, from the Republic of Chile to United States Gulf and Atlantic ports and Canadian, Japanese and European ports. Its customers are the purchasers of the ore with whom it has entered into ordinary contracts of freight, for periods up to seven years; some contracts are based on daily requirements of the receivers. To eliminate southbound voyages in ballast, Canforship endeavors to carry oil; it is occasionally engaged by such shippers as Standard Oil Company. All such transportation of oil has been from Venezuela or other Caribbean ports to Peru and Chile. Because of their lack of cubic capacity the three chartered vessels are not usable for any commodities other than ore or oil. As business necessities arise Canforship charters other specially designed foreign-flag bulk carriers. When carrying ore from Chile to Canada efforts are made to bring cargoes of ore from Seven Islands, Labrador, to Baltimore. There are no American-flag berth operators in that trade.

"Applicant asserts that the Canforship vessels are not competitive with any American-flag vessels operating on an essential foreign trade route simply because there are no American-flag vessels of this nature in service. The competitive rates at which the ore must move are said to be too low to allow for the operation of an American-flag bulk


\[2\] 10,000 tons of coal or grain being the maximum that could be carried.
carrier. The ore is available, however, to American berth services but except on occasions when it is used as bottom cargo it is not susceptible of carriage in liner service. One such liner service is that of Grace Line Inc., the only operator of American-flag vessels between United States Atlantic ports and ports in Chile, Pacific Coast of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. A factor of importance to the person selling the ore is the differential of 25 to 50 cents per ton between the existing bulk rate per ton in large bulk carriers of the type here considered and the rate prevailing on a parcel lot of 2,000 or 3,000 tons carried by Grace Line. Canforship has provided Grace Line with certain ores to the limit of the latter's requirements for discharge at United States Atlantic and Gulf ports and Mr. Isbrandtsen has been told by representatives of Grace Line that they do not object to the continuance of the Canforship operations.

Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., has no direct legal interest in Canforship and would obtain no direct financial benefit if the requested waiver be granted. Certain indirect benefits might accrue to the extent that knowledge of the costs of operating foreign-flag vessels could aid in establishing efficiencies in operation of American-flag vessels. Mr. Isbrandtsen further testified that the grant or denial of this application would not affect the ability of any American-flag vessels to carry ore or oil as described in the application; that it would not be possible for him to dispose of his interest in Canforship except at a rather substantial financial sacrifice, and that even if this were done the situation with respect to American-flag vessels would not be altered in any respect. Foreign-flag bulk carriers would continue to carry the ore at world-market rates. In support of special circumstances and for good cause for granting the waiver the applicant states that Mr. Isbrandtsen will hold no office, nor will he act as director of Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited.

"Discussion"

"Applicant's position is that a waiver for the operation described is not necessary under section 804 of the Act because:

"(1) The specially designed bulk carriers operated by Canforship are not competitive with any American-flag service that

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"Review of Grace Line Subsidy, Route 2, 4 F.M.B. 40, 42.

"The only American-flag operator from Chile to United States Gulf ports is the Gulf and South American Steamship Co., Inc., a corporation owned in equal proportions by W. R. Grace & Co. and Lykes Bros. Steamship Company. See Gulf and South American Steamship Co., Inc.—Application Under Section 605(c), Merchant Marine Act, 5 F.M.B. 747, decided December 16, 1939. Grace Line also operates a berth service from Chilean ports to United States Pacific Coast ports (See Grace Line Inc. Subsidy, Route 25, 4 F.M.B. 549) but to the knowledge of applicant's president there is no movement of liner parcels of bulk ore on Grace Line vessels or on any other vessels to such destinations.
has been determined to be essential under section 211 of the Act;

“(2) The only berth operator from Chile to the United States is the Grace Line and all of the bulk cargoes that Grace Line desires are made available to it by Canforship;

“(3) The movement of ore from Chile to the United States and Canada is by economic necessity forced to move on foreign-flag ships;

“(4) As there are no American-flag vessels operating in the ore trade from Labrador to Baltimore, there are no such vessels operating within the meaning of the essential foreign trade route concept;

“(5) Similarly, there are no American-flag vessels operating in the trade between Caribbean ports and Peru and Chile.

"If, however, a waiver should be deemed essential, applicant submits that this is a situation involving special circumstances and good cause as the particular cargoes have to move by foreign-flag vessels or not move at all. These bulk cargoes are obviously important to the national economy and security and it is also important to the national security that some control of these large vessels should be in the hands of American citizens. Furthermore, granting the waiver and allowing Mr. Isbrandtsen’s interest to continue would necessarily limit the operations of Canforship to what is contemplated by section 804.

"Public Counsel agrees that no waiver is required under section 804 for the reasons, first, the oil movement described is not in the foreign commerce of the United States and therefore can not be considered to be a route determined by the Maritime Administrator to be essential under section 211 of the Act. Secondly, while Grace Line serves the trade between Chile and United States Gulf and Atlantic ports and does carry some quantities of ore, its failure to oppose the application indicates lack of competition. The discrepancy between the rates of the two types of carriers also indicates that the operation of Canforship is not competitive with the American-flag vessels offering berth service and carrying ore in the Chilean-United States trade routes. If competition be found, though, it is the view of Public Counsel that special circumstances and good cause constituting justification for waiver have not been shown.

"Certain findings of the Board in States Marine Lines, Inc., Waiver Under Section 804, Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 6 F.M.B. 71, decided May 31, 1960, are equally appropriate here. Thus, ‘A lack of American-flag vessels of this type (bulk cargo) does not preclude a finding of competition with American flag-service under section 804.’ * * * ‘The service does not have to be identical if the same
products are carried to and from the same area.‘ * * * ‘Ore is carried in American-flag service liners as bottom cargo.’ * * * ‘Bulk cargo in specialized vessels may compete with liner services.’ * * * ‘Under section 804 we are concerned with the existence, not the degree, of competition.’ * * * ‘The fact * * * that other carriers failed to intervene, is immaterial.’ * * * ‘Our responsibility is to discover the existence or nonexistence of foreign-flag vessel competition with essential American-flag service. We find that these (bulk cargo) vessels would be competing with service found to be essential under section 211. Having so found a waiver is required under section 804 if the activities are to be continued and (applicant) enters into a subsidy contract. Applicant seeks to create an inference of lack of competition from the fact that there were no other intervenors. This shows only lack of interest in the outcome of this hearing. Our responsibility exists regardless of any lack of interest, and conclusions premised on the default of others will not be reached.’ (See sheets 6 and 7 of mutilithed report served June 1, 1960.)

“After a discussion of the legislative history of section 804 the Board said (at sheet 9):

"Enough has been said, however, to indicate, (1) that a special circumstance exists where, (a) the proposed foreign-flag vessel use will not adversely affect subsidy payments or the subsidized service, and (b) the Applicant would suffer a hardship if the prohibition is enforced, and (2) that good cause is shown (a) if the proposed vessel use will have an insignificant effect on American-flag service, (b) if ownership or operation of the vessels under the United States registry by citizens is not practicable, and (c) there is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels of the right type to serve the purpose. Other special circumstances and good causes may exist.

“As detailed above the following appear as factors for consideration comparable with those recognized in the recent States Marine Lines decision:

“(1) There is a relative absence of competition between the three Dutch-flag vessels under charter to Canforship and essential American-flag service. Berth liner services do not compete effectively with the large specialized bulk ore and oil carrying vessels described herein.

“(2) The three specialized foreign-flag vessels are engaged in carrying raw materials that are vital to American industry.

“(3) Canforship is operating the vessels under long term contracts, made prior to April 14, 1960, the date of the application, with importers who require long term, stable transportation.

“(4) As a result of using the ore vessels, substantial savings are achieved which are important to American industry.

6 F.M.B.
“(5) There is an insufficiency of American-flag berth vessels to carry all of the ore moved by Canforship from Chile to the United States.

“(6) The foreign-flag operations of Canforship described of record have an insignificant effect on American-flag service.

"Conclusions"

"Conformable with the decision in States Marine Lines Inc.—Waiver, supra, it is concluded that the three vessels of Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, as described herein, compete with essential American-flag service. American-flag service of the liner type is in competition on essential trade routes with foreign-flag vessels providing bulk service. Consequently, the prohibitions of section 804 are in effect as to the applicant and the vessels controlled by Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, in which the president and director of applicant holds a minority, but substantial, interest.

"The record discloses (1) that the continued holding by Jakob Isbrandtsen of his personal interest in Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited would not adversely affect subsidy payments or the subsidized service; (2) that applicant’s president would suffer a hardship through the sacrifice of personal holdings if the prohibition is enforced; (3) that the continued foreign-flag vessel use by Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, would have an insignificant effect on American-flag service determined to be essential, and (4) there is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels of the right type to serve the purpose of economical bulk carriage of raw materials vital to American industry."

Upon the record in this proceeding (1) we conclude that the three vessels of Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, as described in the examiner’s recommended decision, compete with essential American-flag service, and (2) we find that special circumstances and good cause have been shown justifying waiver of the provisions of section 804 of the Act with respect to the continued holding by Jakob Isbrandtsen of his personal stock in Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited.

A waiver will be granted covering the ownership by Jakob Isbrandtsen of shares of stock in Canadian Foreign Steamship Company Limited, for a period of two years, subject to cancellation upon ninety days’ notice.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 29th day of July A.D. 1960

No. S-78

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a), MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1936

On May 18, 1960, American President Lines, Ltd. (APL), filed a petition requesting the Board to “reconsider and revise its report and decision” herein of April 28, 1960 (6 F.M.B. 6), insofar as it limits so-called “grandfather” rights under the proviso of section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (the Act),\(^1\) to 2,852 passengers and 3,204 L/T of cargo a year and not in excess of 26 round voyages. It says in effect that this is not “substantial parity” because it does not permit APL to maintain its position or to “grow with the trade.” APL cites the fact that the “trade has more than doubled” since 1935. The total of all passengers west and east in 1935 was 38,588, and in 1957 (the last full year for which figures are available) it was 76,129.

Matson Navigation Company (Matson) replied that Rule 16 of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, which gives the right to file such a petition, authorizes reopened proceedings only if the Board finds such action is required by “changed conditions in fact or law or by the public interest”, and that the petition contains no information which would permit such a finding. In view of the importance of such rights under the proviso of section 805(a) of the Act, as it affects the California-Hawaii trade, and the significance of the question as to whether the “growth with the trade” is applicable under that section to the extent urged by APL, we decided to hear oral argument in the

\(^1\) See appendix.
matter. On June 15, 1960, we gave notice of and ordered oral argument, which was heard on June 21, 1960.

The purpose of this report is to respond exclusively to the petition for a reconsideration of our original report relative to the scope of APL's so-called "grandfather" rights under the proviso in section 805(a) of the Act. These proceedings and this report are limited to this issue.

Under the proviso the "rights" (as distinguished from "permission") to participate in the intercoastal trade arises by virtue of the operator's activities in 1935, and since it constitutes an exception to the necessity of meeting the conditions prescribed by section 805(a), must not be enlarged by a liberal construction of the statute. Activities in excess of such right may be authorized but only in accordance with the requirements of the other parts of section 805, under which we must consider problems of unfair competition and the objects and policies of the Act.

FACTS

The status of APL in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation was as follows:

1. A line known as Dollar Steamship Line Inc., Ltd., had a "Trans Pacific Service" which used two vessels, the President Hoover and the President Coolidge, operating Los Angeles/San Francisco to Honolulu, Yokohama, Kobe, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila, and returning over the same route to California.

2. Dollar Steamship Line also had a "New York to Manila via Panama Canal and return" service, which used five vessels, the President(s) Lincoln, Cleveland, Pierce, Taft, and Wilson, operating Los Angeles/San Francisco to Honolulu and the same ports served by the "Trans Pacific Service", and return the same way to New York and Boston.

3. The Hoover and the Coolidge at regular intervals during the year departed 13 times from California for Manila via Hawaii and returned via Hawaii, making 13 round voyages altogether. The Lincoln, Cleveland, Pierce, Taft, and Wilson at regular intervals during the year departed 13 times from California for Hawaii (en route from New York to Manila) and returned via Hawaii.

4. Schedules were issued and posted and standard fares established. The combination of the "Trans-Pacific" and the "New York" schedules resulted in 26 regular fortnightly departures from California during 1935. It also resulted in 26 regular fortnightly arrivals from Hawaii, on the alternate weeks during 1935. Combined arrivals and depar-
tures between California and Hawaii and return equalled 52 for all seven vessels.

5. The seven vessels, in 1935, actually carried 1,297 passengers west to Hawaii and 1,555 passengers east to California, or a total of 2,852 passengers out of a total of 38,581 passengers traveling between these points by sea. They carried 7.4 percent of the passengers in 1935, and also carried 3,204 L/T of cargo.

6. California-Hawaii passengers were sold space which was available but not sold to the Far East and to returning passengers. APL was not able to reconstruct voyage plans which would show the amount of space unsold but available or "held out" to passengers between California and Hawaii in 1935, i.e., its total capacity (used and unused) for this service. It was simply everything left over after Far East passengers had been taken care of. This space was sold and cargo bookings were made by Matson under an agreement with APL's predecessor, but APL's predecessor was directly responsible to passengers and shippers in rendering service.

7. In November 1938 the name of Dollar Steamship Lines Inc., Ltd., was changed to American President Lines, Ltd.

We have concluded from the foregoing that APL or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic and intercoastal trade in 1935 over the route for which the present application is made.

As a minimum, APL has the right to make 13 departures or 26 round trips between California and the Far East with stops at Hawaii with the same two-vessel capacity, and 13 departures or 26 round trips from New York for the Far East with stops at California (Los Angeles/San Francisco) and Hawaii with the same five-vessel capacity. The problem is the translation of these departures and this capacity to 1960 conditions, and the determination of how these departures and this capacity may be expressed to describe the scope of APL's "grandfather" rights and accommodate changes in the traffic or changes in vessel size and design over the intervening 25 years.

Since 1935 APL or its predecessor in interest have maintained approximately the same service except for the war-time interruption from 1941 through 1945 or other conditions over which it had no control. After the war it used different vessels to some extent and its departures have diminished. In 1958, 12 departures were made. During this period of activity it carried a low of 1,342 passengers in 1947, which was 5.4 percent of the total passengers carried, and a high of 3,574 passengers in 1950, which was 6.7 percent of the total passengers carried. It has carried as high as 15.6 percent of the passengers carried in 1948 and a low of 1.7 percent in 1958. Its capacity likewise

6 F.M.B.
has varied, particularly during the period after the war. All of this activity over 25 years has presumably been consistent with its rights under section 805(a). During the period from 1935 through 1958, the total number of passengers traveling this route by sea has increased from 38,584 to 95,286. APL’s share of these travelers dropped to 2 percent in 1957, when it made 17 departures from California and 16 from Hawaii with 3 vessels, the Wilson, Cleveland, and Hoover. Applicant now seeks authority to carry more than 2,852 passengers and 3,204 L/T of cargo a year on no more than 35 round trip voyages, which differs from the requirements of our report of April 28, 1960.

**Discussion**

The principal argument of APL is that our earlier report denied it the right under the proviso of section 805 (a) to “grow with the trade”, which has more than doubled. We have held that under the proviso operators are entitled to “substantial parity” of operations during the base year 1935. APL seeks to equate substantial parity with growth and a right to maintain its same position in relation to the increased volume of travel. In the past, however, we have concluded that section 805(a) does not give such a right of growth but only protects the 1935 position. In this view, it may maintain substantially its 1935 rights, whatever they may be.

Comparison is made between section 805(a) of the Act and section 206(a) of the Motor Carrier Act to fortify the growth argument. The two sections are not similar, however. The latter includes a provision which was not included in the later-enacted Merchant Marine Act, 1936, prohibiting the Interstate Commerce Commission from limiting a carrier’s right to “add to his or its equipment and facilities * * * as the development of the business and the demands of the public require”. (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, the court decisions which deny a purpose in the Motor Carrier Act to “freeze” the service to its exact status as the base year or to the precise pattern of prior activities are not applicable to section 805(a) of our Act. Otherwise the express omission of the quoted words from the later enactment would be meaningless. We cannot restore the meaning of the omitted words by our decisions.

The legislative history of section 805(a), on the contrary, shows that the section’s purpose was, first, to protect those operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service from subsidy-aided competi-

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\[3\] Id.
tion, and second, to allow those who receive operating-differential subsidy aid to continue the coastwise or intercoastal service they were giving in 1935. Expansion was authorized only if it was determined pursuant to application therefor that the proposed service would not result in "unfair competition" to the exclusively coastwise and intercoastal operators, but only under other parts of section 805(a). An application for section 805(a) permission covering the service which APL apparently contemplates at this time is not before us.

Since there was no new information developed at the hearing on the petition for reconsideration relevant to "grandfather" rights, there is nothing that warrants our changing our position as to the measure of "grandfather" rights set forth in our original report.

In view of the foregoing:

It is ordered, That the petition for reconsideration be, and it is hereby, denied.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) JAMES L. PIMPER,
Secretary.

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4 See Hearings on S. 3500, Senate Committee on Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 87-89, and the testimony of Mr. J. C. Peacock, Director, Shipping Board Bureau.

6 Id. p. 77. See, also, Am. Pres. Lines, Ltd.—Unsubsidized Operation, Route 17. 3 F.M.B.—M.A. 457 (1951).

6 F.M.B.
Section 805(a):

It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters, or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, That if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations; and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

6 F.M.B.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

No. S-115

MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, INC.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)


Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., granted written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its vessel, the SS Mormacguide, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one voyage in the domestic coastwise and intercoastal trade carrying general cargo from Hawaii and California ports to Gulf ports, commencing at Hawaii on or about August 7, 1960, since granting of the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade; and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Ira L. Ewers for applicant.
John E. Cograve as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

By the Deputy Maritime Administrator:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., filed an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. sec. 1223 (the Act), for its vessel, the SS Mormacguide, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one domestic coastwise and intercoastal voyage carrying general cargo from Hawaii and California ports to Gulf ports, commencing at Hawaii on or about August 7, 1960. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register of July 27, 1960 (25 F.R. 7110). No one appeared in opposition to the application.

States Marine intended to use its own vessel, the SS Lone Star State, for the voyage but the vessel is unavailable because of damage to a boiler. In view of the amount of cargo available, it is necessary to
have a C-3 type vessel, but the only vessel of that type in position to satisfactorily perform the voyage is the *Mormacguide*.

It is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.

6 M.A.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 11th day of August A.D. 1960

No. 890

UNAPPROVED SECTION 15 AGREEMENTS—SPANISH-PORTUGUESE TRADE

This matter has been presented on interlocutory appeal from a ruling by the hearing examiner. The situation as presented to us is as follows:

1. In his ruling of June 7, 1960, the examiner denied respondents' appeal to the Board from his ruling of April 27, 1960, granting a motion by public counsel for discovery and production of documents under Rule 17(k) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, and denied respondents' motions for a referral to the Board for determination of issues pursuant to Rule 10(m). The examiner concluded that respondents had not shown any extraordinary circumstances where prompt decision by the Board is necessary to prevent unusual delay, expense, or detriment to the public interest, as required by Rule 10(m).

2. Respondent Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre thereafter filed a motion for hearing and determination by the Board, asking for a waiver under Rule 1(i) of the requirements of Rule 10(m), which prohibit appeals from rulings of presiding officers prior to or during the course of hearing, except in unusual circumstances. Respondents Concordia Line, American Export Lines, Inc., and North Atlantic/Spanish Conference filed similar motions. Respondent Naviera Aznar S.A. also moves for reconsideration of the examiner's ruling.

3. Petitioners, pursuant to Rule 1(i), request waiver of the prohibition against interlocutory appeals in Rule 10(m) on the ground that such action is needed to prevent undue hardship in this particular case. They argue that undue hardship will occur because they will be subjected to unusual delay and expense as the result (a) of
the need to preserve their rights by assuming a posture of defiance, leaving it to the Board to justify the examiner's ruling in an enforcement proceeding or by not cooperating in view of being wholly in the dark about the violations with which they are charged, (b) of lack of knowledge as to the status of Public Counsel as either a representative of the Board or as a "party" to the proceeding, (c) of the absence of any ruling on the necessity for producing documents of foreign nationals located in foreign countries, and (d) of the difficulties of obtaining unspecified documents covering a period of 10 years.

**Discussion**

In view of the importance of the questions raised by respondents and of the necessity for a prompt decision by the Board, we are waiving Rule 10(m) pursuant to Rule 1(i) in order to review the examiner's rulings of April 27, 1960, and June 7, 1960. We sustain the examiner.

Respondents' principal contentions are:

1. The ruling would endow the Board with power not granted by Congress, *i.e.*, empower the examiner, as presiding officer, to direct respondents, as parties, to produce and permit the inspection and copying of documents in response to a motion by Public Counsel, as a "party showing good cause therefor" under Rule 12(k); such a directive is not expressly authorized by the Shipping Act, 1916, which authorizes these proceedings; and such Act only authorizes the issuance of subpoenas by the Board itself under section 27.

2. Rule 12(k) requires that an examiner's directive must be in response to a motion "showing good cause therefor", and good cause has not been shown in Public Counsel's motion.

3. The examiner failed to grant requests for further particulars relative to the Board's order of investigation, *i.e.*, the required documents were not described more specifically and their relevance to the issues were not shown.

4. The examiner's ruling compels the production of documents located in foreign countries and owned by foreign corporations.

We discuss these contentions on their merits in the order presented above.

**Authorization.** Examiners' directives for the production of documents pursuant to Rule 12(k) are authorized by the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, even though the investigation is initiated pursuant to the Shipping Act, 1916. Section 204(a) of the 1936 Act transferred to the United States Maritime Commission "all the functions, powers, and duties vested in the former United States Shipping Board by
the Shipping Act, 1916 * * *", and section 204(b) authorized the Maritime Commission "to adopt all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the powers, duties, and functions vested in it by this Act", which included powers under the 1916 Act. Investigation of violations is, of course, a major function, power, and duty of the agency administering the 1916 Act. Thereafter, section 104 of Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950 (64 Stat. 1273) transferred to the Federal Maritime Board (established by section 101 thereof) the regulatory functions of the Maritime Commission under the 1916 Act, and by section 105 the Board was given "(5) So much of the functions with respect to adopting rules and regulations, making reports and recommendations to Congress, subpoenaing witnesses, administering oaths, taking evidence, and requiring the production of books, papers and documents under the provisions of sections 204, 208 and 214 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended * * * as relates to the functions of the Board under the provisions of this reorganization Plan." We are of the opinion, moreover, that the power to direct the production of documents in the manner prescribed by Rule 12(k) is impliedly contained in the 1916 Act as a necessary adjunct to the power vested in the Board by that Act to conduct administrative proceedings. In this connection, see section 22 of the 1916 Act, authorizing the Board to investigate any violation of the Act's provisions.

Rule 12(k) was adopted under the Board's rule-making power, as expressly vested in the 1936 Act and as impliedly vested in the 1916 Act. Production and inspection of documents under Rule 12(k) is essential to the effectiveness of the present investigation.

"Good cause." Our order of investigation set the subject of the inquiry in the general terms of whether respondents, in their operations in the trade between the United States and Spain and/or Portugal since 1949, have entered into or carried out agreements in violation of section 15 of the 1916 Act. The order reflects that the Board has reason to believe respondents may have violated section 15. The ground for the directive issued by the examiner is the discovery, production, and inspection of documents necessary and relevant to the preliminary stages of this inquiry, and that was made clear in the examiner's ruling of April 27, 1960, directing respondents, under Rule 12(k), to produce and permit inspection of the documents specified in Public Counsel's motion. Clearly, these proceedings satisfy the requirements of "good cause" within the meaning of Rule 12(k). Moreover, Public Counsel, under the Board's rules, is expressly made a "party", acting in the public interest, and is entitled as such to invoke Rule 12(k).
Particularity. The Board's order of investigation states the issues, and the examiner's April 27 ruling requires Public Counsel to make available to respondents, at least ten days in advance of the hearing, an outline of the principal facts to be presented. At the hearing respondents may make any appropriate motions necessary to a full and fair hearing. In its present stage, this proceeding is merely investigatory. Public Counsel is, and properly so, engaged in the gathering of information preliminary to the presentation of evidence pointing to the question of whether there have been violations of the 1916 Act. At this preliminary stage neither the Board nor its staff is obliged to draw an indictment. It is enough that before any affirmative proof of alleged wrongdoing is presented, respondents be given a fair and adequate notice of what violations they will be charged with and an opportunity to defend against them. This is the procedure being followed in the instant case.

Foreign documents. We have no doubt as to our power to require the production of relevant documents physically located outside the United States. The 1916 Act imposes on us the responsibility of regulating common carriers by water operating in the foreign commerce of the United States, regardless of the nationality of such carriers. Certain agreements and practices are proscribed by the Act, whether accomplished in the United States or abroad. Obviously, the Board could not discharge its responsibility, and the 1916 Act itself would be largely ineffectual, if the Board's authority extended only to the production of documents found within the United States. It appears unnecessary however, to elaborate on the point at this juncture of the present proceeding. In their reply to respondents' motions, Public Counsel state that they "do not press at this time for the production of documents not currently located within the United States", consequently, in the final analysis such documents may not prove to be essential in this case.

In view of the foregoing:

It is ordered, That the above-mentioned petitions and motions, insofar as they seek a waiver of Rule 10(m) pursuant to Rule 1(i), be, and they are hereby, granted; and

It is further ordered, That said petitions and motions, in all other respects be, and they are hereby, denied.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) JAMES L. PIMPER,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 18th day of August A.D. 1960

No. 884

UNAPPROVED SECTION 15 AGREEMENTS—JAPAN-KOREA-Okinawa Trade

This matter has been presented on interlocutory appeal from a ruling by the presiding examiner. The situation as presented to us is as follows:

1. In his ruling of June 22, 1960, the examiner denied respondents' appeal to the Board from his ruling of March 21, 1960, granting a motion by Public Counsel for discovery and production of documents under Rule 12(k) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, and denied respondents' motions for a referral to the Board for determination of issues pursuant to Rule 10(m). The examiner concluded that respondents had not shown any extraordinary circumstances where prompt decision by the Board is necessary to prevent unusual delay, expense, or detriment to the public interest, as required by Rule 10(m).

2. Respondents Barber-Wilhelmsen Line—Joint Service and Maersk Line thereafter filed motions for hearing and determination by the Board, asking that the Board direct the examiner to refer to it for review his ruling of June 22, 1960, together with his prior ruling referred to therein, and all motions, replies, and memoranda of the parties related to either of the rulings; hear oral argument; and make and enter an order reversing the examiner's rulings and denying Public Counsel's motion for discovery and production of documents. Respondent United States Lines made no request for reconsideration, or in the alternative, reference to the Board.

3. Petitioners request action in view of the general importance of the questions presented and the serious constitutional and statutory issues involved in their solution. They also argue that they will be subjected to unusual delay and expense as the result (1) of the need
to preserve their rights by assuming a posture of defiance, leaving it to the Board to justify the examiner's ruling in an enforcement proceeding or by not cooperating in view of being wholly in the dark about the violations with which they are charged, (2) of the absence of any ruling on the necessity for producing documents of foreign nationals located in foreign countries, and (3) of the difficulties of obtaining unspecified documents covering a period of several years.

**Discussion**

Inasmuch as the basic questions involved in this proceeding and the legal contentions of respondents and of Public Counsel are substantially the same as those disposed of by us in *Unapproved Agreements—Spanish-Portuguese Trade,* 6 F.M.B. 103 (1960), and for the reasons set forth therein, we sustain the ruling of the presiding examiner.

In view of the foregoing:

*It is ordered* That the above-mentioned petitions and motions be, and they are hereby, denied.

*By the Board.*

(Sgd.) JAMES L. PIMPER,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-73 (Sub. No. 1)

WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION—APPLICATION UNDER
SECTION 805(a)

Submitted August 3, 1960. Decided August 19, 1960*

Waterman Steamship Corporation granted written permission under Section
805(a) of the Act to engage in domestic coastwise service between United
States Pacific Coast ports and ports in Puerto Rico, and for continuation
of the pecuniary interest of McLean Industries, Inc. and the officers and
directors of McLean Industries, Inc. and Waterman in Waterman Steam-
ship Corporation, and for continuation of the agency arrangements be-
tween Waterman and its subsidiaries, Waterman Corporation of California
and Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico, in connection with
such service, will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or
corporation operating exclusively in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise
service, nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Sterling F. Stoudenmire, Jr., for applicant Waterman Steamship
Corporation.

George Bunn and William D. Rogers for intervener the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, in support of the application.

John E. Cograve and Edward Aptaker as Public Counsel.

INITIAL DECISION OF EDWARD C. JOHNSON, EXAMINER

INTRODUCTION

In an application dated May 16, 1960, and served on May 26, 1960,
Waterman Steamship Corporation (Waterman), an applicant for
operating-differential subsidy under the provisions of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936, as amended, applied for written permission under
Section 805(a) of the Act* to continue, after it is subsidized, to

*In the absence of exceptions thereto by the parties, and upon notice by the Board,
the initial decision of the examiner became the decision of the Board on the date shown
(section 8(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act and Rules 13(d) and 13(h) of the

1 Section 805(a) is set forth in Appendix "A", attached hereto.
operate a domestic coastwise service between United States Pacific Coast ports and ports in Puerto Rico. Request is also made for permission for McLean Industries, Inc., Applicant's parent, and for the officers and directors of Applicant and McLean Industries, Inc., to continue to own a pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly in Applicant, and for approval of the continuation by Applicant of its agency arrangements with its subsidiaries, Waterman Corporation of California, and Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico, performed in connection with such service. The application was duly noticed in the Federal Register on May 28, 1960. A hearing was held in Washington, D.C. on June 15, 1960. No parties intervened in opposition to the granting of the requested permissions. As above indicated, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appeared in support of the application. Public Counsel has expressed no differences with the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by Applicant, which, in general, and subject to certain modifications hereinafter noted, are incorporated herein.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The testimony and evidence in this case shows the following:

1. Waterman, a wholly-owned subsidiary of McLean Industries, Inc., commenced a Pacific Coast-Puerto Rican service in 1949 and either it or its affiliate, Sea-Land Service, Inc. (formerly known as Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation) has operated continuously in that trade since then. No claim of grandfather rights is involved.

2. Waterman operated this service, until recently, in connection with its vessels returning from the Far East operated in the Gulf-Far East trade. Recently, the service has been provided by owned vessels confined exclusively to the service between United States Pacific Coast ports and Puerto Rico. Service has been provided approximately on a monthly basis and is expected to continue substantially on that basis for the immediate future.

3. Waterman, at present, is the only common carrier providing a regular berth service from Northwest Pacific Coast ports and from Los Angeles to Puerto Rico. In addition, it serves San Francisco and Stockton, California.

4. Isbrandtsen Company, Inc. provides a service from the San Francisco Bay Area only, including Stockton, to Puerto Rico, which service is performed in connection with its vessels operated in its Eastbound Round-the-World service.

5. Isbrandtsen also has pending an application for subsidy on its Eastbound Round-the-World service and the Board has approved,
under Section 805(a) of the Act, continuation of the Pacific Coast-Puerto Rican leg of that service after Isbrandtsen becomes subsidized.

6. Pope & Talbot, Inc. operates a common carrier service from Puerto Rico to United States Pacific Coast ports in connection with its intercoastal service but has not operated for some time from the Pacific Coast to Puerto Rico.

7. Waterman observes the same rates as Isbrandtsen and Pope & Talbot.

8. Neither of the above mentioned lines oppose the application and, in fact, no opposition to the application was registered by any person, firm or corporation. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico intervened in support of the application.

9. A large movement of general cargo, consisting of rice, beans, canned goods and numerous other general commodities moves from the Pacific Coast to Puerto Rico and, in a much smaller volume, limited general commodities move from Puerto Rico to the Pacific Coast. During the period 1955-1959, Waterman and/or its affiliate, SeaLand Service, Inc., handled 431,495 tons of cargo in this trade, averaging approximately 86,000 tons of cargo a year. For the years 1955-1958, a total of 736,961 tons of cargo moved from the Pacific Coast to Puerto Rico, averaging approximately 185,000 tons per year. Waterman's participation in the total movement (approximately 86,000 tons per year) has been substantial.

10. Without the service of Waterman, there would be no water common carrier service available from the United States Pacific Coast to Puerto Rico other than Isbrandtsen's service from the San Francisco Bay Area. A large number of shippers on the Pacific Coast are dependent on the service of Waterman to meet their shipping needs to Puerto Rico.

11. Waterman Corporation of California, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Waterman, acts as agent on the Pacific Coast for Waterman, performing solicitation service, husbanding of vessels and related services. An agency commission of 5% revenue, which is standard and customary in the industry, is paid by Waterman for these services.

12. Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico, also a wholly-owned subsidiary of Waterman, performs similar agency services for Waterman in connection with this service in Puerto Rico, receiving the same agency fee. It also furnishes terminal facilities and stevedoring services to vessels operated by Waterman in this trade.

13. Waterman is a wholly-owned subsidiary of McLean Industries, Inc. and the officers and directors of both are interlocking to a cer-

6 F.M.B.
tain extent, and hence, Applicant's parent and the officers and directors of both Applicant and its parent have a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in Applicant, request for permission to continue which has been made.

14. No exclusive domestic coastwise operator operates from the Pacific Coast to Puerto Rico and no record objection has been made by any person, firm or corporation to the application.

15. Maritime shipping services are vitally important to the more than 2 million people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In supporting this application, the Commonwealth shows that about half of what it produces and over half of what it consumes is transported by water. Ocean shipping services are the life line of Puerto Rico in the furnishing of food, stuffs and other commodities essential to the everyday life of its people on an island approximately 100 miles long and 35 miles wide, and located more than a thousand miles from the nearest port in the United States and much farther away from the important United States Pacific Coast ports from which it gets essential food stuffs and raw materials. The continuation of ocean shipping services likewise has a vital bearing on its own public programs and policies, and its recent $20 million Port Development Construction Program has taken on real meaning in relation to gearing its limited pier facilities in San Juan and elsewhere to increased cargo movements by water. The many new Island industries are by necessity oriented toward ocean shipping, and since Puerto Rico's present industrial development program cannot depend solely on local resources or markets since it lacks major raw materials, it then becomes primarily dependent upon shipping from all geographic areas to develop the economic future of the Island.

CONCLUSION

On this record, it is found that the granting of the requested permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for Applicant Waterman Steamship Corporation to engage in domestic coastwise service between United States Pacific Coast ports and ports in Puerto Rico, and for continuation of the pecuniary interest of McLean Industries, Inc., and the officers and directors of McLean Industries, Inc. and Waterman in Waterman Steamship Corporation, and for continuation of the agency arrangements between Waterman and its subsidiaries, Waterman Corporation of California, and Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico, in connection with such service, will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation operating exclusively
in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, nor be prejudicial to the objects or policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as such written permission for the foregoing services, interests, and arrangements requested by Applicant in the absence of any exceptions thereto or review thereof by the Board.

6 F.M.B.
Section 805(a):

It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters, or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, that if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-73

WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)

Submitted April 13, 1960. Decided September 12, 1960

1. Waterman Steamship Corporation, as predecessor in interest of its subsidiary, Waterman Steamship Corporation, Puerto Rico, has “grandfather” rights under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (the Act), to the extent of 26 sailings annually between New Orleans, La., and Mobile, Ala., and ports in Puerto Rico.

2. Grant of permission to Waterman Steamship Corporation to continue service by its subsidiary, Waterman Steamship Corporation, Puerto Rico, between Gulf of Mexico ports (east of and including New Orleans) and Puerto Rico would not result in any competition with an exclusively domestic operation nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

3. Grant of permission to Waterman Steamship Corporation to continue service by its affiliate, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Sea-Land Service, Inc.) between Atlantic ports and ports in Puerto Rico would not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the intercoastal service, and would not be prejudicial to the objects and policies of the Act.

4. Waterman Steamship Corporation's affiliate, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Sea-Land Service, Inc.), has “grandfather” rights under section 805(a) of the Act in service from New York, N.Y., to New Orleans to the extent of 53 voyages, using not more than 4 vessels, but does not have any such rights in service from New Orleans to New York.

5. Permission to Waterman Steamship Corporation to provide trailership service by its affiliate, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Sea-Land Service, Inc.), from New Orleans to New York denied because it would result in unfair competition to an exclusively coastwise service, and be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

6. Grant of permission to Waterman Steamship Corporation to provide two-vessel weekly trailership service between Port Newark, N.J., and Houston, Texas, would not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise service, nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.
7. Permission granted to Waterman Steamship Corporation to charter the Clotirborne and the Monarch of the Seas to Waterman Steamship Corporation, Puerto Rico, for operation between Gulf of Mexico ports and Puerto Rico.

8. Permission granted to Waterman Steamship Corporation to charter or sub-charter the Bienville, Raphael Semmes, Fairland, Azalea City, and Gateway City to Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Sea-Land Service, Inc.) for operation between ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and in the Atlantic/Puerto Rico trade.


10. Petition of Erie and St. Lawrence Corporation and Containerships, Inc., to intervene and to reopen proceeding, denied.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, JR., Vice Chairman, SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

Waterman Steamship Corporation (Waterman or applicant) filed on January 30, 1957, an application for operating-differential subsidy covering various services.¹ On April 2, 1957, applicant filed

¹ See 5 F.M.B. 771, for a full discussion of Waterman's subsidy application and the Board's findings thereon in relation to section 605(c) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1986.
an application for permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the Act), for its affiliates and officers to continue the following domestic coastwise services, charters, and relationships:

1. Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico (Waterman, P.R.), applicant's wholly owned subsidiary, to operate unsubsidized vessels between Gulf ports east of and including New Orleans, Louisiana, and ports in Puerto Rico;

2. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Pan-Atlantic), its affiliated company, to operate unsubsidized vessels between Atlantic ports and ports in Puerto Rico;  

3. Pan-Atlantic to operate unsubsidized vessels between Atlantic ports, between Gulf ports, and between Atlantic and Gulf ports;

4. Waterman to continue to charter the Clairborne and the Monarch of the Seas to Waterman, P.R., for operation in the Gulf/Puerto Rico trade;

5. Waterman to continue to charter the Bienville, Raphael Semmes, Fairland, Azalea City, and Gateway City to Pan-Atlantic for operation in the trade between ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and in the Atlantic/Puerto Rico trade;

6. The continuation of an agency agreement between Waterman and Waterman, P.R., and of the pecuniary interest of the former in the latter.

The following parties intervened: Bull-Insular Line, Inc. (Bull), Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. (Alcoa), Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), and TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. (TMT), The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Pennsylvania Railroad Co., The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, and various cities and others, as their interests might appear.

Hearings were held before an examiner who, in a recommended decision, concluded, in part, as follows:

Waterman P.R. and its predecessor in interest found to have been continuously engaged in the U.S. Gulf/Puerto Rico service since 1928, and the continuation of this service to the extent set forth in the findings and conclusions herein found not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation operating exclusively in the domestic coastwise or intercoastal service, and not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended. Written permission under Section 805(a) for the continuation of this service and to continue certain charter and agency agreements between Waterman and Waterman P.R., in the event a subsidy contract is awarded, should be granted. Grandfather rights prevail.

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2 See appendix.
3 Pan-Atlantic and Waterman are owned by McLean Industries, Inc. Pan-Atlantic, effective April 1, 1960, changed its name to Sea-Land Service, Inc.

6 F.M.B.
Application of Waterman Steamship Corporation for permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, to continue to operate its New York/Puerto Rico trailership service of Pan-Atlantic, in the event it is subsidized, and to continue certain financial arrangements between and among McLean, Waterman, Pan-Atlantic, Coastal, Beauregard and Sea-Land should be granted, since it is found not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service (Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc.), not prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. No grandfather rights asserted.

Granting written permission under Section 805(a) of the Act to Waterman Steamship Corporation to continue its Jacksonville/Puerto Rico service, and its Jacksonville/New York service of Pan-Atlantic, in the event subsidy is awarded, is necessary in order to provide adequate service in the trade, and the award of such permission would neither result in unfair competition to any exclusively domestic service (TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., as to the Jacksonville/Puerto Rico service—no exclusively coastwise service exists between Jacksonville and New York), nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. No element of grandfather rights involved.

Granting written permission under Section 805(a) of the Act to Waterman Steamship Corporation to continue to operate its New York/New Orleans Southbound service of Pan-Atlantic, in the event it is subsidized, is merited by grandfather rights. Northbound service voluntarily abandoned 1955 to 1958, hence no grandfather rights. Northbound leg adequately served by Seatrain, an exclusively domestic coastwise operator, and found entitled to protection against unfair competition.

Section 805(a) permission covering weekly service to Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville by Pan-Atlantic vessels serving the New York/New Orleans trade found not to result in unfair competition to any exclusively coastwise operator, since there are none, and would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act and should be awarded.

Granting written permission under Section 805(a) of the Act to Waterman Steamship Corporation to continue to operate its New York/Houston service of Pan-Atlantic, in the event it is subsidized, would not result in any unfair competition to an exclusively domestic service (Seatrain), nor would it be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. The trade is not now adequately served, and the requested permission should be granted. No grandfather rights obtain as to Applicant.

Exceptions to the recommended decision and replies thereto were filed, and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified by the facts or not related to material issues in this proceeding.

Waterman’s related companies operate the following domestic services:

1. Waterman, P.R.: Weekly, two-vessel, break-bulk service between Mobile, Alabama, and New Orleans on the Gulf and San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez in Puerto Rico;
2. Pan-Atlantic: (a) Two-vessel, weekly, trailership service from Port Newark, New Jersey, to San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez, to Jacksonville, Florida, for discharge and loading of Puerto Rico cargo and loading of Port Newark cargo, to Port Newark;
   (b) Two-vessel, weekly, trailership service from Port Newark to Miami, Florida, to New Orleans, to Tampa, Florida, to Port Newark;
   (c) Two-vessel, weekly, trailership service between Port Newark and Houston, Texas.

Under section 805(a) of the Act, permission shall be granted to continue the foregoing operations if it is shown that applicant has "grandfather" rights; if no "grandfather" rights exist, permission shall not be granted if it is found that it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise service, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

I. Gulf/Puerto Rico Service

A. "Grandfather" rights

Waterman commenced its common-carrier operation between Gulf of Mexico ports and ports in Puerto Rico in 1928, and has operated that service continuously, except during the period of World War II, when the vessels were requisitioned, and other short periods due to labor disturbances or other interruptions beyond its control, until the operation was transferred to Waterman of Puerto Rico, a wholly owned subsidiary. On February 25, 1958, Waterman conveyed all right, title, and interest in its Gulf/Puerto Rico service to Waterman, P. R., which has continued to provide weekly service between New Orleans-Mobile and Puerto Rico.4

Applicant claims "grandfather" rights for Waterman, P.R.'s, two-vessel, weekly service between Gulf ports (east of and including New Orleans) and Puerto Rico. In 1935, the base year for establishing "grandfather" rights, Waterman operated a fortnightly service providing 26 sailings between New Orleans-Mobile-Tampa and Puerto Rico. Between 1936 and the end of 1957, except during World War II, the Gulf/Puerto Rico service provided between 45 and 56 annual sailings, with calls at New Orleans and Mobile.

The examiner concluded that the Gulf/Puerto Rico service was covered by "grandfather" rights to the extent of at least 26 annual voyages between New Orleans-Mobile and Puerto Rico; further, that

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4 Waterman, the former operator of the service, is the "predecessor in interest" of Waterman, P.R., the present operator, within the meaning of the "grandfather" rights provision. American President Lines, Ltd.—Subsidy, Route 17, 4 F.M.B. — M.A. 488, 501 (footnote 21) (1954).
annual sailings in excess of 26, and calls at Gulf ports other than New Orleans and Mobile, were not covered by “grandfather” rights because they are not in “substantial parity” with the service offered during the base year 1935. Applicant excepts to these conclusions, contending that its purchase of New York and Puerto Rico Steamship Company’s (N.Y. & P.R.) Gulf/Puerto Rican service by an agreement dated September 1, 1939, vests it with “grandfather” rights for the difference between the 26 sailings made by Waterman in 1935 and the present weekly service of Waterman, P.R., for which section 805(a) permission is sought.

N.Y. & P.R. made approximately 46 sailings from the Gulf to Puerto Rico in 1935, but it cannot validly be claimed that Waterman or Waterman, P.R., is the successor in interest to that service. Waterman purchased from N.Y. & P.R. only the good will in the latter’s Gulf/Puerto Rico service, for a ten-year period. Prior to the agreement, Waterman and N.Y. & P.R. each operated weekly services from the Gulf to Puerto Rico. Thereafter, N.Y. & P.R. withdrew from the trade and Waterman continued to operate a weekly service. No ships were transferred under the agreement; Waterman never operated the ships formerly used by N.Y. & P.R.; and Waterman’s so-called acquisition of N.Y. & P.R. did not result in any increase over Waterman’s level of operations during 1939. This constitutes an abandonment of the service of N.Y. & P.R. and does not support a claim to “grandfather” rights.

Bull and Alcoa except to the examiner’s finding that 26 annual Gulf/Puerto Rico voyages of Waterman, P.R., are covered by “grandfather” rights. They contend that 26 sailings of the C-2 vessels currently serving the trade are not in “substantial parity” with the 26 sailings of the Laker-type vessels operated in 1935, pointing out that the deadweight tonnage cubic has increased and that reefer service has been added. We disagree. In considering the extent of “grandfather” rights under section 805(a), (1) substantial parity must exist between proposed and past operations, and (2) the “grandfather” clause cannot be so strictly construed as to permit absolutely no flexibility in equipment. American President Lines, Ltd., supra. While Bull and Alcoa contend there is no evidence of an inward service in 1935, there is testimony, unchallenged and unrefuted, that such a service existed.

We find that Waterman has “grandfather” rights in its Gulf/Puerto Rico service to the extent of 26 sailings annually between New Orleans-Mobile and Puerto Rico. Permission may be granted for the additional 26 voyages only if it is found that it will not result in unfair
competition to an exclusively coastwise service, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

B. _Exclusively domestic operators_

Alcoa and Bull oppose award of section-805(a) permission with respect to Waterman, P.R.'s, Gulf/Puerto Rico service on the grounds that the examiner erroneously found that neither of them would continue in this service in the future, the services of both were begun because of a decline in other services, and their services must be determined as of the date of applicant's request, or before, rather than on services initiated after this proceeding began. We conclude that neither Alcoa nor Bull had any exclusively domestic service in this trade until after the application was filed, hence no question of unfair competition is present.

Alcoa began a Gulf/Puerto Rico service on February 26, 1951, with vessels which served in the outbound direction only until March 1958 and called at foreign ports on practically every voyage to pick up inbound bauxite. Since April 1958, some 12 months after Waterman filed its application, Alcoa has provided common-carrier service in both directions between Puerto Rico and the Gulf and, except for one voyage, has not called at foreign ports. Bull instituted a Gulf/Puerto Rico service on February 11, 1959, some three months after the start of the hearing on Waterman's application. Based on the sailings made during the few weeks of its existence, it appears that the service operates between New Orleans-Mobile and Puerto Rico.

We agree with the examiner that neither Bull nor Alcoa qualifies as an exclusively domestic operator in the Gulf/Puerto Rico service within the meaning of section 805(a).

Bull did not provide any service in this trade until February 1959, some two years after Waterman filed its application. Alcoa has provided service outbound and inbound since April 1959 only, over a year subsequent to the filing of the application for section-805(a) permission. The chief reliance in proving an exclusively domestic status must be placed on sailings antecedent to the date of application for section-805(a) permission, otherwise an intervener could enter the service purely for the purpose of affecting determinations under that section. Indeed, Bull and Alcoa seem to contend that the exclusively domestic test under section 805(a) may be entirely prospective. Voyages prior to the filing of an application must be considered as the basis for determination of exclusively domestic status; otherwise an intervener could gain such status merely by announcing that in the

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6 The _Alcoa Roamer_ called at Trinidad June 21, 1958, on a return voyage from Puerto Rico to Mobile.

6 F.M.B.
future he would confine his operations to domestic ports, thus presenting a new service by a subsidized operator, or eliminating a long-existing service by a new subsidy applicant, without assuring any service in the trade to the shipping public.

We agree with the examiner that even if Bull and Alcoa qualified as exclusively domestic operators in their Gulf-Puerto Rico services, the "fundamentally entitled" doctrine was not applicable. As we said in T. J. McCarthy Steamship Co.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 5 F.M.B. 666, 671 (1959):

The fundamentally entitled doctrine has been employed (a) to deny permission to a subsidized operator to inaugurate a new domestic service where established domestic operators entitled to protection have the need for, and capacity to carry, cargoes which the applicant would attract (Am. Pres. Lines, Ltd.—Unsubsidized Operation, Route 17, American President Lines, Ltd.—Subsidy Route 17, and Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Calls at Hawaii, supra), and (b) to deny permission to a subsidy applicant to continue domestic services as part of subsidized offshore services using subsidized vessels where such domestic services have been served by domestic operators who need the cargo and have the ability to carry it (Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Subsidy, E/B Round the World, supra). We will not extend the fundamentally entitled doctrine to deny the continuation of an exclusively domestic service by a subsidy applicant where, as here, the applicant has a long and continued association with the protected trade, and where he proposes to operate such service separate from his subsidized service. If we did, such an operator could not participate in the development of our merchant marine by inaugurating a separate and distinct subsidized service without suffering the penalty of being ousted from his unconnected traditional domestic service.

C. Prejudice to the objects and policy of the Act

Bull and Alcoa contend that the examiner erred in finding that the award of permission for Waterman, P.R., to continue to operate its present Gulf/Puerto Rico service would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Their contention is without merit. The refusal of such permission would only result in the substitution of Bull and Alcoa in the trade for an operator of long standing service which, on this record, has proven efficient and satisfactory to shippers. The continuation of such service could not, in our opinion, be said to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Quite the contrary, to deny such permission to applicant might well be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act by depriving the domestic water-borne commerce between the Gulf and Puerto Rico of an operator which has provided shippers with efficient service over a long period of years.

We find that the grant of permission to applicant to continue its Gulf/Puerto Rico service would not result in unfair competition to
any exclusively domestic operation nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

II. NORTH ATLANTIC/Puerto Rico Service

A. "Grandfather" rights

Pan-Atlantic provides a service between the Atlantic coast and Puerto Rico with two trailerships, the Fairland and the Azalea City, serving the ports of New York and Jacksonville. This service was inaugurated in October 1957 as a weekly break-bulk service. In February 1958, Waterman, P.R., took over the service when it sailed the first trailership to Puerto Rico. Waterman does not claim "grandfather" rights in this service.

B. Exclusively coastwise operations

The examiner found that Bull was not an exclusive domestic operator in the North Atlantic/Puerto Rico trade but that Alcoa is such an operator. We agree. We have already passed on this issue as respects Bull's service, and nothing in this record warrants a change in our decision on this point in Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Subsidy, E/B Round the World, 5 F.M.B. 448 and 5 F.M.B. 483 (1958).

Alcoa operates a weekly service from North Atlantic ports to Puerto Rico, and since 1956 the vessels in this service have sailed foreign on only one occasion. A single foreign call as long ago as 1956 does not deprive this service of its exclusive coastwise status. While Alcoa frequently called at Puerto Rico with vessels in its North Atlantic/Venezuelan service, these calls do not deprive the separate North Atlantic/Puerto Rico service of its exclusively domestic service. Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Calls at Hawaii, 5 F.M.B.—M.A. 287, 292, 297 (1957).

C. Unfair competition

In view of Alcoa's status as an exclusively domestic operator, we must determine whether the grant of the permission requested by applicant would result in unfair competition to it.

The examiner found that the grant would not result in unfair competition; that there was excess over-all capacity of break-bulk vessels in the trade, but that there was no such excess capacity among container-carrying vessels in the New York/Puerto Rico trade; and that the container service provided by applicant was preferred by shippers and was needed in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, the situation we have as respects competition is to determine the extent to which a new technique of transportation competes unfairly with a different existing technique. Tonnage and vessel capacity on a
route are not the only factors in determining whether more capacity creates unfair competition. We must also compare the types of service. When containership capacities are compared, we find, without applicant's tonnage, that there is a shortage to meet the demands of shippers and for the needs of interested areas. The competition offered a container-vessel service which the evidence shows is needed is not unfair to an existing break-bulk service. This is the case even though the latter service has excess capacity and may suffer from the effects of the new competition. The suffering is not a source of unfairness. Applicant proposes to meet the need and the existing carriers do not. Over two years ago applicant put its first trailership into operation, and since July 30, 1958, has operated the service on a weekly basis with vessels which were converted at considerable expense.

Containership operation is of particular benefit in the Puerto Rican trade. In addition to its greater efficiency and lower cost, it requires less terminal space, and the evidence shows that there is an acute shortage of terminal facilities in Puerto Rico. The Port Authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico bases its port redevelopment plans on a projection that at least 40 to 45 percent of the cargoes moving in and out of Puerto Rico will move in containers when sufficient containers are available. Containers do not need shed space; all that is required is a yard which can be made more readily and cheaply available. Additionally, container-ship operation reduces damage and pilferage. While Bull and Alcoa supply some containers without the capacity provided by applicant, there would be insufficient capacity to carry the containerized cargo which the Commonwealth's plans contemplate in working out a solution to Puerto Rico's terminal facilities problem. It is not clear to what extent Bull and Alcoa will provide more container capacity.6

In view of the foregoing, we find that the grant of permission to applicant to continue its weekly containership operation in the North Atlantic/Puerto Rico service would not result in unfair competition to exclusively domestic operators. The service provided by applicant is needed in order that the trade be adequately served.

D. Objects and policy of the Act

We agree with the examiner that grant of permission to applicant for the continuation of the North Atlantic/Puerto Rico service would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Shippers have

6Bull's witness McCarty testified that "Bull feels for the present that with the vans and containers now in use, maximum containerization under the circumstances has been accomplished in the North Atlantic/Puerto Rico trade."
indicated a need for, acceptance of, and reliance upon the service provided by Pan-Atlantic. The Port Authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico believes the service is essential to enable it to work out a solution of the Commonwealth’s terminal problems. Containership operation admittedly is more efficient and tends towards reducing costs of operations. Under such circumstances, if we were to deny to Puerto Rico, dependent to such a large extent on ocean transportation, the service of applicant, it would in our opinion be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

III. JACKSONVILLE/PUERTO RICO, JACKSONVILLE/NEW YORK SERVICES

A. "Grandfather" rights

As indicated above, Pan-Atlantic operates a two-vessel weekly trailershine service from Port Newark, New Jersey, to San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, thence to Jacksonville, Florida, for discharge and loading of Puerto Rico cargo and loading of Port Newark cargo to Newark. It has no "grandfather" rights in these trades since it only began to call its New York/Puerto Rico vessels at Jacksonville on January 18, 1959. Service was not provided in 1935 between Jacksonville and Puerto Rico, or from Jacksonville to New York.

B. Exclusively coastwise services

TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. (TMT), which has been providing service between Jacksonville and San Juan since early in 1956, contends that it has adequate equipment and service to handle all the traffic moving between Jacksonville and Puerto Rico, with the exception of reefer cargo; its management has considered the acquisition of further equipment, when and if warranted. It owns three vessels, only two of which are utilized because of lack of sufficient available tonnage. It usually operates two barges, which are towed by tugs used principally in the movement of loaded truck trailers in what is called a roll-on-roll-off type of operation. These sailings vary and are not at regular intervals. The tug-and-barge operation cruises at an average speed of 10 knots and requires 6-½ days transit time from Jacksonville to San Juan, a distance of about 1,100 nautical miles. It provides no pick-up or delivery service in the United States but does provide such service in San Juan. Two-thirds of the freight received by TMT at Jacksonville is rehandled by transfer from trailers of other carriers into those of TMT. It has no reefer equipment and handles no reefer cargo. TMT is an exclusively coastwise operator entitled to protection from unfair competition.

6 F.M.B.
C. Unfair competition

There is shipper testimony that TMT's service involves less handling, that its rates are substantially below those of conference vessels, and that TMT shipments are not subject to the many terminal difficulties prevailing in San Juan. Other shippers testified that they could not use TMT's service because cargo was exposed to the salt air and therefore rusting; that shipments were so badly damaged because of salt air corrosion that they could not be sold when received; that other paper cargo products were exposed to excessive damage; that TMT's service was erratic and not dependable; and that its failure to provide reefer service was serious. There was other shipper testimony in support of the continuance of the Pan-Atlantic trailership service between Atlantic ports and Puerto Rico, pointing up the superiority of the service over that of TMT. While TMT contends that it can handle all the cargo in that trade with presently utilized vessels, and that it has a third vessel which it can put into service when and if conditions justify it, the record shows that in 1958, 18 of TMT’s 33 sailings went out full; that all of the sailings with less than 90 percent utilization, except one, occurred in the off season between the middle of July and the beginning of September; and that TMT has been operating at capacity southbound notwithstanding Pan-Atlantic’s entry into the trade in January 1959. While TMT claims that it has a third vessel for use if additional cargo offers, this third vessel is used as a rule only when one of the two vessels regularly in use is out of service for inspection, and it will be committed to the trade on a permanent basis only when and if there is sufficient northbound cargo to make it attractive to TMT, leaving the servicing of the heavy southbound trade subject to cargo offerings in the lighter northbound traffic. The service of Pan-Atlantic is needed in order to provide regular and adequate service in the Jacksonville/Puerto Rico trade. We find that the granting of permission to continue a two-vessel weekly trailership service from Port Newark, N.J., to San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez, P. R., thence to Jacksonville, Florida, for discharge and loading of Port Newark cargo to Newark would not result in any unfair competition to TMT.

D. Objects and policy of the Act

TMT provides no reefer space from Jacksonville to Puerto Rico

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7 Jacksonville Traffic Bureau representative testified as to the urgent needs for reefer service.

8 Such as reduced damage and pilferage experience, more expeditious loading and unloading, availability of trailers permitting shipper control of loading and unloading, availability of reefer equipment, reduction in handling of cargo, faster outturn of perishable cargo, and availability of trailer service at areas other than port areas.

6 F.M.B.
although there is a widespread demand for it; such a service is supplied principally by Pan-Atlantic. In addition, TMT has been operating at full capacity southbound notwithstanding Pan-Atlantic's entry into the trade in January 1959, thus indicating that the latter's service is needed to give shippers adequate service in the trade. We find that the grant of permission to applicant to continue such service would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

IV. New York/Tampa-New Orleans-Miami/New York Service

A. "Grandfather" rights

Pan-Atlantic inaugurated its service in 1933 with four vessels providing weekly calls at New York and New Orleans and other ports, not including, however, Miami or Tampa. In 1935, the period for measuring "grandfather" rights, Pan-Atlantic had 53 sailings between New York and New Orleans but did not call at Miami and Tampa, and thus has no claim to "grandfather" rights with respect to these latter two ports. From 1935 to the present time the number of vessels used in this service has ranged from three to seven. From May to December 1957 the service was temporarily suspended while the vessels were taken out of service for conversion to trailerships. The vessels provided annual calls ranging generally from 53 in 1935, an average of 135 annually from 1937 through 1941, and thereafter in excess of 50 annually. In the first half of 1958 there were 28 calls.

Seatrain contends that Pan-Atlantic does not have "grandfather" rights covering the southbound leg of this trade. It argues that the break in service from May through December 1957, when the vessels were out for conversion from break-bulk to trailership, was a voluntary act and not due to circumstances beyond the control of Pan-Atlantic. Seatrain states that Pan-Atlantic could have continued to provide service with other break-bulk vessels, or could have provided service with modified T-2 tankers. It points out that service was provided Houston with the latter type vessels. We find that the break in service between May and December 1957 did not destroy Pan-Atlantic's "grandfather" rights. The conversion was necessary for survival in the New York/New Orleans trade and provided a new service. There was no intention to abandon the service, the vessels were at all times earmarked for this service, and were not used in any other. Conversion was a means to the continuation of the service. We find that Pan-Atlantic has "grandfather" rights in the southbound leg of the New York/New Orleans trades to the extent of 53 voyages, using not more than four vessels.

6 F.M.B.
Pan-Atlantic did not, however, accept cargo for and discontinued its northbound service from New Orleans to New York from April 1955 to January 1958. This break in service does not appear to have been beyond the control of the carrier, or to have been an essential step in the improvement of Pan-Atlantic's future coastwise service; the suspension of service was a voluntary one and constituted an abandonment. Pan-Atlantic's northbound service in its New Orleans to New York trade is not covered by any "grandfather" rights. It therefore is necessary to determine whether an award of section-805(a) permission covering this northbound service would result in unfair competition to an exclusively coastwise service, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

B. Exclusively coastwise services

Seatrain, in the trade since 1932, operates an exclusively coastwise service from New Orleans to New York. This is not contested.

C. Unfair competition

Pan-Atlantic reentered this trade in January 1958 after being out since April 1955. In 1956 Seatrain, then providing the only New Orleans to New York ocean service, carried 104,000 tons of cargo in approximately 2,500 rail cars. Spaces for approximately 850 cars, or an average of 16 cars per sailing, were not utilized. In 1958, Seatrain carried 103,000 tons and Pan-Atlantic carried an estimated 11,000 tons for a total movement in the trade of about 114,000 tons. The total 1958 traffic exceeded that of 1956 by about 9,500 tons. Seatrain's 1956 vessel capacity as such was sufficient to have carried all the cargo which moved in the trade in 1958. Pan-Atlantic has projected a traffic figure of 41,000 tons for 1959. If this figure is added to Seatrain's 1958 traffic of about 103,000 tons, then Seatrain's 1956 capacity of about 138,000 tons could have moved all but about 6,000 tons. If Pan-Atlantic does carry 41,000 tons in 1959, which is about 30,000 tons more than it carried in 1958, at least a good part of the 6,000 tons would no doubt be diverted from Seatrain. Under these circumstances, it appears that Seatrain, as of the present time, can provide sufficient tonnage to serve the New Orleans to New York trade adequately.

The remaining question is whether, in addition to the Seatrain service, the Pan-Atlantic container service is needed to serve the trade. The combined tonnage carried by both in 1958 was lower than that carried by Seatrain alone in 1957 (114,076 tons in 1958 and 121,278 tons in 1957). Pan-Atlantic has not generated as much traffic for water carriers on this route as it has on the other routes where it operates, and it does not appear that this will change in
the future. Few shipper witnesses indicated that they were switching over to Pan-Atlantic or that they had any strong preference for its service. Moreover, to the extent the service is needed, Seatrain claims it will extend its Seamobile service and already has agreements with railroads looking to the carrying out of such plans. We find that Pan-Atlantic participation here is not needed to serve the northbound trade adequately.

D. Objects and policies of the Act

Seatrain needs the cargo moving from New Orleans to New York and has capacity and ability to provide adequate service now and in the foreseeable future. Permission under section 805(a) should be denied where the record supports such a finding. A merchant marine sufficient to carry our domestic water-borne commerce and to provide service on this route, essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic water-borne commerce at all times, would be fostered by protecting the service Seatrain has built up and needs for its success against the added competition of Pan-Atlantic.

We find that the grant of permission to Waterman for its subsidiary Pan-Atlantic to engage in the New Orleans to New York domestic trade would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. The continuation by Pan-Atlantic of its service to Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville from and to New York would not result in unfair competition nor be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Such permission is granted.

V. New York/Houston Service

A. “Grandfather” rights

While Pan-Atlantic did not commence service in this trade until 1953, it claims “grandfather” rights on the basis of its service in 1935 from New York to the Gulf. In 1935 Pan-Atlantic did not serve any Gulf port west of New Orleans, nor was any such port served until 1953. We find that Pan-Atlantic’s New York/Houston service is not covered by “grandfather” rights.

B. Exclusively domestic service

Seatrain, the only other water carrier in the New York/Houston trade, is operating exclusively in the coastwise trade within the meaning of section 805(a), and permission may not be granted to Pan-Atlantic under that section if we find such permission would result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service.
C. Unfair competition

Seatrain’s traffic began to fall off noticeably in 1956 after Pan-Atlantic’s converted tankers were put into service as trailerships between Houston and New York, and the decline became more pronounced in the fall of 1957, after Pan-Atlantic introduced its fully converted trailerships. There is testimony from shippers that they had diverted cargoes from Seatrain to Pan-Atlantic. It does not appear, however, that Seatrain has the physical capacity to carry all of the traffic which now moves in the trade. In 1956, when all of Seatrain’s vessels were employed, it utilized some 8,350 railcar spaces and had 1,277 free spaces northbound. Southbound, it utilized 8,255 railcar spaces and had 1,366 free spaces. The northbound capacity, therefore, was 9,626 railcars loading an average of 39.3 tons; southbound, it was 9,621 railcars loading an average of 29.3 tons. Seatrain’s total capacity during that year appears to be approximately 378,000 tons northbound and 282,000 tons southbound. In 1958, when its vessel utilization was comparatively low, Seatrain’s traffic dropped to 242,000 tons northbound.

Pan-Atlantic’s traffic for the first six months of 1958—when it was still developing its service—was about 60,000 tons, or approximately 120,000 tons northbound on a full year’s basis. Southbound, it carried 64,000 tons for the first six months of 1958. A total of about 361,000 tons of cargo was moved by Pan-Atlantic and Seatrain in 1958. This is about 17,000 tons less than Seatrain’s absolute capacity, and under ordinary operating conditions it appears doubtful that Seatrain could have carried all of it. Pan-Atlantic’s trailership service was new during the last half of 1958, and its management states that it will carry approximately 164,000 tons northbound during 1959. Actually, from February 21 to March 14, 1959, the latest period of record, Pan-Atlantic moved cargo at the above rate. If this estimated 1959 traffic is added to Seatrain’s carryings in 1958, a total of some 406,000 tons is indicated in 1959, and this presently estimated northbound volume would be approximately 28,000 tons greater than Seatrain’s capacity. Southbound, Seatrain carried 150,000 tons in 1958 and Pan-Atlantic carried 128,000 tons, for a total of 279,000 tons. This is about 3,500 tons less than Seatrain’s theoretical capacity. Pan-Atlantic expects to move 196,000 tons in 1959, and has in fact carried southbound traffic at this rate for the most recent four-week period of record. If this traffic is added to Seatrain’s 1959 volume of 150,000 tons, a southbound total of some 346,000 tons is indicated in 1959; this southbound total appears to exceed Seatrain’s capacity by some 64,000 tons.
Although some of Pan-Atlantic’s traffic represents traffic lost by Seatrain, new traffic has been generated in the trade and seems reflected in the figures set forth. Pan-Atlantic trailership service appears to be a primary reason for generating much of this new traffic. The shipper testimony shows than Pan-Atlantic has generated and served a substantial demand for trailership service between New York and Houston. Cargo has been attracted away from overland carriers—particularly the railroads—because of lower rates, reduced damage to cargo, and other advantages inherent in Pan-Atlantic’s new service. It has provided reliable door-to-door service otherwise unavailable to consignees and consignors who do not have rail sidings. Seatrain has carried railroad cars since 1932. In order to meet more effectively Pan-Atlantic’s newer service, and to meet the demands of the trade, Seatrain, in November 1958, after extensive research, instituted its so-called Seamobile service consisting of 27-foot vans, moving from the shipper in the port area to ship’s side, then loaded on the regular Seatrain vessels; at destination port they are discharged from the vessel and delivered to shippers in the port area. Service to shippers outside the port area presently is offered at Houston but not at New York, New Orleans, or Savannah, although it is expected to be added later at those places.

Seatrain has 179 27-foot vans in the service. These basically are trailer bodies capable of being demounted from highway chassis. Seatrain also uses in its Seamobile service some 93 special freight bed chassis, which are truck trailers without box or van. Four of Seatrain’s vessels are modified by special installations to handle 64 Seamobile units simultaneously with 76 railroad cars, and conversion of its remaining two vessels is now under way, as is also the completion of the necessary terminal facilities at Savannah and New Orleans for the institution of Seamobile service as traffic needs dictate. At the present time, with a total of 179 vans of 27 feet, Seatrain cannot provide nearly as much trailer service as that presently offered by Pan-Atlantic with its 226 35-foot vans moving every week in each direction. Seatrain had no vans under construction at the time of hearing, and when and if it does acquire additional vans they will have to be apportioned among its Houston, Savannah, and New Orleans services. Seatrain has averaged 5.4 loaded vans southbound and 2.8 loaded vans northbound between New York and Houston. There is some testimony that the Seamobile units are unsuited for certain purposes because Seatrain does not handle less-than-carload shipments and the service is limited geographically.

8 Seatrain actually docks at Texas City, which is in the Houston port area.

6 F.M.B.
We find that the grant of permission to Pan-Atlantic to continue its two-vessel weekly service between Port Newark, N.J., and Houston, Texas, will not result in unfair competition to Seatrain as a carrier operating exclusively in the coastwise service.

D. Objects and policy of the Act

It is well known that coastwise shipping has long been in a state of decline. We are charged with the duty under the Act and have the responsibility to encourage the revitalization of such shipping and to foster the development of a strong and adequate coastwise fleet. Applicant has expended large sums of money in converting vessels for use in the coastwise trade. The converted vessels represent a forward step in meeting the needs of shippers, increasing efficiency, and reducing cost. We find that the grant of permission for Pan-Atlantic to continue its two-vessel weekly service between Port Newark and Houston would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Indeed, on the contrary, the denial of such permission, in our opinion, would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act, for an operator not already subsidized would not consider the expenditure of funds to improve its vessels used in the domestic service if it knew that if it later should seek operating subsidy aid it would have to give up its coastwise service, even though adequate capacity in meeting the needs of shippers was not otherwise available.

Financial

One of the exceptions is that the examiner failed to recommend a finding that applicant’s financial obligations will result in a diversion of subsidy payments to support the proposed coastwise or intercoastal operations. It is contended that applicant and its corporate parent, McLean, depend on the payment of subsidy in order to discharge their “financial obligations entered into for Pan-Atlantic’s benefit.” Applicant’s obligations are to lend Coastal Ship Corporation money needed to discharge any obligations Coastal may incur, with certain exceptions, and to maintain certain minimum net current assets and consolidated net current assets. Coastal acquired five trailerships with certain borrowed funds and has demise-chartered them to applicant and Pan-Atlantic jointly. Pan-Atlantic operates the ships under sub-charter from applicant. Pan-Atlantic pays charter hire to applicant and owes applicant money on notes on which it pays substantial interest. The principal of the notes covers defaulted charter-hire payments. From this it may be seen that no money, subsidy or otherwise, is paid by applicant to the intercoastal operator, Pan-Atlantic. Pay-
ments are all to applicant. The only "benefit" that appears is that if Pan-Atlantic fails to pay either charter-hire money or interest, applicant, because of its improved financial position as the result of receiving subsidy, will be able to withstand adverse effects of any failure to make such payments when due. Pan-Atlantic already has failed to pay charter hire and allegedly will lose money on its entire operation. Applicant also has failed, in the past, to maintain prescribed current asset levels. This is said to be equivalent to a "threat of assistance from subsidy" from applicant. Such threat is said to be a bar to grant of permission to operate affiliates in the domestic trade.

Under the second paragraph of section 805(a), it is unlawful "to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations * * *." The surmises as to the "support" or "benefit" given by subsidy, particularly in case of default, appear to be quite speculative and far short of diversion. All of the services for which section 805(a) permission is sought are to be operated as separate and distinct services from those which Waterman proposes to operate under subsidy. There is no competitive unfairness where the subsidy will not even indirectly be used in the domestic affiliate's operations, at least not under the remote and speculative circumstances dealt with by interveners. More than threats and speculations are required to show indirect use of subsidy money for domestic operations by an affiliate of an applicant for subsidy. Other arguments, related to the commingling of subsidy and other funds and the use of subsidy money for nonsubsidy purposes if applicant's resources are called on for other obligations, cannot be accepted. The Board will see to it that no diversion of subsidy occurs and that the requirements on applicant under any loan agreements are separate, distinct, and above those required for subsidy purposes.

**Railroads as Interveners**

Three railroads intervened and two of them participated in the proceeding. They contend that one of the issues is the effect on their business of any permission granted under section 805(a), and whether section 101, containing a statement of the objects and policy of the Act, governs our authority to act if such action affects the railroads. Section 805(a) expressly applies only "to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service"; the objects and policy stated in section 101 apply to the "merchant marine" and its encouragement and maintenance. The Act contains
no limitation or directive which authorizes the Board to consider the impact of its decisions on land or air transportation of any kind. Any arguments of this nature must be addressed either to other regulatory agencies or to Congress. We are powerless to consider the facts presented by the railroads.

**Other Permissions**

Waterman, as a contractor under title VI of the Act, also asks written permission to charter the Clairborne and the Monarch of the Seas to Waterman, P.R., for operation between Gulf ports and Puerto Rico. The award or payment of subsidy to applicant-contractor is unlawful unless written permission for chartering vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal service is given by the Board. Service to Puerto Rico is such intercoastal service. The charters run for three years from March 1, 1959, and are renewable. The charter hire is $2,200 per day, which is at least as high as the going market rate at the date of the charter agreement, and higher than later rates. No unfair competition from excessively advantageous costs to the competing line appears to exist, and no prejudice to the objects and policy of the Act have been shown.

Waterman also asks written permission to charter the Bienville, Raphael Semmes, Fairland, Azalea City, and Gateway City to Pan-Atlantic for operation between ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and in the Atlantic/Puerto Rico trade. Actually, this is a subcharter from Waterman. Waterman is not the owner of the vessels but charters them jointly with Pan-Atlantic from their owner, Coastal Ship Corporation, by demise charter dated September 30, 1957. Such demise charter was made contemporaneously with a loan and subordination agreement in connection with an issue of debt securities by Coastal to finance the purchase of the five vessels upon completion of their conversion into C-2 containerships. The vessels were bought from Waterman pursuant to an agreement of September 30, 1957. Pan-Atlantic assigned to Waterman its right in the demise charter and thereafter entered into a subcharter agreement for the operation of the vessels "in any trade throughout the world." No part of subsidy funds could lawfully be used to meet the obligations of the related companies. Applicant's charter was made for the purpose of meeting certain financial requirements related to Coastal's debt financing, not for the purpose of providing any subsidy-aided competition. The charter rates appear reasonable and involve, over a ten-year period, a complete return of the entire purchase price paid by Coastal. These transactions do not involve any factors which would amount to unfair
competition to existing intercoastal operators. Continuance of the charter by Waterman is therefore permitted.

Applicant acts as general agent for Waterman, P.R., in the United States, and asks for permission to continue the relationship and its pecuniary interest in the latter, which otherwise would be unlawful under section 805(a). After entering into a contract for subsidy, applicant will be paid 8 percent on outbound and inbound traffic in comparison with 6 percent of the freight revenues accruing on traffic from the United States to Puerto Rico and 3 percent on traffic moving to the United States from Puerto Rico. One of the interveners, under a similar intercompany agency arrangement, receives 7 percent and 3 percent for such traffic, and another, under a limited agency, pays generally in the United States only 2½ percent. Under its arrangement applicant is not giving the affiliate operating vessels in intercoastal service any unfair competitive advantage on such service. Permission to retain the agency may be given.

When and if Waterman commences subsidized operations in the absence of any later action by the Board, this report shall serve as written permission under section 805(a) for:

1. Waterman, Puerto Rico, to operate a weekly two-vessel service between New Orleans-Mobile and Puerto Rico;

2. Pan-Atlantic to operate a two-vessel weekly trailership or containership service between Port Newark and Puerto Rico, with calls at Jacksonville for discharge and loading of Puerto Rico cargo and loading of Port Newark cargo to Port Newark;

3. Pan-Atlantic to operate not more than four vessels and 53 voyages in southbound service between New York and New Orleans, including calls at Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville;

4. Pan-Atlantic to operate a two-vessel weekly trailership service between Port Newark and Houston;

5. Waterman to charter the Clairborne and the Monarch Of The Seas to Waterman, Puerto Rico;

6. Waterman to charter the Bienville, Raphael Semmes, Fairland, Azalea City, and Gateway City to Pan-Atlantic;

7. Waterman to act as agent for Waterman, Puerto Rico.

After the matter had been submitted on April 13, 1960, Erie and St. Lawrence Corporation filed a petition on July 22, 1960, to intervene and to reopen the proceeding. Rule 5(n) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that “if filed after hearing has been closed it [a petition for intervention] will not be granted ordinarily.” Accordingly, the petition is denied. On our own motion, however, we will set down for further hearing the question of continuing the permissions granted herein insofar as they involve service between Jacksonville and New York (Port Newark).
Appendix

Section 805(a):

It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters, or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, That if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations; and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

6 F.M.B.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 1st day of December A.D. 1960

Docket No. S-73
WATERMAN Steamship Corporation—Application Under Section 805(a)

Whereas, the Board, on September 13, 1960, served its report herein; and

Whereas, the Board, in accordance with said report, desires on its own motion to set down for further hearing the question of continuing the permissions granted therein insofar as they involve service between Jacksonville, Florida, and New York (Port Newark), New York; and

Whereas, the Board, pursuant to section 25 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (46 U.S.C. sec. 824), has authority, upon its own motion, to reopen the proceeding:

It is therefore ordered, That the proceeding be, and it is hereby, set down for further hearing; and

It is further ordered, That, in accordance with Rule 6(d) of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 CFR § 201.94), a pre-hearing conference shall be held before an examiner on January 10, 1961, beginning at 10:00 a.m., in Room 4519 of the new General Accounting Office Building, 5th and G Streets N.W., Washington, D.C. Any interested party may file a petition to intervene.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) Thomas Lisi,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 819

ABSORPTION OR EQUALIZATION OF INLAND FREIGHT CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH TRANSPORTATION BY WATER OF EXPLOSIVES

Submitted April 19, 1960. Decided September 16, 1960

Respondent E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company found to have knowingly obtained transportation by water for shipments of explosives at less than the rates or charges otherwise applicable, by means of an unjust or unfair device, in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Respondents Pacific Far East Line, Inc., and Grace Line Inc. found to have allowed E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company to obtain transportation for explosives at less than the regular rates by means of an unjust or unfair device or means, to have given undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to the shipper or subjected other shippers of explosives to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, or to have unjustly discriminated between shippers of explosives, in violation of sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916.


John Hays for Pacific Far East Line, Inc.

Leonard G. James for R. F. Burley, appearing under subpoena.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, JR., Vice Chairman, and SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

This is an investigation instituted on the Board’s own motion pursuant to section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the Act), 46 U.S.C. 821, to determine whether E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
(du Pont) knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, by means of an unjust or unfair device obtained or attempted to obtain from Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (PFEL), and Grace Line Inc. (Grace) transportation by water for shipments of explosives at less than the rates or charges otherwise applicable, in violation of section 16 of the Act, and whether PFEL and Grace allowed du Pont to obtain such transportation at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on their lines, by means of an unjust or unfair device, in violation of section 16 Second of the Act, and in so doing gave undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to du Pont or subjected other shippers of explosives to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, in violation of section 16 First of the Act, or unjustly discriminated between shippers of explosives, in violation of section 17 of the Act.

Hearing was held before an examiner at San Francisco, California. In his recommended decision he found:

1. That du Pont knowingly and willfully obtained transportation by water for certain shipments of explosives at less than the rates or charges otherwise applicable, by means of an unfair or unjust device, in violation of section 16 of the Act.

2. That PFEL and Grace have not been shown to have allowed du Pont to obtain transportation for explosives at less than the regular rates or charges established and enforced on their lines, by means of an unjust or unfair device, or to have given undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to du Pont or subjected other shippers of explosives to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, in violation of section 16 First of the Act; nor have they been shown to have unjustly discriminated between shippers of explosives, in violation of section 17 of the Act.

Exceptions to the recommended decision and replies thereto were filed, and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified.

PFEL operates as a common carrier subject to the Act from west coast ports to the Far East, including the Philippine Islands, and is a member of Pacific Westbound Conference. Grace operates as a common carrier subject to the Act from west coast ports to west coast ports of Central and South America, and is a member of Capca Freight Conference and Pacific/West Coast of South America Conference. Du Pont manufactures explosives at a plant located on tide-water adjacent to the town of Du Pont, Washington, and the shipments here involved were made from this plant to Philippine and west coast of Central and South American destinations during the period 1953–1957 inclusive via PFEL and Grace.

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Du Pont's plant facilities include a deep-water pier, adequate to accommodate ocean-going vessels, and a company-owned narrow gauge rail line connecting the plant and the pier. Prior to and during World War II, shipments of explosives to foreign destinations were loaded directly at the pier. Since the war du Pont has requested similar direct service at its pier from PFEL and Grace, respondents, or in the alternative, Puget Sound direct loadings at Blake Island, the explosives anchorage established by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Blake Island is located about 25 nautical miles north of Du Pont. Except in one instance—a shipment of explosives loaded at Blake Island by Grace—both Grace and PFEL have refused to load explosives from Puget Sound direct, offering to du Pont in lieu thereof service out of San Francisco, under equalization in the case of PFEL and under transshipment in the case of Grace, as authorized by conference tariffs.

The practices of equalization or transshipment, as such, are not at issue here. So far as the record discloses, equalization on explosives was discontinued by PFEL in the latter part of 1956, and transshipment of explosives was discontinued by Grace early in 1957.

Explosives are particularly difficult for carriers to handle. They are liable to damage other cargo, the vessel itself, and are offensive to passengers. The circumstances under which a ship may be loaded with explosives are rigidly controlled by safety regulations and restrictions of the United States Coast Guard. Vessels may be loaded with explosives only upon issuance of a Coast Guard permit. The Coast Guard frequently invokes restrictions against the loading of explosives unless the location for loading is in compliance with the American Table of Distances or other similar table.

Except at Los Angeles Harbor, California, where a vessel loaded with no more than 300 tons of explosives may use the Outer Harbor dock at San Pedro, no vessel with explosives aboard may dock at a port on the Pacific coast. If a southbound vessel of Grace were to load explosives at Puget Sound for delivery in South America, for example, and called at San Francisco en route, it would be required to proceed first to Anchorage 14 in San Francisco Bay, the designated explosives anchorage, arrange for tugs, lighters, and watchman service, discharge the explosives to lighters, and then proceed to San Francisco Bay terminals. Upon departure from the last terminal the explosives would be reloaded at Anchorage 14. This makes for an extremely costly operation.

Recognizing the difficulties inherent in the handling and carriage of explosives, the conference tariffs effective during the period here
involved established special conditions relating thereto. Pacific West-
bound Conference tariffs 1-V, 1-W, and 1-X provided in Rule No. 33:

The Ocean Carrier shall have the right to refuse to accept any cargo offered
for shipment which is liable to damage other cargo, the vessel, or prove offensive
to passengers.

Capca Freight Conference and Pacific/West Coast of South Amer-
ica Conference tariffs have identical provisions. Capca Freight Con-
ference tariff No. 2 provided in Item 11(A):

Explosives, inflammable or other Dangerous and Hazardous Cargo, or cargo
of objectionable nature, including Creosoted Lumber, Piling and Timber, will
be accepted and transported only at Carrier's option, and subject to special
booking arrangement with individual carrier.

All of the tariffs named specific rates on explosives. Grace and
PFEL claim the right, under the tariff, to refuse shipments of ex-
plosives tendered at a particular port or for a particular vessel. In
practice, however, they have cooperated with explosives shippers in
making mutually satisfactory arrangements for the movement of
shipments offered, and as far as the record shows, no such shipments
have failed to move in some manner, though perhaps not at the times
nor upon the vessels requested initially by the shippers. The rates
applied were those named in the tariffs, and standard forms of bills
of lading were executed. No special contracts are entered into with
the shippers for movement of explosives. Shipments tendered by
explosives shippers other than du Pont—five in the case of PFEL and
28 in the case of Grace—are handled in like manner.

During the period here involved, 56 shipments of explosives moved
from the du Pont plant to destinations in the Philippines and the west
coasts of Central and South America over the lines of PFEL and
Grace. They were carried in regular berth vessels which were adver-
tised for the carriage of general cargo, not excluding explosives. Of
these shipments, 38 were carried by PFEL and ranged from 3.1 to
469 tons, averaging 180 tons. The remaining 18 shipments, carried
by Grace, ranged from 776 pounds to 427 tons, averaging about 100
tons. All of the shipments moved by rail or truck to San Francisco,
and thence were barged to the explosives anchorage where they were
loaded aboard the vessels. Du Pont paid ocean freight at the applic-
cable rates named in the conference tariffs, and also paid initially the
full delivery costs from its plant at Du Pont to vessel at Anchorage
14 in San Francisco Bay. Periodically after shipments were made,
du Pont then billed PFEL and Grace, pursuant to the equalization
and transshipment arrangements, for reimbursement of the cost of

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1 When used herein the word "tons" means short tons of 2,000 pounds.
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movement of the shipments from its plant to vessel at San Francisco, less $10.96. Reimbursement by the carriers was thereupon made as billed, except on three shipments by PFEL on which the payments are being held in abeyance, and on three shipments by Grace on which reimbursement of the total cost of inland movement was made without deduction of the $10.96 allowance.

It is the allowance of $10.96 which is in issue here. Purportedly, it represents the cost per shipment to du Pont for movement from its plant to Blake Island, the preferred point for loading explosives had direct service from Puget Sound been offered by the carriers. The first of the shipments were destined to the Philippines. When they were offered to PFEL and direct service from Puget Sound was requested by du Pont, PFEL declined to provide such direct service, offering instead to provide service out of San Francisco under equalization as then authorized in the conference tariff. Pacific Westbound Conference tariff then in effect provided, in Rule No. 2, so far as pertinent:

Subject to Rules 5, 7 & 9 [not pertinent herein], rates are based on direct loading at loading ports or docks but the individual Member Line Carrier may meet the competition of other Member Lines loading direct at Terminal Ports or Docks, either by trans-shipment or by equalization from point of origin.

* * * * * * * * * *

Equalization is the absorption by the Carrier of the difference between Shipper's cost of delivery to ship's tackle at Terminal Dock at nearest Conference Terminal Port and the cost of delivery to ship's tackle at Terminal Dock and Port of equalizing line. * * *

The tariff named equal rates to the Philippines from Puget Sound ports and San Francisco, subject to a specific requirement that the rates would apply from Du Pont on minimum quantities of 500 revenue tons. Officials of PFEL explained to officials of du Pont that, under the equalization rule, PFEL could absorb the cost of inland movement from the du Pont plant to vessel at San Francisco, less the cost to du Pont of moving the shipments to Blake Island. Accordingly, du Pont was requested to furnish information concerning such Du Pont-Blake Island cost. This cost was then calculated by du Pont as $10.96 per shipment, regardless of size, representing the cost of fuel oil consumed by the MV Du Pont, owned by du Pont, which would be utilized by it in performing the delivery from its plant to Blake Island. Recognizing the lowness of the allowance figure, officials of PFEL inquired as to the possibility that other costs might be involved, such as labor costs, and suggested that the cost per shipment might vary according to the size of the particular shipment, but were assured by officials of du Pont that delivery to vessel at Blake Island
ABSORPTION OR EQUALIZATION ON EXPLOSIVES

would be accomplished with owned equipment, and that labor would be provided by du Pont personnel employed on a monthly wage basis, payable in any event. Thereupon PFEL accepted the assurances and the allowance of $10.96 was used in determining the liability of PFEL to du Pont for reimbursement of inland costs from Du Pont to vessel at San Francisco.

In 1955, when PFEL, in compliance with a revised Pacific West-bound Conference rule requiring that equalization invoices be submitted to the conference for approval before payment, began the preparation of the required reports to the conference, the accuracy of the $10.96 figure was again put up to du Pont, particularly with respect to the ownership of the equipment and the possibility that extra labor expenses might be incurred, and again PFEL received assurance from du Pont that the only extra cost that would be incurred would be the $10.96 per shipment. These facts were reported to the conference, and the equalization payments, less the $10.96 allowance, were approved by the conference.

About the middle of 1953 du Pont offered to Grace the first of the explosives shipments to the west coasts of Central and South America and requested direct service from Puget Sound. Grace likewise refused such direct service but offered to provide service out of San Francisco under transshipment as authorized by the conference tariffs. At the time, Capca Freight Conference and Pacific/West Coast of South America Conference tariffs contained no rates applicable on explosives from Puget Sound to Central and South American ports, the only rates published applying for direct loading from San Francisco and Los Angeles. The tariffs, so far as pertinent, contained a general rule that rates would apply from the Puget Sound ports of Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; that unless otherwise provided, the rates named would apply also from Pacific coast ports other than those mentioned when prior arrangements had been made with the individual carriers, and the vessel called direct to load thereat; and that in the event any carrier found it undesirable for operating reasons to make a direct call at the ports of Seattle and Tacoma, the carrier might effect transshipment between those ports and San Francisco at vessel's expense. The tariff did not provide for similar transshipment at vessel's expense between Du Pont and San Francisco.

It was ascertained that the cost of inland movement from Puget Sound to San Francisco would be about $22 per ton, and accordingly rates were established from Puget Sound to the Central and South American destinations on a level $22 higher than the rates applicable from San Francisco, with the view of permitting transshipment and

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still preserving to the carriers the full ocean revenue obtainable out of San Francisco. Pacific/West Coast of South America Conference rates were made subject to a note reading “Rates apply from Puget Sound loading, subject to vessel’s ability to load.” Capca Freight Conference tariff provided:

*From Puget Sound* loading ports, subject to vessel’s ability to load, rates $22.00 over the rates from California ports stated below.

In October 1956, recognizing that conflict might exist between the rate items and the general rules designating loading ports and authorizing transshipment, the rate items were amended to provide that the rates would apply from Puget Sound loading, direct call or transshipment, vessel’s option, and were specifically excepted from application of the general rules. It was subsequent to these amendments that the three shipments moved on which Grace made full reimbursement to du Pont for inland costs without taking the $10.96 allowance. An ancillary issue arises as to the propriety of this practice, and the proper application of the tariffs prior to the amendments.

It is clear that the conferences, Grace, and du Pont knew that under the tariffs as first established direct calls at Du Pont for loading explosives would in no event be made, and that Blake Island, the designated explosives anchorage, would be the preferred loading point on Puget Sound. Since the loading of explosives could not as a practical matter be accomplished at the ports of Seattle and Tacoma, it is concluded that the general rules should be interpreted so as to substitute Blake Island for Seattle and Tacoma as the loading port for explosives, as required by official pronouncements of governmental agencies, and that under the tariffs prior to the amendments du Pont, under transshipment, would be required to bear the expense of delivery from Du Pont to Blake Island.

Subsequent to the amendments, however, the rates applied at all Puget Sound ports, including Du Pont, and specifically authorized transshipment to San Francisco from Du Pont. Thus du Pont was no longer required to bear the expense of delivery from Du Pont to Blake Island, and reimbursement by Grace to du Pont of the full cost of inland movement from Du Pont to vessel at San Francisco, without deduction of the $10.96 allowance, was in accordance with the tariff. Early in 1957, when it was determined that inland expenses from Puget Sound to San Francisco would exceed the $22 differential in the ocean freight rates, the transshipment privileges were canceled from the tariffs and direct loadings only were authorized.

Before the first shipments moved to Central and South America officials of Grace and du Pont also had discussions concerning the
delivery allowance of $10.96, intended to cover the cost to du Pont of delivery from Du Pont to Blake Island. The same assurances were given Grace as had previously been given to PFEL. Grace officials in San Francisco forwarded the information to their superiors in New York, New York, where additional discussions between traffic officials of Grace and du Pont were had. The du Pont officials in New York assured the Grace officials there that the figure was small because du Pont used its own equipment, but agreed that the figure would be checked with du Pont headquarters at Wilmington, Delaware. Assurance was likewise received from du Pont headquarters that the figure was correct, and the allowance was thereupon approved by Grace.

The *Du Pont* is a wooden motor launch about 65 feet long and 27 years old. It is used by du Pont for the delivery of explosives from its plant to points on Puget Sound, and also to points in southeastern Alaska not accorded regular steamship service. It is manned by a crew of three, whose aggregate monthly salaries are approximately $1,500, and has a maximum capacity of about 50 tons. Although not designed to tow other craft, it has the power to pull a barge laden with up to 250 tons of explosives. If it does tow a barge it is still capable of carrying a full cargo. On occasion it is used by du Pont to transport shipments for other explosives shippers in the Puget Sound area, moving from the du Pont dock to Blake Island or Port Madison, Washington, but only when regular commor-carrier service by carriers operating in the Puget Sound area is unavailable. On such occasions, the charge made by du Pont is the same as that made by the common carriers. Up to August 1955, the common-carrier rate on explosives from Du Pont to Blake Island was 85 cents per 100 pounds, and thereafter was increased to 94 cents per 100 pounds.

Only 10 of the shipments here involved were under 50 tons, ranging from 776 pounds to 47 tons, and were within the capacity of the *Du Pont*. On the shipments between 50 and 300 tons, du Pont would have had to rent a barge and set of tarpaulins, at a daily cost of $18.50 in 1955, in order to effect delivery to Blake Island, such rented equipment being available at Seattle. In order to effect delivery of shipments in excess of 300 tons, du Pont would have had to rent two barges and two sets of tarpaulins, at a daily rental of $37, and would have had to hire a tug to tow the second loaded barge at a minimum charge of $235 plus $35 per hour.

Operating without a tow, the fuel consumption of the *Du Pont* is about 7 gallons per hour, and it can make the trip from Du Pont to Blake Island in about 3 hours. While towing a barge loaded with
about 200 tons of explosives, the fuel consumption would increase to about 9 gallons per hour, and the running time from Du Pont to Blake Island would be about 5 hours. Approximately 14 hours total running time is required for the Du Pont to tow a barge or barges from Seattle to Du Pont, a loaded barge from Du Pont to Blake Island, and the return of the empty barges to Seattle. The average cost per gallon of fuel oil was 14.11 cents in 1953, 14.86 cents in 1954, 15.51 cents in 1955, and 16.52 cents in 1956.

The plant railroad, operated by du Pont employees, can carry about 30 tons of explosives from the magazine to the dock in one hour. It can be unloaded from the train and loaded into the Du Pont by five men, each working a four-hour shift. The two-man train crew would work about nine hours in order to transport 200 tons from the magazines to the dock. Two shifts of five men working eight to eight and one-half hours would be needed to unload the 200 tons from the train, and two shifts of six men working the same time would be required on the barge to receive and store the 200 tons. All of this work would be performed by du Pont employees, whose average wage in 1956 was $2.38 per hour. A shipment of 400 tons would require about twice the number of man-hours required to move and load 200 tons. The Du Pont can discharge its cargo into an ocean-going vessel at Blake Island at the rate of about five tons per hour; explosives from a barge can be discharged at the rate of about six tons per hour.

From the above, it is impossible to determine the precise cost to du Pont for the movement of any particular shipment from its pier at Du Pont to Blake Island. It is clear, however, that the figure of $10.96 per shipment, regardless of size, supplied by it to PFEL and Grace, understates the direct costs for such movement. A shipment of 30 tons, after loading at the pier, would occupy the crew of the Du Pont for a total of 11 hours at the least, including three hours running time to Blake Island, 6 hours for discharge to the ocean vessel, and three hours on the return trip. Fuel oil costs would be $5.92 at the lowest price shown in 1953, and crew labor costs would be $30 assuming that no overtime would be paid, for a total of $35.92, without regard to labor costs for loading and unloading. On a shipment of 200 tons, and disregarding even crew and other labor costs, a minimum of 47 hours would be required to complete the movement, including 14 hours running time, 8 hours loading time at the pier, and 25 hours unloading time at Blake Island, which would result in fuel costs of $17.78 and equipment rental costs of $37, for a total of $54.78. On a shipment of 400 tons, with costs calculated on the latter
basis, allowing only six hours running time for the necessary rented tug to deliver a barge from the pier to Blake Island and return to its base, and assuming that the Du Pont and the barges could discharge their cargo simultaneously into the ocean vessel, the movement could not be completed in less than 49 hours, fuel costs again would be $17.78, equipment rental costs for three days would be $111, and tug hire would be $425, for a total of $553.78. Of the 56 shipments, 41 weighed between 50 and 300 tons, the latter figure being the maximum capacity of the Du Pont and one rented barge, and 5 weighed in excess of 300 tons.

There is evidence concerning the cost of delivery to vessel at San Francisco of explosives shippers located in the San Francisco area, competitors of du Pont, which are borne in their entirety by such shippers. Such costs range from $5 to $24.30 per ton. The evidence was intended to prove that, should PFEL and Grace be found to have allowed du Pont to obtain transportation at less than the regular rates or charges established and enforced, by means of unjust or unfair means or device, in violation of section 16 Second of the Act, such practice likewise would be in violation of sections 16 First and 17 of the Act as unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and preferential and unjustly discriminatory. The witnesses for the San Francisco area explosives shippers, appearing under subpoena, were unable to state whether the practices of PFEL and Grace subjected their respective companies to any disadvantage.

The Act provides, so far as here pertinent:

Section 1. The term "common carrier by water in foreign commerce" means a common carrier engaged in the transportation by water of passengers or property between the United States or any of its Districts, Territories, or possessions and a foreign country, whether in the import or export trade: Provided, That a cargo boat commonly called an ocean tramp shall not be deemed such "common carrier by water in foreign commerce."

Sec. 16. That it shall be unlawful for any shipper or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, by means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, false report of weight, or by any other unjust or unfair device or means to obtain or attempt to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable.

That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly—

First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.

Second. To allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of
such carrier by means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, false report of weight, or by any other unjust or unfair device or means.

Sec. 17. That no common carrier by water in foreign commerce shall demand, charge, or collect any rate, fare, or charge which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers or ports * * *

Du Pont contends that PFEL and Grace are not common carriers by water in foreign commerce in the transportation of explosives, and that the Board has therefore no jurisdiction over such transportation; that its additional costs which would be incurred in the event shipments of explosives were moved by it from Du Pont to Blake Island, exclusive of labor costs, which are payable in any event, would average out at $10.96, any variations from that figure being de minimis; and that consequently no violation of section 16 of the Act has occurred.

As to the first contention, it is asserted that the person to be regulated under the Act is the "common carrier" at common law (Agreement No. 7620, 2 U.S.M.C. 749, 752 (1945)); that by the restrictive conditions published in the conference tariffs, including the reservation of the right to refuse shipments of explosives, Grace and PFEL have negated their common-carrier status; and that explosives by their nature are not subject to common carriage, citing numerous authorities, including Hutchinson On Carriers, 3d ed., sec. 62, where it is stated:

To constitute common carriage the carrier must be under such a legal obligation to carry that an action will lie against him for a refusal to perform—if he may carry or not as he deems best he is but a private individual and vested as all other private persons with the right to make his own contract.

The record is clear that Grace and PFEL, through the medium of the conference tariffs, hold themselves out to transport explosives and establish rates applicable to such transportation, subject only to such restrictive conditions as are required by the nature of the cargo; that the restrictive conditions are applied alike to all shippers of explosives; that no special contracts are entered into for such transportation; and that transportation of explosives was performed at the tariff rates and in accordance with the tariff conditions. A common carrier is such by virtue of his occupation, not by virtue of the responsibilities under which he rests. Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 440 (1889).

It is admitted by Du Pont that the vessels upon which its shipments were transported were general cargo common-carrier vessels. A carrier may be both a common and a contract carrier, but not, however, on one vessel on the same voyage. Transp. by Mendez & Co., Inc., Between U.S. and Puerto Rico, 2 U.S.M.C. 717, 721 (1944); Gage v. Tirrell, 9 Allen (91 Mass.) 299 (1864). See also Waterman v. Stockholms Rederiaktiebolag Svea, 3 U.S.M.C. 131 (1949), where an admitted
common carrier which had refused to carry refrigerated cargo for anyone was held to be a common carrier of refrigerated cargo when it subsequently transported for one shipper under special contracts; and Philip R. Consolo v. Grace Line Inc., 4 F.M.B. 293, 303 (1953).

The conclusion is inescapable that PFEL and Grace were and are common carriers of explosives, in the light of the facts shown here, and as such are subject to the Act. Grace Line Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 280 F. 2d 790 (2d Cir. 1960).

As to the second contention, it has been shown that du Pont’s costs for the Blake Island transportation on the du Pont are substantial, not “de minimis”. These substantial costs should have been deducted by du Pont in preparing the billings submitted to the carriers for reimbursement. To the extent that the costs were not deducted, the carriers reimbursed du Pont for its Blake Island transportation costs.

The agreement between the shipper and the carrier, as reflected in the applicable tariff regulation (supra), is that the carrier would absorb the difference between du Pont’s cost of delivery to the San Francisco loading point and the cost of delivery at Blake Island. The transshipment or equalization-from-point-of-origin provisions in the tariff regulation were interpreted by the carriers, and the interpretation acceded to by du Pont as shipper, to mean that the carriers could absorb the cost of the inland movement less the costs to du Pont of moving the property from Du Pont to Blake Island. Du Pont advised the carriers that this amount was $10.96, although it must have known by elementary cost accounting principles that not only fuel but other operating and administrative costs are involved when labor and equipment are diverted from other plant operations. Du Pont always claimed only fuel costs were involved. The tariff regulations apply to all of du Pont’s costs for the Du Pont-to-Blake Island movement of property, and not just to any added costs or fuel costs. Du Pont was at least disingenuous in telling the carriers its deductible costs were only $10.96 for the purpose of billing the carriers for reimbursement and, in effect, required them to subsidize part of its operations. The statute proscribes the obtaining of transportation by a shipper at less than the rates or charges otherwise applicable. Violation does not depend upon the amount of money involved, even assuming that the theory of du Pont as to the method of computing its cost is correct. The record shows that, except for a few shipments, du Pont’s costs would have been far in excess of the claimed $10.96, and the excess is not “de minimis.” The facts about these costs were known to du Pont and were understated to the carriers in requesting refunds pursuant to the equalization or transshipment agreements. It is concluded that
du Pont knowingly and willfully obtained transportation by water for the explosives shipments here involved at less than the applicable rates or charges, by an unfair or unjust means, in violation of section 16 of the Act.

The foregoing estimates and analysis of the relationship of du Pont’s Blake Island transportation costs to other plant costs also point conclusively to the responsibility of the carriers for giving a preference to du Pont. Not only did du Pont know about the underestimation of costs, but the carriers did too, although they may not have known the precise amount. The carriers’ representatives know enough about business and the allocation of costs to be aware that du Pont’s costs for the Blake Island transportation above the $10.96 fuel costs were being paid for twice—one by income from other du Pont revenues and once by the carriers’ reimbursement. Wages, repairs, maintenance and replacements, administrative overhead, taxes, insurance, and depreciation are such costs. The agreement was that du Pont would pay these costs. This was to be accomplished by the carriers through a deduction from their reimbursement. Instead, the carriers paid them as a result of the underestimation of the deduction and of the consequent overstatement in the billing for reimbursement. This is a fact that no amount of redundant reaffirmation by du Pont officers, that fuel cost is the only cost and that there were no other costs, can conceal. The $10.96 deduction from the reimbursement billing was never misunderstood by the carriers and was clearly represented at all times to be only extra for fuel costs. We do not believe we should let any claimed ignorance of such obvious facts be used to avoid responsibility for allowing any person to obtain transportation for property (explosives) at less than regular rates by the unjust or unfair means of paying the shipper far in excess of the agreed reimbursement, in violation of section 16. To the extent of the excessive reimbursement, the carriers also subjected other shippers to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, in violation of section 16. First, and charged a rate that was discriminatory as against other shippers of explosives, in violation of section 17.

The fact that Grace and PFEL told du Pont about the tariff provision, made inquiry about the cost of Blake Island transportation, questioned the allowance, and pursued the matter to du Pont’s senior officers at its home office in Wilmington, and did so more than once, proves, if anything, the carriers not only suspected what was going on, but deliberately, or through calculated ignorance, allowed themselves to be side-tracked in the search for a cost figure instead of pointing out to du Pont the true meaning of the reimbursement agree-
ment and the true result of the payments they were making. This they never did. As a result, the carriers actually allowed transportation at less than regular rates and actually allowed du Pont to obtain a discriminatory rate. This cannot be treated as a case of inadvertence. The carriers' failure to object to the obvious double payment of Blake Island transportation costs and to the excessive reimbursement in violation of the tariff regulation involves such a disregard of the facts of business life as to amount to an intent and a knowing scheme to violate sections 16 and 17, and we so hold. This case is clearly distinguishable in this regard from Practices of Fabre Line and Gulf/Mediterranean Conference, 4 F.M.B. 611 (1955).

We further believe that the carriers, contrary to their claim of helplessness, had ample means of enforcing the tariff other than by refusing to transport. They could have simply refused to pay on du Pont's billings for reimbursement or abated the reimbursement to du Pont by their estimate of du Pont's Blake Island costs, thus compelling du Pont to produce its known costs.

We conclude (1) that du Pont, by means of false billing, has knowingly obtained or attempted to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable, and (2) that PFEL and Grace allowed du Pont to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established on their lines, by means of an unjust or unfair device or means.

This matter will be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

6 F.M.B.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 5th day of December A.D. 1960

No. 819

ABSORPTION OR EQUALIZATION OF INLAND FREIGHT CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH TRANSPORTATION BY WATER OF EXPLOSIVES

Grace Line Inc. having filed a petition for reopening this proceeding for the purpose of reargument and reconsideration, and it appearing that the petition does not present any issues not considered in the report of the Board entered September 16, 1960:

It is ordered, That the said petition be, and it is hereby, denied; and

It is further ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
Pacific Far East Line, Inc., granted permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, to use the SS India Bear on October 14, 1960, to lift and transport approximately 650 measurement tons of military cargo on one voyage from San Diego, California, to Honolulu, Hawaii, at the request of Military Sea Transport Service, since the granting of such permission would not (1) result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or (2) be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

Odell Kominer for applicant.
John R. Coggrave as Public Counsel.

Report of the Deputy Maritime Administrator

By the Deputy Maritime Administrator:

Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (PFEL), by letter of October 7, 1960, informed the Maritime Administration that it had been asked by Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) to lift approximately 650 measurement tons of military cargo from San Diego, California, to Honolulu, Hawaii, aboard the SS India Bear. The letter was treated as an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 46 U.S.C. 1223, and notice was published in the Federal Register of October 12, 1960 (25 F.R. 9773), that a hearing on the application would be held. The only intervener was Matson Navigation Company (Matson).

PFEL proposes to use the India Bear on one westbound voyage after completing loading operations in Long Beach, California,
October 13, 1960. The vessel can proceed to San Diego on October 14, 1960, without interfering with its presently scheduled departure from San Francisco, California, on October 20, 1960. It will call at Honolulu on its normal schedule. The proposed transportation was negotiated only after the failure of efforts to have the cargo transported by other lines and on Matson’s vessels. Alternative offers by Matson for loadings on October 15 and 16 were rejected by MSTS, which attributed military importance to a loading on October 14. Matson is the only other American-flag operator in this service between California and Hawaii which has shown the Maritime Administration that it has any interest in the competitive effect of the proposed transportation. Matson’s witness stated that it does not object to PFEL lifting this one westbound cargo on October 14. Public Counsel presented no evidence on the competitive effect of the proposed shipment.

It is found that the granting of the permission applied for will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.

6 M.A.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 802

MISCLASSIFICATION AND MISBILLING OF GLASS TUMBLERS AND OTHER MANUFACTURED GLASSWARE ITEMS AS JARS

Submitted August 16, 1960. Decided November 21, 1960

Bartlett-Collins Company and Houston Freight Forwarding Company found to have knowingly and willfully misclassified shipments of glass tumblers and other glassware items, obtaining transportation by water therefor at rates less than otherwise would have been applicable, in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. The matter will be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., Royal Netherlands Steamship Company, and Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion (Venezuelan Line) found to have allowed persons to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates, by means of false classification, in violation of section 16 Second of the Shipping Act, 1916. The matter will be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Karl H. Mueller and Harold E. Mueller for Bartlett-Collins Company.

Richard H. Powell and Warren H. Powell for Houston Freight Forwarding Company.


Norman M. Barron for Royal Netherlands Steamship Company.

David Orlin for United States Atlantic & Gulf-Venezuelan & Netherlands Antilles Conference.

Robert C. Bamford and John E. Cograve as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

Ralph E. Wilson, Chairman; Thos. E. Stakem, Jr., Vice Chairman; Sigfrid B. Unander, Member

By the Board:

The Board, as authorized by section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (the Act), initiated an investigation to determine (1) whether Bart-
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

lett Collins Company (Bartlett or shipper), a manufacturer and shipper of glass products, and Houston Freight Forwarding Company (Houston or the forwarder), a freight forwarder, had willfully, directly or indirectly, by means of false classification or by any other unjust or unfair device or means, obtained or attempted to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges which otherwise would be applicable during September 1955 and thereafter, and (2) whether Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (Lykes), Royal Netherlands Steamship Company (Netherlands), and Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion (Venezuelan Line), common carriers by water (the carriers), allowed any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carriers, by means of false billing, false classification, or by other unjust device or means, in violation of section 16 of the Act. The alleged violations center around certain false classification of glassware shipped from Sapulpa, Oklahoma, to ports in Venezuela, as described in bills of lading covering shipments between September 1955 and June 1956.

The examiner recommended that Bartlett and Houston be found to have violated section 16 but that the carriers be found not to have violated the Act. For the reasons hereinafter noted, we find that all of the respondents violated section 16.

FACTS

1. The forwarder classified Bartlett's shipments of glass tumblers or drinking glasses, nappy (a round serving dish), jugs (pitchers), stemware, cookie jars, sherbet glasses, ash trays, beverage sets, tableware, decanter sets, cola tumblers, bowl sets, reamers (juice extractors), flower bowls, and other table glassware and caster cups as "empty glass jars" or "glassware (jugs)" on 44 bills of lading of the carriers, dated between October 7, 1955, and March 19, 1956. The descriptions appeared under the headings "Shipper's Description of Goods" and "Class and Contents of Packages." The forwarder prepared and "rated" (entered the freight rates and computed the freight charge) the bills of lading in complete form except for signature, numbering, and dating, before they were issued by the carriers.

2. Before preparing the bills of lading the president-owner-active manager of the forwarder discussed the classification of the glassware with Bartlett's authorized representatives and was instructed by them to classify the shipments as jars. Both the shipper and the forwarder
knew the shape, size, and appearance of the articles. The shipper correctly classified the glassware on (a) its loading tally based on its catalogue descriptions and numbers, and (b) its inland bills of lading based on the tally; and the forwarder correctly classified the glassware on an “export declaration” which it also prepared. The “jars” classification was used only on the carriers’ bills of lading. The classification on this document controls the amounts charged for transportation by the carriers. The shipper’s catalogue describes the articles as listed above. They are not referred to therein as jars. There was evidence that the tumblers could be used as jars if suitable caps were used. Caps were not furnished and there is no evidence that they were so used by the consignees named in the bills of lading of record.

3. The commodity descriptions and classifications in Freight Tariff No. 6 of United States Atlantic and Gulf-Venezuela and Netherlands Antilles Conference, in effect September 1955 and carried forward into Tariff No. 7, effective from December 14, 1955, through the date of the last bill of lading, distinguish between “Bottles or Jars, Empty, Glass—with or without caps” (Item 115) and “glassware” and “tumblers” (Item 1000). The former are transported at substantially lesser rates than otherwise would be applicable to correctly classified glassware (e.g., $18.66 as against $92.40 on one shipment).

4. There is no evidence that any of the items shipped were shown to officials of the carriers in order to obtain a decision as to the proper tariff rating. Employees of the forwarder made only verbal inquiries to the carriers’ employees as to the rate on “jars” or “tumblers.” The carriers did not have and were not informed what the inland bills of lading or the tally sheets showed, but they did have the export declarations. The variances between the bill of lading descriptions and export declaration descriptions of the same property was not noticed because the declaration does not always accompany the bill of lading, and they were not always brought together and compared. The carriers relied on the shipper’s description of the property in validating bills of lading and in allowing the shipper to obtain transportation for the property at the established tariff rate (Tariff No. 7, Item 115).

5. Eighteen of the 44 shipments were carried on Lykes vessels, 12 on Royal Netherlands vessels, and 14 on Venezuelan Line vessels, from Houston or Galveston, Texas, to La Guaira, Maracaibo, or Puerto Cabello, Venezuela.

The investigation disclosed that the 44 bills of lading in evidence were merely illustrative of a great number (at least 240) of various documents examined.

6 F.M.B.
1. Charges against the shipper and the forwarder

Bartlett shipped at least 1977 cartons of glassware consisting of water pitchers, beverage sets, ash trays, vases, bowl sets, salt and pepper shakers, dessert dishes, fruit bowls, cookie jars, sherbet dishes, small one-ounce glasses with handles, sugar bowls, cream pitchers, juice reamers, plates, flower bowls, coasters, and caster cups (see appendix for a breakdown of articles by cartons), which it described on ocean bills of lading as glass jars or jugs when the tariff classifications available also provided a rate for "glassware". The description of these articles as empty jars or jugs instead of glassware was a factual misclassification. Regardless of any dual use of drinking glasses as food containers or for powdered soap or bubble bath granules as shown in exhibits, and as jars, as contended by respondents, there could be no such ambiguity about the contents of the 1977 cartons. Bartlett also shipped over 7700 cartons of drinking glasses, which it contends are correctly classifiable as jars instead of tumblers.

The controlling use of all the glassware (except the caster cups), including the tumblers, however, was table glassware. This is clearly shown both by the pictures and other information in the Bartlett catalogue, and by the fact that retailers of glassware such as department stores, drug stores, and "5 and 10 cent" stores were among Bartlett's customers. Bartlett introduced some evidence of the domestic sale of its products for packaging, but none of the Venezuelan consignees of the shipments examined were identified as packers.

Bartlett relied mainly on argumentative proof that the adaptability of the tumblers for use as jars or as "packers' tumblers" could be used to control the tariff classification. It and the forwarder argue that the matter should be put the other way around and that we should say the articles are jars, such as jelly glasses or jars which are treated as containers, not as tumblers, notwithstanding the fact that they are susceptible to use as tumblers.

We think the starting point should be the manufacturer's catalogue, sales efforts, and common understanding as to what the manufacturer-shipper had for sale. Such common understanding is reached by a study of the essential characteristics of articles.

There is also a constant refrain in the testimony of the forwarder's president that "we are not glass experts." However, this excuse is not applicable to the forwarder's ability to identify table glassware or tumblers for drinking purposes by using as a starting point for their thinking the commonly accepted meaning of these terms. It is only when one reverses the approach by departing from the common
understanding and tries to convert table glassware and tumblers into packaging containers that expertise becomes a factor. One has to know whether they are suitable for capping, for use with machinery which puts food into them, or for standing up under the handling involved in packaging, transporting, and merchandising. If the forwarder and his employees had not looked through the wrong end of the telescope to describe the articles in the bill of lading they would not need to be an expert and would have been able to find the correct tariff description with no trouble.

Possible use does not change the essential character of the articles and is not a lawful basis for a difference in freight charges. *Int. Com. Comm. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.*, 225 U.S. 326 (1912); *Craneer v. Lowden*, 121 F. 2d 645 (8th Cir. 1941); *Kimball v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 271 F. 469 (8th Cir. 1921); *Stowe-Fuller Company v. Pennsylvania Co.* et al., 12 I.C.C. 215 (1907); *Ex-River Coal from Mt. Vernon, Ind., to Chicago*, 294 I.C.C. 233 (1955). This is particularly true in the present case where the tumblers were not shown to have been sold for packaging but were sold as table glassware.

The drinking glasses shipped by Bartlett, notwithstanding any adaptability as containers when capped, would be described more correctly by common usage as “tumblers” rather than “jars”. They are labeled “Tumblers” in Bartlett’s own catalogue. They are so designated in other documents. The identical “Tumbler” designation was an available classification in the tariff. It should have been used.

The controlling use as a drinking glass determines the correctness of the tumbler classification. *Continental Can Company v. United States*, 272 F. 2d 312 (2d Cir. 1959), and cases cited. The “jars” classification used to describe tumblers likewise was factually incorrect. We have recently so held in *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.—Misclassification of Glass Tumblers*, 5 F.M.B. 515 (1958);¹ and *Markt & Hammacher Co.—Misclassification of Glassware*, 5 F.M.B. 509 (1958). We hold that the drinking glasses or tumblers also were falsely classified as jars.

The false classification results in the billing and payment of a lower freight rate than would be applicable to tumblers and glassware. To the extent the billing depends on the classification for its correctness, it too was false. Section 16 is violated by shippers and forwarders if the false classification and the false billing were knowingly and willfully made.

Wilfully means “purposely or obstinately and is designed to describe the attitude of a carrier, who, having a free will or choice,

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¹ Reversed by *Continental Can, supra*, on the ground that the Board failed to adduce proof that the controlling use was a drinking glass or tumbler.

6 F.M.B.
either intentionally disregards the statute or is plainly indifferent to its requirements.” *U.S. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.*, 303 U.S. 239 (1938). In *Rates from Japan to United States*, 2 U.S.M.C. 426, 434 (1940), the Maritime Commission stated: “Their persistent failure to inform or even attempt to inform themselves through the *** means which normal business resource and acumen should dictate, is proof that they knowingly and willfully keep themselves in ignorance of the false billings concerned.” A Federal court has said with reference to the Elkins Act (49 U.S.C. § 41(3)), which penalizes anyone who “shall knowingly *** receive *** a rebate”: “it was not necessary under the Elkins Act that there should be an intentional violation of the law, but that purposely doing a thing prohibited by the statute amounted to an offense.” *United States v. Erie R. Co.*, 222 Fed. 444, 449 (D.N.J. 1915).

In addition to what has been noted in the facts and as related to these standards, the examiner found as follows with regard to any willfulness or knowledge the respondents may have had as to what was going on:

1. Bartlett described the same glassware on a “loading tally”, which it prepared, as “tumblers”, “vase assortment”, “Ste. Gen. Nappy”, etc., as noted in the appendix;

2. Bartlett described the same glassware in inland bills of lading, which it prepared in connection with truck shipments to Houston or Galveston, as “glass tumblers”, or “glassware” such as “glass serving sets”, or “decanter sets”, “ash trays”, or “handle mugs”, as required. These bills of lading distinguish between the cartons containing tumblers and those containing other glassware. This shows that Bartlett was aware of the distinct characteristics of its product;

3. Bartlett knew the shape, size, and other characteristics of its products and that they were used predominantly as tableware, as is also shown by its catalogue descriptions and its sales information which it issued to the public;

4. In spite of its knowledge of the dominant characteristics of its product, Bartlett’s representatives instructed Houston to classify the shipments as jars. These actions followed discussions between the owner, president, and active manager of Houston, who testified he talked to “one of the Bartletts”—possibly Edward Bartlett—and “pointed out to the Bartlett Collins Co. the way the tariff read;”

5. Houston, in 23 of the 44 shipments in evidence, described the cargo as “glass tumblers” in the export declaration which it prepared. It classified the shipments pursuant to a schedule covering “Tumblers, Drinking Glasses and Stemware; Machine Made.” The export declarations contained a statement by Bartlett as the shipper, signed by its
“duly authorized officer or employee”, authorizing Houston “to act as forwarding agent for export control and customs purposes;”

(6) Houston, in 20 of the 23 foregoing shipments, on the ocean bills of lading which it prepared, described the same cargo as “Empty Glass Jars under 1 gallon capacity”, and thus brought the shipment under the tariff classification covering “Bottles or Jars.” In the majority of the cases Houston also had in its possession the Bartlett tally sheet or inland bill of lading containing the correct descriptions noted above. If Houston simply had followed the documents in its possession and not consulted with the shipper, it would have described the contents of the cartons correctly. The variances in the ocean bills of lading were made only after consultations with the shipper. The foregoing was written on a bill of lading form (Lykes form) which contained the following notation at the bottom of the page: “Attention of shippers, consignors, consignees, forwarders, brokers and other persons is called to the provisions of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended by the Act approved June 16, 1936, in relation to penalty of not more than $5,000 in relation to false billing, false classification, false weighing, false report of weight, or any other unjust or unfair device or means or attempt to obtain transportation by water of property at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable.”

The above findings show not only that both Bartlett’s and Houston’s senior officers knew there was a variance between what was being shipped and what was described in documents containing this warning, and issued over the signatures of their employees, but also that the variances were willfully created. With full information about the articles, they studied the tariff and then made up their minds about what to do. They decided to choose a classification giving the lowest rate. They could ship a jar for 5½ times less than it would cost to ship a tumbler. They had a choice in classifying the articles. They exercised their choice by choosing the improper description consistently and continually. The choice involved willfully ignoring a printed warning, as well as a more descriptive classification of the articles shipped with a full knowledge (a) of the characteristics and normal use of the article and (b) of the proper classification thereof. As a result, they obtained transportation at less than the rate and charge otherwise applicable.

2. Charges against the carriers

Section 16 is violated by common carriers by water if they allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line

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of such carriers by means of false billing or false classification.

The status of Lykes, Venezuelan Line, and Royal Netherlands as common carriers by water, and the fact that the tariff used by Bartlett and Houston contains the rates and charges then established and enforced by the carriers and its applicability to the shipments in question, were properly established by testimony and are not denied. The falsity of the classification and of the use of less than regular rates or charges in billing have been shown above.

To "allow" a person to do something means to approve or to sanction an act, or to suffer something to be done by neglecting to restrain or prevent. (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary.) In Practices of Fabre Line and Gulf/Mediterranean Conf., 4 F.M.B. 611, 636 (1955), it was stated:

Although unlike the first paragraph of section 16, the quoted language does not contain the words "knowingly and willfully" or similar words, intent is, nevertheless, an element essential to establishment of violation of section 16-Second, which makes unlawful allowing, by unjust or unfair device or means, any person to obtain transportation at less than the regularly established and enforced rates or charges. No resort to lexicography is necessary to determine that a "device" must be a willful, knowing scheme or means to an end.

It is apparent, then, that a carrier does not violate section 16-Second by inadvertence unless the evidence reveals such a wanton disregard of the duty to exercise reasonable diligence to collect applicable rates and charges for transportation as to amount to an intent to collect less than the applicable rates and charges.

In Rates from United States to Philippine Islands, 2 U.S.M.C. 535 (1941), the Maritime Commission held that carriers' office procedures, which consisted of comparing bill of lading descriptions with export declaration descriptions, followed up by having someone in the bill of lading department notify the shipper by telephone in case of a discrepancy, was insufficient, and that this procedure against a background of actual knowledge by the carriers of widespread flagrant false billing by shippers, constituted a violation of section 16. In Rates from Japan to United States, supra, the Maritime Commission held that carriers purposely keeping themselves in ignorance of false billing by shippers, in order to deny actual knowledge, were estopped to deny that which could be learned by the exercise of reasonable diligence. It was concluded that the carriers had violated section 16.

With reference to the foregoing standards, we find the following:

1. In at least 16 shipments by Lykes the ocean bills of lading described cartons as containing "empty glass jars", "glassware, jars", or "glass jars", and the export declaration described them variously as "glass tumblers", "glassware", "tumblers, drinking glasses and stemware", "table glassware", or "beverage sets tumblers";
2. At least 11 shipments by Venezuelan Line were described the same way in the ocean bills of lading, and five export declarations described the property as “table glassware” or “glass tumblers.” The remaining six export declarations described the property as “other unfilled glass containers (new) jars and jugs”;

3. At least 13 shipments by Royal Netherlands were described the same way in the ocean bills of lading, and five export declarations described the shipments variously as “cookie jars”, “glass tumblers”, “table glassware”, “drinking glasses and stemware”, “glassware”, or “nappies.” The remaining eight export declarations described the property as “other unfilled glass containers Jars (new)”, “(new) jars and jugs”, or “(new) jars” as variations of the words “Jars (new)”.

4. According to its witness, Lykes has a “standard operating procedure” which requires that the descriptions on the bill of lading be compared with the export declaration, and in case of discrepancy the reviewing employee is supposed to report to his supervisor “if the difference in the description has any significance.” Under cross examination, however, the witness indicated that it was very unlikely that this “standard operating procedure” was actually followed in “the daily operation of a busy steamship office”, where the clerk responsible is “scampering from pillar to post getting all these different things together”, while “Consulates are sitting on his neck.” This was described as “pretty representative activity.” He also said: “* * * now if it’s followed all the time, I would hate to say, because you have to depend on clerical help to do it.” The witness also stated that in case of doubt about a classification “I must guide myself by the shipper who, after all, knows what he is shipping and tells me.” He professed lack of qualification to tell a jar from a tumbler. He declared it is not within “the province of any steamship agent * * * to question the veracity of a shipper, unless he has good solid cause, and in that case I still think he should go to the shipper first * * *”;

5. Venezuelan Line’s witness stated that “it is our practice to attempt to check each and every bill of lading and dek (sic) [export declaration] against one and the other.” In case of discrepancies “we will ask the freight forwarder or shipper * * * to either correct one or the other, whichever is the correct description;”

6. Royal Netherlands, through its “line manager” employed by Strachan Shipping Co. as local agent, testified that “my general instructions and my understanding is that we compare the export declaration description with the bill of lading description when we are in doubt as to whether it is properly described in the bill of lading or whether by referring to the export declaration we might get a better idea of the proper rate to apply to the item that is on the bill of
lading.” Under further questioning about comparison procedure he said the company made “spot checks where sufficient comparison seems in the opinion of the person handling it justified or called for;”

7. The export declaration is a customs document which requires a description of the contents of export shipments. The standard classifications it calls for are contained in a Government publication, in evidence, containing lists of all of the exported commodities of the United States by category and number. Its descriptions do not necessarily conform to those in tariffs, and it is entirely possible to check a declaration against a bill of lading and not find an inconsistency when in fact there is a false classification. Nevertheless, the declaration is a useful guide to variances in descriptions of property which can alert anyone comparing them with bills of lading and lead to the discovery of a misclassification. It seems to be about the only way, short of opening and visually inspecting packages, to find out about discrepancies.

8. In June 1956, at Galveston, the cargo consisting of cartons of glassware on the SS Fred Morris, operated by Lykes, was inspected by an inspector employed by the United States Customs. He had a shipper’s export declaration with him. The inspection consisted of opening several cartons, taking out several pieces of the glassware contents, looking at them, placing them back in the cartons, and then resealing the cartons. The inspector prepared a written report dated July 18, 1956, showing, from the export declaration, that Bartlett was the exporter and that the contents of various numbers of cartons were “table glassware”, “glass serving sets”, or “tumblers.” The witness called them “ordinary drinking glasses.” The purpose of his inspection was to assure conformity between the contents of the cartons and the descriptions in the shipper’s export declaration. There is no evidence that any employee of Lykes was present, saw any of these actions or the articles removed, or received a copy of the inspector’s report. No inspections were made by employees of the other two lines.

The question is whether these facts show that the carriers did not restrain the shipments after examining the two sets of documents or of having the opportunity to do so, as the result of a wanton disregard of the duty to collect applicable rates. The carriers’ office procedures permitted a discovery of questionable variances, but they are not coupled with additional evidence of knowledge about false billing practices generally. The problem is to determine whether the carriers were sufficiently alerted to the significance of the variances in classifications, even without such knowledge, to justify a finding that they
purposely kept themselves in ignorance by not inspecting the cargo and checking documents more diligently, and thus allowed the shipper to obtain transportation at less than established rates.

The testimony is meager and confusing about what actually happened with reference to the particular shipments. As to Strachlan Shipping Co. and Royal Netherlands, there is no evidence that the spot checks or documents they customarily made were ever made with regard to these shipments. Lykes presented a picture of complete disorganization. But two factors emerge both in the testimony of carriers' witnesses and in the argument of counsel. First, they had available in their offices, and to some extent (the extent is not clear) compared, export declarations and bills of lading to determine whether the bills of lading and the billings were false, but in this case such use failed completely to bring about any discovery which could lead to action to correct the false classifications that have been shown to exist. Lykes' counsel stated that in any event the "differences were certainly not of a nature as to put a nonexpert bill of lading clerk on notice of a misclassification." Second, in case of doubt the carriers, in the words of their counsel, "must rely upon the classification of the goods as furnished by the shipper directly or through his freight forwarder." The Lykes' witness testified, according to counsel's brief, "more than once that * * * he could do nothing other than rely on the shipper's description", and claimed lack of ability to tell jars from tumblers and table glassware "if he had one of the objects in question before him." To the extent of any doubts raised by comparisons, the carriers' employees went to the shipper for information instead of looking at the shipment to satisfy themselves. Third, in case of doubt there was never any effort to inspect cargo, nor any admission of responsibility to do so.

The entire picture, in the words of the carriers' counsel and witnesses, is one of abnegation of any responsibility for making a serious effort to determine the truth. The position they argue puts a premium on ignorance, failure to act, and slovenly office procedures. It encourages the management to hide behind the actions of subordinates as an excuse for mistakes. The carriers' own excuses show a wanton disregard of any kind of duty to exercise reasonable diligence in enforcing procedures which would minimize deceits and falsification of documents. If the carriers' arguments were accepted, section 16 Second would become unenforceable except in the flagrant situations disclosed in the Japan and Philippine cases, supra. The carriers would simply immunize themselves from any obligations under sec-

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tion 16 by inaction, ineffective internal procedures, and inexpert personnel. The carriers' intent to avoid their duty is inferred from their refusal to rely on their own processes of discovery and on their own personnel, and from their placing complete reliance on shippers or forwarders who have an incentive to conceal. This constitutes a willful and knowing means to avoid discovery of the truth, which is an unjust and unfair means.

Where variances in documents were shown, the carriers neglected to restrain or prevent the misclassification simply by taking the shipper's or the forwarder's word as the result of verbal discussions or consultations, and letting it go at that. They allowed the unjust means of falsification of documents to be used and go uncorrected when they did not open packages themselves or ask for the articles to be visually inspected after being alerted by such verbal consultations. We do not think it is always essential that a background of widespread flagrant false billing be shown as an essential ingredient in the offense under section 16. Other evidence is equally material. The fact that there is no specific law or regulation compelling comparison of documents is also not essential or material. We are not making the carriers liable for the violation of such a nonexistent law or regulation, but are interpreting section 16 to determine if, by the action or inaction disclosed, the carriers allowed illegal transportation within our definition of the word "allow". In this case the actions of haphazard document comparisons and of total reliance on the shippers, who are the very persons seeking the transportation for property at less than the carriers' regular rates, constitutes such a wanton disregard of duty as to allow the shipper to obtain the transportation on his terms. _Prince Line v. American Paper Exports_, 55 F. 2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1932). As a result of (a) ineffective office procedures, (b) total reliance on shippers for discovery of the truth, and (c) failure to inspect cargo when alerted, we find the carriers have allowed Bartlett to obtain transportation of glassware at less than the applicable rates established and enforced by them.

3. Other issues

Bartlett sought, by petition, to reopen the record for further evidence after the examiner's recommended decision had been made. The further evidence consisted of (a) tariff changes on June 11, 1959 (after reconvening the hearing before the Examiner), changing the rates applicable to tumblers, and (b) of still further changes since the closing of the hearing in March 1960. The subject of the investi-
gation, however, is what respondents did between September 1955
and June 1956. Since the petition does not relate to anything done
or existing in this period and relates to happenings long afterwards,
it seeks to include evidence necessarily irrelevant to the issues. The
petition is denied.

The matter will be referred to the Department of Justice.

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The following is a listing of the number of cartons of glassware which was shipped, showing, as to each item, the catalogue number and identification title in the catalogue, a description of the article from photographs in the shipper’s catalogue, and how it was listed in ocean bills of lading:

1. 14 ctns.—1680—80 oz. Jug (an ice-lip water pitcher with handle)—listed as “glassware, jars” or as “empty glass jars”.
2. 10 ctns.—1980—80 oz. Jug, same as 1. above.
3. 530 ctns.—1180—80 oz. Jug—same as 1. above.
4. 1 ctn.—1680—7 pc. beverage Set (an ice-lip water pitcher with 6 tumblers)—listed as “glass jars”.
5. 27 ctns.—104 and 107—ash trays—listed as “empty glass jugs” or “glass jars”, or “glassware (tumblers)”.
6. 77 ctns.—1300—Vase (a 3¾” high flower vase)—listed as “glass jars empty”.
7. 2 ctns.—5678—4 pc. Bowl Set (4 different sized kitchen mixing bowls which fit one inside the other)—listed as “empty glass jars”.
8. 137 ctns.—1136—36 oz. Jug (an ice-lip water pitcher with a handle)—listed as “glass jars”.
9. 112 ctns.—1700 and 1800—S & P (Salt and Pepper Shakers, regular (3½”’) and “King Size” (4½”’))—listed as “empty glass jars”.
10. 42 ctns.—Ste. Gen. Nappy (imitation cut glass decorations on dessert or fruit compote dishes)—listed as “glassware, Jars” (4½’’), and fruit bowls (8½’’).
11. 134 ctns.—1590—cookie jar (a 1 gallon cookie jar with a glass top (9¾’’ high))—listed as “glass jars”.
12. 18 ctns.—400 and 500—Sherbet (a dessert dish (2¾’’ high))—listed as “glassware, jars” or “empty glass jars”.
13. 65 ctns.—201—1 oz. tumblers (a glass with beer mug shape and a handle (2” high))—listed as “glassware tumblers”.
14. 75 ctns.—2400—vase assortment (flower vases)—listed as “glassware tumblers” or “empty glass jars” or “glass jars”.
15. 120 ctns.—1180—1111, 7 pc. sets (an ice-lip pitcher with a handle (80 oz. capacity) together with six 11 oz. tumblers (4½’’ high) listed as “empty glass jars”.
16. 67 ctns.—1980—1911—7 pc. sets (an ice-lip pitcher with a handle (80 oz. capacity) together with 6 tumblers)—listed as “empty glass jars”.
17. 11 ctns.—1600—“Sugar” and “Cream” (a sugar bowl, with 2 handles, and a cream pitcher with handle and lip (each 3’’ high))—listed as “empty glass jars”.
18. 10 ctns.—No. 2 Reamer (a fruit juice squeezer)—listed as “glass jars”.
19. 580 ctns.—3200—Flower Bowl—listed as “glass jars”.

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20. 20 ctns.—Ste. Gen. 11 inch Plate (a flat plate, imitation cut glass)—listed as "glass jars".
21. 40 ctns.—Ste. Gen. Cream or Sugar (handled cream pitcher and sugar bowl with imitation cut glass design)—listed as "glass jars".
22. 1 ctn.—20—coaster (an iced tea or other beverage glass coaster)—listed as "glassware (tumblers)".
23. 8 ctns.—Caster cups (glass cups placed under casters or furniture legs to protect floors)—listed as "glassware (tumblers)".

Note.—The shipper’s catalogue in evidence is titled: “Crystal Glassware, Pressed Blown Table Glassware, Hotel and Bar Glassware, Kitchen Glassware, Lamp Founts”.

6 F.M.B.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 21st day of November A.D. 1960

No. 802

MISCLASSIFICATION AND MISBILLING OF GLASS TUMBLERS AND OTHER MANUFACTURED GLASSWARE ITEMS AS JARS.

This proceeding having been initiated by the Board upon its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted, and investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is ordered, That:

1. The following respondents be, and each one is hereby, notified and required (a) to hereafter abstain from the practices herein found to be unlawful under section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and (b) to notify the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service hereof whether each such respondent has complied with this order, and if so, the manner in which compliance has been made, pursuant to Rule 1(c) of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 CFR Part 201.3):

   Houston Freight Forwarding Company;
   Lykes Bros. Steamship Company;
   Royal Netherlands Steamship Company;
   Compania Anonima Venezolana.

2. The proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
MISCLASSIFICATION AND MISBILLING OF GLASS ARTICLES

Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 21st day of November A.D. 1960

No. 802

MISCLASSIFICATION AND MISBILLING OF GLASS TUMBLERS AND OTHER MANUFACTURED GLASSWARE ITEMS AS JARS.

This proceeding having been initiated by the Board upon its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted, and investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on November 21, 1960, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is ordered, That:

Respondent Bartlett-Collins Company be, and is hereby, notified and required (a) to hereafter abstain from the practices herein found to be unlawful under section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and (b) to notify the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service hereof whether respondent has complied with this order, and if so, the manner in which compliance has been made, pursuant to Rule 1(c) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 CFR Part 201.3).

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

S-118

AMERICAN EXPORT LINES, INC.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)


The continuation by Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., of its service from California to Norfolk, Virginia, and Baltimore, Maryland, from California to Puerto Rico, and from Puerto Rico to Norfolk, all in conjunction with its eastbound round-the-world service, found not to constitute unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation engaged exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, nor to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, notwithstanding applicant’s association with American Export Lines, Inc.

Frank B. Stone and J. S. Simpson for applicant.
Richard W. Kurrus for Isbrandtsen Company, Inc.
John Rigby for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Edward Aptaker and Donald J. Brunner as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

American Export Lines, Inc. (American Export), filed an application for written permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1223) (the Act), for the continuation of certain domestic intercoastal or coastwise services by Isbrandtsen Company, Inc. (Isbrandtsen). American Export is a contractor under authority of title VI of the Act (Contract No. FMB-87). Isbrandtsen is conceded to be an associate of the contractor by virtue of having acquired 316,440 shares of its stock, transferred in October 1960. American Export has 1,200,000 shares of stock outstanding and Isbrandtsen is the holder of approximately 26.4 percent of the total. No one intervened in the proceeding.
The Federal Maritime Board already has given Isbrandtsen written permission for the continuation of service from California to Norfolk, Virginia, and Baltimore, Maryland, from California to Puerto Rico, and from Puerto Rico to Norfolk, all in conjunction with its eastbound round-the-world service. The permissions are contained in the following reports and orders of the Board: *Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Subsidy, E/B Round the World, 5 F.M.B. 448 (1958), 5 F.M.B. 483 (1958);* and order in same proceeding, dated November 23, 1960. Pertinent portions of these reports and orders are hereby incorporated into the present report.

It is found that granting the required permission to American Export will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

6 M.A.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

DOCKET No. S-73 (Sub. No. 2)

WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 804

Submitted September 15, 1960. Decided December 7, 1960

Special circumstances and good cause shown under section 804, Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (1) to permit Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico to act as agent for Hamburg-Amerika Linie, a West German operator of foreign-flag vessels competing with essential American-flag service, and (2) to permit Waterman Lines (Antwerp) S.A. and Waterman Lijnen (Rotterdam) N.V. to act as agent for Geo. H. Scales, Ltd., and Waterman Lines (Antwerp) S.A. to act as agent for Moor Line, Ltd., in the absence of foreign-flag vessel competition with American-flag service. Waivers will be granted under section 804 for a period of two years, subject to cancellation upon 90 days' notice to the operator.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman, THOMAS E. STAKEM, JR., Vice Chairman, SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

Waterman Steamship Corporation (Waterman), on June 14, 1960, applied for a waiver from the provisions of section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (the Act), which makes it unlawful for any contractor receiving an operating-differential subsidy under title VI, or any "* * * subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor * * * or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly," to act as agent for any foreign-flag vessel which competes with any American-flag service determined to be essential as provided in section 211 of the Act. The Board is authorized to waive such provisions "under special circumstances and for good cause shown." Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico (Waterman, P.R.) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Waterman. The former acts as a general agent in Puerto Rico for the Hamburg-Amerika Linie (Hamburg), a West German steamship line, in connection with the berth service of that line between Puerto Rico and the Dominican
Republic. The foreign-flag vessels of Hamburg may compete with the service which Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (Lykes), is authorized to perform under its operating-differential-subsidy contract covering service between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. We find there may be competition on this route.

We may waive the statutory prohibition against Waterman in view of the activities of its subsidiary as to any competing foreign-flag vessel if special circumstances and good cause are shown. We have held that circumstances justifying a waiver are that (1) the proposed foreign-flag vessel use will not adversely affect subsidy payments on the subsidized service, (2) the applicant would suffer hardship if the prohibition is enforced, and (3) the proposed vessel use will have an insignificant competitive effect on American-flag service. *States Marine Lines, Inc.—Sec. 804 Waiver*, 6 F.M.B. 71 (1960). No evidence was produced showing need for increased subsidy as a result of applicant’s relation to its subsidiary, and applicant showed that the effect of its foreign-flag agency operation on its regular operation would be very little. This is a special circumstance.

No evidence was presented, no charge was made, and we do not assume that the unsubsidized subsidiary will receive any benefit from subsidy payments to applicant. Such benefit is unlawful. Applicant’s witness testified that the furnishing of the agency services are important to the company. They generate additional revenue, which contributes to the over-all operating results of the company. Termination of the agency account undoubtedly would be a hardship to Waterman because a valuable business arrangement would be lost with no provable gain to any other subsidized American carrier. This also is a special circumstance.

Testimony developed that there would be no injury, direct or indirect, to any American-flag operator in Puerto Rico. Any competitive effect on Lykes was apparently not deemed significant enough to justify Lykes in intervening and presenting evidence on the subject. In the absence of such evidence, we accept applicant’s testimony as to the insignificance of any competitive effect, and find it to be a good cause for a waiver.

In other respects we concur with the examiner that in the absence of any competition between the foreign-flag vessels of Geo. H. Scales or of Moor Line, Ltd., and American-flag service determined to be essential as provided in section 211 of the Act, no waiver is necessary to permit Waterman Lines (Antwerp) S.A. and Waterman Lijnen (Rotterdam) N.V. to act as agents for such operators.

In the absence of later action by the Board, this report shall serve as written permission for the waivers granted herein.

6 F.M.B.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

No. S-119

MOORE-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Application Under Section 805(a)

Submitted December 8, 1960. Decided December 8, 1960

One voyage by the SS Mormacguide, commencing on or about December 9, 1960, carrying a cargo of lumber or lumber products from North Pacific ports to Atlantic ports, found not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation engaged exclusively in coastwise or intercoastal service, and not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

Ira L. Ewers for Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.
Donald J. Brunner as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mormac), has applied for written permission of the Maritime Administrator under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the Act) (46 U.S.C. 1223), for its owned ship the SS Mormacguide, which is under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc. (States Marine), to engage in one intercoastal voyage commencing at a North Pacific port on or about December 9, 1960, carrying a cargo of lumber and lumber products for discharge at Atlantic ports. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register of December 1, 1960, and hearing was held before the Deputy Maritime Administrator. No petitions to intervene were filed and no one appeared in opposition to the application.

States Marine, the charterer of the Mormacguide, conducts as a part of its regular steamship operations an eastbound intercoastal lumber service. For the sailing here under consideration it has been unable to get any other suitable ship. No exclusively domestic operators in the trade have objected to the use of the ship for this sailing.
It is found and concluded that the granting of written permission under section 805(a) of the Act for the Mormacguide, which is under time charter to States Marine, to engage in one intercoastal voyage commencing at a North Pacific port on or about December 9, 1960, carrying a cargo of lumber to the Atlantic ports of Brooklyn, New York, Newark, New Jersey, New Haven, Connecticut, and Camden, New Jersey, will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, and will not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.

6 M.A.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 879

STORAGE PRACTICES OF THE PORT OF LONGVIEW COMMISSION AT THE PORT OF LONGVIEW, WASHINGTON


1. Practices of the Port of Longview Commission of granting certain free time and storage privileges at Longview, Wash., under terms not authorized in its tariff, found unduly prejudicial and preferential, in violation of section 16, and unjust and unreasonable, in violation of section 17, of the Shipping Act, 1916.

2. Respondent required to cease and desist from its unlawful practices.

John F. McCarthy and Willard Walker for respondent.
Robert J. Blackwell and Edward Aptaker as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman, THOS. E. STAKEM, JR., Vice Chairman,
SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

We adopt the examiner’s recommended decision, to which exceptions and replies have been filed. Oral argument was not requested. The recommended decision is as follows:

"This proceeding is an investigation pursuant to section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (46 U.S.C. 821) (the Act), instituted by the Board on its own motion, by order of December 10, 1959, published in the Federal Register of December 23, 1959, 24 F.R. 10464, to determine whether certain storage practices of the respondent, the Port of Longview Commission, at Longview, Wash., constitute the making or giving of any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic, subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, or constitute unjust or unreasonable practices, in violation of sections 16 and 17 of the Act

1 "Practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property.

**The Facts**

“The respondent operates the only public marine cargo terminal at Longview, and provides wharfage, dock, and warehouse terminal facilities in connection with common carriers by water. The respondent is a party to the Northwest Marine Terminal Association and to section 15 Agreement No. 6785 on file with the Board. The executive secretary of the Association, as required by the said agreement, files each member’s terminal tariff with the Board. Respondent is an ‘other person’, other than a common carrier by water, subject to the Act and to the Board’s jurisdiction.

“The Port of Longview (the Port) is on the Columbia River north of Portland, Oreg., about 50 miles downstream from Portland, and about 65 miles from the Pacific Ocean. The Port’s terminal is of the quay type lying parallel to the river. The dock is 2,130 feet long, and has four berths for ships. The respondent has in excess of 286,000 square feet of shed storage space and at least 500,000 square feet of open storage area. At least eight warehouses and other miscellaneous facilities are included in respondent’s terminal facilities.

“The respondent is a municipal corporation under the laws of the State of Washington. It embraces about two-thirds of Cowlitz County. It may purchase or condemn lands, operate wharves, warehouses, and rail and water transfer terminal facilities. It may raise revenue by levy of an annual tax on taxable property in the port district. Its terminal facilities are supervised by the manager of the Port.

“At least 17 steamship lines serve Longview. The Port was recognized as an inbound terminal port by the various steamship conferences serving the Orient trade one at a time over a period of six years beginning in 1950, and the Port’s import business developed and increased with such terminal status. Inbound cargo has increased from 6,371 tons in 1951 to 132,044 tons in 1958. Included in this traffic was dry bulk cargo of 46,951 tons and general cargo of 85,093 tons. Inbound general cargo of 94,000 tons is estimated for 1959. Plywood and chrome ore are two of the main imports. Export traffic in 1958 was 802,851 tons, wheat being the principal commodity. Domestic outbound waterborne cargo, consisting mainly of lumber, decreased between 1951 and 1958, but inbound domestic cargo increased somewhat during these same years. On the whole, the Port has experienced a steady and substantial growth, particularly considering that it has only four berths for ocean-going vessels.

*F.M.B.*
"The Terminal Tariff No. 2 of the Port, filed with the Board, contains its terminal rules, rates, and charges. It includes provisions relating to free time, wharf demurrage, and storage. On imports there is a free-time period of 10 days following the first 7:00 a.m. after the complete discharge of the vessel. Free time is the number of days that cargo may occupy wharf premises before being subject to a specific demurrage charge, to a storage charge, or to removal by the authorities at the expense of the owner of the goods. Wharf demurrage is the penalty charge assessed on cargo remaining on wharf premises after the expiration of free time unless the cargo is accepted for storage.

"This 10-day free-time provision has been disregarded consistently by the Port. This is known by the members of the Northwest Marine Terminal Association. In the past eighteen years under the present port manager, and prior to that time so far as the record shows, the Port never has charged any demurrage regardless of the length of time that the cargo remained on or off the pier. Nor in that time has anyone been required to remove cargo from the dock under the threat of demurrage. The respondent’s manager frankly admitted that the 10-day free-time provision in the tariff is ‘absolutely worthless.’ In his opinion, the demurrage rules are ‘meant for the metropolitan area which must move its cargo out of the terminal.’ The more liberal free-time or free-storage privileges actually offered by the Port of Longview were not incorporated into the Port’s tariff because it did not wish to inflict what it felt would be unfair competition upon the smaller members of the Northwest Marine Terminal Association, inasmuch as the Port felt these smaller members did not have the space or facilities to handle the type of business built up by the Port of Longview. Practically all import cargo using the facilities of the Port of Longview has enjoyed an extended free time privilege ranging from 30 to 90 days.

"The Port has allowed any importer who wishes time to sell and distribute his cargo, at least 30 days free time or free storage. Where the commodities are seasonal in nature, such as Easter baskets, and must be distributed in a short time, the Port has allowed 90 days. On a third general class of imports, including plywood, the Port has allowed importers to keep 20 percent of what they considered would be their annual requirements without charge for storage, provided that they turned that cargo about four times a year.

"The 20-percent requirement is a flexible rule for the industry and not for a particular importer. The rule is subject to the judgment of the Port in a particular instance as to whether the cargo is moving fast enough through the facilities of the Port. As of October 17, 1959,
some 91,243 crates of plywood were stored at facilities of the Port. Of these 44,389 crates were in storage from zero to three months, 28,432 crates from three to six months, 15,887 crates from six to twelve months, and 2,535 crates for more than a year. The Port has not had occasion to charge storage on plywood at any time.

“The amount of plywood held in storage was not considered important so long as the owner or shipper moved a sufficient quantity promptly, in the judgment of the Port. Generally, 40 percent of imports moves out within 15 days, and some of the balance is stored in the meantime. One importer shipped a hundred times the amount of plywood which was held in storage. The individual commodity held may be an odd length, grade, or specie.

“Although it has not assessed demurrage against nor charged for storage of plywood, on one occasion the Port requested a customer to remove plywood from a warehouse when he had over 10,000 crates of it, of which almost three-quarters had exceeded the 90-day rotational period of free storage negotiated or allowed by the Port outside of its tariff provisions. As requested, these crates were moved, except for 1,000 crates which were sold. The plywood which was held so long in storage resulted from a situation wherein the importer attempted to perform a manufacturing process normally done abroad, but was unsuccessful in his attempt to compete with the imported product.

“Again, outside of its tariff provisions, 30 days free time or free storage has been granted by the Port on rattan furniture, pottery, earthenware, porcelainware, woodenware, lily bulbs, steel, machinery, tapioca flour, and canned goods. The Port has accorded 90 days free time or free storage on bamboo blinds and poles, toys, Christmas ornaments, tea, and miscellaneous general oriental imports. Where storage charges are assessed after the expiration of the 30 or 90 free days, they are not in conformity with those specified in the tariff.

“The respondent admits that the storage arrangements and charges are the result of private negotiations between it and the owner of the goods. The parties in fact may ‘dicker’ over the terms of storage. Nevertheless, the Port generally attempts to treat all similar shippers alike, of course, subject to the exigencies of good solicitation in building up the business of the Port.

“While no shipper, terminal operator, port, carrier, or other person has complained to the respondent’s manager about the practice of making free storage arrangements outside of those in respondent’s Terminal Tariff No. 2, little weight can be accorded such fact. Im-

Footnotes:

12 See appendix ‘A’.

6 F.M.B.
porters are unlikely to complain about arrangements much more liberal than those which are required under the tariff. The Port's liberal free time and storage arrangements are available without regard to the use of any particular common carrier serving Longview, so there was no cogent reason for complaint by the carriers.

"Generally, the Port of Longview advised prospective customers that its Terminal Tariff No. 2 did not apply, and in effect that this tariff could be ignored.³ In one letter (appendix 'C') it is stated that 'Tariffs, as you know, are of a general nature and I feel that if you have a particular type of movement in mind and can give us details—volume, origin and possible destination—we can quote you much more satisfactorily.'

"DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS"

"The Port's failure to observe the free time and storage provisions of its Terminal Tariff No. 2 is based apparently on its reliance upon item 11, entitled, 'Reservation of Agreement Rights', which provides:

"The Port of Longview reserves the right to enter into agreements with common carriers, shippers and/or their agents concerning rates and services providing such agreements are consistent with existing local, state and national law governing the civil and business relations of all parties concerned.

"Tariffs must be read in whole and not in part. Item 1, entitled 'Application of Tariff', clearly takes precedence over item 11 in the circumstances herein. Item 1 provides:

"This tariff is published and filed as required by law and is, therefore, notice to the public, to shippers, consignees and carriers that the rates, rules and charges apply to all traffic without specific notice, quotations to or arrangements with shippers, consignees or carriers.

"Even under item 11 of the tariff, agreements must be consistent with national law, which includes the Shipping Act, 1916.

"In Practices, Etc., of San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, 2 U.S.M.C. 588 (1941), also 2 U.S.M.C. 709 (1944), it was found, among other things, that there was a lack of uniformity in and the application of the respondent terminals' free-time rules, regulations, and practices, and that the manner in which they were applied afforded opportunity for unequal treatment of shippers. The free-time rules, regulations, and practices were found unduly prejudicial and preferential in violation of section 16, and unreasonable in violation of section 17 of the Act. Reasonable free-time periods not in excess of 10 days were prescribed, with the single exception of 21 days on petroleum products.

³ See appendices 'B' and 'C'.
"The respondent points out that its operations differ from those in San Francisco Bay Area Terminals case, supra, because there was competition between terminals in that case whereas there is only one terminal in the present proceeding. The respondent contends that a mere preference or discrimination between shippers, carriers, terminal operators, ports, or localities is not of itself unlawful, and that it is only when such preference or discrimination is unjust or unreasonable and results in injury or damage to a particular person or class of persons or advantage to another particular person or class of persons that the same is prohibited by the Act. Respondent cites cases holding that ordinarily there must be a competitive relation between the shippers or between the types of traffic and that there must be a showing of injurious effect upon the traffic to justify findings of undue preference or prejudice. For example, see Phila. Ocean Traffic Bureau v. Export SS. Corp., 1 U.S.S.B.B. 538, 541. The citations largely relate to section 16 of the Act and to matters of preference and prejudice, rather than to whether the practices are undue or unreasonable under section 17 of the Act.

"There is no question that respondent offered and shippers availed themselves of free time and free storage arrangements contrary to those provided in respondent's terminal tariff. Not only did these arrangements differ from those in the tariff, but also these arrangements differed from shipper to shipper and from commodity to commodity. The arrangements were negotiated or arranged with individual shippers. This proceeding, at least in part, is similar to San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, supra. In both instances the free-time rules, regulations, and practices were or are applied in such a manner as to afford opportunity for unequal treatment of shippers. No one was ever charged demurrage for any purpose or any amount at any time in the experience of the manager of the Port of Longview, regardless of the length of time that the cargo remained on or off the pier. As already seen, free time or free storage has been granted for 30 days, 90 days, six months, and a year, and has varied even among shippers of the same commodity. Free time or free storage has been given shippers of some classes of cargo far in excess of that given to shippers of other classes of cargo.

"In San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, supra, it is stated at pages 595-596 and at pages 603-605 as follows:

"Free time is the period allowed for the assembling of cargo upon, or its removal from the wharves. Upon its expiration, demurrage charges are assessed. * * * Obviously, when demurrage is waived, transit shed space, the most valuable in the terminal is being wasted. This involves a cost which has to be recouped somewhere and it is unreasonable that those shippers who do not use
the piers beyond the free time should be forced to bear the burden either directly or indirectly. The practice also affords an opportunity to discriminate between shippers.

"The next question is whether granting storage at noncompensatory rates is unduly preferential and prejudicial in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and an unreasonable practice in violation of section 17 thereof. The storage cases previously mentioned, 1 U.S.M.C. 676, and 2 U.S.M.C. 48, establish two propositions. First, the furnishing of free storage facilities beyond a reasonable period results in substantial inequality of service as between shippers. * * * Second, any preferred treatment by charges or otherwise of certain classes of cargo results in discrimination against other cargo.

Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the practice of furnishing one service below cost has the tendency to prevent any downward revisions of rates for other services however justified they may be. Clearly, such a practice is unreasonable.

"The failure of respondent to abide by the provisions of its tariff, the manner in which respondent's free time or free storage and storage rules are applied, and the opportunity thereby afforded respondent to provide unequal treatment of shippers and preferred treatment of certain classes of cargo, clearly are practices unduly prejudicial and preferential, in violation of section 16 of the Act, and are unjust and unreasonable practices related to the receiving, handling, storing, and delivering of property, in violation of section 17.

"While no shippers, consignees, or receivers are named as respondents, they should abide by the tariff rates, charges, and provisions relative to handling, free time, and storage of their property in connection with the transfer and transportation by water."

We find that the failure of respondent to abide by the free time and storage provisions in its tariff, the manner in which respondent actually has provided free time and storage outside of its tariff provisions, and the opportunity thereby afforded respondent to provide unequal treatment of shippers and preferred treatment of certain classes of cargo, are practices unduly prejudicial and preferential, in violation of section 16 of the Act, and unjust and unreasonable practices in violation of section 17 thereof.

An appropriate order will be entered requiring respondent to cease and desist from the violations found to exist.
APPENDIX A

January 31, 1956.

Mr. W. D. Cavanaugh,
William D. Cavanaugh Associates,
64 East 34th Street,
New York 16, N.Y.

Dear Bill: Thanks for your letter on National Potteries Co., and I would appreciate your following it up.

As to storage, I did not anticipate ceramics so on this item you may drop the storage rate to 2¢ per ton per day, after 30 days. Also the rule is not hard and fast, you may dicker and we should be able to get together. The only thing is I don't believe it is wise to open up a "carte blanche" or all we will get is the frustrated stuff while other ports will get the fast moving cargo.

Best regards,

PORT OF LONGVIEW,
Harvey B. Hart,
Manager.

HBH:dr
Encl.

APPENDIX B

September 4, 1956.

Mr. Eric Wagner,
Del Valle, Kahman & Co.,
260 California Street,
San Francisco 11, Calif.

Dear Sir: Answering your query of August 30, 1956, the Port of Longview owns very sizeable off dock warehousing facilities and it is our policy in granting relief from conventional storage practices to take into consideration three factors:

1. That certain import commodities require reasonable stocks on hand to allow the importer to do business.
2. That certain products must be assembled due to their seasonal sales characteristics.
3. That some ultimate buyers of Import Commodities cannot accept merchandise in massive deliveries but must have their flow on a scheduled basis.

6 F.M.B.
We, therefore, in selected cases by agreement with the importer allot space in our off dock warehouses without additional charge in order to take care of these demands and, of course, to stimulate the flow of cargo through the Port. The Port of Longview Terminal Tariff does not apply to these facilities.

We will be glad to handle your import plywood as outlined by telephone this morning waiving storage and accepting approximately 20% of your annual requirements at any one time. We will, of course, expect you to use us on fast-moving cargo as well as that which requires detention at the Port. Plywood will be lotted according to bill of lading and vessel and we would appreciate receiving through you or your forwarder packing lists which will allow us to segregate the material by size, glue type, and quality. Delivery will be made on your orders and we request that we be allowed the privileges of picking cases from full range numbers rather than individual case numbers. On loading out our packing list will be sent to you naming individual case numbers shipped. On OCP cargo all charges are absorbed jointly by the ocean and rail carriers. On local cargo terminal charges will be billed as follow.

Wharfage.................. 50¢ per 2,000 lb. until October 1 and 70¢ thereafter.
Car Loading................ $2.63 per 2,000 lb. including dunnaging and blocking.
Handling.................. (According to Steamship Conference Tariffs) $1.35 per 2,000 lb. or 40 cu. ft. Maximum of $2.00 per 2,000 lb.

We very much appreciate your inquiry and have handled a good deal of your material which has been sold to other people and we hope you see fit to make use of our facilities.

Very truly yours,

Port of Longview,
Harvey B. Hart,
Manager.

HBH:jr

"APPENDIX C

AIRMAIL.

Mr. J. P. Ohler,
Assistant General Traffic Manager,
Singer Sewing Machine Co.,
149 Broadway,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Ohler: At the request of Mr. Julius R. Jensen, Manager, Cowlitz County Industrial Bureau, we are sending you a brochure
outlining the facilities of the Port of Longview, and also Terminal Tariff #2 outlining charges and services.

Tariffs, as you know, are of a general nature and I feel that if you have a particular type of movement in mind and can give us details—volume, origin, and possible destination—we can quote you much more satisfactorily. I hope you will give us this privilege.

It is our understanding that Mr. Jensen is attempting to prevail upon your company to locate a warehousing operation at Longview. We have much to offer from a transportation standpoint and will be happy to assist you in any way possible.

Very truly yours,

PORT OF LONGVIEW,
H. B. HART,
Manager.

HBH: mij
cc:
Mr. Julius Jensen
Mr. William Cavanaugh
Encl."

6 F.M.B.
At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 13th day of December A.D. 1960

No. 879

STORAGE PRACTICES OF THE PORT OF LONGVIEW COMMISSION AT THE PORT OF LONGVIEW, WASHINGTON

This proceeding having been initiated by the Board upon its own motion, as authorized by section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C. 821), and having been duly heard and submitted, and investigation of the things and matters involved having been made, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is ordered, That:

1. Respondent be, and it is hereby, notified and required (a) to hereafter abstain from the practices herein found to be unlawful under sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and (b) to notify the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service hereof whether respondent has complied with this order, and if so, the manner in which compliance has been made, pursuant to Rule 1(c) of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 CFR § 201.3).

2. The proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI, Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 853

RAYMOND INTERNATIONAL, INC.

v.

VENEZUELAN LINE

Decided January 3, 1961

Classification of fibre forms for concrete found to be correct. Rate charged on a shipment of fibre concrete forms from the port of New York, N.Y., to Las Piedras, Venezuela, found not to be in violation of sections 15, 16, or 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916. Reparation denied. Complaint dismissed.


John R. Mahoney and David Orlin for Venezuelan Line, respondent.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman; THOMAS E. STAKEM, Vice Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

This is a complaint by a shipper against a common carrier by water alleging discriminatory overcharges on a shipment in 1957 of fibre tubes called “Sonovoids”, from New York, New York to Las Piedras, Venezuela on the Venezuelan line. Detriment to the commerce of the United States and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage to the complainant in violation of Sections 15, 16, and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, (Act) are alleged. The answer denies these charges. Hearings were held followed by briefs and a
recommended decision by an Examiner dated May 31, 1960. The recommended decision was that none of the charges and allegations had been proven. Exceptions and a reply were filed, followed by oral argument.

II. FACTS

Complainant, Raymond International, Inc. (Raymond) in November 1957 delivered to respondent, Venezuelan Line, (Venezuelan) 412 pieces of hollow fibre tubes known as "Sonovoids" for transportation to Las Piedras, Venezuela. The shipment was described in an ocean bill of lading showing Raymond as the shipper and "Compania Shell de Venezuela Ltda." as the consignee. The bill of lading described the property as "fibre conduit" and handwritten above these typewritten words is: "concrete molding forms".

The "Sonovoids" comprising the shipment in question were fibre tubes from 20' to 20' 8" long and from 14" to 18.7" in outside diameter with a wall thickness of .250" and .300" made of plies of paper spirally wound into a round tube. A special ply of kraft paper and asphalt is incorporated into the layers and the interior and exterior surfaces are uniformly wax impregnated. The tubes were used by the shipper to create empty spaces or voids inside pre-cast or cast-in-place concrete slabs, columns, walls and piles to make them lighter and to use less concrete. They were advertised and sold for this purpose as shown by descriptive leaflets and pages for insertion in standard product specification catalogues. The evidence showed they could also be used for conduits or pipes where durability was not required but were not extensively used for these purposes nor are they currently advertised or sold for such purpose.

There were four potentially applicable tariff rates observed by the carrier. The rates were those of the United States-Atlantic and Gulf Venezuela and Netherlands-Antilles Conference which the Venezuelan Line had agreed to maintain even though it did not belong to this conference (see Venezuelan agreement of June 19, 1950 and F.M.B. Agreement No. 7777, approved August 3, 1950). The rates they agreed to maintain are found in Freight Tariff VEN 7, Item 1000. A classification was used reading "Forms, viz.: Fibre... (for concrete columns), Classification 8. This rate was the lowest of the three considered by the carrier. The tariff also provided for a measurement by weight and by
volume with the measurement producing the highest revenue to be used. Since the tubes were relatively light, the volume measurement was used.

The complainant contends that the fourth available rate should have been applied covering “Conduits, fibre, viz.: . . . over 12” but not over 20” inside diameter . . . weight” Class 3 rate. The Class 3 rate was $48.00 per ton weight.

III. DISCUSSION

None of the classifications in the tariff exactly fits the property transported. The question is whether the classification applied by the carrier reasonably describes the property. We have held that descriptive words in tariffs must be construed in the sense they are generally understood and accepted commercially. Shippers cannot be permitted to avail themselves of a strained and unnatural construction. *Thomas G. Crowe et al v. Southern S.S. et al* 1 U.S.S.B. 145, 147 (1929). The proper test is the “meaning which the words used might reasonably carry to the shippers to whom they are addressed”. *U.S. v. Missouri Pac. RR Co.*, 250 F 2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1958). Use in a few isolated instances does not contradict the essential characteristics of the property. *Misclassification and Misbilling of Glass Tumblers and Other Manufactured Glassware Items as Jars*. 6 F.M.B. 155 (1960). In our opinion the reasonable construction of the tariff language is the tubes are forms for concrete and are made of fibre.

Since the property was not precisely described in the tariff, reference was made to the manufacturer’s descriptive literature which calls them “laminated fibre tubes” and shows how they are used with concrete. The complainant’s traffic manager referred to them as “cardboard fibre concrete forms” hence the “forms classification” was considered proper. The “forms” description was sought to be excluded from consideration because forms are used outside and concrete is poured into them. The tubes on the other hand were used on the inside and concrete was poured around them. For this reason they were said to be fillers or displacers of concrete. While this is partly true, we concur with the Examiner that it is likewise true that they are internal forms for shaping the concrete that is poured around them. Under the circumstances the selection of the fibre forms classification in conjunction with their use with concrete was reasonable and was the closest description in the tariff applicable to these particular
objects. The fact that the bill of lading used the word "conduit" does not alter the essential characteristics of the product as understood by the shipper, who used them with concrete.

We also agree with the Examiner that in view of the shipping characteristics of the tubes the rate charged by the respondent on a measurement basis was not excessive and therefore was not detrimental to the commerce of the United States in violation of Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The fact that the rate charged by respondent on a measurement basis was 225% of the value of the shipment is not conclusive, in view of the amount of space taken on board a ship, its requirements for a protective tarpaulin covering, and the difficulties of handling the property.

The validity of the tariff regulation is not compromised by the excessive ratio of value of the products to freight rate resulting from the application of a volume measurement rate instead of a weight rate. The cargo has what are known as "balloon" characteristics because the cargo takes up a large amount of space in relation to its weight and is not compressible. Historical concepts of rate making have established the validity of using volume measurement rates where the measurement ton rates to weight ton rates ratio is extreme as in this case.

The respondent was also shown to have given a rate on a weight basis under the "conduits, fibre" classification to the Orangeburg Manufacturing Company for a shipment of pipe instead of on a measurement basis as it did to complainant. This was complained of as being a discrimination between shippers entitling the complainant to reparations for violations of Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Orangeburg, however, is not a competitive product because of its different characteristics and use. It is a different product altogether. In the manufacture of so-called Orangeburg fibre conduits "fluid pulp is built into tubular shape on a rotating mandrel and at the same time is felted under pressure" which produces a "dense and strong" pipe which is later placed in tanks where it is thoroughly impregnated under high vacuum with hard coal tar pitch. Finished it is 75% pitch and 25% fibre by weight which makes it much denser than the cardboard forms. It is used primarily as an electric cable conduit after being encased in concrete. Its shipping characteristics are entirely different being heavier and more durable. Its smaller size and greater density make a weight measurement as a basis of rate charges appropriate.

An order will be entered dismissing the complaint.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 3rd day of January 1961.

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No. 853

RAYMOND INTERNATIONAL, INC.

v.

VENEZUELAN LINE

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This proceeding being at issue on complaint and answer on file, and having been duly heard and submitted, by the parties, and full investigation having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which said report is hereby referred to and made part hereof:

It is ordered, That the complaint be, and is hereby, dismissed.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,

Secretary.

(SEAL)
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S–91

GRACE LINE, INC.—APPLICATION TO SERVE
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, FROM U.S. ATLANTIC PORTS

Decided January 13, 1961

Grace Line, Inc. service to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, from United States Atlantic ports approved. Existing service by vessels of United States Registry operated on a service, route or line served by citizens of the United States determined to be inadequate and that in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, additional vessels should be operated thereon.


Paul A. Bentz, David J. Markun, and Theodore P. Daly, for Intervener Panama Canal Company.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman, THOMAS E. STAKEM, Vice Chairman, SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

Grace Line, Inc. (Grace Line) as required by its Operating Differential Subsidy Agreement with the Federal Maritime Board (Contract No. FMB–49) by letters of February 26 and March 3, 1959 has requested permission (the Contract refers to obtaining "the prior approval of the United States") to commence service from U. S. Atlantic ports to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in accordance with a proposed schedule which accompanied its request.
By an order dated March 23, 1959 we gave public notice of the Grace Line application and requested those having any interest in the application and desiring a hearing thereon to notify the Secretary (24 F.R. 2374 published March 26, 1959). The Panama Canal Company (Panama Canal) by its President was the only petitioner for a hearing. Hearings were held before an Examiner and a Recommended Decision was served May 5, 1960. In this decision service provided by ships of United States registry was found to be adequate.

Exceptions were filed by Grace Lines and by public counsel. Thereafter the Panama Canal, sole intervener and opponent of the Grace Line application, asked for and was granted leave to withdraw from the proceeding.

Thereafter, it appearing 1. that Panama Canal had withdrawn from the proceeding, and 2. that the facts and circumstances upon which the recommended decision was based may have materially changed, we ordered that the proceeding be remanded to the Examiner for a further hearing and recommendation. A further hearing was held November 23, 1960. As a result of this hearing the Examiner found in an initial decision served December 13, 1960 that U. S. flag service to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, was now inadequate.*

The Merchant Marine Act, 1936, clearly requires the development and operation of a privately owned merchant marine under U. S. registry sufficient to carry a substantial portion of the water borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States, and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such commerce at all times. Title V and Title VI provide the forms of aid which Congress deemed essential for accomplishing this.

Provisions of Sections 704 and 705 of the Act become increasingly significant in translating the mandate of Congress that a privately owned merchant fleet be developed and maintained. These sections emphasize that the government owned vessels then being operated were to be removed from service as soon as practicable.

* It is to be noted that after February 10, 1961 the activities of Panama Canal Line will be confined solely to the transportation of passengers and freight for the account of the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone government pursuant to a directive by the President in a memorandum dated December 21, 1960 to the Secretary of the Army. If any consideration is to be given to this limitation on Panama Canal's service it would be to further increase the inadequacy of non-governmental service to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and to create a corresponding need for Grace Lines' proposed service.
The establishment of any steamship line by the United States Maritime Commission could only be accomplished if the foreign trade of the United States was not served adequately by privately owned and operated U.S. flag steamship lines. (Section 705) And where any such line may have been established, the Congress declared in that same section of the law, "it shall be the policy . . . to encourage private operation . . . by selling such lines to citizens of the United States . . ." (Emphasis added). Grace Line is a privately owned shipping line and in reaching our conclusions on inadequacy of service, competing government owned service should not be considered.

Even if we should include Panama's carryings we find the service provided by U. S. flag carriers to be inadequate.

The overall participation by U. S.-flag vessels (including Panama's) in the entire North Atlantic/Port-au-Prince Trade both outbound and inbound fell from 50% for the period 1955-1958 to 40.7% in 1959. It declined to 57% in 1958 from 64% in 1957.

Exception was made to the Examiner's finding that U. S.-flag service in the New York segment of the North Atlantic/Haiti trade is adequate. We do not agree with the Examiner that our decision in Gulf & South American Steamship Co., Inc.—Service Extension Route 31, 5 F.M.B 747 (1959), is controlling in this case.

1. New York is not the dominant port to the extent that New Orleans is for the movement of outbound cargo as compared with other Gulf ports. New York's percentage share of total North Atlantic outbound traffic in 1959 was 51.1% and appears to be declining (93% in 1957 and 78% in 1958). New Orleans' corresponding share in the first 6 months of 1958 was 72% of the total tonnage of liner commercial cargo against the remainder for other Gulf ports.

2. U. S. flag participation in commercial cargo (including Panama's carryings outbound) in liner service is not as dominant from New York as it was from New Orleans, being most recently 60.6% in 1959 as against 83% from New Orleans.

3. In the total North Atlantic trade U. S.-flag outbound participation for the latest period (1959) is 31% and has declined the last 3 years. The comparable U. S. flag participation in the Gulf area was 61% for the last six months in 1958.

We find that Grace Line is not operating an existing service on Trade Route No. 4 between U. S. North Atlantic ports and ports.
in Haiti and that the service already provided by ships or vessels of U. S. registry in such service is inadequate within the meaning of Sec. 605 (c) and that in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of the Act the additional service proposed by Grace Line should be permitted; and that Sec. 605 (c) is not a bar to the granting of an operating-differential subsidy to Grace Line for the operation of additional vessels on the route in accordance with its proposed schedule.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 833

MAATSCHAPPIJ "ZEE TRANSPORT" N. V. (ORANJE LINE) ET AL.

v.

ANCHOR LINE LIMITED ET AL.

Decided January 23, 1961

1. Upon complaint, respondents Anchor Line, Ltd., The Bristol City Line of Steamships Ltd., Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., The Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd., Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd., Manchester Liners, Ltd., The Ulster Steamship Co. Ltd.—Head Line & Lord Line, found to have violated the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, which require common carriers by water to file immediately with the Federal Maritime Board a true copy or a true and complete memorandum of every agreement with another such carrier to which it may be a party or conform to, in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates.

2. Upon complaint, respondents Anchor Line, The Bristol City Line of Steamships Ltd., Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., The Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd., Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd., The Ulster Steamship Co. Ltd.—Head Line & Lord Line, found to have violated the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, which require common carriers by water to file immediately with the Federal Maritime Board a true copy or a true and complete memorandum of every agreement with another such carrier to which it may be a party or conform to in whole or in part, allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports, and providing for exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangements.

George F. Galland, G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., Robert N. Kharasch, and Thomas K. Roche for Oranje Line et al.

Ronald A. Capone, Cletus Keating, Elmer C. Maddy, and Robert E. Kline, Jr., for Anchor Line Limited et al.


6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman; THOMAS E. STAKEM, Vice Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

This is a reopened proceeding resulting from an order of September 19, 1960, ordering re-argument in the matter if requested by any of the parties. On September 21, 1960, the attorneys for the complainants requested re-argument.

The complainants are a group of common carriers by water in the foreign commerce of the United States operating between ports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River ports in the United States and Canada. They consist of the following companies: Maatschappij "Zeetransport" N. V., a Netherlands Corporation, (Oranje Line); A/S Luksfjell, A/S Dovrefjell, A/S Falkefjell and A.S Rudolph, Norwegian corporations (Fjell Line); and Smith Rederi A/B and Rederiaktiebolaget Ragne, Swedish Corporations (Swedish Chicago Line); Liverpool Liners Limited, a British corporation; and, A/B R. Nordstrom & Co. OY, a Finnish corporation (Nordlake Line).

The case has been considered on the present record and on oral re-argument. Our previous report on such record appeared in 5 F.M.B. 714, was decided December 14, 1959 and served March 2, 1960. Re-argument was ordered as the result of an appeal from the Board's report filed in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in No. 15,700. The appeal contends that the Board's order was unlawful for want of a majority vote on the issues involved in Docket No. 833. Oral argument was held on November 30, 1960. The issues were limited to the complaint in No. 833 alleging violations of sections 14 and 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, (Act), (39 Stat. 733, 46 U.S.C. 812, 814) as follows:

1. The respondents, Anchor Line Limited (Anchor); The Bristol City Line of Steamships Ltd. (Bristol City); Canadian Pacific Railway Company (Canadian Pacific); The Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. (Cunard); Ellerman's Wilson Line Limited (Ellerman); Furness, Withy & Co. Limited (Furness); Manchester Liners Ltd. (Manchester); The Ulster Steamship Company, Ltd.—Head Line & Lord Line (Head & Lord); between January 1958 and March
28, 1958, acting in concert, notified shippers in the trade from the United Kingdom to United States Great Lakes ports of freight rates contained in a jointly agreed upon tariff and quoted rates therefrom without the Board's approval.

2. The Ulster Steamship Company, Ltd., Head Line & Lord Line, The Anchor Line, Limited and The Bristol City Line of Steamships Ltd. without Board approval entered into a cooperative working arrangement calling for a pooling of vessels, alternation of sailings and joint service from the port of Glasgow for the 1958 navigation season together with understandings for the maintenance of uniform rates.

3. The respondents executed Agreement No. 8400 controlling and regulating competition and filed it with the Board for approval on November 5, 1957, knowing at the time that there was then in existence Agreement No. 8140 which had created with the Board's approval a conference in substantially the same trade which Agreement No. 8400 purports to cover. Agreement No. 8400 is alleged to be unlawful.

4. The aforesaid violations and Agreement No. 8400 are elements of a conspiracy to drive complainants from the trade between the United States and Canadian Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River ports on the one hand and ports in the United Kingdom on the other.

5. The respondents are also parties to agreements, understandings, and cooperative working arrangements, whereby they have apportioned among various of their members ports or ranges of ports on the United States Great Lakes in conjunction with ports or ranges of ports on the Canadian shore of the Great Lakes as well as Canadian ports on the St. Lawrence River. Such agreements, understandings and arrangements seriously restrict competition between the respondents and others in foreign commerce of the United States and eliminates or destroys competition among the respondents in such commerce of the United States between the Great Lakes and the United Kingdom and Eire. None of the foregoing agreements, understandings or arrangements is reflected in Agreement No. 8400.

These proceedings are further limited to a review of the alleged violations of Sec. 15 of the Act.

6 F.M.B.
II. FACTS

The facts relate to the evidence showing: (a) alleged unapproved agreements fixing or regulating transportation rates; (b) unapproved agreements controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition, or allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports or providing a cooperative working arrangement; and (c) possible conspiracy to drive complainants from the trade between United States and Canadian Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River ports on the one hand and ports in the United Kingdom of Great Britain on the other hand.

On January 18, 1958, the Board published a notice in the Federal Register (23 FR 349) that the respondents had filed for approval under Sec. 15 of the Act, a proposed agreement No. 8400 to create a new conference to be known as the British Westbound Conference from Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Eire to Great Lakes ports in the United States. In preliminary meetings leading to the organization of a conference, secretaries were designated to draft the conference agreement and to proceed with the compilation of a draft tariff to be used by the conference. A draft in at least 79 serially numbered copies was prepared and submitted to the member lines in the proposed conference. Revisions were circulated bearing effective dates. Each line keeps a copy and receives amendments keeping the tariff up to date. The secretary is notified each day of the rates each line quotes “in competition with non-conference outsiders”. The cover page describes the tariff as applicable to traffic to the same ports as the ports covered by the proposed conference agreement. A draft tariff was issued some time prior to February 7, 1958. The date on the cover of the more recent tariff in evidence is April 1958. The tariff was described by the secretary as the basic tariff under the proposed agreement and the one which would be printed when the agreement was approved. The secretary said the lines “naturally refer to the tariff” in quoting rates and that the tariff “would likely be a tariff that they were free to use if they like . . . something they normally refer to to find out what would be somewhere about the basis of the rates.” None of the respondents suggested that they had any other tariff.

Thereafter, the record showed that six different carriers in the conference quoted, with two exceptions, identical rates in response to many shippers’ inquiries relative to specified commodities to
designated ports. Rate quotation letters written in April 1958 to shippers covering twelve commodities or commodity classifications showed identical quotations in each case where two or more lines quoted rates on a particular commodity to a particular destination. In the case of every commodity except linoleum tiles the proposed tariff rates were quoted, but even on the tiles the four quoting carriers gave identical rates. The tariff rates were not available to nonconference members. A variation in rate quotations on two commodities by one of the members was shown.

There are two groups of alleged cooperative arrangements. The first is the Anchor-Bristol City-Head & Lord lines arrangement and the second is the Canadian Pacific-Cunard-Furness lines arrangement.

The second group of lines is not explicitly identified by their names in the complaint, but the names of the participating lines were established during the hearing and such lines are considered as being covered by the part of the complaint referred to in item 5 above.

With regard to the first, four ships, the M. V. Korbach, Fair Head, Urania and Ballygally Head were advertised to provide freight service by three lines, Bristol City, Anchor and Head & Lord from the three ports of Avonmouth, Glasgow and Liverpool to American ports in the Great Lakes. The M. V. Urania was a German registered ship chartered to The Ulster Steamship Company Ltd.—(Head & Lord Line) and the MV Korbach was a German registered ship chartered to Bristol City. The M.V.s Fair Head and Ballygally Head are British registered ships owned by the Ulster Steamship Co. Ltd. (Head & Lord Line). The advertisements appeared in various publications and by announcements in 1958. Closing dates for cargo at Glasgow were from March 27, 1958 through October 11, 1958. The M.V. Korbach was advertised by Anchor Line for closing of cargo from Glasgow and by Bristol City Line for closing of cargo from Avonmouth 6 days later, destined for Detroit and Chicago and on an "if inducement" basis for Cleveland and Milwaukee. The same vessel was similarly advertised for a voyage, with a two day interval between Avonmouth and Glasgow, about a month later by the same two lines. Next, the M.V. Fair Head was advertised by Anchor Line with a closing for cargo from Glasgow five days after the same vessel was advertised by Head & Lord Line for closing for cargo from Bristol. The same vessel and the same companies offered similarly spaced departures from the same cities in June and August. The
M.V. *Urania* was advertised by all three lines from the cities they served (Bristol City: Avonmouth, Head & Lord: Liverpool, and Anchor: Glasgow) with about a 5 day interval between each city for departures in April and June and a Liverpool-Glasgow departure in August. The M.V. *Ballygally Head* was advertised by Anchor Line and Head & Lord for Glasgow-Liverpool cargo closings at about three to seven day intervals in May, July and September. The result of such voyages is that three of the four vessels were used by two companies and one vessel was used by three companies from the cities served by each of the lines.

An Anchor Line handbill stated its “pleasure in announcing their Freight Service between Glasgow and the American ports—the Great Lakes during the 1958 open water season” and listed the above named ships. The handbill stated that “freight engagements and all cargo received and shipped will be subject to the terms, conditions, exceptions and liberties of the Company’s usual form of Wharfinger’s Receipt and/or Bill of Lading”. Other exhibits in the record showed Anchor Lines’ offers of service for the season and generally describe it as a carrier although somewhat later in May 1958 it began calling itself “Loading Brokers”. This change occurred after the complaint was filed in this case and after the Conference Secretary told the managing director of Anchor that their circular would be misinterpreted.

Although a ship used by Bristol City called at Glasgow, the advertising of Bristol City did not describe Anchor as an agent or loading broker or make any reference to Anchor or to Glasgow, but did list its agents in other ports than Glasgow. Anchor Line quoted its rates in response to shippers’ inquiries and referred to “details of our sailing for the 1958 season.”

Bristol City also advertised departures from Avonmouth, to Detroit and Chicago “and vice versa” and other “American Great Lakes ports if inducement”. Head & Lord advertised departures from Liverpool to “U.S.A. Great Lakes Ports, Chicago and Detroit (also Cleveland and Milwaukee, if inducement)”. The M.V.s *Korbach, Fair Head, Ballygally Head* and *Urania* were used as noted above.

With regard to the second group, service to United States Great Lakes ports in 1957 was also offered in advertisements by Canadian Pacific, Cunard and Furness. A handbill announcement and advertisements in Lloyd’s Loading List Supplement and the Handy Shipping Guide announced service “London-Great Lakes Direct Canadian Pacific-Cunard-Furness to . . . Cleveland, Detroit,
Chicago", listed the locations of the loading berths of each line in London and stated "For Rates of Freight and other information apply to" giving three London addresses and telephone numbers "Or any other Canadian Pacific, Cunard and Furness Line Office or Agency". At least fourteen such notices and others of similar import were shown for the months of March through May 1957. There was evidence in the announcements of an exchange of ships between Cunard and Canadian Pacific, but not in the service to Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago. The service to these ports, however, was alternated between the Cunard and Furness ships at about one week intervals. Cunard ships called at both Canadian and Great Lakes ports in the U.S. but Furness ships never called at Canadian ports and Canadian Pacific ships never called at Great Lakes U.S. ports. As regards American ports Cunard ships never called at Chicago. The proposed conference agreement disclosed still further refinements in restrictions on service to Great Lakes ports in the United States.

The following ships were German registered ships chartered in 1958 as noted: M.V.s Erin Nuebel and Berni Nuebel to Cunard, Otto Nuebel and August Schulte to Canadian Pacific, Lissy Schulte and Maria Schulte to Furness. The Erin Nuebel was advertised for cargo as both a Canadian Pacific and a Cunard ship. The Otto Nuebel was likewise advertised for cargo by these two lines.

The Chairman of Furness in his annual review of the Company's affairs at the annual General Meeting on September 25, 1957 had the following to say with possible reference to these arrangements:

"For two years prior to 1957 we have operated a service, in conjunction with others, from London to ports in the Great Lakes. We consider this to be a necessary development, partly in protection of our Canadian business and partly to ensure our participating in the expansion of trade which it is anticipated will occur when the St. Lawrence Deepwater Seaway is opened for traffic in 1959. From the commencement of the current season, i.e., the opening of the St. Lawrence River to navigation, we have established our own direct service from London to Canadian and United States Lakes ports, including Toronto, Hamilton, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee and Chicago in friendly association with the Cunard Steam-Ship Co., Ltd., and the Canadian Pacific Railway Co. Only small ships can be employed until the St. Lawrence Seaway is completed, after which date larger and consequently more economical tonnage will be introduced into the service provided developments justify such expansion."

The foregoing was explained as follows in a stipulation: "The statement was made to Furness, Withy & Company Stockholders and was intended to let our Stockholders know that we had entered this trade in our own right, in place of the earlier service to Cana-
dian Lake ports which was previously operated in conjunction with others.

"The phrase 'in friendly co-operation' (sic) means precisely what it says, no more and no less, and friendly means the opposite of unfriendly. There is no agreement written or verbal, but without any obligation to do so, we endeavor not to tread on their toes in the hope that they similarly will endeavor to avoid treading on ours. That is all there is to it."

Another cooperative arrangement is thought to be shown by a joint notice entitled "Notice to Shippers and Consignees" dated March 1, 1958, as follows:

"Shippers and Consignees are hereby notified that the undernoted Lines will each operate regular Westbound services from their customary berth ports in the United Kingdom and Eire DIRECT to the United States Great Lakes ports, principally Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago and Milwaukee.

"The direct services will commence with the opening of the St. Lawrence Navigation this year, i.e., approximately 1st April, 1958, and interested Shippers or Consignees are invited to apply direct to the individual Lines for information concerning the frequency of service and the freight rates applicable on traffic shipped by the selected Line's Direct vessels.

Anchor Line Ltd. Ellerman's Wilson Line Ltd.
Bristol City Line Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd.
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. Head Line & Lord Line
Cunard Steam-Ship Co. Ltd. Manchester Liners Ltd."

In October 1956 the member lines of the North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association recorded in a minute that several of them (Anchor, Cunard, Furness, Head & Lord and Manchester) were operating independently to United States of America Great Lakes ports, that others intended to do the same and that McDiarmid & Co. had been instructed to draft an appropriate conference agreement. (McDiarmid & Co. is a professional organization of conference secretaries who administer conference agreements).

This is the same agreement that was prepared in connection with the tariff rates and regulations noted above. Anchor, however, denied it operated any such independent service.

By letter of December 30, 1957, McDiarmid submitted for Board approval a signed agreement identified as F.M.B. No. 8400 covering Westbound trade. Agreement No. 8440 was submitted later and covered Eastbound trade. In Dockets 834 and 843 the Board refused to approve the two agreements. The agreements were in preparation for operations in 1958 to the Great Lakes.

The respondents are participants in a system of territorial divisions and of port assignments covering the routes of their vessels in the areas served by the proposed conference agreement. The
United Kingdom ports are served as follows: Anchor Line serves only Glasgow; Bristol City Line serves only Avonmouth and Bristol channel ports; Manchester Liners serves only Manchester; Head & Lord serve only Liverpool, Belfast and Dublin; Cunard, Furness and Canadian Pacific serve London and Liverpool. Canadian and United States Great Lakes ports are served as follows: Anchor, Bristol City, Manchester Liners and Head & Lord serve the full range of United States Great Lakes ports; Cunard and Canadian Pacific serve the United States Great Lakes ports only as far as Detroit; Furness serves these ports and Milwaukee and Chicago.

In addition to these United States Great Lakes ports the evidence disclosed that the same lines were participants in a pattern of port allocation along the United States Atlantic coast and appear to be restricted so as to not serve areas served by other British lines.

III. DISCUSSION

The violations complained of concern the failure of the respondents, to the extent that they are common carriers by water in the foreign commerce of the United States, to file immediately with the Board a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every agreement with another common carrier by water to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, dealing with certain subjects. The subjects of this proceeding are agreements fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition; and allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and characteristics of sailings between ports; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The term "agreement" under Sec. 15, and in this report, "includes understandings, conferences and other arrangements". The Board may by order approve or disapprove agreements. Before approval and after disapproval agreements are unlawful.

The basis of the complaint is, that the respondents herein, were acting as though they were carrying out the proposed but unapproved conference agreement's obligations, by using the freight rates contained in the draft tariff which had been prepared. First, the respondents distributed 79 copies of the tariff among themselves and second, the respondents quoted the tariff rates to shippers.
The respondents were shown to have quoted rates exactly as they appear in the tariff which contains detailed and complex rates and regulations. The tariff was not on file anywhere so it could not be consulted by everyone. All respondents received notices of changes and all reported their quotations from time to time. One line could not find out what another was doing without consultation. The rates used were the same as each other's and were the same as the tariff rates with one or two exceptions. Without the exchange of information they couldn't conceivably quote the same rates. Even in the case of the exceptions, the lines used a uniform rate. Apparently, as respondent's counsel indicated in oral argument, "it would have been foolish to have waited Board approval" (sic.) before preparing, and presumably using, the tariff.

Three of the respondents' advertisements covering about a year state: "For rates of freight and other information apply: Canadian Pacific Railroad" or "Cunard Line" or "Furness, Withy & Company", giving the address and telephone number of each. Under this it says to apply to: "Any other Canadian Pacific, Cunard or Furness Line office or agency". It is a fair inference that a shipper would not call each line for its own rates in response to such an advertisement but that a shipper could call any one of the lines or their agents and obtain an applicable rate. It would have been very easy to rebut any such uniformity of rates by bringing in bills of lading showing variations but this was not done.

Such uniformity of action is consistent only with some sort of previous understanding that the carriers would conform to an agreed course of action. Independent activity without any understanding normally would produce differing and non-conforming actions by each carrier. The result was that transportation rates were fixed and regulated.

No evidence of any such agreement in the form of a true copy, or of any understanding in the form of a memorandum was ever filed with the Board as required by Sec. 15. The legislative history of the Act makes it clear that Congress was interested in oral understandings, tacit agreements and gentlemen's agreements between common carriers by water such as those involved here. (The Alexander Report, House Doc. 805, 63d Cong. (1914) see vol. 4 pp. 295–304, 416–418). The purpose of Sec. 15 was to place in Board custody information and proofs which the Board could review and analyze and make up its mind about whether the re-
requirements of the second paragraph of Sec. 15 were being followed. In this case the respondents have not put in Board hands evidence of understandings to which they are a party or to which they conform. The complaint of a violation of the requirement in Sec. 15 as to filing agreements relating to fixing or regulating transportation rates has been proven. See: *Wharfage Charges and Practices at Boston, Mass.* 2 U.S.M.C. 245 (1940).

The basis of the second major complaint is directed at the regulation of the number and character of sailings between ports and at cooperative working agreements. The result of the schedules observed by six of the respondents is a coordinated westbound service between the United Kingdom and United States Great Lakes ports during the 1957 and 1958 navigation seasons. Two groups of sailing arrangements are shown: Those between Anchor, Bristol City and Head & Lord lines covering the ports of Glasgow, Bristol City, Avonmouth and Liverpool during 1958 and those between Canadian Pacific, Cunard and Furness departing from London, during 1957 and 1958, destined to United States Great Lakes ports.

The significance of the notices described herein is not that they involve joint advertising which by itself does not justify finding that the action was taken pursuant to agreement. *Los Angeles By-Products Co. et al. v. Barber SS Lines Co. Inc., et al.* 2 U.S.M.C. 106, 108 (1939). The significance is that the information contained in the notices requires cooperative arrangements to carry out the commitments made to the public. The commitments also require activity going far beyond that which occurs simply as the result of respect for the historic position of each line in a port as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. In the United States there could be no such tacitly respected historic position in the Great Lakes.

The work involved in preparing the advertisements and schedules bespeaks mutual understandings among the participating lines as to how ports should be allotted, what schedules to print and about the timing, destination and other description of service to United States ports. The subsequent detailed alternation of departures and arrival of ships from the allotted ports in accordance with the public notice, the use of berths, the loading of cargo and the allocation of revenues and costs all require coordinated activity which could only be accomplished by a policy of cooperation followed by arrangements made at the managerial level among the participating companies. A highly sophisticated plan of opera-
tions has resulted. It is inconceivable that the administrative organization connected with the use of so much money, the movements of so many ships, or of so much cargo, and of so many ports between different carriers during a full season could be conducted without some explicit understandings as to cooperative activity to regulate sailings between the allotted ports, and as to the distribution of revenues and the sharing of expenses.

There was evidence that the respondents passed ships from one company to the other to enable each line to carry cargo to the ports each served including United States Great Lakes ports. There was no break in this pattern of exclusive and preferential service from various ports. The uniform characteristics of the service preclude any inference of independent operation. Mutual agreement is essential to the effective accomplishment of the operations shown in this record. When all of this coordinated activity follows statements of a corporate official reading "service in conjunction with others" and the careful coordination required to avoid treading on others' toes is considered, the existence of agreements is inescapable.

No evidence of the required agreements in the form of true copies or memorandums describing these undertakings were ever filed with the Board pursuant to Sec. 15. The complaint of a violation of the requirement in Sec. 15 as to the filing of agreements relating to the allotment of ports, the restriction or regulation of the number and character of sailings between ports and to exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangements has likewise been proven.

The final charge of violations was that the proposed agreements F.M.B. 8400 and 8440 are not full agreements between the parties, therefore, they do not qualify for approval. A larger pattern of operations which restricts or destroys competition is charged. Since we are not revising the earlier report disapproving the proposed agreements, no review of these charges is undertaken.

Other than the inferences of conspiracy sought to be drawn from the route and port call pattern of the respondents, no proof of conspiratorial actions against the complainants was produced. More than this is needed and such complaint is found to be unproven.

The defense was interposed that respondent Anchor was not a common carrier by water. Generally, Bristol City's and Head &

1 Bristol City is not a common carrier as to the M.V. Uranía which was identified as a "Head Line" ship using "Head Line Bills of Lading". (Ex 35).
Lord’s common carrier status as regards this joint undertaking is not in issue. The other lines are also concededly common carriers by water. The defense is based solely on the assertion that Anchor’s advertisements did not show them to be common carriers by water, but rather loading brokers, and a statement by the conference secretary as a witness that Anchor was not considered a common carrier. The advertisements, however, did not indicate the status of Anchor as a loading broker until after the complaint was filed. Anchor stated in its handbill issued to the public that cargo would be subject to “the Company’s usual form of Wharfinger’s receipt and/or bill of lading”. This referred to its own bill of lading. This is what it told to prospective shippers. Anchor is also signatory to the proposed conference agreement in which it is described as a common carrier in the trade. The conference secretary advised the Board staff that “several Shipowners who have been engaged in the Liner trade between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for over 50 years . . . have recently each inaugurated independent Liner service direct from United Kingdom ports to the ports on the U.S.A. Great Lakes.” In October 1957, when this was written, there was no indication that Anchor was anything other than a common carrier. In none of the following correspondence relating to revisions in the agreement prior to Board approval is there any indication that Anchor’s status had changed. In correspondence to shippers under its own letterhead Anchor enclosed “our sailing card” and referred to “details of our sailings for the 1958 season” and quotes its own rates. All of the lines including Anchor, which are signatories to the proposed conference agreement as participating carriers use the same name as they used in the advertisements and notices, without change or qualification.

In the handbill subscribed to by all of the 8 respondents involved in this proceeding reference is made to the fact that: “the undernoted lines will each operate regular westbound services from their customary berth ports in the United Kingdom and Eire direct to United States Great Lakes ports . . .” Anchor is referred to as a “line” with no other qualification to distinguish its status from that of other subscribers.

In Agreement No. 7620, 2 U.S.M.C 749 (1945) the Kerr Steamship Co. sought to be considered as a proper party to a conference agreement as a common carrier by water. Kerr was excluded, however, as not being a common carrier by water, but an agent. Agency status was established because Kerr had not owned any

6 F.M.B.
vessels since 1936, operated only as a "berth owner" (i.e.: had contacts with, and enjoyed the good will of, shippers in the trade) and, as a result of its ability to attract business, acted as loading brokers for ships belonging to others. Kerr signed dock receipts and bills of lading as agent for the ship owners. Kerr advertised itself as "loading brokers" and "general agent". Kerr had a detailed agreement with the Silver Line Ltd. and Lief Hoegh & Co., A/S of Oslo, providing for the furnishing of cargo, the use of other vessels and the division of gross freights.

The opposite status was found in Agreements No. 6210, 6210–A, 6210–B, 6210–C, and 6105, 2 U.S.M.C. 166 (1939) where the Consolidated Olympic Line as a conference member used the ships of James Griffith & Sons, Inc. and other ship owners. Consolidated Olympic issued its own bill of lading as agents for the carriers. The Commission reported: this "company handles the cargo from start to finish; assumes all the responsibility and obligations of a common carrier; and considers itself a common carrier." The Commission stated that "the contract between Consolidated and the various vessel owners, and also the bill of lading form used by Consolidated, are confusing. They are also inconsistent with the contentions of the parties that Consolidated is a common carrier. We conclude from all the facts that Consolidated is a common carrier". To distinguish the Kerr case and the Consolidated Olympic Line case, the Commission found that Consolidated undertook toward shippers the obligations of common carriage and was therefore a carrier, but Kerr apparently did not.

Anchor appears to have held itself out, so far as the public is concerned, as a common carrier. It advertised its schedule for the entire season for the 4 ships which were passed between companies. Its advertisements and shipping publication information all refer to Anchor Line service. While the evidence is not entirely clear the preponderance of unrepudiated evidence shows that Anchor wanted to be known as the carrier of shippers' goods tendered to it.

No other evidence was introduced showing that Anchor was not a common carrier by water other than the loading broker designation in its notices after the end of April 1958 and the statement by the conference secretary. The respondent merely sought to use claimed shortcomings in complainant's proofs to show absence of proof of such status. On the proofs offered we are convinced that Anchor is a common carrier by water and was required to file its agreements along with the other respondents.
Respondent Ellerman's Wilson Line Ltd., was not shown to have offered service to the United States Great Lakes ports nor to have participated in any of the transportation rate fixing or joint services. Accordingly, this respondent has not been shown to have violated Sec. 15. Respondent Manchester Liners Ltd. operated to Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee and Chicago and quoted the proposed tariff rates, but does not appear to have participated in any of the joint services through an exchange of ships or cooperative sailing arrangements. Accordingly, this respondent has not been shown to have violated Sec. 15 insofar as it relates to agreements for allotting ports, restricting or regulating sailings and providing for exclusive, preferential or cooperative arrangements. Of the remaining respondents, all have violated Sec. 15 insofar as it requires the filing of agreements relating to fixing or regulating transportation rates. Anchor Line, Ltd., The Bristol City Line of Steamships Ltd., Canadian Pacific Railway Company, The Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd., Furness, Withy & Co. Limited and The Ulster Steamship Company, Ltd. (Head Line & Lord Line) have violated Sec. 15 insofar as it requires filing of agreements relating to the allotment of ports, the restriction or regulation of the number and character of sailings between ports and to cooperative working arrangements.

The precise dates when any of the agreements complained of were made is not clear from the record. As regards agreements regulating transportation rates, it appears that full agreement on the use of the tariff must have been reached by April 1 in view of the date on the cover, its prior distribution and the fact that all of the carriers' letters quoting identical rates were after such time, the first such letter being dated April 10, 1958. We establish April 1, 1958 as the date when the common carriers by water began to violate the requirement as to the immediate filing of agreements regulating transportation rates.

The Anchor-Bristol City-Head & Lord Line agreement about departure and port calls seems to have become final at the latest by February 3, 1958 when the Bristol City Line advertised departures under the arrangement in Lloyd's Loading List. Anchor and Head & Lord advertised in the Journal of Commerce February 22, 1958, with reference to the ships involved in the arrangement. The first closing date for any cargo was March 27, 1958 which would allow time to arrange the use of the four ships involved. We establish February 3, 1958 as the date when the aforesaid common carriers
by water began to violate the requirement as to the immediate filing of agreements relating to the allotment of ports, the regulation of sailings and to cooperative arrangements.

The Canadian Pacific-Cunard-Furness agreement about departures and port calls must have become final at the latest by February 18, 1957 when the Liverpool Journal of Commerce carried notices both by Furness separately and by Canadian Pacific-Cunard-Furness jointly. Joint notices of the service in question herein appear in several publications thereafter. Existence of the understandings is confirmed by the Furness report to its stockholders. Continuation of the service for the 1958 season is contained in a joint announcement dated March 1, 1958, subscribed by these carriers among others. We establish February 18, 1957 as the date when the aforesaid common carriers by water began to violate the requirement as to the immediate filing of agreements relating to the allotment of ports, the regulation of sailings and to cooperative arrangements.

The aforesaid respondents which have violated Sec. 15 are liable to penalties as provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 15. The facts and findings herein shall be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Decided February 2, 1961

Provision of freighting agreement proposed by the members of the Gulf and South Atlantic Havana Steamship Conference to cover cargo originating at any inland port or place and moving via or exported by way of any river or inland waterway terminating at, touching, or flowing through any Gulf or South Atlantic port of the United States found to constitute a modification of an agreement by a common carrier by water with another such carrier under Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916 and must be filed with the Board.

Provision of freighting agreement proposed by the members of the Gulf and South Atlantic Havana Steamship Conference to cover cargo originating at any inland port or place and moving via or exported by way of any river or inland waterway terminating at, touching or flowing through
any Gulf or South Atlantic port of the United States found to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers and ports and to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, under Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Common carriers by water found to have subjected particular persons, localities and descriptions of traffic, to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage by preventing (1) shippers from using economical transportation alternatives, (2) river port cities from obtaining cargo, and (3) traffic inland by barge transportation, in violation of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Common carriers by water found to have demanded, charged and collected a rate which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers and ports by compelling shippers to pay rates based on shipments from ports served by respondents instead of rates from ports and by transportation methods chosen by shippers, in violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916.

Gulf and South Atlantic Havana Steamship Conference's attempt to extend dual rate system to cargo shipped from inland ports not served by conference members found to be unlawful under Sec. 14 Third of the Shipping Act, 1916, because it was (a) not in effect on May 19, 1958 and (b) was for the purpose of stifling the competition of independent carriers.

Swift & Co. and Swift and Company Packers, complainants entitled, under Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, to full reparation for the injury caused by the violation of said Act equal to the actual damages to the complainant during the period from January 1, 1959 through the close of business on January 21, 1959.


H. L. Shaffer, for Dubuque Packing Company; W. L. Fidler, for Hygrade Food Products Corp.; H. C. Brockel, for Great Lakes Harbors Association and for Board of Harbor Commissioners, City of Milwaukee; Interveners in Nos. 849, 851 and 854.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman; THOMAS E. STAKEM, Vice Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

The Board, upon its own motion as authorized by Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act), on January 12, 1959, entered into an investigation and hearing to determine whether a provision (Article 1 (b)) in the 1959 Freighting Agreement (No. G-18), (1959 Agreement), adopted and submitted to shippers by the Gulf and South Atlantic Havana Steamship Conference (Conference), “(1) constitutes a new Sec. 15 agreement and/or (2) would be unjustly discriminatory, unfair, or operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States within the meaning of Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, or would be in violation of Sections 14, 16 or 17 of said Act.” Article 1(b) provides:

1. * * * The aforesaid cargo and shipments covered by this

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agreement shall include all cargo and shipments which the shipper may ship or cause to be shipped directly or indirectly as follows:

* * *

"(b) That portion of the carriage between Gulf and South Atlantic ports of the United States and the Cuban ports hereinabove described in respect of all cargo originating at or from any inland port or place and moving via or exported by way of any river or inland waterway terminating at, touching, or flowing through any Gulf or South Atlantic port of the United States."

Compania Naviera Cubamar, S. A., Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., Naviera Garcia, S. A. (Ward-Garcia), Standard Fruit and Steamship Company, United Fruit Co., and West India Fruit and Steamship Co., Inc., (West India) parties to the agreement and acting jointly as the Conference, were all made respondents in the proceeding. The Board's order dated January 16, 1959, as amended February 27, 1959, ordered them to cease and desist from effectuating the quoted provision. On April 3, 1959, by further order, the Board, upon its own motion, entered upon another investigation and hearing "to determine whether (1) the whole of Article 1 of the 1959 Freighting Agreement No. G-13 . . . constitutes a new agreement and/or . . . would be in violation of Sections 14, 16 and 17 of said Act . . . . or should be approved pursuant to Sec. 15 of said Act . . . ." ² Thereafter, on May 20, 1959, Swift and Co. and Swift & Co. Packers (Swift), shippers of lard and meat products to Cuba, filed a complaint ³ asking: 1. for reparation, 2. that its complaint be consolidated with the two investigations and, 3. for other relief as the result of damage suffered from the enforcement by the Conference of Article 1 (b) against Swift. The two investigations and the complaint were consolidated for hearing by the Examiner's notice dated June 11, 1959.

The proceedings were heard by an Examiner who, in a decision served on March 31, 1960, recommended that the Board find:

1. that the 1958 Freighting Agreement (G-12), (1958 Agreement), did not apply to shipments from St. Louis to Havana;

2. that the Conference and its members have violated section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, (a) by their attempted interpretation of the 1958 Freighting Agreement to contain a routing restriction precluding direct shipment from St. Louis, and (b) by their adop-

² Order dated April 15, 1959, entered in Docket No. 851, on April 3, 1959, 24 F.R. 3058, April 21, 1959.

³ Docket No. 854.
tion of the 1959 Freighting Agreement, both without Board approval.

3. that Article 1 of the 1959 Freighting Agreement (G-13) is a new section 15 agreement and/or a modification of the organic Conference Agreement (No. 4188), (Conference Agreement), and the 1958 Freighting Agreement.

4. that the shipper's freighting agreements in question, past and proposed, insofar as they are applied to impose a routing restriction on shipments from inland ports which the Conference lines do not serve, results (a) in detriment to the commerce of the United States as well as unjust discrimination against such ports and shippers therefrom in contravention of section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, and (b) in undue prejudice and unjust discrimination against such ports and shippers in violation of sections 16 and 17 of said Act.

5. that the attempt by the Conference to extend the dual rate system to inland ports not served by its members was made for the purpose of stifling non-conference competition in violation of section 14, Third, Shipping Act, 1916.

6. that complainants were damaged in the amount of the difference between the charges paid at non-contract rates on shipments made between January 1, 1959, and January 12, 1959, and those which would have accrued at the contract rates contemporaneously in effect thereby; and they are entitled to reparation on such shipments, with interest. All other claims for reparation were denied. Reparation statement should be filed in accordance with Rule 15 of Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Exceptions to the recommended decision and replies thereto were filed and oral argument was heard. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified.

II. FACTS

Since 1935 the Conference has existed under F.M.B. Agreement No. 4188 approved in its original form on April 24, 1935, pursuant to Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916. The Agreement authorized a dual rate contract arrangement whereby tariffs were established at two levels, the lower of which was charged to shippers who agree to ship cargoes on members' ships only. Others paid the higher rates. Swift had been a party to such a contract for over 30 years. Beginning June 25, 1958, a company known as "White
Gold Barge Line Corporation”, which is not a Conference member, made five trips carrying full barge loads of lard from St. Louis, Mo., to Havana, Cuba, and Swift was the shipper on the first voyage. Since September 1958 the barges have not operated because of a Cuban government decree prohibiting the use of the barges for lard imports. The Conference by letter dated July 10, 1958 told Swift it considered Swift’s shipments by such barges a violation of its agreement to ship on Conference members’ ships because St. Louis was a Gulf and South Atlantic port covered by the agreement to ship from such ports exclusively on such ships. This interpretation of the agreement, embodied in a revision of the 1959 Agreement, was the basis for initiating Docket No. 849 on the ground that the revision contained in paragraph (b) of Article 1 of the 1959 Agreement was really a new agreement and not an interpretation of what had existed all along. If this was shown to be the case, the revision would have to be filed under Sec. 15. Notwithstanding its argument that the existing agreement impliedly covered the port of St. Louis, the Conference thereafter filed the revised 1959 agreement for approval by the Board presumably as a modification of the Conference Agreement. After such filing Docket No. 851 was initiated to determine if the entire Article 1 (not just the interpretation in paragraph (b) thereof) was a new agreement which must be approved pursuant to Sec. 15 of the Act.

Prior to the barge shipments Swift had its lard transported to Havana, Cuba, from West Palm Beach, Fla., in freight cars on respondent West India’s freight car ferry ships. Before the paragraph was added to the 1959 Agreement, but after Swift changed over to the use of barges, the Conference and its members had contended Article 1 meant that the transportation of lard on barges from St. Louis to Havana violated the freighting agreement as they interpreted it, by a failure to offer, during the period January 1, 1958, to December 31, 1958, “all cargo which shipper may have, or may cause to be shipped directly or indirectly from Gulf and South Atlantic ports of the United States to the Port of Havana, Cuba” and claimed damages (under Article 7) for failure to ship. As noted above, a cargo shipment from St. Louis to Havana “constitutes a shipment from a Gulf port” according to a Conference interpretation of Article 1. The claim based on this interpretation was arbitrated and Swift lost. On October 28, 1958, Swift notified the Conference it would not extend the 1958 Agreement to 1959. On December 31, 1958, Swift refused to sign the 1959 Agreement
submitted to it on December 8, 1958. It would not sign until the paragraph (b), which specifically covered shipments from St. Louis, had been removed and, if removed, unless the interpretation of Article 1 giving it such effect was revoked. The Conference refused both conditions. The Board’s order dated January 16, 1959, as amended February 27, 1959, to cease and desist from effectuating the new provision of the 1959 Freighting Agreement was served on the respondents January 20, 1959 and was published in the Federal Register issue of January 21, 1959. The Conference on March 10, 1959 notified all of its contract shippers, but not Swift, that it would “comply with the order of the Board”. Swift was notified on April 27, 1959. On May 8, 1959, Swift signed the 1959 Agreement effective May 11, 1959. Between January 1, 1959 and May 11, 1959, Swift was charged and paid the non-contract rates on lard and paid about $28,000 more than contract rates.

III. DISCUSSION

The Examiner concluded that the meaning of the 1958 Agreement was in issue, and that its interpretation by the Board was not precluded by the arbitrators’ decision. Exception is taken to this conclusion.

The meaning of the 1958 Agreement is relevant insofar as it also establishes the meaning of the agreement between common carriers by water or other persons subject to the Act, which must be filed pursuant to Sec. 15, i.e. the Conference Agreement. Only conference agreements, modifications or cancellations approved by the Board are lawful, under Sec. 15. To the extent any interpretation of the 1958 Agreement extends its scope beyond that allowed by the authorizing Conference Agreement heretofore filed and approved by the Board, the 1958 Agreement must modify the Conference Agreement and thus make it a “new Sec. 15 agreement”. Such modified agreement is unlawful until it is filed and the Board approves it. Therefore, the meaning of the 1958 Agreement is in issue under Docket Nos. 849 and 851, since the respondents are in effect saying that the arbitrators’ decision is more than just a finding that Swift “violated” the Freighting Agreement, because the arbitrators must first find the existence of an obligation to be violated. Thus, it is also a final opinion that the 1958 Agreement is not a modification of the Conference Agreement which we have already approved but an interpretation of what has existed all along. If the provision is a modification, the arbitrators’ decision
is a final opinion that the arbitrators, not the Board may approve the provision and may go on to find it has been violated. Sec. 15 is quite clear that only the Board may approve agreements or modifications. Our responsibilities and the common carriers' duties are not discharged by any other technique of administering Sec. 15, hence the exception to this extent is not valid.

Relying on the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14) respondents urge that the Board has no authority to place its interpretation on the 1958 Agreement, but must give final and binding effect to the results of the arbitration between the Conference and Swift. It is stated that the Arbitration Act provides "for finality of arbitration decisions of the very kind here in issue". No authority is cited for this proposition. We find no provision of the Arbitration Act which expressly or impliedly enacts any rule of law which expressly provides for such finality or limits our authority under the Act, nor any court decision which holds that it does so by implication. There is no provision in the Act which does so either. This part of the exception is invalid as we have an independent responsibility to determine the scope of agreements which we approve under Sec. 15.

The Examiner found the 1958 Agreement did not apply to cargo shipped from St. Louis, Mo. to Havana, Cuba and outports. West India and the Conference except to this. The 1958 Agreement contains no provision naming St. Louis (see above), but the respondents argue it reasonably may be interpreted to extend to this port because of the word "indirectly" as applied to cargo shipped from Gulf and South Atlantic ports. This, it is argued, proves that cargo originating inland and passing through the Gulf port of New Orleans as a Gulf port is covered. Another aspect of the exception is that the shipper's obligation to use Conference ships is not dependent on the origin of the cargo or mode of transportation to a Gulf port. By passing through New Orleans a cargo automatically becomes cargo the Conference member ships are entitled to carry and should be offered to them for carrying. Quite apart from these considerations our reasons and conclusions stated below that such a provision, whether by interpretation or by express modification, is a restriction on cargo routing, contrary to our decision in Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220 (1939), makes the issue of the applicability of Article 1 of the 1958 Agreement immaterial because the provision itself is invalid and requires no interpretation. Since the restriction is invalid, the Examiner correctly held the agreement did not apply to ship-
ments from St. Louis, nor is it applicable to shipments through New Orleans.

To the extent that the Conference attempted before filing with the Board, to make the 1959 Agreement extend to St. Louis by the addition of an express provision as paragraph (b) in Article 1 of the 1959 form of Agreement, the Examiner found such provision is a "new agreement" or modification of the Conference Agreement.

The scope of any freighting agreement is necessarily limited by the agreements between common carriers by water, or other persons subject to the Act, which are filed and approved as required by the first sentence of Sec. 15 of the Act. The Agreement creating the Gulf and South Atlantic Havana Steamship Conference regulating its activities governs the 1958 and 1959 Agreements in question and limits the scope of Conference authority. The 1958 and 1959 Agreements do not name any port located on an inland waterway or not located on the Atlantic or Gulf coast. It is argued that, nevertheless, the 1958 Agreement, as interpreted, or as revised in 1959 implies that, without naming the port, it covers the carriage of cargo originating at or from any inland port, in this case St. Louis, exported by way of any river, flowing through any Gulf port such as New Orleans, i.e. the Mississippi River. The Conference Agreement names other ports, however, such as Savannah, Ga., Port of Palm Beach, Fla., Tampa, Fla., Panama City, Fla., and Pensacola, Fla., all "South Atlantic" ports, and New Orleans, La., Lake Charles, La., Orange, Tex., Beaumont, Tex., Port Neches, Tex., Port Arthur, Tex., Galveston, Tex., and Houston, Tex., all "Gulf ... ports". These ports are named in Article 15 after the statement declaring the intention of the members to maintain service under this Agreement. The Agreement also names Havana, Cuba, and service "to Cuban Mainland Outports ... namely Mariel and Matanzas ... and nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend the provisions of this agreement to ports or territories other than as described herein ..." None of the Conference members serves or has ships to serve St. Louis, Mo. The issue of calling St. Louis a Gulf port never arose until White Gold began its tug and barge service. We see no escape, in the light of the way the 1958 Agreement was drafted and of the foregoing, from the Examiner's conclusion that the "interpretation" by the Conference is not an interpretation at all, but is in effect a fundamental modification of the scope of the Conference Agreement and hence, of its terms.

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Sec. 15 requires every common carrier by water to file immediately with the Board a true copy or memorandum of such modification. This was not done until February 26, 1959. We find that between July 10, 1958 when the Conference first asserted its claim that shipments by barge from St. Louis constituted a breach of the 1958 Agreement thus modifying the Conference Agreement, and February 26, 1959 when the Conference filed the revised 1959 Agreement provisions with the Board and requested approval thereof, the respondent common carriers by water members of the Conference violated the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act by failing to file the modification of an agreement with another such carrier fixing or regulating transportation rates, giving or receiving special rates or special privileges or regulating the character of freight traffic to be carried.

West India and the Conference seek to avoid the filing requirements of Sec. 15 by citing paragraph 16 of the Conference Agreement authorizing dual rates for stabilization purposes and the absence of any provision containing "any limitation upon the Conference's contract rate authority in terms of origin of the cargo, mode of transportation to ports served by the Conference or in any other terms." The Examiner found and we have agreed that the "Gulf and South Atlantic ports" and Havana, Cuba ports provision in Article 1 coupled with the meaning of such ports in Article 15 and the statement in the opening clause of the Conference Agreement that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend the provisions of this Agreement to ports or territories other than as described herein" constitutes such a limitation.

Exception is taken to the Examiner's disregard of the cases of Hymen I. Malatzky d.b.a. Himala International v. American Export Lines, 3 F.M.B. 232 (1950), and Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., v. North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, et al, 3 F.M.B. 235 (1950). These cases involved no issue as to the port coverage of the Conference Agreements in question which is the issue involved here, but attacked the dual rate system. The dual rate system is not challenged here. The cases are not authority for any recognizable issue in this case and were properly disregarded.

Further, West India claims the right to receive Swift's cargo pursuant to its contract on the ground that the cargo "is first hauled to New Orleans by a river tug, and then transferred to a deep sea tug" thus making the cargo a shipment from a Gulf port just as though it were sent there "by locomotive and then transshipped to the ocean vessel." The more correct analogy is that of
the freight train which changes or adds locomotives at the foot of a steep grade. No cargo transfer is involved. There is a continuous movement in the same barge and neither the change from river to ocean tugs nor even a temporary halt in the barge movement converts the cargo to a shipment from an ocean port.

The Examiner found that the modification of the Conference Agreement constituted a routing restriction which was detrimental to the commerce of the United States and unjustly discriminatory as between shippers or ports and subject to disapproval by the Board pursuant to Sec. 15 of the Act. He also found the modification (1) subjected particular persons, i.e. shippers, and localities, i.e. ports, to undue prejudice or disadvantage in violation of Sec. 16, second paragraph, First., and (2) involved the demand charge or collection of a rate, fare or charge which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers or ports in violation of Sec. 17 of the Act. West India, the Conference and an intervener Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves except to this and to the fact that the Examiner did not dispose of West India's contentions touching on the subject.

The basis for the Examiner's conclusion was that the restriction by the respondent common carriers by water acting together prevented, (1) shippers from using the Mississippi River, on which large amounts of public money have been spent for navigation and harbor improvements, (2) river port cities from obtaining cargo for shipment therefrom and (3) traffic in lard by barge transportation from being used by shippers when it has certain economic advantages. The restrictions tended to compel shippers to forego these advantages in favor of using conference line ships from the ports they served. The facts support such conclusions. The compulsion exists, because, in the words of a respondent's counsel "with respect to this other traffic [other commodities Swift ships to Cuba and an occasional tank car of lard], if the Conference position is sustained, Swift would be reduced to the choice of shipping by Conference ships at non-contract rates. . . ." We think this choice involves an undue disadvantage to shippers. Since the shipper can't sell more lard if its sale price includes the higher freight rates, the shipper either complies with Conference terms or gets out of this line of business. Counsel says the result of the barge service alternative is that "Swift will be in a position almost immediately to monopolize the Cuban lard market . . ." Assuming relevance to respondent's monopoly charge the record did not bear out these fears. Swift once enjoyed 18% to 20% of the trade; it
now has 12% to 14%. Barge traffic should not be prejudiced until more evidence of detriment to commerce is shown.

The other contentions and considerations urged by respondents to prove detriment to commerce are (1) the "havoc barge competition would cause" in the existing stable business situation, or "chaos in the Cuban trade" through lack of rate stability, presumably through lowered freight rates, (2) the damage to West India, whose services are needed by Cubans to market their fruits and vegetables, (3) lack of appearance by port interests in support of Swift, (4) support by Gulf port cities and Palm Beach Port District for the Conference, (5) unwillingness of the barge industry to commit equipment to the Cuba trade, (6) damage to West India from loss of the lard trade, (7) threat to other Conference carriers from the expansion of barge use to other commodities, (8) diversion of traffic from rail carriers, (9) advantages of rail and car ferry over through barge movement, and (10) encouragement of the use of barges subverts the national defense interest in having a specialized fleet of self-propelled ships suitable for use in transporting tanks. The contentions that barges will be damaging to the business of respondents, but that the service provided by respondents is better anyway, exemplifies the contradictions involved in considering either one as a dominating consideration in a study of detriments to the commerce of the United States. The interests and needs of shippers in foreign commerce should dominate where competing methods and new techniques of water transportation are involved. An arrangement would seem to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States or be unfair as between shippers and exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors which prevents the former from having a free choice among competing methods of transportation for cost advantages. Anything which impedes such free choice among constantly changing alternatives provided by technical changes in traffic and transportation methods is a detriment to commerce in the long run. There is no inherently more advantageous method of transportation such as common carriage over private carriage or the use of self-propelled ships, that must be protected regardless of the context of any situation, in the name of avoiding detriment to the commerce of the United States. None of the considerations listed by respondents take the shipper's freedom of choice into account, all are designed to protect the status quo or the particular interests of the respondents, hence they are of little weight in countering all the conflicting carrier, shipper and port interest
considerations the Examiner used as the basis for his findings about prejudice and discrimination against ports, shippers and traffic.

The authority of the Conference to institute the contract rate system in Agreement No. 4188 is not in issue. Rather, the justness and fairness of a particular contract obligation in the Freight Agreements as applied to Swift and the use of barges, the discriminatory or prejudicial aspects of such obligation and the effect on the commerce of the United States of such obligation when it limits a shipper's choice of transportation alternatives (such as through barge movements from St. Louis) are the principal issues. No overriding consideration which would resolve the issues in favor of the proposed 1959 Agreement obligation, consistently with statutory standards, has been shown.

The Examiner found that the contract obligation in issue restricted a shipper's choice to the point where it was not consistent with the Maritime Commission's interpretation of Sec. 15 of the Act in the Contract Routing Restrictions case, supra. There, the contract obligation sought to be imposed on shippers required contract signers to offer respondent conference members all cargo and shipments to certain European ports "which shipments move via any United States or Canadian North Atlantic port or waterway (Great Lakes, River St. Lawrence and other waters tributary to North Atlantic included)." If a shipment be made in violation of the contract the carriers may terminate the contract and charge the higher non-contract rates. This obligation is comparable to the one in question. In this proceeding shipments are to Havana, Cuba, instead of to European ports. Shipments subject to the contract are those moving via Gulf ports instead of North Atlantic ports which are qualified to include those moving "by way of any river or inland waterway" such as the Mississippi instead of "any . . . waterway" such as the Great Lakes and River St. Lawrence. The only arguable difference is whether the change from a river tug to an ocean tug at the Gulf port of New Orleans or the non-use of ocean going ships up to St. Louis, which was not done in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence transit, makes any difference, and whether the use of ocean-going, deep-draft, self-propelled ships to Montreal makes a difference. As noted above we do not consider that the change of tugs or the use of barges instead of deep-draft ships alters the character of the transportation as far as the shipper and his shipment are concerned. It is stated "that shoal draft inland barge transportation and deep sea movement"
are not the same thing in fact”. They are different, of course, but the difference does not provide any distinction relevant to the existence of shipper and port discrimination under Sec. 15 of the Act as interpreted in the Contract Routing case. Inferences are sought to be drawn from the fact that, (1) Great Lakes ports are accessible to ocean shipping while St. Louis is not, (2) there were other discriminatory practices involved in the Contract Routing case such as discriminatory shipper contracts, and (3) shippers testified against the restriction in the Contract Routing case, (supra) but here “almost the reverse is true.” Such facts are not controlling since we find the contract obligation which restricts a shipper’s choice regardless of these background factors has the effect of eliminating St. Louis as a port for ocean cargoes which can be put on barges there. The obligation is thus unjustly discriminatory against the port of St. Louis and unfair to potential shippers therefrom who have cargo suited to barge transportation. The same facts insofar as they create a discrimination against shippers and ports also involve the demand, charge or collection of a rate which is unjustly in violation of Sec. 17 by compelling shippers to pay rates based on shipments from the ports served by the respondent common carriers instead of rates from ports and by transportation methods chosen by shippers.

Public interest in the stability of rates is also urged as a basis for upholding the contract obligation, assuming it will produce such stability. The same argument for stability was present in the Contract Routing case (supra) and found not to be controlling there. We have never held stability of rates to be an end in itself. It is a significant factor in upholding the dual rate system, but not a justification for otherwise discriminatory or unfair practices or for other illegal activity. The dual rate system remains intact without the provision in question unless in a factual context the system is also found to stifle competition in violation of Sec. 14, Third of the Act. This is the basis of the next exception.

The examiner concluded that the attempt, through the 1958 and 1959 Agreements, to extend the dual rate system to cargo shipped from inland ports not served by Conference members was made for the purpose of stifling non-conference competition. The Examiner made precise findings that the present system under the proposed modification was applied for the purpose of stifling competition. Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). The Isbrandtsen case holds that Sec. 14, Third strikes down dual rate systems where they are used as predatory devices.
The Examiner found that the modifying contract provision extending the dual rate system to St. Louis was not in use and not filed with the Board until February 27, 1959 and thus, was not made lawful by Congress in spite of the Isbrandtsen case. The interpretation embodied in the written modification was first asserted in a letter to Swift from the Conference dated July 10, 1958. (Public Law 85–626, 74 Stat. 253, 46 U.S.C. 812), amended Sec. 14 to validate, notwithstanding the Isbrandtsen case, any dual rate contract arrangement “in use” by Conference members on May 19, 1958. This Act is in effect until June 30, 1961 (P.L. 86–542, 74 Stat. 253). Even assuming the agreement could be in use without Board approval, it does not meet the test of P.L. 85–626. We don’t think arguments, unsupported by any evidence, as to the meaning of the Conference Agreement prior to July 10, 1958 constitute a dual rate arrangement in use by Conference members.

While it might not be essential to pass on respondents’ several exceptions as to the Examiner’s findings with regard to the applicability of Sec. 14 of the Act because we have held that our interpretation of Sec. 15 of the Act as applied to the facts in the Contract Routing Restrictions case (supra) is equally applicable to the facts in this case making the restriction in question invalid, we do so in fulfillment of our original order in Dockets 849 and 851 raising this issue. To the finding that the extension of the dual rate system to inland ports not served by members was a predatory device made to stifle competition in violation Sec. 14 Third, respondents make the following exceptions: (1) a dual rate provision was “in use” on May 19, 1958 having been a part of the Conference Contract at least since 1935 and is thus protected by the amendment of Sec. 14 contained in P.L. 85–626 (supra) and (2) that the Isbrandtsen, case, supra, interpretation of Sec. 14 applies only to dual rate obligations which stifle “independent non-conference common carrier or berth operations.” This dual rate provision covering cargo originating at an inland port and moving by way of a river flowing through a Gulf port was not in effect until the respondents asserted it for the first time July 10, 1958. The exception under (1) is not well taken for this reason. As to the second exception, Isbrandtsen, the plaintiff was an independent non-conference common carrier, but the language of the decision is nowhere limited to such carriers as suggested by the respondent in stating that the decision was concerned only with stifling competition by such carriers. Justice Brennan said “The Congress in § 14 has flatly prohibited practices of conferences which have the
effect of stifling the competition of independent carriers.” There is no further qualification in the decision such as “common carrier” or “berth operations.” The sole qualification is found in the word “independent”. We take this to mean any carrier not a conference member. Swift’s contract carrier “White Gold” meets this description.

We find the present case indistinguishable for any significant reason or circumstance from the Isbrandtsen case. The Isbrandtsen case concerned inbound cargoes from the Far East while this one concerns outbound cargoes to Cuba. No provision of the Act or the Supreme Court’s discussion of the Isbrandtsen case makes the direction or origin of cargoes a significant factor in interpreting the law. The exception under (2) is not well taken either and we agree that the proposed contract violates Sec. 14 Third of the Act.

Swift, West India and the Conference except to the award of reparations. Swift objects to the limited period from January 1 to January 12, West Indies objects to basing the measure of reparations on the difference between the non-contract rates and the contract rates applicable if Swift had been given a contract, and the Conference objects to the conclusion that Swift was damaged by the 1958 or by the 1959 Agreements and to the assessment against them during all periods of non-conference rates when they were not signatory to a Conference contract.

Sec. 22 provides that the Board “may direct the payment on or before a day named, of full reparation to the complainant for the injury caused by such violation”, i.e. a violation of the Act which the complainant proves. Swift has proven a violation and is entitled to reparation. Our rule on the proper measure is set forth as follows in Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S.S. Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41 (1922), wherein the Board rejected as a measure the difference between the freight actually paid and “the sum which would have been paid had the complainants been given a discount . . . as were contract shippers”:

“It cannot be inferred from the language used [in Sec. 22] that compensation for other than the actual damage incurred is to be granted.” Such damage is payable only where it results from discrimination against the complainant. Overcharges and discriminations have quite different consequences as far as reparation is concerned. A different measure of recovery applies where the shipper has paid the applicable rate (non-contract) and sues upon the discrimination caused by other shippers having to pay
less or by being unjustly refused the contract rate. The Examiner concluded that there was no discrimination because Swift could not "produce any documentary evidence . . . which would show its comparative costs . . ." Discrimination depends on what the respondents do, not on loss by the complainant; even assuming the incorrect statement that evidence thereof must be "documentary". Here enforcement of the respondent's proposed contract was found by the Examiner to result in discrimination against shippers (i.e. Swift) "in contravention of Section 15," and a "discrimination against . . . shippers in violation of sections 16 and 17 of said Act." We concur. Accordingly Swift should be given the opportunity to prove its damages in accordance with the rule in the Eden case, supra. A further hearing on this is essential.

Exception is taken to the period during which the right to reparation accrued. The Examiner allowed the extra freight paid from January 1 to January 12, 1959 on the ground that on January 12 Swift "had prompt notice" of the Board's order suspending Article 1 (b) of the 1959 Agreement pursuant to Docket No. 849. The evidence of notice consisted of a statement by a Swift official during cross-examination that he first learned "that there had been a cease and desist order" from "their Washington attorney" in "early January". In response to the question "So that virtually at the same time that it (the order) was issued, you knew about it?" The witness said: "Practically." Further on, light is shed on the meaning of "practically." The witness was asked, after a statement about the above testimony: "So I assume that you learned about it, say, at the middle of January?" A. "Somewhere around that date, yes, sir." The Examiner held that on January 12, 1959 the situation changed and "Swift could have obtained the contract rates with the assurance that the lawfulness of the agreement would be duly determined by the Board . . ." Swift excepts on the ground that it did not know whether the Conference intended to obey the Board's January 12 order. This is not material. Assuming the Conference did not intend to obey the order, the result at the end of the Board's process would be to correct the effect of any such disobedience as far as Swift was concerned. As the Examiner found, the lawfulness of the agreement would be determined regardless of respondent's opinion or actions and our order would be based on such determination. Hence we are not willing to extend the period of injury to May 11, 1959, when the new contract was finally signed. We do not agree, however, that the period should end as the result of supposed knowledge of our order
based on an informal communication from its Washington attorney. Formal notice of the order was first given pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act by publication in the Federal Register. The Board’s order appeared in the January 21, 1959 issue (24 F.R. 482). The order itself was dated January 16, 1959. On January 21, 1959, there could be no doubt of notice since notice is to be presumed after the official publication. Before then Swift was justified in refusing to sign; after that it was not. We hold that Swift is entitled to show damages from January 1, 1959 through the close of business on January 21, 1959. A further hearing to determine the amount of damages will be necessary. The damages found to be due shall be paid within 30 days from the date of our order fixing the respondents’ liability.

Exception is taken to the fact that the Examiner disregarded our precedent in *Himala International v. American Export Lines*, *supra* that the granting of a lower contract rate when there was no contract would be a discrimination in favor of the complainant by the carrier. The case is not in point because the failure to grant a lower “contract” rate is not Swift’s complaint. Its complaint is based on the respondent’s refusal to sign a valid contract, the various illegal consequences of such action, and the discrimination against Swift caused by the refusal to grant contract rates because of its barge shipments.

The final exception is to the failure of the Examiner to find that the dual rate system as applied by the Conference was unlawful as a single carrier monopoly. Since we have already held the proposed contract obligation is an unauthorized routing restriction and not in effect on March 19, 1958 pursuant to P.L. 85-626 we find it is not necessary to pass on this issue.

The proceedings will be held open for further proceedings to determine the exact amount of the reparations found to be due. An appropriate order, consonant with this report, will be issued.

The Respondents, in Docket No. 849, who have violated Sec. 15 of the Act are liable to penalties as provided by the last paragraph thereof. The facts and findings herein shall be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 2nd day of February 1961.

No. 849

AGREEMENT AND PRACTICES PERTAINING TO FREIGHTING AGREEMENT GULF AND SOUTH ATLANTIC HAVANA STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE (AGREEMENT NO. 4188)

No. 851

IN THE MATTER OF APPROVAL OF ARTICLE 1 OF FREIGHTING AGREEMENT (G-13) OF GULF AND SOUTH ATLANTIC HAVANA STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE (AGREEMENT NO. 4188)

No. 854

SWIFT & COMPANY AND SWIFT & COMPANY PACKERS

v.

GULF AND SOUTH ATLANTIC HAVANA STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE, ET AL

An investigation docketed as Nos. 849 and 851 having been entered upon by the Board on its own motion and the proceeding docketed as No. 854 being at issue upon complaint and answer on file, and the investigation and proceedings having been consolidated and duly heard with respect to all issues other than reparation, after full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof having made and entered a report stating its conclusions, decision, and findings therein, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

6 F.M.B.
It is ordered, That:

1. Respondents be, and they are hereby, notified, and required immediately to cease and desist and to abstain from entering into, or continuing or performing any of the contracts, agreements, or modification thereof restricting shipments of cargo originating at any inland port or place and moving via river or inland waterway terminating at, touching or flowing through any Gulf or South Atlantic port of the United States, found herein to be in violation of Sec. 15, Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

2. Respondents be, and they are hereby, notified, and required immediately to cease and desist and to abstain from (a) subjecting particular persons, localities and descriptions of traffic to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, (b) demanding, charging and collecting a rate which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers and ports found herein to be in violation of Secs. 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

3. Respondents be, and they are hereby, notified and required, immediately to cease and desist and abstain from extending a dual rate system to cargo shipped from inland ports not served by conference members found herein to be unlawful under Sec. 14, Third of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

It is further ordered, That, the proceedings docketed as No. 849 and No. 851 be, and they are hereby, discontinued; and

It is further ordered, That, the proceeding docketed as No. 854 be, and it is hereby, held open for further proceedings on the claims of complainants for reparation, if any.

BY THE BOARD.

(Signed) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 848

IN RE: RUBIN, RUBIN & RUBIN CORP., N. N. SERPER & COMPANY,
ACADEMY FORWARDING COMPANY

Decided February 20, 1961

Respondents, Rubin, Rubin & Rubin Corp., N. N. Serper & Company, shippers, and Academy Forwarding Company, forwarders of paper products from New York to Puerto Rico, found to have knowingly and willfully, by means of false classification, obtained transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable, in violation of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. Herman L. Weisman and Burton R. Rubin for Rubin, Rubin & Rubin Corporation, Respondent.

Max J. Dym for Academy Forwarding Corp., Respondent.
Mark P. Schlefer and Harrison D. Hutson for Bull-Insular Line, Inc., Intervener.

Frank Gormley and Robert C. Bamford as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

RALPH E. WILSON, Chairman; THOMAS E. STAKEM, Vice Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

The Board, as authorized by Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, (Act), instituted upon its own motion an investigation of the lawfulness of certain shipments under Sec. 16 of the Act to determine whether respondent Rubin, Rubin & Rubin Corp. (Rubin), a shipper and a printer and manufacturer of printed
products, and respondent N. N. Serper & Company (Serper) a shipper of printed products, and respondent Academy Forwarding Co. (Academy), a forwarder, had obtained transportation between April 1955 and February 1957 for property consisting of paper products, by water, from the United States to Puerto Rico at less than the charges which otherwise would be applicable.

Although not named as a respondent, the intervener, Bull Insular Line, Inc. (Bull Line) filed a brief, as the result of statements made during the course of the hearing, imputing to it knowledge of the alleged misclassification of shipments. Under Sec. 16, Second of the Act, it is unlawful for any common carrier by water to allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates established and enforced by the line of such carrier by means of false billing, false classification or by any other unjust or unfair device or means. No evidence developed to convince the Examiner that the carrier should also be made a respondent.

The Examiner recommended that the shippers Rubin and Serper be found to have committed unlawful acts and that the forwarder Academy be found not to have committed any unlawful acts under Sec. 16. Exceptions and replies to the Examiner's recommended decision were filed and oral argument has been held.

II. FACTS

1. The shipper Rubin is a printer and manufacturer of composition books, columnar ruled pads, business blanks in tablet form, receipt books, merchandise order books, loose leaf fillers, stenographer notebooks, quarter bound composition paper, salesmen's order books, memorandum books, and various other school and business paper products. These products are described in a catalogue issued by Rubin. Rubin does not advertise the availability of, or ship, nor does his catalogue describe, blank paper for printers. Rubin has shipped his products, consisting primarily of composition books and paper items for use in schools since about 1950. In 1953 during a visit to Puerto Rico, Leon Rubin, Vice President of Rubin, learned that a loss of sales was caused by lower competitive prices made possible by competitors shipping their products as "printing paper" which may be shipped for a lower freight rate under the applicable tariffs of the common carriers by water. Before 1953 Rubin prepared bills of lading describing its products as "stationery" or "composition books". After this Rubin described similar merchandise as "printing
IN RE: RUBIN, RUBIN & RUBIN CORP. ET AL. 237

paper". Rubin ordered the change in the description in the bill of lading which was prepared to obtain the lower freight rate and so instructed its forwarder, Academy.

The procedure for instructing the forwarder was to send the forwarder a copy of Rubin's invoice to which was stapled a sheet of paper on which was handwritten or typed the words "no insurance, Bull Line, printing paper", or words or abbreviations to this effect and giving the name of the ship together with a copy of an order by the buyer in Puerto Rico. The invoice described the products as "Trop" (meaning "tropical"—a quality of paper) followed by a number or "Agate" (a description of the cover designs) followed by a number or "pads" or "green tint-stenos" or "8½ x 11 pads, ruled, white" or "200 page marble comp." (marble is also a description of the cover design), or simply a number referring to items in its catalogue. There were from one to fifteen differently numbered and priced items on the invoices. Opposite each item were prices for each item and an extension of the totals of each order.

The instructions as to the printing paper designation were begun after Rubin learned the reason for the lower competitive prices of these products in Puerto Rico and after a discussion of the correct classification of the products with a representative from the Bull Lines. The evidence was not clear as to the details of the discussion with Bull Lines, nor as to when it occurred. Rubin made such classifications on about 85 shipments in 1955, 1956 and 1957.

2. The shipper Serper ordered composition books from Rubin for shipment to his customers in Puerto Rico. Serper's orders began around 1953. Rubin, upon receiving a letter or telephone order from Serper, executed the order by having the goods packaged in cartons and delivered to the carrier at the dock. Rubin sent Serper an invoice covering the shipments. The invoices contained the information referred to above. Dock receipts covering Serper's shipments were prepared by either Rubin or Serper. When prepared by Rubin a signed copy of the dock receipt would be sent to Serper with Rubin's invoice. After receiving these papers Serper prepared the bills of lading and export declaration. Serper did not see or handle the products, but he knew what they looked like, he knew what was in Rubin's catalogue, and he knew what his customers ordered.

When Serper, in 1953, began selling composition books, which were the only Rubin products he ordered, he was told by Leon 6 F.M.B.
Rubin that the books should be classified as printing paper and was also told that this was "all right with the Bull Line" pursuant to the conversations which Rubin had with the Bull Line representative. Serper prepared his bills of lading, dock receipts and export declarations to read "printing paper" or "unprinted paper" the same as Rubin. Serper made such classifications on about 29 shipments of composition books and notebooks in 1956 and 1957.

3. The forwarder Academy was engaged by Rubin to prepare its shipping documents. Academy prepared the bill of lading, the dock receipt and the export declaration for Rubin. The documents were prepared on the basis of the written instructions stapled to the commercial invoice as noted above. Such written instructions were followed after a discussion with Rubin as to what to do. The invoices were the same as described above. Academy did not have a copy of Rubin's catalogue and never saw or handled the cartons containing shipments. The invoices, however, described Rubin as "Manufacturing Stationers" and the president of Academy knew that Rubin was in the paper and printing business. Academy had been a forwarder for Rubin since at least September 1953. Academy prepared export declarations containing references by a code number to items in so-called Schedule B of the Bureau of Census which applies to "Fine Paper: Writing Paper" and covers items shipped by Rubin and not to printing paper.

4. The commodity descriptions and classifications in the applicable "United States Atlantic and Gulf-Puerto Rico Conference Tariff", No. 6 (January 1955 through January 9, 1957) and No. 7 (thereafter) refer to 'BOOKS, Blank or Printed", "PAPER and PAPER ARTICLES: Bond. Not Otherwise Specified, Printing, N.O.S., Tablet, ruled, not padded, not bond, and Writing", "PRINTED MATTER, N.O.S. and STATIONERY and SUPPLIES, N.O.S." The tariff shows a considerably lower rate for transporting articles classified as "Printing Paper" than for writing tablets, stationery and similar products.

The classification of "printing paper" or "unprinted paper" appeared in bills of lading of Bull Line and Alcoa Steamship Company (Alcoa) covering Rubin's shipments. The bills of lading were dated various dates from February 25, 1955 to January 1, 1957 insofaro as the bills of lading prepared by Academy are concerned.

In preparing his products for shipment Rubin would have them placed in cartons which were stenciled variously as follows: "1 Gr. No. 760 60 pages B. Marble Comps", "1/2 Gr. 8 x 10 Marble Comps
III. DISCUSSION

Rubin and Serper both shipped in foreign commerce between 1955 and 1957 many cartons of composition books and other kinds of writing books and paper for school or business use under bills of lading describing them as "printing paper". The bills of lading were prepared by Academy or by Serper but the shippers were responsible for the information in the bill of lading. There is no serious denial that the descriptions of the products shipped were false. The tariff provided a much more descriptive classification covering the articles referred to in 4. above covering blank books, paper articles, ruled tablets, printed matter and stationery supplies and since these classifications were not used, the descriptions chosen by the respondents constituted a false classification.

The false classification resulted in the billing and payment of a lower freight rate than would be applicable to the shipments if they had been correctly classified.

Sec. 16 of the Act is violated by shippers and forwarders if the false classification is knowingly and willfully made.

We have held that where a shipper, with full information about the article shipped, after studying the tariff, chooses an improper description consistently and continually by ignoring a more descriptive classification, and where a shipper knows of the variance between what is being shipped and what has been described, such shipper knowingly and willfully obtains transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges otherwise applicable, by means of a false classification. Misclassification and Mishbilling of Glass Tumblers and Other Manufactured Glassware Items as Jars, 6 F.M.B. 155 (1960).

We have also held that where a shipper has doubt as to the proper tariff designation of his commodity, he has a duty to make diligent and good faith inquiry of the carrier or conference publishing the tariff. We also stated that "resort to a definition" of an article "which does such violence to the clear meaning of the tariff, at best, manifests such an indifference and lack of care in construing the tariff as to constitute a deliberate violation of Sec. 16". Markt Hammacher Co.—Misclassification of Glassware, 5 F.M.B. 509, 511 (1958). A persistent failure to inform oneself by means of normal business resources might mean a shipper or

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forwarder was acting knowingly and willfully. Indifference on the part of shippers is tantamount to outright and active violation and diligent inquiry must be exercised by shippers and by forwarders. *Misclassification of Tissue Paper as Newsprint Paper*, 4 F.M.B., 483 (1954).

Rubin knew exactly what it manufactured and shipped. For a while it correctly classified the products in bills of lading in accordance with the tariff and paid the correct charges. In 1953 after Rubin found out that it was losing business because of high freight, a company official made up his mind to change his previous action and to misdescribe the products in an apparently plausible way to get a lower freight rate. In the meantime, Rubin continued to have the cartons containing its products correctly stenciled and to prepare invoices with accurate references to what they were.

Rubin's concern was not with consistency or with telling the truth about its product regardless of what the tariff contained or with conformity between what its officers knew its products to be and an unambiguous tariff description but only with doing what others were doing. This was a thought out plan of action to achieve a specific result (saving money) which was put into effect by giving new instructions to the forwarder and by continuing an inconsistent course of action with respect to the cartons and the invoices after discussing the subject with others.

Rubin's manager had a clear question in his mind about the proper thing to do, i.e. whether to change a previous "Stationery" and "Composition Books" description. He resolved the question by changed action. This was knowing and willful conduct. The extenuating circumstances, that he was meeting unfair competition of others doing the same thing is not relevant under the statute.

The shipper Serper likewise showed no concern for the truth when it came to typing in the correct information in the bills of lading which he prepared himself. Serper knew also the characteristics of the product he was selling and that it was not printing paper. Serper did not have to see the products to know that the words "printing paper" which he typed on his bills of lading were untrue. Since he claims not to have seen the tariff and to have been unfamiliar with its provisions, its contents are immaterial as regards his knowledge about proper classification. He did not describe the articles correctly and when confronted with a question about the variance between the description and what he
had to ship he did not consult the tariff nor the carrier to find out the proper course of action. He failed to seek enlightenment. He resolved any doubt in his mind or lack of knowledge about how to prepare the papers by finding out from Rubin how it was done and whether it would get by, not whether it was accurate.

While Serper might not be well informed about the preparation of a bill of lading, he at least knew he was not shipping printing paper and he made no effort to obtain enlightenment about the obvious discrepancy between both the facts and the correct descriptions he saw on the invoices. He did this above a warning in bold face type on the bill of lading form reading as follows: "ATTENTION OF SHIPPERS is especially directed to Secs. 235-236 U.S. Criminal Code (18 U.S. Code 285-6). Sec. 4472 U.S. Revised Statutes (46 U.S. Code 170), Sec. 16 Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S. Code 815), Sec. 3, subdiv. 5, also Sec. 4, subdivs. 5 and 6, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936 (46 U.S. Code 1303, subsec. 5, 46 U.S. Code 1304, subsecs. 5 and 6) which provisions of law subject shippers to substantial penalties, liabilities and disabilities for false classification, misdescription or insufficient description of goods", etc. Serper’s conscious choice in the preparation of the inaccurate bills of lading involved knowing and willful conduct.

Academy had just as much information as Serper had and in addition was an expert in the business of preparing shipping documents. Academy also had before it an invoice which clearly varied from its instructions. Academy ignored the variance and translated “200 page marble comps” and similar designations, and a variety of numbers into “Printing Paper”. Academy, unlike Serper, had a tariff book available containing words to describe the invoiced articles, but it made no effort to be guided by the book or to discover what the many different invoice numbers and prices referred to. Instead, it assumed they were all “printing paper”. Printing paper would rarely have the variety of prices these invoices showed. Academy did this even though for years it had been forwarding Rubin’s products under correct bills of lading. Then, there was a change, but Rubin did not change its business or its product. Academy conformed to the change without inquiry. Academy too, failed to resolve the obvious conflict in descriptions and change of descriptions, and used the wrong one over the same bold-face type warning to shippers. Academy consistently and continually ignored a more descriptive classification than printing paper. It was argued that Rubin never asked Academy for advice, never discussed the matter and never told Acad-
emy what it was shipping. Rubin didn’t have to do this. Academy already knew what was being shipped.

Still further evidence of Academy’s knowledge is the fact that in preparing the export declaration, its clerks picked out a substantially correct code number from the Schedule B (Statistical Classification of Domestic and Foreign Commodities Exported from the United States) and used it to designate items actually shipped. While this code number and its heading does not cover “composition books” (apparently covered by other numbers) neither does it cover “printing paper” and the latter may be found under other headings and numbers. The page heading in Schedule B was generally descriptive and covered words like “blank books” and “salesbooks”. Even though Academy selected substantially the correct code number covering composition books in preparing the export declaration it also wrote in the words “printing paper” conforming the words with the bill of lading.

The selection of the correct number from this technical publication (Schedule B) requires considerable knowledge of the products and an ability to match their characteristics with the descriptions in the “Schedule”. This was done substantially correctly by the forwarder showing that it knew generally what it was shipping and that it was not printing paper which is under another number. The printing paper number was never used indicating a conscious study of the schedule and the selection of a code number to be written in the export declaration to identify products that Academy knew were being shipped. Academy knowing of the variance ignored the more descriptive classification in the tariff book. The effect of this action would be to prevent the carriers, which make word comparisons between export declarations and bills of lading, from discovering any misclassification, yet give the Bureau of the Census, which requires the documents, fairly accurate information through the code number. This is thought-out deception.

We conclude from the foregoing that the shipper Rubin and Serper and the forwarder Academy have knowingly and willfully, directly by means of false classification obtained or attempted to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable.

Bull Line and Alcoa were not made respondents, but Bull Line intervened to protect its interests. No testimony was taken to obtain a full statement of their responsibility under Sec. 16, but enough evidence was produced to show they followed procedures which might make them responsible under other circumstances.
There was clear evidence that both Bull Lines and Alcoa accept bills of lading under a statement that the carriers have received specified goods and packages and over the signature of the master of the ship, or someone acting in his behalf, without having the true facts checked by anyone directly responsible to the carriers. The closest they got to the goods or packages was to have their "receiving clerk" sign or initial on the back of the bill of lading after an employee of the stevedore, known as the "checker", makes a count of the boxes as they are taken off a truck at the pier. The checker may also measure the shipment. The receiving clerk was not shown to have gone out on the pier floor to make any examination of the shipment. He takes the checker's word and the master of the ship, necessarily, takes the receiving clerk's word. In this case the checker and everyone else failed to notice the clearly stenciled boxes with correct abbreviated descriptions on them. Counsel suggested that "second, third and fourth hand boxes are common" and they can't "go by stencils", but no proof that this was the case here was offered. In fact, the contrary was shown. Moreover, where for years the stencils on the boxes accurately and properly described their contents to the carrier, such excuses are weak at best. We think a reasonable check of cargo should be made by an employee responsible to the carrier when performing such important acts as receiving cargo and signing the bill of lading therefor. Substantial legal rights in property are dependent on the actions of the carriers' employees at these points.

Obviously most cargo can't be opened and inspected, but far more than a blind signing of bills of lading for the ship's master and a comparison of words on papers in the carriers' offices is possible. Moreover unquestioning reliance on shippers for the truth as to the information on bills of lading is not enough. Mis-classification and Misbilling of Glass Tumblers and other Manufactured Glassware Items as Jars, supra.

All of the respondents herein have violated the provisions of the first paragraph of Sec. 16 of the Act. The facts and findings herein shall be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

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732-047 O-64—17
At a Session of the Federal Maritime Board, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 20th day of February, 1961.

No. 848

RUBIN, RUBIN & RUBIN CORP., N. N. SERPER & COMPANY, ACADEMY FORWARDING COMPANY

This proceeding having been initiated by the Board upon its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted after investigation of the things and matters involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is ordered, That, the following respondents be and each one is hereby notified and required, (a) to hereafter abstain from the practices herein found to be unlawful under Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended; and, (b) to notify the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service hereof whether such respondent has complied with this order, and if so, the manner in which compliance has been made, pursuant to Rule 1 (c) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 CFR 201.3):

Rubin, Rubin & Rubin Corp.
N. N. Serper & Company
Academy Forwarding Company

The proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.
By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 815

COMMON CARRIERS BY WATER—STATUS OF EXPRESS COMPANIES, TRUCK LINES AND OTHER NON-VESSEL CARRIERS

Decided March 2, 1961

Found that any person or business association may be classified as a common carrier by water who holds himself out by the establishment and maintenance of tariffs, by advertisement and solicitation, and otherwise, to provide transportation for hire by water in interstate or foreign commerce as defined in the Shipping Act, 1916; assumes responsibility or has liability imposed by law for the safe transportation of the shipments; and arranges in his own name with underlying water carriers for the performance of such transportation, whether or not owning or controlling the means by which such transportation is effected, is a common carrier by water as defined in the Shipping Act, 1916.

Status of individual respondents determined in accordance with above conclusion except as to Weaver Bros. Inc. and Railway Express Agency, and except as otherwise noted as to other respondents named in the report.


Robert E. Johnson for Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, respondent.

Frank L. Ippolito for Porto Rican Express Company, respondent.

Harry C. Ames and James L. Givan for Universal Carloading and Distributing Company, respondent.

Paul J. Coughlin for National Carloading Corporation, respondent.


Warner W. Gardner and Vern Countryman for American President Lines, Ltd., respondent.

Alphonsus E. Novick for Global Van Lines and Trans-Ocean Van Services, respondents.


Laurence E. Masoner, Henry A. Cockrum, and J. C. Kinney, Office of the Judge Advocate General, on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, for the Department of Defense, intervener.

Clarence J. Koontz, Malcolm D. Miller, and J. H. Macomber, Jr., for Administrator of General Services, intervener.


Robert B. Hood, Jr., Edward Aptaker and Robert E. Mitchell as Public Counsel.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman, SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Member,
RALPH E. WILSON, Member.

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

This is a report on the results of a hearing and an investigation ordered by the Board by an order dated March 14, 1957, to determine (1) the classification and status of motor truck companies, freight forwarders and express companies under the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, (Act) and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended (Intercoastal Act) in order to arrive at a general rule or interpretation applicable in the future to all persons, and (2) the lawfulness of agreements filed under Sec. 15 of the Act in which the aforesaid classes of carriers are parties. Seventy-seven parties were made respondents and six parties not named as respondents intervened. Evidence was taken in the form of verified statements and exhibits in response to questionnaires promulgated by the Board. The submission of briefs was followed by a recommended decision of an Examiner and by exceptions thereto.

II. FACTS

Many motor truck companies, freight forwarders and express companies as part of their business, provide the service of moving household goods and other personal property from points in the United States to points overseas using both trucks or vans which they own or operate and ocean ships which they do not own and operate. Such companies and forwarders are the initial carriers. Truck and rail service may be used overseas. The initial carriers offer this service to the public by advertisement and solicitation. The service consists of taking property from the shipper at his home or place of business, carrying it by motor vehicle or rail car to a port, having it loaded on a ship, transported overseas, and by further land transportation delivered to the consignee. Household goods are frequently packed by the mover and generally protected from damage in transit by appropriate padding and placed in vans, sent to a port, unloaded and repacked into specially built contain-

ers which are used for the ocean shipment of household goods. They either own or lease the containers. The loaded containers are delivered into the custody of ship operators at the pier. Any needed stevedoring is handled by the initial carriers. Railway Express business is essentially a small package business. Railway Express transports packages under a single bill of lading naming the Express Company as shipper. Both types of carriers issue their own through bills of lading to the original shipper-consignor. By the bill’s terms they agree to deliver the goods to the final destination named by the shipper and generally assumed liability for safe arrival. The extent of their monetary liability, however, might be limited. Claims for loss or damage are submitted to the initial carriers. Charges for these services and for the obligations undertaken are those specified in the carriers’ tariff schedules and regulations. The tariff charges are for a combination of the costs for preliminary packing in the case of household goods, for land transportation from origin to a port, for over water transportation including the cost of packing and unpacking of household goods containers, and for land transportation to the final destination and delivery to the consignee, and for overhead and profit. The initial carriers collect the freight charges based on this tariff. The services have proven useful, desired by the public and extensively used.

Agreements have been filed with the Board by such motor truck companies, freight forwarders and express companies, on the assumption that the signers were common carriers by water and required to do so by Sec. 15 of the Act.

An agreement between 30 motor truck companies was placed in the record of this proceeding. The agreement designates a “Bureau” (A private corporation) to administer the agreement and obligates the parties: (1) to file with the Board a tariff specifying the rates, charges, rules and regulations applicable to the transportation of household goods between points covered by the agreement; (2) to quote, charge and collect rates and other charges only in accordance with the tariff adopted by the members pursuant to the agreement; (3) to furnish the bureau all information required for its records; (4) to cooperate by following prescribed procedures in voting on proposals for the establishment or revision of rates, rules, regulations or practices; and (5) to furnish the Board copies of various documents evidencing bureau action including the joint tariff observed by the signatory carriers. This agreement and others having the same objective have been per-
formed by the filing of various tariffs containing charges for overseas transportation of household goods.

The general purpose of all the agreements is to require the signatory carriers to charge uniform rates for moving household goods as specified in the mutually agreed upon tariffs that are adopted as part of the performance of the agreements.

III. DISCUSSION

The result to be achieved by our inquiry is to determine the extent to which these facts bring the respondents within the ambit of Sec. 15 of the Act, and in so doing to provide an interpretation thereof which may be used as a guide in determining its effect on other carriers and on future agreements involving similar services.

Sec. 15 of the Act requires that “every common carrier by water, or other person subject to the Act shall file immediately a true copy . . . of every agreement with another such carrier or other person subject to this Act . . . fixing or regulating transportation rates . . . controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition . . . or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement.” Agreements are lawful “only when and as long as approved by the Board.” Before approval or after disapproval it is unlawful to perform the agreement. Lawful agreements are “excepted” from the provisions of the Federal laws relating to combinations in restraint of trade and monopolies, contracts which may be construed to create restraints of trade or monopolies are declared to be illegal ² and under certain circumstances agreements among several carriers providing for the establishment of uniform rates, for cooperation and for an exchange of information may constitute such illegal contracts.

A determination of the extent to which respondents must comply with Sec. 15 and come within its exception depends upon whether the motor truck companies, freight forwarders, and express companies that make agreements among themselves fixing through rates for moving personal property overseas should be classified as, and have the status of, “common carriers by water” ³ or “Com-

² 15 USC §§ 1 and 2

³ "A 'common carrier by water' is defined in the first section of the Shipping Act, 1916, to mean 'a common carrier by water in foreign commerce or a common carrier by water in interstate commerce on the high seas or the Great Lakes on regular routes from port to port.' " (39 Stat. 728, 46 U.S.C. 843, as amended.)
mon carriers by water in intercoastal commerce" and therefore must file such agreements with the Board. If respondents must comply, then the lawfulness of the agreements, and whether respondents may be excepted from the so-called anti-monopoly restraint of trade laws must be determined.

The entity which constitutes a "common carrier by water in foreign commerce" as defined in the first section of the Act is subject to the provisions of the Act. The term "common carrier" is not defined but the legislative history of the Act indicates that the person to be regulated is the common carrier at common law: One who holds himself out to carry for hire the goods of those who choose to employ him. *Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc.*, 5 F.M.B. 615, 620 (1959). We have also held that a respondent's status as "common carrier" does not depend on its ownership or control or means of transportation, but rather on the nature of its undertaking with the business which it serves. Where a party "undertakes to transport from door to door it is a common carrier over the entire limits of its routes, both the portion over land and the portion over sea". Where the respondent assumed complete responsibility for the safe transportation and delivery of goods entrusted to it from the time of receipt from the shipper until arrival at ultimate destination, it was held to be a common carrier by water. *Bernhard Ulmann Co., Inc.*, 3 F.M.B. 771 (1952).

Railway Express Agency, Inc., was classified as a common carrier by water when it published a tariff naming rates and charges applicable, but restricted, to shipments transported by ship between ports in the United States and ports in Alaska pursuant to

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4 A "common carrier by water in intercoastal commerce" is defined in the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, to include "every common and contract carrier by water engaged in the transportation for hire of passengers or property between one State of the United States and any other State of the United States by way of the Panama Canal. (47 Stat. 1425, 46 U.S.C. 843, as amended.)

5 Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, provides: "That every common carrier by water . . . shall file immediately with the Board a true copy . . . of every agreement with another carrier . . . fixing or regulating transportation rates . . ." (first par.)

6 Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, provides: "All agreements, modifications or cancellations made after the organization of the Board shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Board. . . ." (fourth par.)

7 "Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section shall be excepted from the provision of the Act approved July second, eighteen hundred ninety, entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies', and amendments and acts supplementary thereto, and the provisions of sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, both inclusive, of the Act approved August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled 'An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes', and amendments and acts supplementary thereto." Sec. 15, (fifth par.)

6 F.M.B.
an agreement with a steamship company. The agreement provided that the company received one half of the gross revenue under the tariff. The company did not issue a bill of lading or freight bills (i.e., enter into an agreement with shippers). *Alaskan Rates*, 2 USMC 558, 582 (1941).

In response to a disclaimer of common carrier by water status because the carrier owned nothing that floats and carried nothing across the water, we held that such status “does not depend on its ownership or control or means of transportation but rather on the nature of its undertaking with the public which it serves.” The Act regulates those who perform or agree to perform water transportation service regardless of ship operation. *Bernhard Ulmann Co. Inc. v. Porto Rican Express Co.*, supra. In the Ulmann case we reported, as to the respondent therein, “Since it undertakes to transport from door to door it is a common carrier over the entire limits of its route, both the portion over land and the portion over sea”. The facts indicated that the respondent’s freight bill to shippers showed total transportation charges and respondent undertook, by its information furnished to the public and by agreements with shippers, to assume complete responsibility for the safe transportation of goods entrusted to it from the time of receipt from the shipper at his “store door” in New York until arrival at ultimate destination in Puerto Rico. It was decided that the respondent came within the definition of the term “common carrier by water” in foreign or interstate commerce, as the term is used in Sec. 15 of the Act and in the Intercoastal Act, within the meaning of the first section of the Act. Both of these decisions involved intercoastal operations or non-foreign commerce. The present operations involve foreign commerce.

The principal question here is which of the respondents likewise comes within the definition of common carrier by water as a result of the conformance or non-conformance of its activities with the foregoing standards as applied to foreign commerce. The Examiner found that our standards might be summarized as follows: “. . . a person who holds himself out by the establishment and maintenance of tariffs, by advertisement and solicitation, and otherwise, to provide transportation for hire by water in interstate or foreign commerce, as defined in the Shipping Act; assumes responsibility for the safe water transportation of the shipments;
and arranges in his own name with underlying water carriers for the performance of such transportation, whether or not owning or controlling the means by which such transportation is effected, is a common carrier by water as defined in the Shipping Act . . .”

The Examiner found that most of the respondent motor carriers, freight forwarders and express companies were “common carriers by water” within the meaning of such term in the first section of the Act, as a result of the application of these tests to their activities as shown by the record before him.

He concluded that their agreements fixing through transportation rates had to be filed immediately and approved by us to be lawful as required by Sec. 15 of the Act.

The exceptions relate only (1) to the extent to which certain motor carriers, because of the facts of their operations as shown in the record, were found not to be “common carriers by water” when engaged in transporting household goods in foreign commerce or in intercoastal commerce; (2) to the failure to find that respondents should also be considered as “forwarders, in the ordinary sense of the word, in their relationship with vessel operators”; and (3) to the Examiner’s reference to “the ‘eligibility’ of the different kinds of carriers” instead of to the problem of “whether such agreements may exist between such persons, on the one hand, and vessel-operating common carriers or other persons subject to the Act, on the other hand . . .”

The excluded carriers were Carrol F. Genovese; Movers & Warehousemen’s Association of America, Inc.; Allied Pittsburg Warehouse & Van Co., Inc.; Atlas Van Service, Inc.; Howard Van Lines, Inc.; Pacific Freight Corporation; Pan American Van Lines, Inc.; Puerto Rico Freight Delivery Co.; Smyth International Van Lines, Inc.; Bekins Moving & Storage Co. (Oregon); Bekins Van Lines, Inc. (California); Bekins Van & Storage Co. (California); and Weaver Bros., Inc. After the date of the recommended decision the Bekins companies withdrew from the tariff fixing agreements to which they were a party and which had been filed pursuant to Sec. 15. Of the remaining excluded carriers only Weaver Bros., after the Examiner filed his recommended decision, submitted an affidavit showing that their operations had been materially changed since the time of their verified statement of their activities, used as a basis for the Examiner’s conclusions. The record is reopened for receiving this document. The sworn statement of Weaver’s general traffic manager was that it now (1) “consolidates” freight by picking up parts of whole shipments from sup-
pliers or delivering carriers for assembling into single lots; (2) “containerizes” shipments in “sealed vans”; and (3) moves freight under through bills of lading issued by Weaver Bros. under its published through tariff schedules. By the issue of its own bill of lading, Weaver has arranged in its own name for the performance of transportation obligations in line with the Examiner’s test. According to its affidavit, charges for the entire movement are collected by Weaver and Weaver “assumes sole responsibility to the shipper for the safe water transportation of the shipment as well as land functions at both origin and destination”. Weaver’s agreement with shippers as evidenced by the “terms and conditions” which constitute the contract of carriage shown in the bill of lading which was a part of the sworn statement, however, are at variance with the sworn statement. It is agreed in Sec. 3 of the bill of lading that “Carrier shall in no event be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, nondelivery or misdelivery or for any damage or loss occurring while the property is not in its actual custody.” 9 The property is not in Weaver’s custody when it is in the custody of the vessel operator. In Sec. 12 of Weaver’s bill of lading the obligation of the carrier is as follows:

“Any carrier hereunder in making arrangements for any transshipping or forwarding by any vessel or other means of transportation not operated by such carrier shall be considered only as a forwarding agent, acting solely for the convenience of the shipper without any responsibility whatsoever. The carriage by any transshipping or forwarding carrier, and all transshipment or forwarding, shall be subject to all terms and conditions whatsoever in the regular form of bill of lading, freight note, contract or other shipping document used at the time by such carrier, whether issued for property or not, and even though such terms may be less favorable to the shipper or consignee than the terms of this bill of lading and may contain more stringent requirements as to notice or claim or commencement of suit, and may exempt the on-carrier from liability for negligence...”

These provisions show that Weaver has not assumed sole responsibility to the shipper for the safe water transportation of shipments. Instead, it is a “forwarding agent” for the “convenience” of the shipper insofar as the water transportation part of the journey is concerned. Because of the restricted nature of its undertaking with the public as evidenced by its agreement with shippers, we find that Weaver has failed to bring itself within the definition of a common carrier by water.

9 The “Terms and Conditions” may have been mistakenly used since it is noted that they refer to “said Puget Sound Alaska Van Lines, Inc.”, a party which is nowhere else referred to on the face of the “Bill of Lading” document headed “Weaver Bros.”
The Examiner found that Railway Express "assumes liability for the safe through transportation of the shipment." It is noted, however, that its "Uniform Through Export Bill of Lading" (Form 2100—(4–57)) in evidence contains, under the heading "Additional Provisions as to Transportation to be Performed Beyond the Boundaries of the United States" and after the statement "The terms and conditions of this Order Bill of Lading under which the shipment is accepted are printed on the back hereof", paragraph 10 therein which is on the back and reads as follows: "The company shall not be liable for any loss, damage, or delay in said shipments over ocean routes and their foreign connections, the destination of which is in a foreign country, occurring outside the boundaries of the United States, which may be occasioned by any such acts, ladings, laws, regulations, or customs. Claims for loss, damage, or delay must be made in writing to the carrier issuing this bill of lading or its agent within nine months after delivery of the property or in case of failure to make such delivery then within nine months and fifteen days after date of shipment; and claims so made shall be deemed to have been made against any carrier which may be liable hereunder. Suits shall be instituted only within two years and one day after the date when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof. Where claims are not so made, and or suits are not instituted thereon in accordance with the foregoing provisions, the carrier shall not be liable."

Unlike the Weaver Bros.' bill of lading terms which expressly create an agency relationship between the shipper and the ocean carrier for the water portions of the transit, Railway Express terms appear to make it a principal as far as the ocean carrier is concerned, but with a disclaimer of liability. The legal effect of such an obligation is not clear.

The Uniform Through Export Bill of Lading of Railway Express is also made "subject to Classification and Tariffs in effect on the date hereof." The "International Tariff No. 5–A" in the Exhibits, and filed with the Board, limits liability in Rule 13:

"Railway Express Agency will assume full common carrier liability from origin to destination in the amount of $50.00 for any shipment of 100 pounds or less, and 50¢ per pound for any shipment in excess of 100 pounds." Railway Express might, however, accept "the terms and conditions of the receipts or bills of lading of ocean carriers" involving a different liability.
We do not pass on the legality of these disclaimers of liability. Railway Express did not file a brief and the effect of these provisions was not explored. If the provisions are valid, Railway Express does not assume liability and would not be a common carrier by water under the Examiner's tests. But if Railway Express as a common carrier has liability imposed on it notwithstanding these provisions, then it may be a common carrier by water. In view of the unresolved status of Railway Express' liability to shippers on the over-the-water portion of the transportation which it handles, we are unable to come to any conclusion about the status of Railway Express as a common carrier by water. Until such a conclusion can be clearly reached based on an unequivocal assumption of liability to shippers or a showing of an imposition of liability by the courts, we conclude Railway Express is not a common carrier by water and its rate fixing agreement may not be received for filing. To permit further examination of the liability issue this proceeding is held open as to Railway Express, so that further proof, in the form of briefs or oral argument, may be received and considered by the Board. Upon completion of such a review a report will be issued as to Railway Express.

As regards the Examiner's recommended decision, we conclude, however, that the assumption or attempted assumption of liability should not be the sole test of common carrier by water status. Rather, the actual existence or imposition of liability is also a significant factor. Actual liability as a common carrier over the entire journey including the water portion is essential.

In the absence of exceptions by the remaining carriers excluded from being considered as common carriers by water, the recommended decision is adopted as to such carriers. All of the remaining respondents are classified as, and found to have the status of, common carriers by water as we interpret such term in the first section of the Act or as common carriers by water in intercoastal commerce as we interpret such term in the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933.

We conclude that a person or business association may be classified as a common carrier by water who holds himself out by the establishment and maintenance of tariffs, by advertisement and solicitation, and otherwise, to provide transportation for hire by water in interstate or foreign commerce, as defined in the Shipping Act, 1916; assumes responsibility or has liability imposed by law for the safe transportation of the shipments; and arranges in his
own name with underlying water carriers for the performance of such transportation, whether or not owning or controlling the means by which such transportation is effected, is a common carrier by water as defined in the Shipping Act, 1916.

One of the purposes of the proceeding was also to investigate the lawfulness of all agreements filed under Sec. 15 of the Act in which motor truck companies, freight forwarders, and express companies are parties thereto. This does not appear to be possible on the record before us since it includes only one agreement. To the extent that agreements are being filed,\textsuperscript{10} they are subject to review and approval or disapproval on a case by case basis pursuant to 46 CFR § 222.14. This procedure will be continued, and nothing herein shall affect any approval specifically granted heretofore by the Board.

\textsuperscript{10} Filing is required by Sec. 15 of the Act and implementing regulations contained in 46 CFR §§ 222.11—222.16.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 2nd day of March 1961

No. 815

COMMON CARRIERS BY WATER—STATUS OF EXPRESS COMPANIES, TRUCK LINES AND OTHER NON-VESSEL CARRIERS

This proceeding having been entered upon by the Board on its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report stating its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof.

It is ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued as to all respondents named herein except Railway Express Agency,

It is further ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, held open as to Railway Express Agency for a period of 30 days from the date hereof for the submission of such further proof as may be offered by Railway Express Agency to determine its status as a common carrier by water as defined in the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

By the Board.

6 F.M.B.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., granted written permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its vessel, the SS. MORMACSUN, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one eastbound intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products from United States North Pacific ports to United States Atlantic ports, commencing on or about April 2, 1961, since granting of the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation, operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade; and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

Ira L. Ewers, for applicant.
Donald Brunner, as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., filed an application for written permission under Section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1223) (the Act)¹ for its vessel, the SS. MORMACSUN, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one eastbound intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products commencing at United States North Pacific ports on or about April 2, 1961, for discharge at United States Atlantic ports.

¹ Section 805(a) is set forth in Appendix "A" attached hereto.
The application was duly noticed in the Federal Register of March 18, 1961, (26 F.R. 2324). Hearing was held on March 24, 1961. No parties intervened in opposition to the granting of the requested permission.

The testimony in this case shows that States Marine has cargo bookings of approximately 6¼ million feet of lumber and lumber products. States Marine has been unable to obtain any other suitable ship for an early April departure. This sailing, which is scheduled to commence shortly after loading on April 2, 1961, will not increase the normal pattern of scheduling in States Marine Lines, Inc. eastbound intercoastal service.

On this record it is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation, operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.
APPENDIX "A"

Section 805 (a):

It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters, or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, that if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations; and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 827

PHILIP R. CONSOLO

v.

FLOTA MERCANTE GRANCOLOMBIANA, S.A.

No. 827 (Sub. No. 1)

PHILIP R. CONSOLO

v.

FLOTA MERCANTE GRANCOLOMBIANA, S.A.

Decided March 28, 1961

Complainant found injured to the extent of $143,370.98 by respondent's refusal to allocate, between August 23, 1957 and July 12, 1959, refrigerated space on respondent's ships for the carriage of bananas from Ecuador to North Atlantic ports of the United States, and reparation in such amount is awarded.

Robert N. Kharasch and William J. Lippman for complainant, Philip R. Consolo.

Odell Kominers, Renato C. Giallorenzi and John H. Dougherty for respondent, Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOMAS E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

By an order on June 22, 1959 the Board ordered that the proceeding docketed as No. 827 be held open for further proceedings.
on the claim of the complainant, Philip R. Consolo (Consolo), for reparations, if any, (5 F.M.B. 633, 641) pursuant to Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act). The present proceedings are in response to a complaint to Docket No. 827 filed November 15, 1957 by Consolo requesting an order by the Board ordering Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A. (Flota) to pay reparation for damages during the period November 4, 1955 through November 4, 1957 in the amount of $600,000 and other relief and to a supplemental complaint filed November 18, 1959 (Docket No. 827, sub. No. 1) by Consolo requesting an order by the Board ordering Flota to pay reparation for damages during the period November 15, 1957 through September 1, 1959, in the sum of $250,000, and for other relief.

By its report and order of June 22, 1959, served July 2, 1959, in *Philip R. Consolo et al v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A.*, 5 F.M.B. 633 (1959) the Board found Flota to be a common carrier by water in the operation of ships between the west coast ports of South America and United States Atlantic ports and found Flota's practice of contracting all of its refrigerated space on its ships operating between Ecuador and ports on the North Atlantic coast of the United States to a single shipper to be unjustly discriminatory and unreasonably prejudicial in violation of the Act.

The further proceedings and hearing on the claim for reparations were had by an examiner who, on October 5, 1960, submitted a recommended decision that reparations were due in the amount of $259,812.26. Exceptions and replies thereto were filed. Oral argument before the Board was held on January 25, 1961.

II. FACTS

Consolo, an experienced and qualified shipper of bananas for many years between Ecuador and the United States was found to have proven his complaint that Flota's practice of excluding him was in violation of Secs. 14 and 16 of the Act. The Board's findings of fact, conclusions, decision and order on this phase of the proceedings were entered of record and reported in *Philip R. Consolo et al v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A.* (Supra).

In its report the Board found that Flota in the operation of its freight ships between Ecuador and the U.S. North Atlantic ports and U.S. Gulf of Mexico ports is a common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the U.S. (page 638). No date was established for the beginning of such status, but Flota was shown to have operated since July 20, 1955 between Ecuador and the U.S. on an
approximately weekly schedule with 5 ships and that it now operates 6 ships. Consolo did not use any of these ships until September 1, 1959.

Consolo first expressed an interest in space in the Spring of 1955 when he had a conference with Flota officers and “made inquiry as to the height of each chamber [for banana storage] and then the rate they were asking for the ships.” He inspected a ship later and found fault with the height of the storage chamber. Consolo was given figures as to what Flota “wanted for the ships in its entirety” (sic) but he asked for a reduced rate on the lower chamber or for the two upper chambers at the proposed rates. The counter offers were rejected. Other negotiations, for a contract by correspondence and by conversations in 1956 and 1957, did not result in a mutually acceptable arrangement. At no time before August 23, 1957 did Consolo ask for an allotment of space at a regular tariff rate, but accepted the prevalent trade custom of either bidding or negotiating for space on a contractual basis.

Consolo proved that he could have bought and sold 5,000 to 15,000 additional stems of bananas if Flota had allotted him space.

By a letter dated August 23, 1957, addressed to Flota at Bogata, Colombia, Consolo wrote asking “to be considered for a fair and reasonable amount” of space on Flota’s ships. The letter referred to our dockets Nos. 771 and 775 as the basis for this request. Flota’s reply dated October 7, 1957, was that “reefer space on our vessels has been committed for the next two years”.

By its order of June 22, 1959, served July 2, 1959, the Board ordered Flota “to cease and desist and to abstain from entering into, or continuing or performing any of the contracts, agreements, or understandings for the carriage of bananas, found herein to be in violation of sections 14 and 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916 as amended, not later than August 1, 1959.” Respondent was also ordered to offer, within 10 days after July 2, 1959, all qualified banana shippers refrigerated space for the carriage of bananas. No proofs were introduced in the present proceeding to show how this order was complied with. An allotment of space was made by Flota September 1, 1959, when Consolo was one of five qualified shippers who applied for and were allotted space.

III. DISCUSSION

Sec. 22 of the Act authorizes any person to file a sworn complaint “asking reparation for the injury, if any,” caused by any violation of the Act. Exclusion of complainant, Consolo, from the
use of Flota's common carrier service from Ecuador has been found to be a violation of the Act. Consolo filed a sworn complaint asking for reparations. An examiner conducted proceedings in which the issues were limited to ascertaining the period of injury and the computation of the amount due as damages for injury. The examiner recommended that complainant is entitled to reparation in the amount of $259,812.56 based on 105 voyages during the period August 23, 1957, to September 1, 1959, yielding a net profit of $779,436.78 of which Consolo was entitled to one-third.

In interpreting Sec. 22 in *R. Hernandez v. A. Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft* 1 U.S.M.C. 686 (1937) the U.S. Maritime Commission held that defendants unjustly discriminated against complainant in violation of paragraph Fourth of Sec. 14 of the Act by refusing to book cargo in response to applications by complainants for the transportation of automobiles. Complainant was shown to have exported unboxed automobiles by securing steamship booking and then purchasing the automobiles therefor. Complainant was also shown to have the ability to obtain automobiles for shipment. In some cases complainant also had small lots of automobiles available in New York ready to ship to Bilbao, Spain, before booking. Defendants were shown to have held themselves out as common carriers of unboxed automobiles from New York to Bilbao. Their ships were constructed to accommodate automobiles and capacity was available. The number of automobiles required to fulfill complainant's contract to sell to a dealer in Spain was shown. Complainant proved a loss of 15% profit on prospective shipments. Proximate injury was held to have been caused complainant because of his inability to supply automobiles pursuant to an agreement with the importer in Spain. The case was assigned further hearing to determine the amount of reparations due, in the absence of evidence (1) that all the cars upon which reparation was based could have been carried by defendants, (2) as to the amount of space which was available and, (3) as to the value of the cars which could have been carried in such available space.

In *Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein S., M.B.H.* 2 U.S.M.C. 62 (1939) the above elements were proven and reparations equal to the estimated net profits that would have been earned during the reparations period were established.

The defendants having failed to comply with the order, the appellant brought suit for enforcement pursuant to Sec. 30 of the Act. The defendants resisted enforcement on the ground that
(1) there was no basis for the plaintiff's claim and (2), it was plaintiff's duty to mitigate any damages. The District Court agreed in Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein S., M.B.H., 31 F. Supp. 76 (D.C.N.Y. 1940), but on appeal Circuit Court, reversed in 116 F. 2d 849, 851 (2nd Cir., 1941) stating that the District Court raised too high a standard on which to test the proof as to damages as found by the Commission. The Court held that where the Commission's findings "are supported by substantial evidence . . . and where no new evidence on the subject is introduced . . . it is the duty of the court to accept and give them effect". The duty of the court is equally that of the Board. The basis for plaintiff's claim was found to exist and the Court stated that the "burden to show a failure to mitigate the damages was upon the defendants".

In the reparation hearing in Waterman et al. v. Stockholms Rederiaktiebolag Svea et al., 3 F.M.B. 248 (1950), the Board found that the complainants had not sustained the burden of proof because of want of proof on "cost, outturn and selling price" but in so holding acknowledged that damages are to be based on the difference between cost and selling price, where there was a refusal to furnish refrigerated space to the complaining fruit shippers.

The Supreme Court has held that ordinarily "the measure of damages in such case [refusal to carry] is the difference between the value of the goods at the point of tender and their value at the proposed destination, less the cost of carriage." McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 49, 27 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1906). In accord are 9 Am. Jur. Carriers, § 314, 3 Hutchinson on Carriers (3rd Ed.) §§ 1359, 1370, 2 Moore on Carriers § 609, 13 C.J.S. Carriers, § 88, and see Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry Co., 124 F. 2d 952, 958 (8th Cir., 1942).

In the present case proof of damages meeting the specific standards of cost, outturn and selling price was offered in detail. Witnesses were agreed on the availability of bananas in Ecuador and the existence of a market for them in the United States. Consolo was shown to have the resources to buy and ship bananas. The loading sheets showing actual purchases and the outturn sheets showing actual sales and "liquidation sheets" (report of commission merchant to importer showing proceeds of sale, expenses, commission and net proceeds) were used, for each shipment of bananas by Consolo on Grace Line ships during the reparation period. The space that would have been used on Flota
ships at Flota's freight rates during the reparation period was shown. Costs in Ecuador were taken from actual loading sheets showing actual purchases week-by-week. Freight charges were supplied from Flota's records of actual freight collected on its voyages during the reparation period. Stevedoring costs came from testimony of banana shippers as to actual costs at New York. We find the figures used in the reparation computation to be fully supported in the record. The computation itself, using the above data, established a dollar figure for profit or loss per banana stem shipped before stevedoring and freight. From the amount of profit per voyage the freight stevedoring and incidental administrative overhead and other expenses have been deducted. The examiner's conclusions were based on these fully documented facts.

Consolo excepted to the examiner's recommendation that the reparation period did not begin until August 23, 1957, and to the failure to recommend that Consolo be awarded reparation for the period November 15, 1955, through September 1959 inclusive. Consolo also excepted to an error in computing damages within the period August 23, 1957, to September 1, 1959, on the ground that the deduction from profit for stevedoring costs should be the cost for stevedoring in Philadelphia instead of New York. The New York costs were shown to be 48.8 cents per stem whereas the actual Philadelphia costs were later shown to be 35.15 cents per stem.

Flota excepted to the following:
1. The Examiner's ultimate recommendation.
2. The Examiner's failure to recognize that the Board's decision of June 22, 1959 did not purport to determine liability for the period prior thereto.
3. The incompleteness of the Examiner's findings as to the facts and circumstances confronting Flota prior to and during the period for which reparations are sought, and to his failure to consider and make complete findings thereon, as contained in Flota's opening brief on reparations, and in the present brief; and his failure to find that in light of such circumstances Flota's actions were completely reasonable and violated no provision of the Act, and no obligation to Consolo.
4. The Examiner's failure to find that in any event award of reparations would be inequitable and unjust, and for that reason should be denied.
5. The Examiner's inclusion of voyages subsequent to the Board's report of June 22, 1959, in calculating reparations, and to his failure to find that Flota acted promptly thereafter to comply with the Board's order, and therefore incurred no liability during that period.

6. The Examiner's failure to find that the burden of proof upon all issues was upon Consolo, including the alleged violation prior to compliance with the Board's order of June 22, 1959; the alleged injury to Consolo during the period; and the extent of any such injury; and to his failure to impose that burden on Consolo.

7. The Examiner's failure to find that the record proves there was no injury to Consolo and that Consolo's claim of injury is not bona fide.

8. The Examiner's failure to find that Consolo's claimed losses are speculative.

9. The application by the Examiner of an incorrect measure of damages.

10. The Examiner's incorrect computation of reparations, including his arbitrary allocation to Consolo of one third of Flota's space, for calculation purposes; his failure to appreciate the significance of the 18.46 percent figure representing the allocation to Consolo following the Board's order of June 22, 1959.

11. The Examiner's failure to hold that Consolo is not the proper party complainant.

12. The Examiner's conclusion that Consolo could not have minimized his damages, if any, by utilizing other available transportation, including specifically Grace Line, Chilean Line, and chartered vessels.

13. The recommended award of interest on reparations.

14. The Examiner's subsidiary findings, or the possible implications therefrom, inconsistent with the foregoing exceptions, listing certain findings of fact.

15. The Examiner's failure to find that the renewal of Panama Ecuador's (Panama-Ecuador Shipping Corporation, exclusive shipper on Flota's ships) contract in 1957 was based upon an option contained in the 1955 contract between Flota and Panama Ecuador, and upon Flota's action determining that Panama Ecuador's bid was the most favorable to it, all of which occurred prior to the Board's decision in Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line Inc., 5 F.M.B. 278 (1957).

16. The Examiner's failure to find that there was no significant competition between Consolo and Panama Ecuador.
17. The method of ascertaining damages employed by the Examiner.

18. The Examiner's failure to make subsidiary findings as to the components of the recommended $259,812.26 reparations.

19. The Examiner's failure to enter findings in accordance with the facts recited by Flota in its opening brief on reparations.

The arguments supporting the exceptions are essentially (1) that the Board did not, in Philip R. Consolo et al v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, supra, find Flota guilty of violating the Act before June 22, 1959; (2) that in contracting all of its refrigerated space for bananas to a single shipper before then, Flota acted legally; (3) that the failure of the Board or the Board's staff, prior to June 22, 1959, to give Flota a legal opinion, in response to a petition for declaratory relief, as to the validity of Flota's exclusive patronage contract prevents the Board from considering Flota as having acted wrongfully; (4) that the complaint and request for the losses are speculative, the claim for reparation is not bona fide and the burden of proving loss has not been sustained; and, (5) the damages were incorrectly measured and computed and interest should not be added.

For the reasons given below, we agree in part only with the respondent's exceptions as to the computation of reparations and to the award of interest on reparations. The remaining exceptions are rejected. Exceptions and proposed findings not discussed in this report nor reflected in our findings have been considered and found not justified.

The first and thirteenth exceptions refer to the award of interest on reparations. We find that it would be inequitable to award interest on an unliquidated claim before it was due and disallow any interest on the award herein.

In exception two respondent argues that it acted reasonably and did not unjustly, unfairly or unreasonably discriminate against Consolo and therefore did not violate any statute during the period before the Board's order of June 22, 1959. In exception three the incompleteness of the findings is averred and in exception four failure to find inequity in an award is excepted to. Our report in 5 F.M.B. 633 has already held that in the past "Flota has acted in violation of Secs. 14, Fourth and 16 of the Act." (639). The facts and circumstances omitted all relate to more arguments that Flota did not violate the Act before June 22, 1959. Such facts and the issues they raise have already been considered and decided in the first proceeding and are not appropriate sub-
jects for exceptions in the reparations phase of this docket. The examiner properly did not review these facts nor retry the issues they raise. The previous report on these issues is plain and is final as far as the Board is concerned. The only remaining issue was the measure of the reparation Consolo is entitled to under Sec. 22 of the Act. Facts bearing on this issue alone were all the examiner was required to consider.

The exceptions are also based on the argument that because Flota had contracted all of its space to another single shipper during the period involved reparations would be inequitable and unjust and the inclusion of voyages before June 22, 1959, when the favored shipper's contract was still being performed, was not proper. This argument, too, uses the erroneous premise that performance of the exclusive patronage contract, during a time when Flota unjustly discriminated against a shipper in the matter of cargo space and gave undue and unreasonable preference or advantage to particular persons, was a valid excuse for non-performance of obligations under Secs. 14 and 16 of the Act. The performance of the contract is the very act which constitutes the violation of such sections. We have held that such conduct was improper in the following words: "It is . . . clear that they (Consolo and Banana Distributors, Inc.) were deniedreefer space accommodations by Flota, to their prejudice and disadvantage, and that Panama Ecuador, in receiving and using that space, was favored and advantaged. We find no justification for this conduct on the part of Flota and conclude that in denying reefer space accommodations to complainants, and in granting that space to a single favored shipper, Flota has acted in violation of Secs. 14, Fourth and 16 of the Act." Philip R. Consolo et al v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, supra, at 638. In other words, as long as the contract caused the denial of space there was a violation. The violation did not begin June 22, 1959, but long before this. There can be no question of inequity or unjustness to a respondent who violates the Act by means of an exclusionary contract. It is the excluded shipper who has the equities on his side under the Act, not the favored shipper nor the discriminatory and preference-giving carrier.

One of the arguments advanced to prove absence of fault in failing to offer non-discriminatory and non-preferential service was (1) that Flota had filed a petition for declaratory relief (Docket No. 835, decided in Philip R. Consolo et al v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 5 F.M.B. 633 (1959)) asking the
Board to determine the validity of Flota’s contracts and to terminate the uncertainty that had arisen as a result of the conflicting demands upon Flota following the decision in *Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line Inc.* 5 F.M.B. 278 and 5 F.M.B. 615 (1959) and, (2) that the Board failed to make a timely response thereto. It was not incumbent on the Board, however, to give Flota a legal opinion on the effect of its conduct on shippers. The demands were conflicting only to the extent that Flota made them so by continuing to serve favored shippers. The subsequent uncertainty was the consequence of Flota’s own position that it could continue to contract refrigerated space to preferred shippers and to exclude complainants without violating the Act as was contended in *Grace Line Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board*, 280 F. 2d 790 (2nd Cir., 1960). In *Philip R. Consolo v. Grace Line, Inc.*, 4 F.M.B. 293 (1953) and *Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc.*, 5 F.M.B. 278 (1957) the Board decided that Grace Line, Inc. was a common carrier by water under sufficiently similar facts as to lead the Board to state in the present case (5 F.M.B. 633) that what we said in the *Banana Distributors* case “is appropriate here, and we feel is dispositive of the issues in this proceeding”. Instead of accepting the *Grace Line* cases as providing a rule for its guidance, Flota refused to offer service and litigated the issues relying on “arguments relating to the differences between Flota’s vessels and Grace’s vessels” (635) to justify such refusal. Flota was eventually found to have violated Secs. 14, Fourth, and 16 of the Act. No delay converted its past violations into lawful conduct and Flota must take the consequences of its refusal, (it became a common carrier in 1955) to take Consolo’s cargo after Consolo asked for non-preferential service in 1957. Common carrier status is not created by nor are violations of the Act non-existent until the Board’s report is served. Both are brought about by Flota’s own actions beginning in 1955.

The 5th exception relates to the inclusion in the reparations calculations, of voyages after June 22, 1959, which is the date our decision in No. 827 was made. The examiner extended the damage period to September 1, 1959, when Consolo was actually allotted space in response to the Board’s order served on July 2, 1959. Respondents were ordered, within 10 days after the date of service of the order, to offer refrigerated space for the carriage of bananas on its ships to all qualified banana shippers. Flota made no offers between June 22 and July 12, 1959, but we have no reason to doubt that Flota would have offered space on July 12 if bananas
had been tendered in Guayaquil at that time. None were tendered before then, as far as this record shows. No shipments were ready until September, but this does not furnish a reason for extending the damage period beyond the date when the Board's order should have been complied with, in the absence of any offer of proof by complainant of a refusal, after July 12, 1959, and in the absence of proof of its own willingness to ship, nor of a tender of cargo. The damage period should not be extended to the time when the complainant shipper was ready to provide a cargo, but is limited to voyages departing from Guayaquil through July 12, 1959, the date when compliance should have begun. Cf. Swift & Company and Swift and Company Packers v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana SS Conference et al, Docket No. 854 Decided February 2, 1961.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth exceptions all concern the proofs of injury offered by complainant and allege a failure to maintain the burden of proof or to show actual damage. The burden of proof was maintained by extensive testimony and exhibits showing availability of bananas, cost, selling price (226 quotations over a period of four years were shown) and freight, stevedoring and other expenses as noted above. The actual damages were shown to be a proximate result of violations of the statute. Waterman v. Stockholms Rederiaktiebolag Svea et al., 3 F.M.B. 248, 249 (1950). The losses shown were not speculative, but fairly inferable from the data supplied and testimony of witnesses that complainant would have shipped on Flota ships if he had not been excluded.

The ninth, tenth and seventeenth exceptions deal with the method of measuring and computing the damages. The examiner began the measure of damages from August 23, 1957, instead of 1955 as claimed. We agree with the examiner's date and with the finding that Consolo's offers and counter-offers for service before then were for contract carriage and not for space on a non-preferential basis. He was not excluded before then because he never sought an allocation of space on an equal basis with other shippers; rather, Flota's facilities or charges for services were not acceptable to the complainant on complainant's terms. These negotiations may not be translated into requests for a non-preferential allocation of space on a common carrier by water. What Flota refused during this period was the demand for a special contract which would make Consolo a favored shipper too.

The examiner found Consolo entitled to one-third of Flota's space based on the fact that complainant was one of three qualified applicants for space. Other applicants were declared to be
unqualified. When space was finally allocated five shippers actually qualified and measurement by Flota's technical adviser showed that in actual practice over a period of time there had been an allotment to, and use by, Consolo of 18.46% of the cubic capacity of Flota's ships on the U.S. Atlantic run. This actual experience with Flota appears to be a just and reasonable guide of what Consolo was entitled to for the purpose of measuring his past damages and it is adopted. Respondent's exception on this point is valid.

The eleventh exception is found unsupported.

The twelfth exception deals with complainant's failure to minimize damages by using other means of transportation. Once the failure to perform common carrier obligations and exclusion is shown, "the burden to show a failure to mitigate the damages was upon the defendants". Hernandez v. Bernstein, 116 F. 2d 849, 851, 852 (2nd Cir., 1941). Flota offered no such proof other than a suggestion that chartered ships might be used, but no suitable ones were shown to be available. Respondents have failed to show any mitigating factors.

Exception fourteen relates to the examiner's subsidiary findings of fact on which the award of reparations is based. None is shown to be wrong, and all have been fully established in this docket.

The fifteenth exception likewise assumes the untenable premise that discriminatory and perferential conduct did not exist until after the Board's decision on Consolo's complaint against Flota, and that the contract which caused such conduct excused the disregard of statutory obligations.

The sixteenth exception is unsupported by the record.

The eighteenth and nineteenth exceptions relate to the ascertain-ment of damages. Complainant submitted extensive evidence of lost profits in the form of schedules of about 226 individual voyages between 1955 and 1959 showing for each voyage the number of banana stems actually carried by named ships on specified dates between Guayaquil, Ecuador, and Philadelphia, Penna. (with the exception of two ships which discharged at Charleston, S.C., and Baltimore, Md., respectively because of a strike at Philadelphia, Penna.) In the absence of other proven data and of any disproof of the complainant's data or challenge of complainant's figures, such data and figures have been used in the computation of reparations found to be due.

The complainant's profit per stem of bananas is the difference in cost at Guayaquil and the value or sale price at Philadelphia which is taken to be the total gross profit per stem. This amount
has been multiplied by the number of stems on each shipment and the products added to get the gross profit. From such total gross profit there has been deducted (1) the total freight cost and (2) the total estimated cost of handling the bananas at Philadelphia. The latter amount is 50.15 cents a stem (35.15¢ for stevedoring, plus 3¢ for overhead, plus 12¢ for insecticides, rope and bags) multiplied by 1,061,286 stems carried during the reparation period. Complainant did not show the 3¢ a stem deduction for overhead in its claim, but this amount was deducted by the examiner with the subsequent admission by the complainant that it was a proper amount. The examiner's computation was also based upon the use of New York instead of Philadelphia stevedoring costs and omitted the deduction of the estimated incidental costs of handling bananas at Philadelphia in the amount of 12 cents. The latter figure was also furnished by complainant.

Based upon the shipment of 1,061,286 stems of bananas on 98 voyages between August 23, 1957, and July 12, 1959, the use of the complainant’s statement of profits per voyage totaling $2,513,236.43 on all voyages allowed, and the subtraction therefrom of total freight in the amount of $1,204,343.95 and incidental costs in the amount of $532,234.93, as proven by complainant, we find the remainder is the proper net profit of $776,657.55. Consolo is entitled to 18.46% of the net profit. An award is hereby made and shall be paid to complainant Philip R. Consolo of 4425 North Michigan Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, on or before 60 days from the date hereof, in the amount of $143,370.98, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on any amounts unpaid after 60 days, as reparation for the injury caused by respondent's violation of Secs. 14 and 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

6 F.M.B.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 28th day of March, 1961.

NOS. 827 & 827 (SUB-1)

PHILIP R. CONSOLO

v.

FLOTA MERCANTE GRANCOLOMBIANA, S.A.

This proceeding being at issue upon complaint and answer on file, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered a report stating its findings of fact, conclusions and decisions thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof;

It is Ordered, That respondent Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. be, and it is hereby notified and directed to pay unto complainant Philip R. Consolo of 4425 North Michigan Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, on or before 60 days from the date hereof, $143,370.98, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on any amounts unpaid after 60 days, as reparation for the injury caused by respondent's violation of Secs. 14 and 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.
The Oceanic Steamship Company should be granted written permission under Section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, to permit its parent company, Matson Navigation Company, to charter the latter's owned SS HAWAIIAN BANKER to Pope & Talbot, Inc., for a period of from 2 to 4 months for operation in the intercoastal service, such charter period to commence on or about April 1, 1961, since granting of such permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

Willis R. Deming and Alvin J. Rockwell for applicant.

J. Alton Boyer for Pope & Talbot, Inc.

Richard W. Kurrus for Isbrandtsen Company, intervener.

Sterling F. Stoudenmire, Jr. for Waterman Steamship Corporation, intervener.

William Jarrel Smith as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

THOS. E. STAKEM, Maritime Administrator

The Oceanic Steamship Company filed an application for written permission under Section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1223), to permit its parent company, Matson Navigation Company, to charter its owned C2-type ship the SS HAWAIIAN BANKER to Pope & Talbot, Inc., for operation in the Intercoastal Service for a period of
from 2 to 4 months, such charter period to commence on or about April 1, 1961. The application was duly noticed in the Federal Register of March 24, 1961, (26 F.R. 2536). Waterman Steamship Corporation (Waterman) and Isbrandtsen Company, Inc. (Isbrandtsen) intervened in opposition to the granting of the requested permission and hearing was held on March 30, 1961. Subsequent to the hearing Isbrandtsen Company withdrew its opposition to the granting of the permission.

The Administrator on March 31, 1961 also received a communication from Waterman waiving its right to file exceptions and stating that Waterman will not object to the initial decision becoming final. In view of these cited circumstances the examiner's initial decision is hereby adopted as the decision of the Administrator.

This report will constitute the written permission required.

6 M.A.
Service already provided by vessels of United States registry from East Gulf ports other than Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande is inadequate, and in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, additional vessels should be operated in service between these ports and East Coast U.K./Continent. Section 605(c) of said Act is no bar to granting of applications of Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., and Bloomfield Steamship Company for extension of service in said trade.

John Mason and Andrew A. Normandeau for Applicant Bloomfield Steamship Company.

Walter Carroll and Odell Kominers for Applicant Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.

M. C. Cunningham and L. A. Parish for Intervener Alabama State Docks Department.

Sterling F. Stoudenmire, Jr., for Intervener Waterman Steamship Corporation.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS.

By letter dated July 19, 1955, Lykes Bros. SS Co., Inc. (Lykes) applied for permission to provide service from East Gulf (Gulf of 278
Mexico) Ports (Port St. Joe/Gulfport Range, both inclusive) to the East Coast United Kingdom and Continent and in the event the application is approved, requested an addendum to its Operating Differential Subsidy Agreement to cover the extension of its B–2 Service to include East Gulf Ports in the loading and discharging area for its Line B–2 ships. By letter dated June 26, 1958, Lykes amended its application to request that the United States area on Lykes’ Line B–2 (Trade Route 21, Freight Service No. 2) be described as “Between United States Gulf ports (Key West-Mexican Border)”.

By letter dated August 11, 1955, Bloomfield SS Co. (Bloomfield) stated that it was “willing to undertake 8 sailings a year serving the East Gulf if the other subsidized operator . . . will furnish 16 sailings for East Gulf ports and will in the future comply . . . with subsidy contract requirements by coordinating its sailings with ours.” By letter dated September 23, 1955, Bloomfield expressed its belief that the port of Mobile “is not being furnished adequate service.” By letter dated October 13, 1955, the letter of application was supplemented “by asking that our request for an increase in our annual subsidized sailings . . . be acted upon independently of our intention to serve Mobile . . .”

Waterman SS Corp. (Waterman) and the Alabama State Docks (State Docks) intervened. Hearings were held and briefs filed, followed by a recommended decision by an Examiner served December 23, 1960. Exceptions and replies have been filed. Oral argument was scheduled for March 21, 1961, when the parties appeared and waived argument.

II. FACTS

Trade Route No. 21-U.S. Gulf/United Kingdom and Continent covers service between ports in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico ports from Key West, Florida, to the Mexican border and ports in the United Kingdom, Eire and Continental Europe North of Portugal. The Administrator determined that U.S. flag sailing requirements on Trade Route No. 21 are 13 to 15 per month. One to two sailings are on Service No. 1 to the west coast of the United Kingdom, and Eire and 12 to 13 sailings are on Service No. 2 to the East Coast United Kingdom and Continental Europe North of Portugal. It has been found that the C–2 ships now operated on this route are suitable and efficient ships for operation on Trade Route 21 and that 26 to 30 freighters of this type are required to provide adequate U.S. flag service. The primary U.S. flag operators on this
route are Bloomfield, Lykes, Waterman and States Marine Lines, Inc. (States Marine). Lykes is a party to an Operating Differential Subsidy Agreement with the U.S. (Contract No. FMB 59) which authorizes service on Route 21 (a) "between U.S. Gulf ports (Key West-Mexican Border) and ports on the west coast of the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) and Ireland (Republic of) with the privilege of calling at ports in the West Indies and on the east coast of Mexico"; (b) "between U.S. Gulf ports (west of but not including Gulfport, Miss.) and ports on the east coast of the United Kingdom and Continental Europe" with permissive calls at Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande, Fla.

Bloomfield is a party to an Operating Differential Subsidy Agreement with the U.S. (Contract No. FMB 27) which authorizes service on Trade Route 21 "between a U.S. Gulf Port or ports (west of but not including Gulfport, Miss.) and a port or ports on the East Coast of the United Kingdom and/or a port or ports in Continental Europe (north of but not including Bordeaux) including Baltic and Scandinavian ports, with the privilege of calling at Tampa, Port Tampa, Boca Grande and ports in the West Indies and Mexico."

East Gulf Ports are Mobile, Ala., Gulfport and Pascagoula, Miss. and Pensacola, Panama City, Tampa, Boca Grande and Port Tampa, Fla. These ports are not involved since applicant Lykes may now make permissive calls at such ports and applicant Bloomfield has the privilege of calling at such ports pursuant to their respective operating differential subsidy contracts. At the present time neither applicant furnishes regular subsidized service to the other East Gulf Ports. The ports of Mobile, Ala., Gulfport and Pascagoula, Miss. and Pensacola and Panama City, Florida are the subjects of these applications.

At the present time Waterman and States Marine also operate on Route 21, but without operating differential subsidy contracts.

Waterman, the intervenor, currently makes regular calls at Mobile, Ala. and Tampa, Fla. Since 1954 it has averaged approximately 32 sailings annually. It called at Mobile outbound an average of 22 times per year during the period 1954 through first half of 1958; at Panama City 6.5 times per year, and at Pensacola once in 1954. Between July 1949 and July 1957, it provided no service from the Gulf to United Kingdom ports, chartered vessels to other operators on numerous occasions, and resigned from the Gulf/U.K. Conference in 1950, rejoining in 1957 after its subsidy application was filed. In 1957, States Marine had a sailing from
the Gulf to Antwerp and Bremerhaven approximately every two months. Its service since, if any, is not of record.

There are eleven foreign-flag lines (ten if two lines providing joint service are counted as one) operating on Trade Route 21, each of which serves both East Gulf and West Gulf ports, the latter predominantly. Four of these lines call regularly at East Gulf ports other than Tampa, and principally at Mobile, Ala. Foreign-flag lines serving Mobile provided twice as many sailings as U.S.-flag vessels (1958-1959), and carried four times as much liner commercial cargo outbound and inbound (1953-1958). There is only one U.S.-flag line, Waterman, operating in the East Gulf (except the privilege ports).

Commercial cargoes carried in liner service between the East Gulf ports (excluding Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande) and Continental Europe north of Portugal to the Danish border and including the English coast and channel ports for the years 1953-1958 (provided almost exclusively by Waterman), was a total average of 24.88 percent outbound, and 37.11 percent inbound. Phosphate rock is the principal export from the excluded ports. From the excluded ports, which originate about 70 percent of all liner cargo from East Gulf ports and which are served by Lykes but not by Bloomfield, the total average U.S. flag participation between 1953 and 1958 was 61.27 percent outbound, and 29.61 percent inbound. From the entire East Gulf, including Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande, U.S.-flag participation was 51.17 percent outbound and 32.38 percent inbound during the 1953-1958 period. Participation in the outbound movement dropped from 51.15 percent in 1957 to 34.97 percent in 1958 when Lykes curtailed its calls at Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande.

The free space (i.e., not utilized) during the period 1957-1959 of Lykes and Bloomfield averaged approximately 6 percent of cubic capacity. Waterman, in 1959, had deadweight capacity for an additional 66,000 tons of cargo, and utilized 69 percent of its cubic capacity.

The records showed that outbound liner tonnage from East Gulf Ports to the East Coast of the United Kingdom and to the Continent had increased from 339,470 long tons in 1955 to 465,103 long tons in 1957, with a setback in 1958 to 393,586 long tons. Liner carriage of bulk commodities influences this traffic.

American flag participation in bulk cargo carriage is very small in comparison with foreign flag participation. In 1957 U.S. flag
ships carried 25,474 tons while foreign ships carried 74,561 tons. Defense cargo is a very small part of total outbound tonnage.

Factual data in exhibits prepared by the Maritime Administration Staff showed U.S. flag carriage in liner commercial traffic at East Gulf ports inbound declining from 42.93 percent in 1953 to 20.26 percent in 1958 and outbound declining from 52.65 percent in 1953 to 34.97 percent in 1958 after reaching a high outbound of 60.71 percent in 1954, and 60.85 percent in 1955. A comparison of inbound and outbound tonnage shows that exports exceed imports by a 3 to 1 ratio.

For the East Gulf trade U.S. flag-liner participation for the six years of record (1953-1958) exceeded 50% in all but two years (1956 and 1958). U.S. flag participation averaged more than 50% outbound during the entire period. Cargo carried between East Gulf ports (excluding Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande) and Europe by U.S. flag liners has been well below 50% outbound and except for 1954 below 50% inbound during such six years.

The decline in U.S. flag participation on the entire route is explained to some extent by the fact that Lykes curtailed its phosphate movement from Tampa (the largest traffic generating port and the commodity providing the largest tonnage making up the statistics). Lykes also reduced its calls at Tampa for loading of the predominant commodity available to liners on the East Gulf coast; because the rates were not attractive for carrying phosphate rock. Lykes was responsible in part for the decline in U.S. flag liner participation figures or percentages for the route as a whole.

With regard to the ports which may be served, the following additional specific facts are found:

**Mobile**—Waterman concedes that U.S. flag service to Mobile is inadequate. Mobile is the most important port on the East Gulf as far as general cargo is concerned. U.S. flag carriage of outbound general cargo at Mobile declined from 48% in 1953 to 18% in 1958.

**Gulfport**—Witnesses testified as to industrial growth in this city, as offering prospects for added service.

**Panama City**—In 1958 approximately 32,000 tons of cargo moved outbound compared with only 4,800 tons for all other East Gulf ports except Mobile and Tampa. For the years 1953-1958 U.S. flag participation outbound was 53%, in 1958 U.S. flag participation was 52% in liner commercial cargo. There is an expanding paper mill industry at Panama City.
**Pascagoula**—There are fertilizer and chemical plants at this city. The traffic director of Lykes testified they have had general requests from this port regarding inauguration of service with respect to these plants. This testimony is somewhat supported by other testimony that cargo figures for the route have been better in the last 6 months of record.

### III. DISCUSSION

We recently found service on Trade Route No. 21 is inadequate and in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of the Act additional ships should be operated thereon. *Waterman Steamship Corp. Application for Operating Differential Subsidy (Sec. 605(c) Issues Only)* 5 FMB 771 (1960).

Since the present proceeding applies only to the East Gulf portion of Trade Route No. 21, the issues in this proceeding will be to determine if there is any inadequacy at the present time on such route particularly at the East Gulf ports.

The Lykes-Bloomfield applications request additions to existing service on a route serviced by intervenors, Waterman and by States Marine, citizens of the U.S. using vessels of U.S. registry and request amendments to applicants' operating differential subsidy contracts for such purpose.

Section 605(c) of the Act provides that "no contract shall be made under this title [Title VI—Operating Differential Subsidy] with respect to vessel to be operated on a service, route, or line served by citizens of the U.S. which would be in addition to the existing service, or services, unless the Commission [Board] shall determine after proper hearing of all parties that the service already provided by vessels of United States registry in such service, route, or line is inadequate, and that in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of this Act additional vessels should be operated thereon; . . ."

In *Bloomfield Steamship Company—Subsidy Routes 13 and 21*, 4 F.M.B. 305, 317-318 (1953), the Board stated that:

the adequacy of services under consideration in section 605(c) is adequacy of berth or liner service on the particular trade route in question. What may be considered adequate United States-flag service on one route may be quite inadequate on another. The standard of adequacy must be consistent with the realities of each particular route and with the purposes of the Act. . . . [T]he United States-flag service [on Trade Route 21] must be deemed inadequate unless dependable United States-flag liner sailings are available sufficient to carry at least one-half of the outbound commercial cargo that may be expected to move in liner service.
Past inadequacy on the route has been demonstrated by the fact that American-flag ships carried approximately 25% of the outbound and 37% inbound commercial cargo from the ports in issue and that only Waterman has operated on this portion of Route No. 21 according to schedules prepared by the Maritime Administration staff and put in the record. American flag participation on the route has also declined recently. Applicants propose to call at East Gulf ports with available space on their ships. An increase of available space on American-flag ships will give these East Gulf ports the benefit of more adequate service. Witnesses testified that exports on liners should increase moderately over the next few years and have already increased somewhat since 1958, the last year for which figures are available.

"The most valuable guide to measure adequacy of service in the future is necessarily adequacy of service in the past, modified to such extent as may appear justified by the best available judgment as to what the future may have in store." Bloomfield SS Co. —Subsidy, Routes 13 (1) and 21 (5) 4 F.M.B. 305 (1953).

The record shows that American flag carriers are not the principal carriers of exports any longer in this area. If there is to be an increase, American flag ships should be available to share in the development. The future increases, while inevitably speculative, seem to be based on tangible factors of industrial expansion supported by some shipper demand for present service.

The above is consistent with the examiner's decision with which we concur.

The intervenor, Waterman, has excepted to the following findings in the recommended decision of the examiner:

1. that there are 11 foreign-flag lines operating on Trade Route 21 each of which serves both East Gulf and West Gulf ports;

2. that support for Lykes East Gulf service comes from George H. MacFadden Bros. for a service from Mobile to French ports and Military Sea Transportation Service for the entire Lykes application;

3. that there should be an increase in the future in traffic from East Gulf areas;

4. that Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande should not be included in determining adequacy or inadequacy of service for the East Gulf;

5. that applicants would have sufficient free space for additional service to and from East Gulf ports;
6. that U.S. flag service from East Gulf ports other than Tampa, Port Tampa and Boca Grande is inadequate and that additional vessels should be operated in the service between said ports and East Coast United Kingdom/Continent in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of the act; and,

7. that Sec. 605 (c) is not a bar to the granting of the applications involved in this proceeding.

Waterman also excepted to the failure to find the U.S.-flag service at Panama City is adequate.

The first exception involved no material facts since it depends on the method of counting the number of lines in this service. Moreover, the presence of American-flag vessels on the route is the determinative factor for showing adequacy or inadequacy of service, not foreign lines.

The second exception is supported by an allegation that supporting letters were admitted in evidence instead of direct testimony and that the letters are hearsay evidence. Administrative agencies customarily accept letters of this type.

The third exception is also a contention that the testimony of Lykes' witness as to expansion of industrial activity is hearsay. The Examiner gave this appropriate weight along with other evidence.

The fourth exception protested the exclusion of three of the Florida ports in considering inadequacy. Lykes and Bloomfield currently have authority to call at these ports as well as other ports on Trade Route No. 21. Under such circumstance we hold that adequacy of U.S. flag service should be co-extensive with the service proposed.

The fifth, sixth and seventh exceptions either repeat prior exceptions or involve matters covered in the opening reply briefs. In any event, the Examiner found persuasive evidence that Lykes has sufficient space for the proposed service, and that both Lykes and Bloomfield proposed to serve an existing inadequacy.

The final exception is essentially to the Examiner's formula for determining inadequacy of service to the East Gulf ports in question and is a claim that adequacy should be examined port by port. Since inadequacy of service to all the remaining East Gulf ports is in issue it is concluded that the Examiner properly determined the issue on the only relevant basis which was the application itself. Panama City need not be considered alone, but as a part of the remaining range of ports in the East Gulf area. In American President Lines—Calls, Round the World Service, 4 F.M.B.
681 (1955) applicants served New York and Boston within the East Coast Range and proposed to call at other ports within the range. The Board held that adequacy was to be considered in conjunction with the applicant's proposed service and excluded cargo data applicable to New York and Boston. The Board found there was inadequacy of service at the remaining ports of Philadelphia, Baltimore and Hampton Roads. The situation is similar to this one.

The finding of inadequacy by inference answers affirmatively the issue of whether in the accomplishment of the purposes and policy of the Act additional ships should be operated in the service in question and disposes of any question of undue prejudice against the existing operator. We conclude that Sec. 605 (c) is no bar to the granting of the applications in question for extension of service in said trade.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 815

COMMON CARRIERS BY WATER—STATUS OF EXPRESS COMPANIES, TRUCK LINES AND OTHER NON-VESSEL CARRIERS

Decided June 1, 1961


SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

The Federal Maritime Board on March 2, 1961 decided that certain trucking companies, freight forwarders and express companies might be classified as common carriers by water pursuant to the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act) and to the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended (Intercoastal Act). Two of the respondents, Railway Express Agency, Inc. (Railway Express) and Weaver Bros. Inc. (Weaver) were found not to be classifiable as common carriers by water.

The proceeding was held open as to Railway Express so that further proofs in the form of briefs or oral argument might be received and considered by the Board. Railway Express submitted, on April 3, 1961, a petition for reconsideration of our order of March 2 in relation to its status as a common carrier by water and incorporated therein a supplement to “Official Express Classification 36 containing ratings, rules and regulations applying on express traffic covered by tariffs issued subject thereto” (Supplement 23) issued August 19, 1960 and effective September 26, 1960 and the Board was also informed that the Railway Express Agency “Uniform Through Export Bill of Lading, Form
2100" had been revised effective May 1, 1960. Both documents show that Railway Express assumes full common carrier liability from origin to destination based on the value of property shipped as declared by the shipper and certain limitations on liability contained in the bill of lading placed in evidence in the original proceeding have been eliminated. Based on the above-filed documents, we find that effective May 2, 1961 respondent Railway Express is included within the classification of motor carriers, freight forwarders and express companies which are "common carriers by water" within the meaning of such term in the first section of the Act.

Weaver submitted a late filed motion for leave to file a petition for reopening under the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure. At the same time and without waiting for leave to be granted, a petition was filed "For Reopening, For Leave to Supplement the Record and For Reconsideration." We hereby accept the petition. The petition is in the form of a brief containing arguments and exhibits showing that Weaver may be a common carrier by water within the Board's test. The principal exhibits are revised pages of Weaver's tariff, modifying Weaver's bill of lading form effective April 28, 1961, to eliminate the provisions of disclaimer of liability that were held to preclude Weaver from being a common carrier by water. Based on the above-filed documents, we find that effective May 2, 1961 respondent Weaver is included within the classification of motor carriers, freight forwarders and express companies which are "common carriers by water" within the meaning of such term in the first section of the Act.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 868

MISCLASSIFICATION OF DIATOMACEOUS OR INFUSORIAL EARTH AS SILICA

Decided June 1, 1961

Shipper and forwarder respondents found not to have knowingly and willfully by means of false classification obtained transportation by water for diatomaceous silica from New Orleans, La. to European and South African destinations at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

Carrier respondents found not to have allowed shippers and forwarders to obtain transportation for diatomaceous silica from New Orleans, La. to European and South African destinations at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carriers by means of false classification in violation of the second paragraph of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

James A. Thomas, Jr. and Herbert Morton Ball for respondent Johns-Manville International Corporation.

Frederick G. Poeter for respondent Great Lakes Carbon Corporation.

Walter Carroll for respondent Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.

Morton Zuckerman for respondents Baron Iino Line and U.S. Navigation Co., Inc.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman, SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman, RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

The Board by an order of September 3, 1959, supplemented October 30, 1959 (24 F.R. 8977, No. 216, November 4, 1959), in-
stituted an investigation, as authorized by Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, (Act), to determine whether a misclassification of infusorial or diatomaceous earth as silica had occurred in violation of Sec. 16 of the Act.

The following parties were made respondents:

1. Great Lakes Carbon Corporation and its subsidiary F. W. Berk and Company, Inc. (Great Lakes) a shipper of diatomaceous silica (also called diatomaceous or infusorial earth); 2. Johns-Manville International Co. (Johns-Manville) a shipper of diatomaceous silica; 3. Mattoon and Company, Inc. (Mattoon) a forwarder for the shipper, Great Lakes; 4. H. P. Lambert Company, Inc. (Lambert) a forwarder for the shipper, Johns-Manville; 5. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish American Line); Wilhelmsen Line—Joint service of Wilhelmsens Dampskibssaktieselskab (Wilhelmsen); Zim, Israel America Lines—Joint service of Zim Israel Navigation Co., Ltd. (Zim); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. (Lykes); Baron Iino Line (Baron), common carriers by water which transported the aforesaid property; 6. Strachan Shipping Co. (Strachan) agent for the common carriers Swedish American, Zim and Lykes; and 7. U.S. Navigation Co. Inc. (Navigation) agent for Baron.

Hearings were held before an Examiner who, in a recommended decision, found: 1. that respondent shippers and freight forwarders have falsely classified and billed shipments of diatomaceous earth in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 16 of the Act, 2. that respondent steamship lines have not violated the second paragraph, subparagraph "Second" of Sec. 16 of the Act.

Exceptions to the recommended decision were filed, followed by oral argument.

II. FACTS

Great Lakes is the manufacturer of a high speed filtering product which has the basic trade name of "Dicalite" and is marketed under a variety of other trade names, such as "Dicalite Speedflow," "Dicalite Superaid," "Dicalite Speed Plus," "Speedex" and "Dicalite 4200." Johns-Manville is also the manufacturer of the same product which is marketed under the trade names of "Celite," "Super Cel," "Hyflo," "Micro Cel" and "Filter Cel."

Both shippers obtained the raw materials for these products
from openpit mines of diatomaceous silica located at Lompoc, Calif. The raw material is mined by machinery, conveyed to a processing plant, mechanically pulverized, dried and packed in bags for shipment. Neither the pulverizing nor the drying changes the chemical nature of the product. The bags bear the trade names noted above. The packaged product is in all respects the same as the product fresh from the mine except for the elimination of water in the drying process.

The product was shipped by railroad from Lompoc, Calif. to New Orleans, La. subject to inland bills of lading describing it as a specified number of “bags infusorial earth ground” or abbreviations of these words.

The packaged product has a low density which gives it a stowage factor of from 150 cu. ft. to 160 cu. ft. per ton while silica in crystalline state or in the form of sand stows at 35 cu. ft. to 40 cu. ft. per ton. The amorphous character of the product as distinguished from the crystalline character of silica in sand form causes this difference in their densities.

Between January 1958 and September 1959 each shipper made about 110 shipments on ships of the respondent common carriers by water from New Orleans, La. to ports in Europe, South Africa and the Mediterranean area.

Great Lakes by its forwarder Mattoon described its shipments as follows in bills of lading of the designated carriers under the heading “Particulars Furnished by Shipper of Goods” and under columns headed “Marks and Numbers” and “Description of Packages and Goods” (subject to changes in the number of bags):

*Swedish American Line*

“DICALITE—Superaid, Special Speedflow, Speedex, Speedplus
604 BAGS SILICA”

*Baron iino Line*

“DICALITE—Speedplus
400 BAGS—SILICA”

Johns-Manville by its forwarder Lambert described its shipments as follows (with changes in the number of bags), in bills of lading of the carriers under the same headings:
"CELTIE 281, 86 BAGS, SILICA"

"HYFLO 2000 BAGS, POWDERED SILICA, BAGS"

"MATERIAL, 432 BAGS, JM CELITE (white label) 545 432 " " " (pink label) 503 432 " " STANDARD SUPER-CEL (green label) 1296 " " SILICA"

The forwarders, Mattoon and Lambert, prepared all of the shippers' bills of lading containing the allegedly false classifications. The bills of lading were prepared in accordance with written instructions from the respondent shippers. The instructions were in the form of a letter transmitting listed documents and specifying the particulars to be followed in handling the shipment, including the name of the consignee, the destination and the bill of lading description. Great Lakes' letter of instructions was in the form of a memorandum under its letterhead addressed to the forwarder and over the signature of its traffic manager. The instructions specified the name of the ship, the sailing date and the port of discharge. The following, is a typical example of an instruction as to the bill of lading description: "No. of bags: 604, Commodity SILICA." Opposite "Special Instructions" is written: "Note Commodity Description." Other details, such as weight, marks and numbers and the documents enclosed, are also written in the instructions. The instructions by Johns-Manville are in the form of a letter under its letter-head addressed to the forwarder, over the signature of its traffic manager or his designee. Generally similar information is contained in the letter and opposite the words "Bill of Lading Description" is written: "SILICA" or "SILICA-EXP. DEC. SILICA (CELTIE-TRADEMARK)" or "Powdered Silica in Bags." The forwarders at the time of preparing the bills of lading also had delivery and approval notices from the inland rail carriers describing the products as "Diatomaceous or Infusorial Earth." The forwarders did not solicit advice of the carriers involved as to the proper classifications unless requested to do so by the shipper. They did not question the vari-
MISCLASSIFICATION—DIATOMACEOUS EARTH AS SILICA

ance in the descriptions. Their witnesses testified variously "We are not one to question our shippers as to how to describe their shipments" and that in this particular transaction they were "like a clerk" and were only doing "exactly what we were told" or were facilitating the handling of paper "by being able to sign on their (shippers) behalf."

In its statement of facts the shipper Great Lakes asserted that "the respondent freight forwarder who acted on behalf of Great Lakes did so in accordance with its instructions and [Great Lakes] assumes complete responsibility for these instructions, for the acts of the forwarder in preparing the documents and delivering them to the carriers."

On bills of lading of Zim, Hellenic and Fern Ville lines the products were described as "Infusorial Earth Powder."

The tariff descriptions, rates and regulations used as a source of the rates to be applied to the bill of lading descriptions are those of the Gulf/French Atlantic Hamburg Range Freight Conference, Gulf Continental Tariff No. 7, The Gulf/South & East African Conference, The Gulf/United Kingdom Conference, The Gulf/Mediterranean Ports Conference and The Gulf/Scandinavian and Baltic Sea Ports Conference. The rates for diatomaceous silica and for silica are on different pages of the book because the commodities are listed alphabetically. The classifications read, typically, as follows:

Gulf/Continental Tariff No. 7

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<td>Diatomaceous</td>
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6 F.M.B.
The above are fairly typical of the choices that would have been available to the shippers if the tariff book had been given to them for examination. Later in 1959 after this dispute arose the traffs were revised by adding a measurement factor to the information under each classification. For example the Gulf/South East Africa Tariff reads under “Earth, diatomaceous”:

"Meas. up to & “incl. 50' per 2240# $28.00W (2240#)" and “over 50' per 2240# $50.00W (2240#)"
on on the Capetown basis. Similar differentials were made in the other tariffs except the Gulf/Scandinavian and Baltic Sea Ports Conference tariff, which had not been changed as of November 23, 1959. None of the tariffs have a classification for “diatomaceous silica.” All of the tariffs provide a considerably lower rate for transporting silica as sand, than for transporting diatomaceous or infusorial earth.

Diatomaceous earth, or infusorial earth or diatomaceous silica technically known as “diatomite” is a hydrous or opaline form of silica generally about 90% to 96% pure amorphous silica and inert. It is distinguished from silica by the presence of fossil remains of single-celled marine organisms known as diatoms.
X-ray diffraction pictures were taken of the product and of cristobalite, which is pure silica (Si O₂ or Silicon Dioxide). One picture showed a broad halo and an almost complete lack of sharp lines indicating that the material is amorphous or non-crystalline. This material was identified as natural diatomaceous earth or diatomaceous silica. The second picture, identified as a sample of cristobalite, shows very sharp lines which characterized the pattern typical of the crystalline material. A third film, taken of diatomaceous silica known as Celite, showed a pattern which was identical with the second indicating that it was composed of cristobalite. Counsel for one of the respondents represented one of its experts as saying “the pattern of pure silica and our product (Celite) is the same.”

The tariffs of the various Conferences were not generally available, were “not public,” and the shippers' employees never saw the tariffs and were not “freely . . . able to get the tariffs.” Agents of the conference carriers verbally advised shippers about rates in response to inquiries and told the shippers the rates on silica and diatomaceous earth or infusorial earth, after being asked if they had such a rate.

About April 19, 1959, the carrier Lykes, through its New York representatives discussed the “silica” shipments with the shipper Johns-Manville. The carrier said it would not accept cargo described as silica because of a variance with its export declaration description as “infusorial [diatomaceous] earth.” In response, the shipper said it would make other arrangements for shipment. The next day Lykes said it would move the shipment as originally booked. On receiving more information about the product the carrier advised that it “did not contemplate raising any question as to his [the shipper's] description on the bills of lading . . .” and “the matter now seems to be that we accept Johns-Manville International description of silica.”

III. DISCUSSION

Sec. 16 of the Act provides “That it shall be unlawful for any shipper . . . forwarder . . . or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, by means of . . . false classification . . . to obtain or attempt to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable.”
"That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, ... directly or indirectly:

**"Second. To allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carrier by means of ... false classification ..."**

The shipper classifies the product by the description written in the bill of lading. Here, the word "Silica" was written in bills of lading to describe the product.

The product shipped is found to be properly described as diatomaceous silica, diatomaceous earth, or infusorial earth, all of which have amorphous characteristics and is not properly classifiable as silica which is similar to sand in its most common form. The products were falsely classified as the examiner has found.

Sec. 16 is not violated by shippers or forwarders unless the false classification is knowingly and willfully made. The exceptions to the examiner's conclusions, that the false classification was knowing and willful, are substantially that the tariff was sufficiently ambiguous as to preclude any precise choice between the two tariff descriptions or that it could not be said that one or the other was completely inapplicable and that the shipper was entitled to select the one giving the lower rate.

The "Sand-silica" rates were almost one half the "Earth, diatomaceous" rates, because of the stowage factor. Where both commodity rates are adequately descriptive the one making the lower charge is applicable. *Cone Bros. Construction Co. v. Georgia R.R. et al.,* 159 I.C.C. 342 (1929). Ambiguities should be resolved against the carriers writing the tariff. *Rubber Development Corp. v. Booth S.S. Co. et al,* 2 U.S.M.C. 746, 748 (1945).

The significant fact of this case is that the books containing the written tariff descriptions were not available and "requests to examine the tariffs at the offices of the Carriers and Conferences were refused." The two respondent shippers and their forwarders are not in the position of parties who have the opportunity to make a visual inspection of the words contained in tariffs which are available to the public. *Misclassification and Misbilling of Glass Tumblers and other Manufactured Glassware Items as Jars,* 6 F.M.B. 155 (1960). *Classification of Paper Products by Rubin, Rubin & Rubin Corp. et al,* Docket No. 848, decided February 20, 1961. As a result of this lack the shippers and the forwarders
could not make up their minds about the proper thing to do on the basis of an accurate understanding of the tariff.

As a result of the unavailability of the carriers’ tariffs these shippers could not take the printed descriptions and compare them with what they knew about the characteristics of their products. Instead, they had to depend on verbal statements about the tariff rates for various commodities in response to their inquiries and to depend on what meager information the carrier conference was willing to furnish. One of the descriptions furnished by the carriers was for a silica product, or “Silica” and it was used in preference to the “Earth” description. To the respondent shippers who had to rely on verbal statements about the contents of the tariff, the tariff was quite ambiguous, in the sense that two interpretations were possible for this product: The first was based on its diatomaceous characteristics and the second was based on its dominantly silica composition. The first could reasonably be rejected because it was not essentially “earth” to the shippers, but was essentially “Silica.”

The writers of the tariff recognized the existence of an ambiguity also when they decided to apply a stowage factor to the “earth” classification. From the carriers’ point of view the amount of space a product takes and its weight is far more important than labels. They recognized that both “earth” and “silica” had stowage problems and eventually applied the same rate to each depending on volume in order to eliminate the freight rate consequences of the ambiguity.

There is no justification for holding that the “earth” classification, at least as presented to these shippers by the carriers, “is so clearly right and the other wrong that willful and knowing intent to misclassify is the only fair conclusion.” Continental Can Co. v. United States of America and Federal Maritime Board, 272 F. 2d 312, 316 (1959).

There was also sufficient confusion about the classification as to justify the Bureau of Census to authorize the use of a “Silica (Celite Trademark)” description in export declarations as a compliance with its “Schedule B” instructions and at the same time to use a code number covering “Diatomaceous Earth and Products.” Both were thought to be applicable.

When these difficulties are joined with the fact that there was considerable doubt as to what the product really was in view of its dominant silica composition, the shippers had reason to give themselves the benefit of any doubt as to which tariff description
should be applied to their product. An expert witness testified on the subject of "X-ray diffraction patterns . . . of pure silica and . . . of Johns-Manville's diatomaceous silica . . . and demonstrated that they were exactly the same . . .", as the respondent Johns-Manville stated.

The shipping instructions given to the forwarders were undoubtedly given against this background and with a natural desire to obtain the lowest possible freight rate. The only available information for the carriers plus the information they had about the silica content of the product shipped was such as to create enough of an ambiguity in their minds which could be resolved in favor of the lower rate.

Shippers and forwarders, faced with an ambiguity under the circumstances of this case, may not be held to have committed a misdemeanor by violating the provisions of Sec. 16 of the Act covering knowing and willful false classification if they place their own reasonable interpretation on a tariff which has been made ambiguous by the publishing carriers' actions.

Respondents Swedish American, Wilhelmsen, Zim, Lykes, Baron, Strachan and Navigation, as carriers violate Sec. 16 only if they allow transportation at less than regular rates by means of false classification. An employee of Strachan, line manager of Swedish American and Wilhelmsen admitted that their ships carried the product described as silica. Strachan was presented with bills of lading, booking contracts, dock receipts and export declarations which all describe the shipments as "silica". The inland bills of lading and other papers describing the shipments as "diatomaceous or infusorial earth" were not examined by Strachan. There was no discussion about the shipments.

Baron and its agents likewise only had documents for examination which describe the product as silica. Two days before the issuance of the supplemental order in this case, Baron asked Great Lakes and Mattoon to witness a sampling of the product, but neither made any representative available. Samples were drawn, analyzed and found to be diatomaceous earth. Baron advised that the shipment would not be loaded unless it was reclassified. Great Lakes thereafter removed the shipment from the pier. Baron did not knowingly allow any misclassified shipments to be made.

There is no evidence in the record that Zim carried any misclassified cargo.
On these facts, we find that respondents Swedish American, Wilhelmsen, Zim and Baron have not violated Sec. 16 of the Act. Respondents Strachan and Navigation were not shown to be common carriers by water and do not come within the terms of the Act. The proceeding is dismissed as to them.

The finding that Lykes was not found to have allowed the shipper to obtain transportation by water for property at less than the applicable rates then enforced and established by Lykes was excepted to.

The property shipped is a specialized product. Its exact characteristics must be determined by microscopic analysis by trained scientists to determine its precise classification as either earth or silica. With this difficulty of determining its composition, proper classification is not within the knowledge of the average agent or employee of the carriers. Lykes' chief traffic official was concerned only with establishing a compensatory rate for shipping the product based on its weight, volume and other shipping characteristics. He was confused by the various descriptions of the product which were furnished him and promptly took action to have the product investigated and the rate adjusted once the confusion had been brought to his attention. A revision of the tariff regulations was undertaken. We don't believe that Lykes showed any wanton disregard of the duty to exercise reasonable diligence to collect applicable rates as to amount to an intent to collect less than the applicable charges. Practices of Fabre Line and Gulf/Mediterranean Conf., 4 F.M.B. 611 (1955).

To prevent tariffs from being construed contrary to the interests of the carriers formulating them, more care should be taken in making definitions clear and precisely descriptive of the commodities covered and in specifying the freight rates applicable thereto. In the present case a less confusing tariff description and one which showed more clearly the difference between earth and silica, as well as prescribing stowage factors as was belatedly done, would have resulted in the assessment of proper charges and eliminated ambiguity of descriptions.

It is concluded that the carrier respondents have not allowed shippers and forwarders to obtain transportation for diatomaceous silica from New Orleans, La. to European and South African destinations at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the lines of such carriers by means of false classification in violation of the second paragraph of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.
At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C. on the 1st day of June, 1961.

No. 868

MISCLASSIFICATION OF DIATOMACEOUS OR INFUSORIAL EARTH AS SILICA

This proceeding having been instituted by the Board upon its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted, and investigation of the things and matters involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is Ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 871

INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN STORAGE PRACTICES OF PACIFIC FAR EAST LINE, INC., TRANS-OCEANIC AGENCIES, STATES STEAMSHIP COMPANY, AND HOWARD TERMINALS AT THE PORTS OF STOCKTON AND OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

Decided June 1, 1961

Respondents Pacific Far East Lines and States Steamship Company, common carriers by water, found, in conjunction with other persons, (a) to have given undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to particular persons, localities and descriptions of traffic and to have subjected particular persons, localities and descriptions of traffic to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage; and, (b) to have allowed persons to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established on the line of such carriers by an unjust or unfair means in violation of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

Respondents Trans-Oceanic Agencies, as a partnership of two individuals, and Trans-Oceanic Agencies Inc. and Howard Terminals, other persons subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, found to have given undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to particular persons, localities and descriptions of traffic and to have subjected particular persons, localities and descriptions of traffic to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, in violation of Sec. 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

Respondents Pacific Far East Lines and States Steamship Company, common carriers by water, found, to have failed to establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing or delivering of property in violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. Just and reasonable practices ordered enforced.

Respondents Trans-Oceanic Agencies, as a partnership of two individuals, and Trans-Oceanic Agencies, Inc. and Howard Terminals other persons subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, found, to have failed to establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable practices relating to
or connected with the receiving, handling, storing or delivering of property in violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. Just and reasonable practices ordered enforced.

John Hays, for Pacific Far East Lines, Respondent.


Gilbert C. Wheat and H. Donald Harris, Jr., for States Steamship Company, Respondent.

Gerald H. Trautman and William W. Schwarzer, for Howard Terminal, Respondent.

Robert J. Blackwell and Edward Aptaker, Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

The Board, as authorized by Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act) (46 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq.) by its order dated September 23, 1959 (24 F.R. 7839, September 29, 1959) upon its own motion entered upon a proceeding of inquiry and investigation to determine whether certain storage practices of the Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (PFEL) and Trans-Oceanic Agencies (TOA) at Stockton, Calif. and of States Steamship Co. (States) and Howard Terminals (Howard) at Oakland, Calif. are in violation of Secs. 16 and 17 of the Act.

Hearings were held and briefs received, followed by a recommended decision of an Examiner served on December 27, 1960. Exceptions and replies were filed followed by oral argument on March 22, 1961.

II. FACTS

Respondent PFEL, a common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the U.S., was approached in early 1957 by Albert W. Gatov, a San Francisco businessman, with a plan whereby his organization known as "Trans-Oceanic Agencies" would "work up a distribution arrangement for importers which would make it economical for them to route shipments via the Port of Stockton". The arrangement is more fully described below. The ensuing discussions, in about 12 meetings with PFEL’s President
and its General Traffic Manager in the office of the President, resulted in the execution of a "Husbanding Agency Agreement" signed by Warren H. Atherton, a Stockton attorney and partner in TOA and a PFEL Vice President and a "Booking Agency Agreement" signed by the same parties and both dated June 1, 1957. The husbanding agency agreement authorizes and appoints TOA as agent "to act as exclusive husbanding agent for the Principal in Port of Stockton, Calif., performing only the usual husbanding activities for principal's vessels". Usually husbanding activities consist of making arrangements for pilots and tugs to bring a ship up to a dock, obtaining entry and clearance of a ship by port authorities, ordering of work gangs, dealing with problems of manning, replacing sick crew members, providing local repairs to a ship and furnishing lines, bunkers, provisions, stores and dunnage and related work for a ship. Compensation was to be $50.00 for each 24 hours for each vessel of principal while it is berthed at Stockton with a minimum compensation per vessel of $150.00 and a maximum compensation per vessel of $250.00. PFEL also agreed to pay all accounts for vessel husbanding and such other items as may be arranged by the agent and on request to advance funds to the agent for anticipated charges. For the 33 month period, commencing June 1, 1957 through February 29, 1960, PFEL paid fees of $24,350.00. The fees were paid whether or not services were rendered to a specific ship. The record discloses no specific details of any husbanding services actually performed for and reimbursement or advances by PFEL. A TOA official was unfamiliar with significant details of port activity at Stockton which a husbanding agent would normally know. The record did not show whether the attorney-partner or the Traffic Manager knew anything about husbanding or did any such work.

The Booking Agency Agreement authorized TOA to develop, solicit, procure and book cargoes through its general offices for the principal's ships. PFEL was required to pay 3% of the gross freight on all inbound general cargo whether booked or not, 5% on all outbound general cargo and 1½% on outbound and inbound bulk cargo (with certain exceptions). Total payments were subject to a minimum of $300.00 per month. During the same 33 month period PFEL paid commissions on inbound general cargo of $45,425.05 and on outbound bulk cargo of $23,060.95 plus $1,200.00 in monthly minimums. Total payments were $115,158.93. Nothing was paid on inbound bulk cargo.
PFEL was kept fully informed about TOA activities through the receipt of copies of almost all of TOA's solicitation letters during 1958 and 1959. PFEL cargo soliciting agents also wrote letters describing the TOA plan to shippers and asked a shipper "if he would consider storing all his cargo free at Stockton instead of moving these cars to 44 different warehouses and then drawing on Stockton for the individual LCL (less than carload) lots required at the $1.50 rate and receive store/door delivery". Another PFEL letter told TOA that an importer using Los Angeles would bring his cargo to Stockton if the "free storage offsets the trucking charges Stockton/Los Angeles . . ." An exchange of correspondence between PFEL and TOA suggested TOA tell an importer how to save money by using Stockton instead of Seattle as a port, because of the availability of free storage. Other correspondence indicates PFEL employees talked with potential shippers about what was available in Stockton through TOA activities.

TOA was organized in June 1957 as a partnership consisting of Albert W. Gatov and Warren H. Atherton. Wherever "TOA" is referred to herein, it shall be taken to refer also to each of these persons as individuals, to the partnership and to the corporation formed later. In February 1959 the partnership became a corporation with the two former partners as sole stockholders. The violations charged cover both periods.

The San Francisco partner was engaged in warehousing activities. TOA had a Post Office Box at Stockton and an office in Stockton which was the same as the office in which one partner conducted his law practice. It had no employees or records or files in this office. TOA also has an office in San Francisco where its only employee, the Traffic Manager, performed his services without stenographic assistance. He also worked part of the time for another company controlled by the San Francisco partner. This company has the same telephone number as TOA. TOA's Booking Agency Agreement contained a recital representing it as having offices in Sacramento, Madera, Milpitas, Calif. and Reno, Nev. Its stationery also referred to such offices in the letterhead. The record shows it had no such offices.

The majority of the cargo handled was booked in Japan, where TOA has no cargo solicitors, and control of the routing of cargo was in persons located east of the Rocky Mountains where TOA was not required to maintain freight solicitors.
By letter dated April 30, 1957, the President of TOA wrote to the Director of the Port of Stockton confirming a conversation informing the Director that the President "was undertaking to act as agent for ocean carriers in the Central Valley area and [am] doing business as Trans-Oceanic Agencies" and offering to "lease" on a monthly basis a minimum of 5,000 sq. ft. of first class warehouse space within the confines of the Port of Stockton area. The director by letter of May 13, 1957, assigned the north two-thirds of Warehouse G comprising 10,300 sq. ft. on a month to month basis at a "rental" of $500 per month. The agreement was verbally revised June 1, 1958 to increase the assigned space to 30,000 sq. ft. and the "rent" to $1500.00 per month and again verbally on September 1, 1959 to 130,000 sq. ft. to rent at $3000.00 per month. The agreement provides that any services performed by the Port of Stockton shall be charged for in accordance with applicable tariffs of the Port of Stockton. The rates are contained in the "Port of Stockton (Warehouse Division) Warehouse Tariff No. 1", effective July 1, 1949 and as revised from time to time.

TOA solicited the business of shippers by telephone, by personal contact and by letter over the signature of its traffic manager. The letters followed a standard pattern and stated that TOA: 1. is an agent for PFEL; 2. has warehouse facilities at Stockton in which the shipper's needs can be accommodated; 3. would hold merchandise for the period of time the shipper required without charge and that this arrangement applied both to local cargo and to "over-land common point" cargo (O.C.P. cargo); 4. would prepare without charge bills of lading on shipments from its facilities; 5. would furnish, prepare and apply tags at the rate of 6¼ per tag if required and if the shipper furnished the tag, only a modest charge would be made for applying it; 6. would make no charge for movement of cargo from shipside to storage location and the goods would be stored and segregated according to the inbound markings; and 7. would extend these arrangements only to cargo carried by PFEL and discharged at the Port of Stockton. The foregoing constitute the "distribution" services. TOA's solicitation letters contained no information concerning PFEL's service. No mention is made of the ship size, speed, transit time, loading points, schedules, accommodations or any of the other operating details of a carrier's service. TOA's letter did not disclose that it was only a husband-
ing and a solicitation agent and was not PFEL's agent as regards the services it offered to perform.

Between December 1957 and March 1960 TOA secured 64 accounts using the aforesaid services. During the period December 1957 to the fall of 1958 free and unlimited storage was accorded to all customers with charges only for marking, tagging, stenciling, sorting or other accessorial services if they were specifically requested by the customer. From the fall of 1958 to September 1959, TOA instituted a 7½¢ service charge per package on some cargo but this decision was not put into effect right away so that on storage provided through 1958, storage was still rendered free of charge and without time limit. During the 9 month period from January 1959 to September 1959 the service charge was not assessed on cargo in the warehouse at the time of the inception of the plan; it was sometimes levied whether or not the shipper required any service and it was assessed against some customers but not against others so that some customers still received free storage. From September 1959 to the time of the proceeding in March 1960, TOA assessed a service charge per package on all cargo using its facilities. This practice began on September 1, 1959 shortly after a visit by an investigator for the Board. The charge has varied between customers running from 2½¢ to 25¢ per package depending on different customer requirements, were based on negotiations with customers, and are not related to the length of time goods remain in storage. TOA's booking agency agreement authorizes advertisement of its services subject to the approval of PFEL and PFEL agrees to reimburse its agent for the expense. There has been no advertising, however.

TOA obtains custody of shippers' goods after unloading by PFEL's contract stevedores and at the end of Stockton's 7-day free time period or when the goods are moved to TOA's assigned space. The moving is done by draymen employed by the Port of Stockton. No documents were produced to evidence any transfer of custody or possession to TOA. Before April 1959 the Port of Stockton billed TOA for the moving service at the rate of 60¢ per hundred pounds pursuant to the tariff. Since then the Port has absorbed this cost. Thereafter stenciling, marking, inventory control and other services are also performed on goods by port personnel and TOA is billed for such service at tariff rates. Stockton, without charge to TOA, also provides labor and supervision to move cargo from the assigned space to connecting carriers for
further transportation and prepares bills of lading for TOA customers. Stockton maintains in its administration building the business records concerning TOA operations. TOA has no tariff or other schedule of rates for its services.

The record showed that shipments in TOA custody had remained in Port of Stockton warehouses for periods up to 108 days beyond the normal free storage time without any special charge to consignees or shippers for storage. Fourteen shipments of earthenware were shown to have been held an average of 15 days, 76 shipments of plywood were held an average of 25 days, 78 shipments of rattan furniture were held an average of 44 days and 30 shipments of toys were held an average of 28 days.

The Warehouse Division of the Port of Stockton Tariff contains rates and regulations for storage including therein rates for the same services as TOA offered to perform and rules stating how the rates should be applied. Seven days free time is allowed by Stockton on inbound general cargo. Thereafter monthly storage and storage handling rates apply on various descriptions of commodities and packages. These facilities and services were available at the Port of Stockton for all shippers. TOA’s practice was to order handling services in response to shippers’ instructions and to pay Stockton for them at the established rates as required by its agreement with the Port Director.

TOA services for consignees were referred to in the record by one shipper as an offer of warehousing at “a fantastically low figure” in fact it would be cheaper “to use Stockton than to use his own company warehouse”.

One toy shipper had portions of 11 shipments in TOA facilities. The shortest storage period on any of these was 53 days and the longest about 5 months.

A shipper paid, since August 1959, 7½¢ per carton for marking, segregation and storage of goods. This is one and one quarter cents more than tagging charges alone and comparable services in San Francisco would cost 21¢ per carton plus costs of drayage to a warehouse.

States, by letter dated April 23, 1959, accepted a proposal by Smyth Storage Inc. (Smyth) that Smyth act as its “solicitation and distribution agent in the San Francisco Bay area”. States agreed to guarantee Smyth’s expenses for the 90 day trial period beginning May 1, 1959 and to pay $300.00 a month as a retainer.

Under the plan storage and accessorial services would be provided at Howard Terminals in Oakland. Howard would bill Smyth
for services. After Smyth paid Howard, Smyth billed and was reimbursed by States. Fourteen shippers were provided services which began in April 1959 and terminated in February 1960.

Howard, a public wharfinger in Oakland, Calif. performed its work for shippers pursuant to its Marine Terminals Association of California Tariff No. 1A containing terminal rates and charges. There are no written agreements with Howard in evidence, but Howard officials and States officials had discussions about the arrangement. Howard had discussions with States about the preparation of invoices and followed the discussions by sending its invoices for services addressed to shippers “c/o Smyth Storage Inc., 1798 Timothy Drive, San Leandro, Calif.” and Smyth paid Howard. States later paid Smyth. This sequence of furnishing services, rendering invoices, and receiving payments was followed in other transactions. The respondents States, and Howard acknowledge the arrangement and do not contest that free storage was provided as far as 14 shippers are concerned before the practice was discontinued February 29, 1960.

III. DISCUSSION

The order of investigation recites practices which may constitute the granting of undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to certain persons and localities, in violation of Sec. 16 of the Act or which may be unjustly discriminatory between shippers or ports or may constitute unjust or unreasonable practices in violation of Sec. 17 of the Act.

The second paragraph of Sec. 16 makes it unlawful for any common carrier by water or other person subject to the Act, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly, to give undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person or locality or to subject any particular person or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage or to allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges established and enforced on the line of a carrier by any other unjust or unfair device or means. Violators of any provision of this section are guilty of a misdemeanor.

Sec. 17 provides: that every common carrier by water and every other person subject to the Act shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing or delivering of
property. Whenever the Board finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable, it may determine, prescribe and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice.

Based on his review of this record and testimony, the Examiner recommended that the practices of PFEL, TOA, States and Howard be found unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and preferential and that the aforesaid respondents be found to have allowed persons to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges and that such practices be found unjust and unreasonable in violation of Secs. 16 and 17 of the Act.

PFEL excepts to the recommended finding that PFEL acted in concert with TOA in soliciting, promoting, fostering, as well as participating in TOA’s storage and distribution services insofar as such services were limited to imported cargo distributed only by PFEL ships at Stockton and that such practices violated Secs. 16 and 17 of the Act. PFEL also excepted to the recommended finding that TOA was an “other person” as defined in Sec. 1 of the Act and as the term is used in Sec. 16, and to the statements in support thereof. PFEL excepted to the Examiner’s statement that it was aware of the limitation TOA’s distribution services to imports discharged only from PFEL ships.

TOA excepts to the following conclusions in the recommended decision:

1. TOA is furnishing warehouse or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water and is an “other person” subject to the Act.

2. TOA’s practices at Stockton were and are unreasonably prejudicial and preferential in violation of Sec. 16, and were and are unjust and unreasonable practices related to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property in violation of Sec. 17.

3. TOA’s failure to publish a tariff and its practices in connection with its storage and distribution services afforded opportunity for, and TOA provided, unequal treatment for shippers and preferred treatment for certain classes of cargo.

4. Whether TOA had a tariff and ignored it, or had no tariff, does not change the lack of uniformity in the application of its charges for storage and distribution services.

5. By limiting its services to cargoes discharged by PFEL, TOA was, and is, giving an undue and unreasonable preference and advantage to PFEL, and was, and is, subjecting other carriers, such
as States and American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) to an undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage.

6. In providing its storage and distribution services on imports, TOA limited them to cargo discharged from PFEL vessels. PFEL was aware of this limitation. Insofar as this limitation of the services to one carrier was unlawful, by either providing for or condoning in the limitation, TOA and PFEL acted in concert in violating the Act.

7. PFEL acted in concert with TOA in soliciting, promoting, fostering, as well as participating in TOA's storage and distribution services insofar as such services were limited to imported cargo discharged only by PFEL vessels at Stockton. PFEL's practices were and are unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and preferential, and allowed persons to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges, in violation of section 16, and PFEL's practices were and are unjust and unreasonable practices related to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property in violation of section 17.

8. An appropriate order should be entered by the Board, requiring respondents to cease and desist from the violations herein found to exist.

States makes the same exception as to illegality as TOA in its exception No. 6.

Public Counsel excepts to the Examiner's conclusion that it is unnecessary to find that TOA was the agent of PFEL in providing storage and distribution services at Stockton.

We find these exceptions not sustained and our conclusions are in accord with those of the Examiner.

The unlawful acts covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 16 apply to a common carrier by water acting "either alone or in conjunction with any other person" and applies to indirect as well as direct actions.

PFEL obligated itself by means of two contracts to pay monthly to TOA substantial sums of money in return for the latter's agreement to act as its agent and to perform certain services. The record shows, however, that PFEL had the facilities to perform and did in fact perform the identical services TOA was obligated to perform.

The initiating meetings between PFEL officials and TOA organizers, the receipt of TOA correspondence, PFEL's correspondence with TOA, and the representations to shippers by PFEL em-
ployees concerning TOA services all show that PFEL had full knowledge of how TOA performed the agency agreement and what TOA did with the payments it received. PFEL's subsequent lack of concern about the TOA organization and facilities and failure to insist on any bona fide services pursuant to the two contracts shows that PFEL was not concerned with the use of PFEL payments for other unstated yet well understood purposes; namely, payment of Stockton's charges for services to shippers as ordered by TOA. Statements by PFEL officials to shippers establish that PFEL understood what TOA was doing for shippers, and that it was solicitation only to the extent that it presented the obvious economic advantages of what TOA was doing with PFEL payments. It was not the customary type of solicitation for shippers' cargoes. The lack of advertising tends to show that the economic appeal of the plan obviated the need. The failure to point out features of PFEL ships and services showed that the normal attractions of a line for a shipper were secondary to the economic advantage TOA offered.

The facts are that PFEL (1) made two agreements with two persons, associated, as far as this record shows, for the sole purpose of receiving substantial amounts of money over a period of about 33 months, (2) failed to obtain any performance of the contracts remotely commensurate with the amounts paid, (3) knowing what was going on, permitted the use of its payments to such persons for buying storage and other services for its shippers or consignees, which they would normally have had to buy from Stockton, and (4) acted with the knowledge that TOA limited its storage services to PFEL cargoes discharged at Stockton. Such facts establish that PFEL as a common carrier by water in conjunction with another person, and indirectly (i.e. through the intervention of TOA) (a) gave undue preference and advantage to inbound traffic through the Port of Stockton and thereby subjected other ports such as San Francisco to undue prejudice and disadvantage and (b) allowed shippers or consignees of inbound property on its ships to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established by PFEL by an unjust or unfair means, contrary to the requirements of Sec. 16 of the Act.

PFEL shippers' charges would normally be the applicable Conference tariff rates plus the cost of services required at Stockton in accordance with the Stockton Warehouse Tariff manual. The latter costs were avoided by diverting part of the ocean freight
charges back to the shippers or consignees by means of the benefit received from the intermediary TOA.

The preference and advantage to Stockton and the prejudice and disadvantage to other ports is “undue” because substantial economic advantages of the plan were available only through the TOA organization and only at one port to the exclusion of all other ports and shippers.

The substantial economic advantage which shippers got from PFEL via TOA payments, is the unfair means which caused the cost of transportation to shippers to be less than established rates.

The fact that TOA operated independently in furnishing services to shippers and PFEL had nothing to do with TOA’s operations or TOA’s limitations on its service or with other business decisions, are not material because PFEL, regardless of TOA’s independence, had a duty to terminate its payments when it knew how they were being used. The Examiner correctly evaluated the evidence to prove that PFEL knew what was going on. The further fact that PFEL collected full freight from the shipper or consignee and paid the Port of Stockton compensation properly due the port for acting as terminal agent are equally immaterial, since indirect actions and actions “in conjunction with” others are also prohibited by Sec. 16. The complete interchange of information between the two respondents and the financial dependence of TOA on PFEL evidences that they were working in conjunction with each other. The Examiner’s conclusions on this point are correct and the exceptions thereto are not well taken. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States et al., 305 U.S. 507 (1939); Propriety of Operating Practices New York Warehousing, 198 I.C.C. 134 (1938); Practices of San Francisco Bay Terminals, 2 U.S.M.C. 588 (1941); Storage Charges Under Agreements 6205, 6215, 2 U.S.M.C. 48 (1939); Storage of Import Property, 1 U.S.M.C. 676 (1937).

The facts show that both PFEL and States participated in the arrangements for receiving, handling, storing and delivering shippers’ or consignees’ property in such a way that the latter would not have to pay normal charges for handling, storing and delivering the property in addition to established freight charges for transportation. Such practices are unjust and unreasonable because of the discriminations and preferences they create as discussed more fully herein.

TOA argues (1) that when it takes custody of merchandise at the end of the 7-day free time period the “terminal” aspects of
water transportation of property are complete; (2) that the wharfage, dock and warehouse facilities referred to in the first section of the Act must be "terminal" in character and (3) if the furnishing of "terminal facilities" is ended at or before the time TOA places goods in its assigned warehouse space then, TOA is not furnishing terminal type services and is not an "other person" under the Act. Therefore, TOA is not subject to the Board's jurisdiction because it does not meet the description in the first section of the Act.

The first section of the Act states that the term "other person subject to this act" means any person not included in the term "common carrier by water", carrying on the business of furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water. The term "person" includes corporations and partnerships.

In *Wharfage Charges and Practices at Boston, Mass., 2 U.S.M.C. 245 (1940)*, the U.S. Maritime Commission held that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was an "other person" within the definition contained in the Act "insofar as it engages in the activities of an other person" as defined in the Act. The activities were not otherwise described but the record showed they related to the unloading of ships and warehousing of cargoes. In *Practices Etc., of San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, 2 U.S.M.C. 588 (1941)*, the respondents Board of Port Commissioners of the City of Oakland and the Stockton Port District were "admonished that any space rental device used for the purpose of unduly discriminating between storers of cargo in water transportation is strictly in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended". *Id.*, at 608. Respondent here seeks to limit the warehouse storage related to furnishing terminal facilities to the free time period. This test is too limited and is a too conceptualistic description of the consequences of what TOA was doing.

TOA has furnished its customers the identical facilities and related services Stockton furnished its customers subject to the latter's "Warehouse Tariff No. 1". All TOA has done is place itself between Stockton and its consignee customers for the purpose of ordering or obtaining such services for them. If Stockton furnishes warehouse or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water, so does TOA. It is implicit in *Practices Etc., of San Francisco Bay Area Terminals* that Stockton furnishes terminal facilities in connection with common carriers by water. We hold that a person is furnishing ware-
house or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water who: 1. receives custody of property from a common carrier by water or its agent after unloading at a dock or pier, and 2. keeps custody thereof within the geographical confines of an ocean terminal facility, such as a warehouse adjacent to a dock or pier, until custody of the property is relinquished to an inland carrier or to the consignee. TOA meets this description. The terminal character of the facilities furnished continues until the inland carrier takes possession. The Board has assumed jurisdiction up to this point. *Investigation of Certain Storage Practices of the Port of Longview Commission at the Port of Longview, Washington*, 6 F.M.B. 178 (1960). We note that public terminals were thought to be subject to regulation by the terms of the Act according to the understanding of Congressmen Alexander, one of the framers of the Act. (See: Debates on H.R. 15455 in the House of Representatives, 53 Cong. Rec. 8276). The terminal aspect of handling property is not complete at the time goods are delivered by Stockton to the “lessee” of its assigned warehouse space. Other facts may also constitute one an “other person”, but the foregoing principle is applicable to the facts of this case.

Based on the facts that TOA, (1) rented warehouse space, (2) offered the warehouse and terminal services and facilities described in its letters to potential clients and (3) contracted for Stockton’s warehouse and terminal services for TOA clients, TOA was properly found to be carrying on the business of furnishing warehouse or other terminal facilities. TOA (1) by receiving consignees’ cargoes from PFEL, (2) by its agreements with PFEL, and (3) by its arrangement with shippers using PFEL transportation was also properly found to be acting “in connection with a common carrier by water”. TOA is, therefore, an “other person subject to this act” within the definition of such term in the fourth paragraph of the first section of the Act and as the term is used in the second paragraph of Sec. 16 of the Act. The first exception is rejected.

TOA practices at Stockton were related to and connected with the receiving, handling, storing and delivering of property, since TOA received property unloaded from PFEL ships, handled the property by having it moved to TOA’s assigned space in the terminal area, stored the property and performed further handling operations on the property and delivered it to an inland carrier.
These practices involve services related to the provision of warehouse and terminal facilities.

TOA's method of soliciting freight was to offer shippers warehouse facilities at Stockton in which it would hold merchandise without charge and would perform certain other services without charge, except a charge for putting tags on packages. Later TOA made small charges per package but did not specify what particular service the charges were for. The charges were never related to the value of the service performed and were far below its normal cost. TOA solicitation representations were directed entirely to the presentation of these services, to the low charges, and to the fact that shippers would thereby avoid substantial expenses which they would normally have to pay when their shipments pass through a warehouse, and are processed in various ways between the unloading from a common carrier by water and onto an inland carrier. The only charges were for expressly requested special services and such charges were at cost. The essence of the TOA appeal was "free storage". TOA never mentioned any details about PFEL services which solicitors usually present to shippers and which shippers are usually interested in. Nor did it maintain any soliciting personnel at any of the places where potential shipper clients were located.

TOA's performance for PFEL on one hand and charges to shippers on the other disclose a complete discrepancy between the value of the services rendered by TOA to each and the amounts charged for its services. Shippers, through the intervention of TOA, were the beneficiaries of PFEL's payments, and PFEL in return was the recipient of the shippers' business. TOA was the instrument for channelling PFEL money so that this result could be achieved.

These actions establish that TOA as an "other person" subject to the Act gave economic preference to shipments to the locality of Stockton and to shippers using PFEL at Stockton. As a result, other localities than Stockton and other shippers were subjected to prejudice and disadvantage and shippers through Stockton were allowed to obtain transportation at less than PFEL's established rates.

TOA argues that the arrangement was a trial to obtain cost experience before making compensatory charges later on. The Act, however, would be violated at the time of the first offending action and without reference to motivation.
TOA, by using money paid to it by PFEL and obtained by PFEL from its freight revenues from shippers, both with the full knowledge of each party, also indirectly allowed its shipper-clients to obtain transportation for property on PFEL ships at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of PFEL by an unjust and unfair means. The unjust and unfair means consist of making representations that it would perform certain services and concealing the fact that Stockton performed the services pursuant to the latter's tariff, and of absorbing, on behalf of shippers, the normally applicable warehouse service costs with payments by the carrier.

TOA's assumption of custody over shippers' and consignees' property without, as far as this record shows, executing any receipt therefor or being named as agent in any shipping documents covering particular property and its assertion of power to direct Stockton as to the movement of and services to the property without furnishing proofs of its interest in the property constitutes a failure to establish a just practice relating to the receiving, handling, storing, and delivering of property within the meaning of Sec. 17.

The practices shown establish violations of Secs. 16 and 17 as the examiner found and the second exception is rejected.

Preferred treatment, by differing charges for certain classes of cargo, results in discrimination against other cargo. Practices, etc. of San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, 2 U.S.M.C. 588, 603 (1944). TOA insulated its clients from Stockton's Warehouse Tariff No. 1 and did not publish its own tariff for furnishing identical services, but made varying charges based on negotiation. Negotiation is the antithesis of tariff uniformity. The erratic method of charging shippers or consignees shows that the charges were an unimportant part of the arrangement and that the recapture of costs from shippers or consignees was not a significant factor in TOA's operations. The Examiner was correct in finding that the absence of a tariff was a device or means which was unfair or unjust. The third and fourth exceptions are rejected.

By limiting its services to PFEL cargoes and excluding cargoes of other carriers from the economic advantages of its warehouse and terminal facilities TOA was properly found to be prejudicing the excluded carriers and placing them at an unreasonable disadvantage in the competition for cargoes. The fifth exception is rejected.
The facts clearly establish that PFEL and TOA acted in conjunction with each other in providing money and services which enabled each to perform actions in violation of the Act hence the sixth and seventh exceptions relating to actions in concert in violating the Act are not well taken.

The remaining exception is to the failure to find that TOA was an agent of PFEL because the latter knew that TOA practices “were at best of dubious legality” and that the two “collaborated in establishing the scheme as a joint venture”. Neither establishes agency, nor is such relation essential. We agree with the Examiner in effect each is an independent contractor and as such has acted in conjunction with each other and with Stockton. To prove acts “in conjunction” it is not necessary to show agency.

The Act applies to such specific actions by the individual respondents. Whether a party is a “dummy”, as contended, or whose idea the plan was, or whether PFEL successfully disassociated itself from TOA activities, is not controlling. The substantial effect of the actions of each respondent on transportation have been considered and found to be contrary to the terms of the Act as indicated herein without regard to their status as agents or principals.

States simply made a forthright agreement with an intermediary, Smyth, analogous to TOA whereby Smyth, like TOA, would pay storage and other warehouse charges normally chargeable to shippers and would be reimbursed by the carrier, States. Pursuant to the arrangement, 14 shippers did not have to pay storage charges. The only substantial difference is that PFEL paid TOA without regard to the cost of the services and apparently paid ahead of time instead of afterwards based on actual costs. The result of the two procedures is identical and States has not seriously contested its consequences, relying rather on a showing that if its plan is not authorized, neither is that of TOA.

States made arrangements with Smyth and Howard whereby 14 shippers were relieved of paying storage charges. States used Smyth as agent to pay the charges and Smyth was later reimbursed. Inasmuch as such concessions on storage charges were not available to all shippers and because different periods of storage were required by different shippers, discriminatory treatment was involved and such actions are likewise unreasonable practices connected with the receiving, storing, and handling of cargo. Although States problem of meeting PFEL competition may be considered as a mitigating factor, it does not exculpate
the respondent from being found in violation of statutory obligations.

Howard is a public terminal and wharfinger subject to the Act. Although Howard received the proper charges for all storage services rendered to the 14 customers of States, it nevertheless engaged in an arrangement whereby the common carrier by water, States, would absolve the shipper of storage charges. The record supports a finding that Howard was aware that States and not the shipper would pay for Howard’s services. Howard’s submission of invoices to Smyth which it knew would be paid by States and its participation in the arrangement constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice connected with the receiving, handling and storing of property in violation of Sec. 17 of the Act.

We conclude: 1. that each of the persons comprising the partnership and the sole stockholders of the business association identified as TOA and Howard as other persons subject to the Act, and PFEL and States, as common carriers by water, have violated the the provisions of Sec. 16 of the Act and each is guilty of a misdemeanor; 2. that each of the persons comprising the partnership and the sole stockholders in the business association identified as TOA and Howard, as other persons subject to the Act and PFEL and States as common carriers by water, have violated the second paragraph of Sec. 17 of the Act by not observing, establishing and enforcing just and reasonable practices relating to the receiving, handling, storing or delivering of property; and, 3. that this proceeding should be discontinued.

The facts and findings herein relative to such violations shall be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. An appropriate order will be entered.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 1st day of June, 1961.

No. 871

INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN STORAGE PRACTICES OF PACIFIC FAR EAST LINE, INC., TRANS-OCEANIC AGENCIES, STATES STEAMSHIP COMPANY, AND HOWARD TERMINALS AT THE PORTS OF STOCKTON AND OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

This proceeding of inquiry and investigation having been entered upon by the Board on its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted after investigation of the things and matters involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is Ordered, That the respondents Pacific Far East Line, Inc., States Steamship Company, Trans-Oceanic Agencies and Howard Terminals be and each one is hereby notified and required to hereafter abstain from the practices herein found to be unlawful under Sec. 16 and Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and notify the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service hereof whether such respondent has complied with this order, and if so, the manner in which compliance has been made, pursuant to Rule 1 (c) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 CFR 201.3).

It is Further Ordered, That the proceeding be, and is hereby, discontinued.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS Lisi,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 889
UNAPPROVED SECTION 15 AGREEMENT—
NORTH ATLANTIC/BALTIC TRADE

Decided June 19, 1961

Respondents found not to have entered into or carried out before approval under Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, during 1958 or prior thereto an agreement affecting westbound trade from Gothenburg, Sweden, to the United States North Atlantic Coast. Agreement No. 7549, as amended, found to have been lawfully carried out in a fashion consistent with its terms, as heretofore approved by the Board, and Agreement No. 7549, as amended, should not be disapproved.


T. K. Roche for respondents Swedish American Line and Transatlantic Steamship Co., Ltd.

William J. Smith, Jr., as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

The Board by an order dated January 15, 1960 and supplemented April 4, 1960 ordered that an investigation be instituted to determine: 1. whether any of the persons named as respondents have carried out before approval under Sec. 15 any agreement requiring such approval in violation of Sec. 15; 2. whether Agreement No. 7549 as amended has been lawfully carried out; and 3. whether Agreement No. 7549 should be disapproved. Hearings were held and briefs filed followed by a recommended decision of the Examiner. Exceptions and replies were filed and we have heard oral argument.
The Examiner concluded that the respondents should be found not to have entered into or carried out before approval under Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act) during 1958 or prior thereto an agreement affecting the westbound trade from Sweden to the United States and that Agreement No. 7549 as amended has been lawfully carried out consistently with its terms and should not be disapproved.

The Examiner found that Agreement No. 7549 dated October 17, 1945 had been approved by the Board on December 4, 1945, and has never been considered by the parties to be inoperable. Amendment No. 1 of the agreement was likewise filed and approved March 5, 1946, and is also still in effect.

The agreement provides that beginning October 27, 1945 “and continuing until cancelled by 30 days’ notice the Lines agree to alternate sailings under Swedish and American flag (every Friday from New York).” “Ships are to sail as scheduled, loaded or not loaded . . .” The purpose of the alternating sailings “is to maintain a regular service to Sweden with an approximately even division of Swedish and U.S. freight, East and West bound, originating from or destined to U.S. North Atlantic Ports, between Swedish and American flag ships, both from a freight-revenue point of view and of volume.” The amendment provides that “the previously agreed alternate sailings under Swedish and American flags every Friday from New York . . . be increased from time to time as mutually agreed by the two parties in such a manner as . . . to carry out the purpose of the Agreement as to an even distribution of freight.”

In 1946 trade prospects changed and the parties amended the original agreement to provide that alternate sailings be increased from time to time as mutually agreed in such a manner as to best serve the trade. As trade has developed, Swedish American sails out of New York weekly and Moore-McCormack now goes out about 3 times a month, weather permitting.

None of the respondents has ever considered the agreements to be inoperative and the changes in departures have improved services.

By a letter dated July 28, 1958, the President of Moore-McCormack wrote to the Director of Swedish American concerning the former’s desire to serve Gothenburg westbound. Moore-McCormack indicated an intention to have a sailing a month westbound from Gothenburg with the time of the month to be decided upon
after consultation. A copy of this letter was not filed with the Board.

The foregoing facts were found by the Examiner and the Board takes no exception thereto.

Objection is made to the finding of the Examiner—1. that the subject agreement has never been considered by the parties to be inoperative, and 2. that the discontinuance of alternating sailings by Moore-McCormack and Swedish American was consistent with the amended agreement. Under these circumstances, Public Counsel excepts to the failure of the examiner to find that respondents have violated Sec. 15 of the Act by modifying or cancelling Agreement No. 7549 without Board approval.

We find however that the changes in respondents' pattern of sailings are consistent with their undertakings and represent adjustments to the circumstances. The changes are operating matters comparable to current rate changes which need not be filed as agreements under Sec. 15.

The correspondence between the officers of the two respondent lines is merely an implementation of the basic agreement which has been approved and which is still operative.

In conclusion we find that no agreement of the type described in Sec. 15 of the Act affecting westbound trade from Gothenburg, Sweden to the United States North Atlantic coast was entered into or carried on without approval of the Board during 1958 or prior thereto by the respondents and that Agreement No. 7549 has been performed according to its terms as heretofore approved by the Board and that said Agreement No. 7549 as amended should not be disapproved.

An order discontinuing this proceeding will be entered.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 19th day of June, 1961.

No. 889

UNAPPROVED SECTION 15 AGREEMENT—

NORTH ATLANTIC/BALTIC TRADE

This proceeding having been instituted by the Board upon its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted, and investigation of the things and matters involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is Ordered, That this proceeding be, and it is hereby, discontinued.

BY THE BOARD.

(Sgd.) THOMAS L ISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.

732-047 O-64-22
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

No. S–125

MOORE-MCCORMACK LINES, INC.—
APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 805(a)

Decided June 23, 1961

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., granted written permission under Section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its vessel, the SS ROBIN MOWBRAY, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one eastbound intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products from United States Pacific North West ports to Wilmington, Del., Camden, N. J., and Baltimore, Md., commencing on or about June 26, 1961, since granting of the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation, operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade; and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

John R. Ewers, for applicant.

Donald Brunner, as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., filed an application for written permission under Section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1223) (the Act) for its vessel, the SS ROBIN MOWBRAY, presently under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to engage in one eastbound intercoastal voyage carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products commencing at United States Pacific North West ports on or about June 26, 1961, for discharge at Wilmington, Del., Camden, N. J., and Baltimore, Md.

Section 805 (a) is set forth in Appendix “A” attached hereto.
The application was duly noticed in the Federal Register of June 17, 1961, (26 F.R. 5438). Hearing was held on June 23, 1961. No parties intervened in opposition to the granting of the requested permission.

The testimony in this case shows that States Marine has cargo bookings of approximately 6½ million feet of lumber and lumber products. States Marine advises that it has been unable to obtain any other suitable ship for this position. This sailing, which is scheduled to commence shortly after loading on June 26, 1961, will not increase the normal pattern of scheduling in States Marine Lines, Inc. eastbound intercoastal service.

On this record it is found that the granting of the requested permission will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation, operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, or be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.

6 M.A.
Section 805(a):

"It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters, or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, that if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

"If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations; and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 765

INVESTIGATION OF PRACTICES, OPERATIONS, ACTIONS, AND AGREEMENTS OF OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND RELATED MATTERS, AND PROPOSED REVISION OF GENERAL ORDER 72 (46 CFR 244)

No. 831

INVESTIGATION OF PRACTICES AND AGREEMENTS OF COMMON CARRIERS BY WATER IN CONNECTION WITH PAYMENT OF BROKERAGE OR OTHER FEES TO OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND FREIGHT BROKERS

Decided June 29, 1961

1. Performance by forwarders of forwarding services free of charge or at non-compensatory charges to shippers, and receipt of brokerage from carriers on the shipments, found to violate section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

2. Forwarders, in assessing charges to shippers in varying amounts, adding disguised markups to charges for accessorial services procured for their shippers, and performing forwarding services free or at non-compensatory charges for some shippers and not for others, found to give undue or unreasonable preference to some shippers and subject others to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, in violation of section 16 First of the Act, and to engage in unjust and unreasonable practices in violation of section 17 of the Act.

3. Forwarders found to have failed to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property and the practices of forwarders in connection therewith found unjust and unreasonable, in violation of section 17 of the Act.

4. Performance by carriers of forwarding services free or at non-compensatory charges to shippers found to violate section 16 Second of the Act.
5. Payments by carriers to forwarders of brokerage, resulting in indirect rebates to shippers through the performance by forwarders of forwarding services free or at non-compensatory charges in violation of section 16 of the Act, found to be an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of section 17 of the Act.

6. Violations of the Act as shown above found to have occurred regularly, and unjust and unreasonable practices relating to and in connection with the receiving, handling, storing, and delivering of property found to exist. Just and reasonable rules and regulations in connection therewith determined, prescribed, and ordered enforced.

7. Forwarders and carriers found to have entered into, and carried out, agreements or arrangements providing for the regulation of competition, pooling or apportioning of earnings, or cooperative working arrangements, without prior approval of the Board, in violation of section 15 of the Act.

8. Findings in prior decisions cited in order in No. 831 that agreements between carriers prohibiting payment of brokerage, or limiting brokerage to less than 1½ percent of freight charges, are or would be detrimental to the commerce of the United States, found no longer valid.


J. Richard Townsend for Pacific Coast Customs and Freight Brokers Association and Los Angeles Customs and Freight Brokers Association, Inc., respondents and interveners.


G. M. Footner for Baltimore Custom House Brokers and Forwarders Association, respondent and intervener.

Robert Eikel and E. C. Leutsch for Texas Ocean Freight Forwarders Association, respondent.


Paul J. Coughlin for Judson Sheldon International Division of National Carloading Corporation, respondent.


Frank G. Wittenberg for Universal Transport Corporation, respondent.

George F. Galland for American Union Transport, Inc., respondent.

Hyman I. Malatzky, respondent and intervener, pro se.
Roger Roughton for Thomson & Earle, Inc., respondent.
Charles I. Runi for Parker Commission Co., respondent.
Cyrus C. Guidry for Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, intervener.
Chas. R. Seal for Virginia State Ports Authority, Intervener.
T. W. Titsworth for Ebasco Services Incorporated, respondent.
Leonard G. James for Capca Freight Conference, Pacific Coast, Caribbean Sea Ports Conference, Pacific Coast European Freight Conference, Pacific Coast/Mexico Freight Conference, Pacific Coast/Panama Canal Freight Conference, Pacific Coast/River Plate Brazil Freight Conference, Pacific Indonesian Conference, Pacific Straits Conference, and Pacific/West Coast of South America Conference, respondents.
Odell Kominers, Mark P. Schlefer, J. Alton Boyer, and John Cunningham for United States Atlantic & Gulf-Puerto Rico Conference, respondent.
John R. Mahoney for Associated Latin American Steamship Conferences, respondent.
Herman Goldman, Elkan Turk, and Elkan Turk, Jr., for Wilhelmensens Dampskibsaktieselskab; A/S Den Norske Afrika-O
Australieline; A/S Tonsberg; A/S Tankfart I; A/S Tankfart IV; A/S Tankfart V; A/S Tankfart VI; Compagnie Maritime Belge, S. A. Compagnie Maritime Congolaise, S.C.R.L.; Skibsaktieselskapet Varild; Skibsaktieselskapet Marina; Skibsaktieselskapet Sangstad; Skibsaktieselskapet Solstad; Aktieselskabet Glittre; Dampskibsinteressentskabet Garonne; Aktieselskabet Standard; Fearnley & Egers Befragtningsforretning A/S; Skibsaktieselskapet Siljestad; Dampskibsaktieselskabet International; Skibsaktieselskapet Mandeville; and Skibsaktieselskapet Goodwill, respondents.

William L. Hamm for Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., respondent.

Alan B. Aldwell for Matson Navigation Company and The Oceanic Steamship Company, respondents.

Clarence J. Koontz, Malcolm D. Miller, F. W. Denniston, and J. H. Macomber, Jr., for Administrator of General Services, intervener.

Louis J. Lefkowitz and J. Bruce McDonald for State of New York, intervener.


Thomas F. Lynch for United States Steel Export Company, intervener.


Elmer C. Maddy for witness George F. Foley appearing under subpoena.

C. Leonard Gordon for witness George H. Bernard appearing under subpoena.

Elliott B. Nixon for witness C. R. Andrews appearing under subpoena.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

These proceedings were consolidated for hearing, present related issues, and will be disposed of in one report.

In No. 765, we instituted a general investigation into the practices of ocean freight forwarders by order of October 6, 1954, with the view of amending or supplementing General Order 72 regulating the business practices of such freight forwarders, 46 CFR Part 244, or taking such other action as might be warranted by the record. Subsequently, by notice of proposed rule making issued March 11, 1957, and published in the Federal Register of March 19, 1957, 22 F.R. 1779, we instituted a rule-making proceeding pursuant to section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 1003, proposing a revision of General Order 72.

Petitions were filed by interested ocean freight forwarder associations, requesting that the rule-making proceeding be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. These petitions were denied, Proposed Rules Governing Freight Forwarders, 5 F.M.B. 328 (1957), on the ground, among others, that certain of the arguments advanced were premature. The jurisdictional issues were accordingly again raised at the outset of the hearings herein.

In an order of January 3, 1958, in No. 765, published in the Federal Register of January 15, 1958, 23 F.R. 277, we stated that the final form and scope of the rules and regulations which would ultimately be promulgated in the rule-making proceeding should properly await the conclusion of our investigation of forwarder practices, and that the rule-making proceeding should be consolidated with the investigation.

In No. 831, published in the Federal Register of January 15, 1958, 23 F.R. 278, we instituted an investigation of the practices and agreements of common carriers by water in connection with the payment of brokerage or other fees to ocean freight forwarders and freight brokers.

Hearings were held at New York, N. Y., San Francisco, Calif., and New Orleans, La., during the period November 5, 1958, through February 18, 1959. United States Steel Export Company and the Pacific Westbound Conference intervened in No. 765; Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc., the Ad-
ministrator of General Services, National Industrial Traffic League, United States Borax and Chemical Corp., Sunkist Growers, Inc., Port of New York Authority, and Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans intervened in Nos. 765 and 831; and Hyman I. Malatsky, doing business as Bergen Shipping Service, Baltimore Custom House Brokers and Forwarders Association, New York Foreign Freight Forwarders and Brokers Association, Inc., Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America, Inc., Pacific Coast Customs and Freight Brokers Association, Los Angeles Customs and Freight Brokers Association, Inc., and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico intervened in No. 831. Subsequent to the hearing, the People of the State of New York through its Department of Commerce, the City of New York, and the Virginia State Ports Authority were permitted to intervene in both proceedings. Requested findings and conclusions pursuant to Rule 13(a) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 CFR (1958 Supp.) sec. 201.221, were filed by Public Counsel, and opening and reply briefs were filed by the parties.

Our order in No. 765, including the consolidation therewith of the rule-making proceeding, contemplated a broad investigation into the practices of the ocean freight forwarding industry as a whole, with the view of promulgating revised regulations pursuant to the Shipping Act, 1916 (the Act), as might be warranted by the record. The proceeding in No. 831, on the other hand, contemplated only a reappraisal of prior holdings to the effect that concerted action by common carriers in the foreign commerce of the United States which prohibits the payment of brokerage, or limits brokerage payments to less than 1 1/4 percent of the ocean freight charges, is detrimental to the commerce of the United States within the meaning of section 15 of the Act; and a determination of the extent to which we may control or limit the payment of brokerage by individual common carriers. This order was issued with the view of issuing rules or regulations which may be required in the public interest, or taking such other action as might be warranted by the record. While the application of prior decisions was limited to steamship conferences engaged in foreign commerce (see Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170, 172), the order in No. 831 includes as respondents carriers and conferences engaged exclusively in the domestic offshore trades, and a petition to discontinue the investigation as to them was denied.

6 F.M.B.
In aid of the investigation in No. 765, questionnaires were promulgated by orders of February 17, 1958, to the ocean freight forwarding respondents and to named steamship companies, and abstracts of the information thus secured were presented in evidence.

Ocean freight forwarders, hereinafter called forwarders, are persons subject to the Act, see U.S. v. American Union Transport, 327 U.S. 437 (1946). The Act does not require permission from the Board to enter into the business of ocean freight forwarding, and, accordingly, the present regulations provide merely for registration by forwarders with the Board, see 46 CFR, sec. 244.2, et seq. As a consequence, it is easy for a person to open business as a forwarder, and the industry is overcrowded and extremely competitive. This makes it possible for employees of a forwarder to divert clients from their employer and to set up their own forwarding businesses. One forwarder located in New York has seen eight forwarding firms started by his ex-employees.

THE FORWARDING INDUSTRY

Forwarders are generally located in port cities, although some maintain offices in principal interior cities such as Denver, Colo., Minneapolis, Minn., and Washington, D. C., and there are forwarders registered with the Board at every port of commercial significance in the United States and its possessions. In essence, they act as the export departments for their shipper clients. In making export shipments, it is necessary that the cargo be booked aboard a carrier and moved to shipside, that shipping documents be prepared and processed, that in the case of foreign shipments export declarations be prepared and cleared through the United States Customs Bureau, that in some instances consular invoices required by the country of destination be prepared and processed, and in some cases accessorial services such as crating, recoopering, and warehousing be furnished or provided at the port city.

In almost every instance shown of record, the services of forwarders are engaged by the shipper or consignee of the cargo, and there is no indication that any contractual relationship exists between the forwarders as such and carriers. A few large shippers, engaged extensively in foreign commerce, maintain their own export departments, and perform their own forwarding, but in the great majority of instances the volume of freight exported by the average exporter does not justify the maintenance by him of a full-time export traffic department at the ports. For example,
there are more than 17,000 merchants who have executed exclusive service contracts with the Trans-Atlantic Associated Freight Conferences, but only about 20 of these maintain export departments at the port of New York.

Except in the instances noted above, exporters in the United States are dependent upon the forwarders to perform the essential services required to accomplish the exportation of their goods. For the most part, the exporters are themselves unfamiliar with the technical aspects of forwarding, and even when they are located in port cities they rely upon forwarders to handle these matters. It can be said, therefore, as this record bears out, that the forwarding industry is an integral part of the commerce of the United States, and makes a valuable contribution to foreign trade through its function of relieving exporters from many details and formalities connected with export shipments. See Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, supra, at 173-4.

The record discloses in detail the various services provided by forwarders. While not all of them are necessary with regard to each export shipment, the principal ones enumerated above must be performed in every instance, either by a forwarder or by the shipper. The forwarders’ services include the following: (1) Preliminary to movement of the cargo, advising the shipper-client as to the best port to use, based on a consideration of inland freight rates, frequency of vessel services, congestion at the various ports, and the availability at a particular port of heavy-lift equipment or other special equipment required; securing an export license if required, or reviewing the export license obtained by the shipper; and examination of the letter of credit to insure that compliance therewith can be effected. (2) Tracing the movement of the cargo to the port, and taking action to expedite it if necessary. (3) Reserving vessel space. (4) Preparation of a dock receipt, an export declaration, a delivery order directing the movement of the cargo to the pier and delivery thereof to the inland carrier, and an ocean bill of lading in the number of copies required for the use of the shipper and carrier. (5) Clearing the export declaration with the Customs Bureau, delivering the bill of lading and copy of the export declaration to the carrier, preparing and processing through consular officials the consular invoice, and making a complete set of the documents to conform with the letter of credit. (6) Coordinating the movement of the cargo to shipside to coincide with the loading schedules of the carrier. (7) Consolidating separate cargo lots for one shipment.
or consolidating several small shipments for movement on one bill of lading to avoid minimum charges. (8) Arranging for accessorail services, such as the placement of marine insurance, cartage on small shipments, cooperage to repair damaged packages or for export packing or crating at the port city, and storage or warehousing to await the arrival of additional cargo lots or to accommodate cargo missing the vessel. (9) Payment of the ocean freight to the carrier on behalf of the shipper. (10) Assembling the documents in compliance with the letter of credit and delivering them to the bank.

With respect to a substantial portion of the shipments handled by forwarders, they are authorized by their shipper clients to arrange for the booking of the cargo, and to select the carrier over whose line the shipment will move. In performing this function, the forwarder testimony of record is unanimously to the effect that the forwarder's primary obligation is to the shipper, and that selection of the carrier is generally made with the view of securing the earliest possible delivery at destination consistent with good service. It is clear, however, that the forwarders are in a position with respect to shipments for which they have booking authority to favor one carrier over another where there is competitive service to the destination port. For this reason, the forwarders are regularly solicited for business by the carriers. On rare occasions, forwarders are requested by carriers to secure so-called "spot" cargo when a particular vessel is in danger of sailing light, and they are sometimes able to secure from their shipper clients such spot cargo, but specific instances cited of record are few. Shippers are likewise directly solicited for spot cargo.

Some forwarders also perform functions not directly related to the handling of specific shipments, which tend to develop foreign trade. In connection with the solicitation of business for their own account, they sometimes induce shippers to enter into the export business. Some of them prepare bulletins compiling the sailing schedules and rates of different carriers, port handling charges, and inland rates, for dissemination to their shipper clients. A few maintain representation abroad for the solicitation of business from foreign consignees, or travel abroad for the same purpose, and are sometimes instrumental in bringing together foreign consumers and domestic producers. The record indicates, however, that the growth and development of our foreign export trade depend primarily upon the sales efforts of the exporters
themselves. Forwarders sometimes intercede on behalf of their shipper clients for rate adjustments by the carriers, both inland and ocean, in order to facilitate the movement of goods produced in the United States at landed costs competitive with goods produced elsewhere. Forwarders are also instrumental in securing from their shipper clients the execution of exclusive service contracts with steamship conferences, in order that their clients may be entitled to the lower contract rates in those situations where conferences maintain dual rate systems.

Forwarders generally receive their revenues from two sources. Except as noted below, they bill their shipper clients for the various services performed by them, as discussed in detail infra. In addition, on the great majority of the shipments handled by them, they receive so-called brokerage payments from the ocean carriers. The importance of the brokerage payments to the revenue position of the forwarders is indicated by Table I below, which consists of a compilation of the data furnished by the forwarders responding to the questionnaires mentioned above. The brokerage received as shown in the table corresponds closely with the total amount of brokerage reported as paid by the carriers in 1957 of $11,284,748.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity and Revenues of Forwarders in 1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of No. on which Brokerage Forwarders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of of which Brokerage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forwarders shipments brokerage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forwarded received received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATLANTIC COAST 897 1,550,621 1,166,702 7,946,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GULF COAST 150 238,790 163,411 2,105,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACIFIC COAST 146 155,307 101,071 929,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-OCEAN 80 51,502 23,771 127,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS 1,273 1,996,220 1,454,955 11,109,131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is substantial variation in the size and activity of the individual forwarders. More than 500 forwarders handled less than 100 shipments each in 1957, while several processed over 20,000 shipments. Of the 1,273 forwarders responding to the questionnaires, 283 or 22 percent handled no shipments at all in 1957, 221 or 17 percent handled between 1 and 99 shipments, and 219 or 17 percent handled between 100 and 499 shipments. Forwarders in order to function efficiently must keep abreast of

1 Whether “brokerage” as used in this report can be construed to mean brokerage fees in the strict sense of the latter term is doubtful, in view of the discussion infra.
changes in traffic patterns and in the regulations of our own and foreign governments. There is evidence of record to the effect that a forwarder should handle a substantial volume of traffic, 500 shipments or more annually, in order to maintain current acquaintance with changing conditions in the trades. Some of the larger forwarders employ persons specializing in the commercial practices of the various trade areas.

Table II below shows the extent of forwarder activity at the major ports of the United States in 1957, and the extent of the dependence of forwarders at the various ports and as a whole upon brokerage payments. Of the total of 919 forwarders reporting income from brokerage and forwarding fees separately, 124 received more than 50 percent of their income from brokerage.

**Table II.—Forwarder Activity at Major Ports in 1957**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of</th>
<th>Shipments handled</th>
<th>Percent of brokerage to total income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>forwarders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, Mass.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, N. Y.</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>1,407,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, Pa.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore, Md.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk, Va.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans, La.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>113,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, Tex.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle, Wash.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, Calif.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>87,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total United States</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>1,996,220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is indicated by the data shown in Table II, the port of New York is by far the leading center of activity in the forwarding industry. New York is the leading general cargo port in the United States, handling about 13 million tons annually in foreign trades. About 80 percent of the general cargo passing through the port of New York for export originates at interior ports, and the physical situation at the port requires complicated and exacting procedures to coordinate the arrival of the cargo at the port and its delivery to the pier. The tracks of most of the railroads terminate on the New Jersey side of the port, while most of the steamship piers are located on the New York side. Rail cargo therefore generally requires lighterage in order to effect delivery at shipside. In order to avoid congestion of lighters at
the piers, the steamship companies require the issuance of loading permits and the railroads require that delivery orders and accompanying vessel permits be presented at least 48 hours prior to the time of lighterage delivery specified. There are also rail tariff provisions permitting split lighterage deliveries of individual shipments combined into a single carload, which necessitates close coordination at the port in order to effect delivery at shipside.

Because of their connections with shippers located in the interior, forwarders located at New York not only handle cargo passing through that port, but they also control a substantial amount of cargo moving through ports elsewhere in the United States. To a substantial degree, the New York forwarders through such control affect the operations of carriers and forwarders at ports other than New York, giving rise to arrangements which are discussed more fully hereafter. The influence of the New York forwarders extends even to the Pacific Coast. For example, the Pacific Coast European Conference requires that forwarders be specifically designated by their shippers before brokerage may be paid to the forwarders. At the time of the hearing, there were 308 such designations on file, and only 123 of these forwarders were located on the Pacific Coast, with the remaining 185 being located elsewhere, principally at New York.

PRACTICES OF FORWARDERS

Forwarding fees and billing.—The record in these proceedings, despite its size, discloses no discernible pattern of forwarding fees within the forwarding industry, or by any one forwarder individually. Apparently, the charges made by a forwarder to his shipper clients are established by negotiation, and vary from shipper to shipper. As testified by one forwarder, a fee of $10 for a particular service may be charged one shipper, but another who "drives a hard bargain" may get the same service for $7.50. There is intense competition within the forwarding industry, and this tends to drive the overt forwarding fees, labeled as such in the forwarder's billing, to the lowest possible levels. There are examples in the record of the printed billing forms used by several forwarders. One of these shows separate items covering inland freight; cartage; ocean freight; insurance; consular fees; preparation and/or presentation of consular documents, translations, blanks, etc.; preparation of bills of lading; forwarding fee;
customs clearance; handling draft and collections; cables, telegrams and air mail postage; and storage and/or demurrage charges. This form includes a statement that inland freight, ocean freight, or consular fees, if included, are net disbursements.

Another billing form shows separate items for inland freight, cartage, charges, ocean freight and charges, insurance charges, consular fees, cost of consular blanks, preparation of consular invoices, preparation of certificates of origin, preparation of bills of lading, forwarding fee, customs entry fee, customs duty, customs clearance, special services, postage, petties and taxes, and banking documents. This form includes the statement "Items appearing on our invoice are cash advances as an accommodation to you. We are obliged to insist upon immediate payment of our invoice of expenses otherwise it will be impossible for us to extend you credit facilities on future transactions."

A third billing form shows items of ocean freight; foreign port, government, surcharges, landing charges; consular fees and blank consular forms; preparation and handling consular invoices; certification; messenger service; inland freight and charges; insurance; arranging insurance under consignee's or shipper's policy; cartage; storage; arranging transportation, preparation and handling bill of lading and attendance; customs clearance, checking and verification for export control; cables, telegrams and telephone toll charges; postage and airmail; banking service and preparation of draft for collection; banking service, preparation of documents and handling against letter of credit; advancing ocean freight and charges; and arranging confirmation and payment to suppliers. This bill includes no forwarding fee as such, and it is the only bill form indicated of record which informs the shipper client that brokerage payments from the carriers might be received. This form includes the statement:

The charges separately listed above for "Ocean Freight", "Inland Freight", "Consular Fees", and "Foreign Port, Government, Surcharges, Landing Charges" are the exact amounts actually paid out by us in each instance for your account. In accordance with our agreement with you, and as specified in the terms and conditions of our Acknowledgment of Shipping Instructions heretofore sent you, our profit, in addition to our direct costs, expenses and disbursements incurred for your account, is a component of the other items detailed in this Bill of Charges. As agreed as aforesaid, we are separately compensated for our services to the ocean carrier in respect of this shipment by the steamship company's payment to us of a commission at the rate of 1¼% of such carrier's charge (itemized above) for Ocean Freight.
The present regulations (46 CFR sec. 244.7) require, among other things, that forwarders shall use invoices or other forms of billing which state separately the amount of insurance premiums actually disbursed for insurance bought in the name of the shipper or consignee, and the amount charged for each accessorl service performed. A common practice, particularly among the New York forwarders, is for the forwarder to mark up the charges for these accessorl services above the amounts actually disbursed in his billing to the shipper client. In numerous instances, marine insurance is secured by the shipper under his own policy, leaving the actual placement of the insurance upon specific shipments and the payment of the premiums to the forwarder. In these circumstances, there is no indication that the billing to the shipper includes markups in contravention of the regulation. In other cases, however, insurance is placed by the forwarder under his own open marine insurance policy, and the forwarder charges the shipper more than the cost of the insurance, generally without advising the shipper that the latter is paying more than the cost of the insurance alone. These markups, so far as this record shows, are imposed in a random fashion, vary from shipper to shipper and from shipment to shipment, and appear to bear no relation to the cost to the forwarder for his services of placing the insurance, despite the testimony of some forwarders that the markups represent legitimate service charges covering the work necessary to secure insurance coverage,

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*This section provides:

244.7 Billing Practices. All forwarders shall use invoices or other forms of billing which state separately and specifically, as to each shipment:

- (a) the amount of ocean freight assessed by the carrier;
- (b) the amount of consular fees paid to consular authorities;
- (c) the amount of insurance premiums actually disbursed for insurance bought in the name of the shipper or consignee;
- (d) The amount charged for each accessorl service performed in connection with the shipment;
- (e) other charges.

Provided, however, that forwarders who offer to the public at large to forward small shipments for uniform charges available to all and duly filed with the Federal Maritime Board, shall not be required to itemize the components of such uniform charges on shipments as to which the charges shall have been stated to the shipper at time of shipment, and accepted by the shipper by payment; but if such forwarders procure marine insurance to cover such shipments, they must state their total charge for such insurance, inclusive of premiums and placing fees, separately from the aforementioned uniform charge.
preparation of insurance certificates, and handling of claims where necessary. Table III below illustrates the practices of the forwarders in this respect, showing the more extreme amounts of markup from among the instances shown of record.

**Table III.—Markup of Insurance Charges by Forwarders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forwarder</th>
<th>Insurance premium</th>
<th>Markup</th>
<th>Percent of markup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hasman Shipping Corporation</td>
<td>$ 26.25</td>
<td>$ 36.75</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>46.17</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmos Shipping Co., Inc.</td>
<td>44.15</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>22.47</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presto Shipping Agency</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. C. Andrews &amp; Co., Inc.</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>144.40</td>
<td>115.52</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Weisel &amp; Co.</td>
<td>221.87</td>
<td>53.15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>225.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Expediters, Inc.</td>
<td>32.43</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>23.90</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The extent of variation in the practice of marking up insurance charges as between different shippers by one forwarder is illustrated by evidence concerning D. C. Andrews & Co., Inc. During November 1957 this forwarder marked up the insurance charges on 9 shipments of one shipper 76 percent or a total of $54.71, and on 4 shipments of another shipper 56 percent or a total of $50.87, while on 16 shipments handled for two other shippers there was no markup at all. The alertness of shippers in dealing with forwarders is a factor in determining whether a markup will be imposed, and its amount. If a shipper is not aware of the practice, he is more likely to bear the added charge. There is testimony to the effect that the markup is based on what the traffic will bear, and that there is no standard basis for determining the amount of the markup. One forwarder testified that as a matter of policy he attempted to mark up the insurance charges on shipments to a particular area by one percent of the insured value of the shipments, but the evidence as to specific shipments shows wide variations from this policy. Because of their volume of shipments, forwarders under their own open policies are sometimes able to obtain insurance at lower costs, including the markups, to the shippers than could be obtained by the shippers themselves. In instances where shippers maintain their own marine insurance policies, they sometimes request the forwarders to place insurance under the forwarders’ policies when...
the claim experience on particular types of shipments or to particular areas is unfavorable, in order to protect the loss ratio under the shippers' own policies which bears on the premium rates.

Forwarders are frequently requested to arrange for cartage within the port area on shipments. As in the case of insurance, it is common for the New York forwarders to mark up the cartage charges to the shippers above the amounts disbursed for this purpose. There is evidence that in one instance ocean freight charges were also marked up, in contravention of the regulation, but no indication that this practice is widespread, since freight rates are generally readily ascertainable by the shippers.

The record leaves little doubt that the practice of marking up accessorrial charges is induced by intense competition within the forwarding industry, which as indicated above tends to drive forwarding fees to unremunerative levels, and the markups provide a means for the forwarders to recover their costs of arranging for the accessorrial services and of other forwarding services without endangering their competitive position, since the marked up charges are disguised and the amounts thereof unknown to the shippers.

The responses of the forwarders to the questionnaires show that of 1,273 forwarders responding, 226 or about 18 percent admitted doing some free forwarding during 1957. Under this practice, the forwarding services are provided without charge to the shipper. It is likewise caused by competition between forwarders, and is made possible by the receipt of so called brokerage payments from the carriers. Obviously, free forwarding services are furnished only to those shippers whose shipments earn sufficient brokerage to pay the cost of forwarding, others being charged fees even though brokerage is collected on their shipments. One Pacific coast forwarder provides free forwarding services for 11 of his shipper clients. During the last six months of 1958 the amount of brokerage received on these 11 accounts was $19,073, and was $29 on one account and ranged from $465 to $5,536 on the other 10 accounts. Generally only the larger shippers are favored with free forwarding services.

The General Services Administration handles export shipments for a number of Federal agencies. Until May 1958 it utilized forwarders registered with the Board and included in a special list, who applied for the privilege of performing free forwarding services. These free forwarding services were not actively solicited.
by the General Services Administration. During 1957, free forwarding services were offered by 128 forwarders, 96 on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and 32 on the Pacific coast. The shipments were rotated among the various forwarders every 30 days at New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and every 60 days at other ports. In 1957, 82 such forwarders handled 3,274 shipments for the General Services Administration under their offers to perform free forwarding, and the total ocean freight charges on these shipments were $4,364,870. If so called brokerage was received on all of these shipments by the forwarders at the usual rate of 1¼ percent, it amounted to $54,561, or an average of $16.66 per shipment. Table I indicates that the average income per shipment from forwarding fees and brokerage combined in 1957 was $17.75.

In March 1958 the Comptroller General ruled in Transportation—Freight Forwarders—Free or Reduced Rates for Services, 37 Comp. Gen. 601, that the acceptance by a Federal agency of free forwarding services or forwarding at rates reduced by the forwarder in contemplation of the receipt of brokerage, would be in violation of section 16 of the Act. Upon receipt of this ruling, the General Services Administration changed its policies regarding forwarding, and issued invitations to forwarders to bid for the performance of such services. The services sought included preparation and processing of export declarations; preparation and processing of ocean bills of lading, dock receipts, and delivery orders; and processing of consular invoices. The specifications included a condition that any bid submitted which stated that it is conditioned upon the receipt of a brokerage charge for performing, in part or in whole, the forwarding services outlined would be disqualified. On berth general cargo, the bids received from east coast forwarders and opened on September 23, 1958, ranged from no charge and 1 cent per shipment to $25 per shipment, and one New York forwarder offered to pay the Government 25 cents per shipment for the privilege of handling the shipments. East coast bids accepted under this invitation were no charge at Savannah, 1 cent per shipment at New York, 10 cents per shipment at Baltimore, and ranged from $5 to $10 per shipment at other ports. Bids accepted at Gulf and Pacific coast ports ranged from no charge at Los Angeles and $1.50 per shipment at New Orleans upward to $7.50 per shipment.

While there is no definitive cost evidence of record, there is an indication that at some time prior to 1955 forwarder costs at New
York averaged $2.76 for preparation and processing of the export declaration, $4.28 for preparation and processing of consular invoices, and $8.89 for preparation and processing of ocean bills of lading and related dock receipts and delivery orders, or a total of $15.93 per shipment for these services alone. There is also substantial evidence clearly indicating that as a whole, forwarding fees as such, including markups on accessorial charges, do not fully cover the costs of performance by the forwarders of the services performed by them, and that the receipt of brokerage is necessary in order for them to recover their costs of operation and realize a profit.

Monarch Finer Foods, a west coast manufacturer of food products, located at San Francisco, exports from numerous ports throughout the country. It maintains its own export department in San Francisco and there performs all of its own forwarding services, and retains a forwarder in New York to handle shipments moving through the latter port. This shipper formerly paid its New York forwarder $300 per month on a retainer basis. In December 1953, Gentry Shipping Co., a New York forwarder, was given the account for a retainer of $150 per month, and a promise of brokerage on shipments moving through San Francisco. At the time, the shipper was still performing its own forwarding at San Francisco, and no forwarder was collecting brokerage on the shipments. In order to accomplish the arrangement, a fictitious branch office of the forwarder was set up in San Francisco, headed by the shipper's office manager, who received a fee from Gentry. Brokerage thereafter was collected from west coast carriers on west coast shipments, even though the forwarder performed no services thereon, and claims for brokerage were made upon the carriers, and paid by the latter, on shipments which moved prior to the date of certification of the forwarder to the west coast carriers by the shipper. In this instance, forwarding services at New York for the shipper were partially compensated for by the receipt of unearned brokerage on west coast shipments.

Agreements.—Frequently a forwarder in one port will control the traffic of a shipper who exports from other ports, and this situation is most prevalent among the New York forwarders. In these instances, the New York forwarders have entered into agreements or arrangements with forwarders at other ports, such

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3 The name was changed to Consolidated Food Products during the course of the events here related.
as Baltimore, New Orleans, and San Francisco, under which the out port forwarders will handle the shipments. Compensation to the outport forwarder is usually made by a split of the brokerage payments received from the carriers. About 80 such agreements have been filed with and approved by the Board under section 15 of the Act, but the record indicates that there are numerous such agreements in existence which have not been submitted for approval.

In order to avoid, where possible, the necessity of splitting brokerage payments, the New York forwarders have also entered into arrangements with the ocean carriers under which the work necessary to complete forwarding services, such as clearance of the export declarations and processing of consular invoices, is accomplished by the ocean carriers without charge at ports such as Boston and Baltimore, and the Southern U.S. Atlantic ports of Charleston and Savannah. Pursuant to these arrangements, the New York forwarders have diverted cargo from New Orleans to Savannah and Charleston in order to avoid the splitting of brokerage with New Orleans forwarders, because carriers have refused to perform outport forwarding services or the completion thereof at New Orleans. The forwarders at Boston and Baltimore have requested that the carriers discontinue their performance of free forwarding services for the New York forwarders, or alternatively that like services be performed at New York on behalf of the Boston and Baltimore forwarders, but these requests have been refused. It has been estimated that the Baltimore forwarders are deprived of revenues amounting to about $125,000 annually because of these practices.

Relationship between forwarders and shippers.—Several instances are shown of record wherein relationships exist between forwarders and shippers or employees and stockholders of shippers to the extent that the receipt by the forwarders of brokerage payments may constitute direct or indirect rebates in violation of section 16 of the Act, as found by the Board in Samuel Kaye—Collection of Brokerage/Misclassification, 5 F.M.B. 385 (1958), and Luis (Louis) A. Pereira—Collection of Brokerage, 5 F.M.B. 400 (1958). The Ford Motor Company employs a forwarder, the J. R. Willever Company, which prior to 1958 performed no services whatsoever, all of the forwarding work being performed by the Ford Motor Company, but which was permitted to collect brokerage payments on all of the shipments exported by Ford. Brokerage payments amounted to almost $200,000 in 1957. Prior
to 1956, 90 percent of the stock of Willever was held by members of the Ford family. The record does not disclose the present relationship between Willever and the Ford Motor Company, but Willever now books all Ford Motor Company shipments with the carriers and collects brokerage thereon, without charge to the Ford Motor Company, and all other forwarding services are performed by the latter.

The situation with regard to Monarch Finer Foods has previously been detailed. Studebaker-Packard Corporation does practically all of its own forwarding work, and permits its forwarder, Commercial Shipping Company, to obtain brokerage on the shipments. From 1944 to 1955, an official of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation owned a partnership interest in Commercial Shipping Company. The Jahrett Shipping Co., Inc., a forwarder, is commonly owned, in part, with Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc., and Cooper-Jahn, Inc., shippers. Brokerage is received by this forwarder on shipments of the commonly owned shippers. Similarly, Banho Shipping Corporation, a forwarder, has common stockholders with Banho Export Co., Inc., a shipper.

BROKERAGE

General.—The practice of the payment of brokerage by ocean carriers to forwarders is of long standing, going back 60 years or more. It is a matter of prime importance in these proceedings, since brokerage constitutes a substantial portion of the revenues of forwarders as previously detailed. Therefore, before making findings concerning brokerage practices, it is necessary to determine as precisely as possible the exact nature of the relationship between forwarders and carriers, and whether the brokerage payments here involved are actually brokerage fees. Past decisions of the Board and its predecessors and of the courts have accepted the premise that forwarders, in their dealings with carriers, act in the capacity of freight brokers. See, for example, In re Gulf Brokerage and Forwarding Agreements, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 583 (1936); Agreements and Practices re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170 (1949); and U.S. v. American Union Transport, supra, at p. 442, f.n. 6. It has consistently been held by the Board and its predecessors that brokerage is compensation for securing cargo for a vessel, see Pacific Coast European Conf.—Payment of Brokerage, 5 F.M.B. 225, 233-4 (1957), and the proceedings there cited.
In none of these decisions, however, was there any reference to the accepted definition of a broker, and the elements necessary to establish a brokerage relationship. In *American Union Transport v. River Plate & Brazil Consfs.*, 5 F.M.B. 216 (1957), upheld in *American Union Transport v. United States*, 257 F. 2d 607 (1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 828, an attempt was made to distinguish between the forwarding and so-called brokerage activities of a forwarder, but this proceeding involved only the activities of a single forwarder with respect to a specific series of shipments, and the Board relied upon its prior definition of brokerage as securing cargo for the ship. The principles there enunciated are relevant, however, in determining the issues here.

A broker is an agent employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons in matters of trade, commerce, and navigation for a compensation, commonly called brokerage. 12 C.J.S. § 11. A broker may act as agent for his customer only where he has been engaged to do so by a contract of appointment or employment, which may be either express or implied. 12 C.J.S. § 12. The right of a broker to recover commissions or other remuneration for his services must be predicated on a contractual relation, he must have been employed to negotiate the contract or transaction in connection with which his services were rendered, and the employment must have been by the person from whom the commission is claimed or by some one acting for him. Where there is no employment or binding contract for the payment of commissions and the broker acts as a mere volunteer, he is not entitled to compensation for his services, although such services are the efficient cause of bringing the parties together and they result in a sale or other contract between them. 12 C.J.S. § 60.

The court in *American Union Transport v. United States*, *supra*, stated, p. 613:

The appointment of AUT [the forwarder] as a broker by Central [the shipper] could not create any liability on the part of the ocean carriers. There was no agreement by the carriers authorizing the appointment, and certainly no agreement by the members of the Conference to incur liability to AUT, with whom it had engaged in competition for the very business for which it now claims compensation by way of reparations. AUT was not the broker for the carriers to obtain the contract and there was no agreement at any time between AUT and the members of the Conference to pay brokerage.

As previously stated, in almost every instance shown of record, the services of forwarders are engaged by the shippers or consignees of the cargo, and there is no indication that any contract-
tual relationships exist between the forwarders as such and carriers. The rates of ocean carriers generally apply at ship's tackle, and it is the duty of the shipper to bring the cargo alongside the vessel ready for shipment, and not that of the ship. See *American Union Transport v. River Plate & Brazil Conf.*, supra, at 223. The services of forwarders detailed above are almost entirely directed toward performance of the shipper's duty. Much stress is laid, in the briefs and in the testimony, upon the fact that it is the duty of the carrier under the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. 193, and the Bills of Lading Act, 49 U.S.C. 100, to issue bills of lading, and that in preparing bills of lading the forwarders are acting on behalf of the carriers. See *In re Gulf Brokerage and Forwarding Agreements*, supra, at 534-5, and *Puerto Rican Rates*, 2 U.S.M.C. 117, 133 (1939). This duty of the carriers is accomplished, however, by the issuance of an original bill of lading for each shipment. The record here discloses, on the other hand, that for the use of the shipper a number of copies of the bill of lading are required, as many as 25 or 30, that the bills of lading are prepared at the request of the shipper, that a charge for this service is ordinarily made to the shipper, and that in no instance are the forwarders employed by the carriers to perform this function. The benefits to the carriers from this service are therefore merely incidental to the needs of the shippers.

In the light of the comprehensive record made herein, it is concluded that, except in those rare instances in which forwarders are retained by carriers, under either express or implied agreements, to secure spot cargo, forwarders are not brokers. It is urged by some that the long accepted definitions of "broker" and "brokerage", as such, are no longer valid in relation to the services performed by forwarders. Brokers are specifically named in section 16 of the Act among those who are forbidden to obtain or attempt to obtain rebates, and there is no indication that this term was used by the Congress in any other than its accepted sense. Settled principles of law are not so lightly discarded.

*Brokerage practices.*—In the great majority of instances, steamship conferences limit, by agreement, the payment of brokerage to 1¼ percent of the ocean freight charges, and all carriers members of such conferences pay brokerage at such rate. Only two instances of deviation from this rate are shown. The North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference tariff permits the payment of brokerage at 1¼ percent on rates up to and including $19.99 per ton, 2¼ percent on rates of $20 up to and including $22.99 per
ton, and 5 percent on rates of $23 per ton or over. These higher rates of brokerage are required by severe competition from non-conference lines, which in this trade pay brokerage as high as 10 percent. The Pacific Coast European Conference tariff limits the payment of brokerage on grain and grain products to \( \frac{3}{4} \) of 1 percent, on lumber and open rate commodities to 1 percent, and on certain commodities included in a net rate list prohibits the payment of brokerage. These tariff provisions were at issue in Pacific Coast European Conf.—Payment of Brokerage, supra, and the Board found that the prohibitions and limitations on brokerage to less than 1\( \frac{1}{4} \) percent were similar to those condemned in Agreements and Practices re Brokerage, supra, but withheld action with respect thereto pending the outcome of the instant proceedings.

In the trades from the Pacific Coast to East and South Africa, and to Australia, the carriers by individual action do not pay brokerage. The evidence is that, in the event any one of the carriers in those trades commenced the payment of brokerage, the others in order to remain competitive would need to do likewise. Non-conference carriers generally pay brokerage at the rate of 2\( \frac{1}{2} \) percent, although there are instances cited of record where brokerage payments as high as 16 percent were made, and the non-conference carriers consider their higher rates of brokerage as a competitive advantage.

Steamship conferences, as indicated above, generally fix the upper limits of brokerage rates. They recognize that brokerage payments are a competitive device to attract cargo to a particular steamship line, and that in the absence of agreed limits, if maximum rates of brokerage were left to the individual action of the carriers, brokerage would soon get out of hand.

Methods of payment of brokerage.—In the majority of instances, forwarders present invoices to carriers for brokerage claimed, and are paid by the carriers on the basis of these invoices. Generally, the carriers check only to insure that the shipments invoiced actually moved, and that no more than one brokerage payment is made on any one shipment. The carriers make no effort to ascertain that the forwarders have performed any services with respect to any shipments, and do not attempt to determine

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4 Tariff No. 24 of the North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference, of which official notice is taken pursuant to Rule 13(g) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 CFR § 201.227, increased the respective upper limits of the rates, effective January 1, 1960, to $21.99, $24.99, and $25, or over.
whether there are any relationships between forwarders and their shipper clients which would make the payment of brokerage on the shipments of such shippers rebates in violation of section 16 of the Act. The carriers insist that they rely primarily upon the fact that a particular forwarder is registered with the Board, that it is impossible for them to inquire into any possible relationships of forwarders with the shipper and an onerous burden would be imposed upon them were they to be required to ascertain whether the forwarders actually performed any services on shipments on which brokerage is claimed, in view of the great number of shipments handled by the forwarders.

With the recent development of machine accounting systems, several carriers have instituted an automatic method of payment of brokerage. Under this method, all bills of lading showing on their face that a registered forwarder is in any way connected with the shipments are collected together, information showing the name of the forwarder, the bill of lading number, and the ocean freight charges are transcribed to machine records, computations as to the amount of brokerage due are automatically made and checks issued to the forwarders, all without requiring the forwarders to submit any claims or invoices for brokerage. This automatic method of payment results in cost savings to the carriers, in that it eliminates the necessity of checking numerous forwarder invoices against carrier records, and is regarded by some as a favorable competitive device in that it results in more prompt payment of brokerage to the forwarders.

The present regulations (46 CFR § 244.13*) prohibit forwarders from receiving brokerage in cases where payment thereof would constitute a rebate, or from sharing any part of the brokerage

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*This section provides:

244.13 Brokerage. No forwarder, after the date on which he is required to register, shall accept brokerage from ocean carriers unless and until such forwarder has been assigned a registration number pursuant to these rules. Registration shall not entitle a forwarder to collect brokerage from a common carrier by water in cases where payment thereof would constitute a rebate—i.e., where the forwarder is a shipper or consignee or is the seller or purchaser of the shipment, or has any beneficial interest therein or where the forwarder directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by the shipper or consignee, or by any person having a beneficial interest in the shipment. A forwarder shall not share any part of the brokerage received from a common carrier by water with a shipper or consignee. No forwarder shall demand or accept brokerage during the period his registration number is under suspension or after his registration number has been cancelled pursuant to these rules.
with a shipper or consignee. In an attempt to insure that, so far as possible, the carriers will be protected against inadvertent rebates, they generally require a certification on the invoices of forwarders to the effect that, in compliance with section 16 of the Act, payment by the carrier and acceptance of brokerage by the forwarder are on the strict understanding that no part of the brokerage shall revert to the shipper or consignee, and that the business of the forwarder is in no sense subsidiary to that of the shipper or consignee. In the case of automatic brokerage payments, the checks of the carriers include a similar certification as a part of the endorsement, which must be executed by the forwarders when negotiating the checks. The record leaves little doubt that these certificates are executed indiscriminately by the forwarders, and that the present regulation and the certificates are ineffective in preventing rebates, direct or indirect, in cases where forwarders provide forwarding services free of charge to their shipper clients, as in American Union Transport v. River Plate & Brazil Consfs., supra, or in cases where there is an identity of interest between a particular forwarder and his shipper clients, as in Samuel Kaye—Collection of Brokerage/Misclassification, supra, and Luis (Louis) A. Pereira—Collection of Brokerage, supra.

Some shippers have requested that the carriers of their shipments do not pay brokerage to the forwarders employed by them. So far as the record discloses, these requests are honored by the carriers. A number of shippers, as indicated above, perform on their own behalf all of the services normally provided by forwarders. Such shippers do not receive brokerage payments. Some of these shippers testifying of record herein, are of the opinion that in the performance of forwarding services, their activities redound to the benefit of the carriers in exactly the same manner as the normal operations of forwarders, and that if the forwarders are entitled to brokerage, the shippers are entitled to the same privilege. All parties of record recognize that the direct or indirect payment by a carrier to a shipper of any portion of the ocean freight charges would constitute an unlawful rebate in violation of section 16 of the Act. See Payments to Shippers by Wis. & Mich. Steamship Co., 1 U.S.M.C. 744 (1938), and Rates, Charges, and Practices of L. & A. Garcia and Co., 2 U.S.M.C. 615 (1941). See also Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 444 (1917), involving a similar situation under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Unearned brokerage.—The record discloses a number of instances in which brokerage, in substantial amounts, is paid by carriers to forwarders on shipments as to which the forwarders have done little or no work. The circumstances under which the forwarders employed by Ford Motor Company, Monarch Finer Foods, and Studebaker-Packard Corporation receive brokerage have previously been detailed. Anderson, Clayton and Company, the largest cotton shipper in the Gulf, performs all of its own forwarding services at New Orleans and Houston, and the annual ocean freight charges paid are about $5 million. Forwarders perform no service whatever on the great majority of the shipments. However, Anderson Clayton certifies 10 forwarders in Houston and 20 in New Orleans on a rotating basis for the payment of brokerage.

Balfour Guthrie & Company, Ltd., exports shipments through the port of New York on which its annual freight charges are about $1 million. It maintains an export department by which the forwarding services are largely performed. Since 1945 its freight forwarder has been Nyos Incorporated. From 1948 until about 1955 Nyos performed no services whatsoever on these shipments, but was furnished with a copy of all ocean bills of lading, on the basis of which Nyos collected brokerage from the carriers. Beginning in 1955 Nyos took over the function of performing messenger service for Balfour Guthrie in connection with the forwarding of shipments, with the remainder of the forwarding work still being performed by Balfour Guthrie. Nyos is paid for the messenger service an amount in excess of the cost to Balfour Guthrie for the same service. Nyos continues to receive brokerage on all the shipments. The vice president of Balfour Guthrie and the controlling stockholder of Nyos are husband and wife, respectively.

H. A. Gogarty, Inc., a forwarder, performs forwarding services for American Paper Exports, Inc., at New Orleans, for which it receives forwarding fees. At New York, forwarding services on shipments moving through that port are all performed by the shipper. After completion of the shipments, a list of the shipments and applicable freight charges are furnished to Gogarty on the New York shipments, in order that Gogarty may collect brokerage thereon, even though the forwarder has performed no services. American Cyanamid Company has an annual freight bill of from $2 to $3 million, and does all of its own forwarding, but certifies M. J. Corbett Co. as its forwarder for the payment of brokerage. Corbett’s only service is that it occasionally gives
information to the shipper about available carrier services, without charge. Nestles Products has an office at San Francisco which performs all of the forwarding on shipments moving through that port, but it certifies its New York forwarder, Fred P. Gaskell & Co., for payment of brokerage on the San Francisco shipments. Gaskell does not maintain an office on the West coast.

There is reference in the record to additional instances in which similar practices are followed. The shippers apparently permit the collection of unearned brokerage by their forwarders as a good will gesture or as a favor, although in some of the instances cited the receipt of unearned brokerage constitutes direct or indirect rebates. The record contains no direct evidence as to why the carriers continue the payment of unearned brokerage, but the inference is unavoidable that the forwarders to whom it is paid control the routing of important cargo of other shippers, and that these forwarders are in a position to divert such cargo away from any carrier who would refuse payment of brokerage.

Domestic trades.—Brokerage is not paid by the carriers in the domestic trades, such as those between the continental United States and Hawaii and Puerto Rico regulated by the Board, and the coastwise and intercoastal trades regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In these trades rate regulation is much more comprehensive than in the case of foreign trades. Brokerage in the domestic off-shore trades subject to regulation by the Board is generally prohibited by the conference agreements.

Cargo documentation is generally less complicated in the domestic trades, in that no export declarations are required in the Hawaiian trade, and in the Puerto Rican trade need not be authenticated by the Customs Bureau prior to loading of the cargo; no consular invoices or export licenses are required; and there are no currency exchange problems. There are a limited number of carriers in these trades, and their schedules and itineraries are widely known.

As a result of the non-payment of brokerage, the forwarders do not generally solicit traffic in the domestic trades, and there is evidence to the effect that forwarders will refuse to handle shipments in these trades except as an accommodation to those of their shippers who also export in foreign commerce. Bills of lading are generally prepared by the carriers, and other forwarding services are performed by the shippers themselves, or by the carriers at charges stated in their tariffs. For example, United States Atlantic & Gulf-Puerto Rico Conference Outward
Freight Tariff No. 7, in item 18, names service charges covering the preparation and handling of extra copies of bills of lading, preparing and clearing export declarations, preparing and completing drafts or commercial invoices, arranging for transfer of cargo from terminal inland carrier to carrier's pier, and securing permits.

Competition and comprehensive regulation in the domestic trades tend to hold the freight rates to relatively low levels. The carriers engaged in the Puerto Rican trade, supported by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, express the fear that, were the carriers now to be prevented from prohibiting the payment of brokerage, the added expenses occasioned by brokerage payments to forwarders would require immediate increases in the freight rates. There is no indication that commerce in the domestic trades is adversely affected by the existing prohibitions against the payment of brokerage, and the forwarders have expressed little or no interest in these trades.

Positions of parties regarding brokerage.—There is a wealth of testimony from carriers, forwarders, and public bodies to the effect that brokerage payments constitute compensation by the carriers for the performance by forwarders of services of value to, or redounding to the benefit of, carriers, particularly the services of booking cargo or otherwise arranging cargo space, solicitation of traffic, coordination of cargo movement to shipside, preparation and processing of bills of lading, preparation and processing of dock receipts and delivery orders, preparation and processing of consular documents or export declarations, and payment of ocean freight charges. When pressed, however, none of the witnesses could specify with particularity any service which was performed for the carriers, with the exception of the preparation of the bills of lading. It has previously been found that, in the performance of this function, the forwarders are acting for their shipper clients. The carriers likewise testified unanimously that the brokerage rate of 1 1/4 percent, solely by reason of its long standing, was fair and reasonable. In fact, no individual carrier, other than those engaged in the Pacific Coast/ East and South Africa trade where no brokerage is paid, opposed on this record the payment of brokerage to forwarders.

Conference chairmen and officials on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts generally supported the payment of brokerage, except in those instances where, prior to the decision in Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, supra, the conference agreements had
contained a prohibition against such payment. On the other hand, the conferences on the Pacific Coast which had, prior to that decision, generally prohibited the payment of brokerage except on overland shipments which were susceptible of movement by any coast, generally opposed the payment of brokerage. The majority of all conference officials, however, were of the opinion that rates of brokerage should be left to conference action, rather than be held to a stated minimum by Board action.

The testimony above summarized, which occupies a substantial portion of the record herein, lends little to a determination of the actual reasons for, and the nature of, brokerage payments. In our complex economy, the successful fruition of any particular business endeavor depends upon the efficient performance of many related activities. Thus, the carriers benefit as much from the efficient performance by inland carriers of port lighterage and port delivery services as they do from the efficient functioning of the forwarder industry. Brokerage, however, is paid only to the latter. It must be concluded that brokerage does not constitute compensation by the carriers for any of the services of the forwarders, since the services of the latter must necessarily be performed for the shippers in order to bring shipments into position for export.

The overwhelming conclusion drawn from the record as a whole, as found by the Examiner, is that brokerage is primarily a competitive device, utilized by the carriers to attract to themselves as much as possible of the traffic as to which the forwarders, by authorization of their shipper clients, control the routing. It is apparent that, to the extent that brokerage payments by all members of carrier conferences are generally limited to 1¼ percent, the competitive impact of brokerage is largely nullified. It comes into play only in preventing any one carrier, by individual action, from refusing to pay brokerage, since such a carrier would immediately be faced with diversion away from it of all traffic controlled by the forwarders to the maximum extent possible.

Effect of brokerage prohibitions upon commerce.—As stated in the order in Docket No. 831, it was held in Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, supra, that conference agreements in foreign commerce which prohibit the payment of brokerage, or limit brokerage payments to less than 1¼ percent of the ocean freight charges, would be detrimental to the commerce of the United States within the meaning of section 15 of the Act, and this decision was thereafter followed by our predecessors until it was
announced, in *Pacific Coast European Conf.—Payment of Brokerage, supra*, that action looking to a reconsideration thereof would be taken.

The record has been searched in vain for any probative evidence indicating that the prohibition of brokerage payments would have any adverse or detrimental effect upon the foreign commerce of the United States, limiting the definition of “foreign commerce” to the actual movement of goods in the export trades, and the promotion and development of such trades. There are numerous general assertions in the record, by forwarders and others, that if brokerage is eliminated entirely the forwarders will perforce need to increase their charges to shippers in order to recoup the lost revenues, that numerous commodities move in export on which the profit margins are narrow which could not stand the imposition of increased forwarding charges, and that the movement of such commodities would thus be adversely affected. No shipper testimony to this effect was adduced, and the shipper testimony of record, from shippers who perform their own forwarding services and do not receive brokerage, indicates to the contrary.

The record, in fact, supports the conclusion that increased forwarding charges, to the extent necessary to provide full compensation to the forwarders and a reasonable profit, should have no substantial deleterious effect upon the movement of goods in export. Such increases in forwarder charges, established to compensate for the loss of brokerage, would not have an adverse effect on our export commerce. In all trades, in recent years, increased costs of the carriers have compelled substantial increases in ocean freight rates in excess of 1 percent, without noticeable decreases in traffic attributable to this cause alone. There are, in this connection, numerous statements on the record by carriers and conference officials that brokerage payments, as such, are not reflected in the ocean freight rates, and that the cessation of such payments would not induce an immediate concurrent decrease in the rates. They recognize, however, that brokerage payments are items of expense to the carriers, and it is reasonable to assume that, if relieved of this expense, the impact of other cost increases would be minimized, and that ultimately the savings realized by the carriers from the cessation of brokerage payments would be reflected in rates which would be lower relatively. This assumption is borne out by the position of the carriers in the Puerto
Rican trade, who show that increased expenses by reason of brokerage payments would necessitate rate increases in that trade.

The carriers generally fear that, were the forwarding industry to be crippled, the necessary functions performed by the forwarders on behalf of their shippers would need to be performed in large part by the carriers themselves. In this connection, it is necessary to point out here that, as stated above, ocean freight rates generally apply at ship's tackle, and the carriers' obligations, in return for the freight charges, are limited to the receipt, transportation, and delivery of tendered shipments. It is the duty of the shipper, as pointed out in American Union Transport v. River Plate & Brazil Consfs., supra, to perform all of the functions normally performed by a forwarder to bring cargo alongside a vessel ready for shipment, and this finding was expressly upheld in American Union Transport v. United States, supra, at p. 612. It necessarily follows, therefore, that if brokerage payments providing the sole compensation for the performance of forwarding functions constitute an indirect rebate to the shipper in violation of section 16 of the Act, the performance of such functions by the carriers for shippers free or at non-compensatory charges would result in direct rebates likewise in violation of the statute. Cf. Propriety of Operating Practices—New York Warehousing, 198 I.C.C. 134, 216 I.C.C. 291. The testimony of carriers upon this point generally recognizes that if carriers were required to perform forwarding services, they would be entitled to establish charges therefor, and the statute would require that such charges be compensatory.

Many forwarders testified at length concerning the probable impact upon their operations should they lose the revenues received from the carriers in the form of brokerage payments. This impact would undoubtedly be severe, since it has previously been found that as a whole in the forwarding industry, fees charged to the shippers do not fully cover the costs of forwarders for the services performed by them. The forwarders point to the efforts of some members of their industry directed to the promotion of foreign trades, which they contend will be hampered by losses in revenue from brokerage, but the impact of these efforts upon the foreign commerce of the United States has heretofore been found to be negligible, and stem largely from the sales efforts of the forwarders in the furtherance of their own pursuits, which can logically be expected to continue.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Jurisdiction.—As indicated at the outset, several contentions relating to the jurisdiction of the Board have been raised by the forwarders. The first of these, to the effect that we have no statutory authority to institute a rule-making proceeding per se, under section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, was specifically overruled in *Proposed Rules Governing Freight Forwarders*, supra, and has been rendered moot by the consolidation of the rule-making proceeding with the proceeding in No. 765, an investigation to determine the lawfulness of the practices of forwarders with the view of amending or supplementing General Order 72 as may be warranted by the record. The forwarders agree that, upon findings of unlawfulness, we are authorized to issue rules under the Act prescribing corrective action for the future. See *California v. United States*, 320 U.S. 577 (1944).

The forwarders further contend that brokers are not persons subject to the Act, as held in *In re Gulf Brokerage and Forwarding Agreements*, supra, and that we have no authority to establish definitions for “broker,” “brokerage,” or “brokerage service.” These contentions are based upon the premise that forwarders, in relation to carriers, are brokers, which premise was heretofore found to be erroneous in law and in fact. As was held by the court in *American Union Transport v. United States*, supra, at 613:

> Even if it be true that the Conference has heretofore paid brokerage wherever the broker forwarder was “identified with the cargo”, no reason exists why the Board, under its broad power, should not have authority to distinguish between the services of a broker and those of a freight forwarder.

It is further contended that we lack jurisdiction under section 15 of the Act to review agreements by carriers prohibiting brokerage or limiting it to less than $1\frac{1}{4}$ percent of the freight charges, on the ground that such agreements are designed merely to prevent the expenditure of funds which, in the absence of such agreements, would be expended, and are therefore not the type of agreements contemplated by the statute. Section 15 of the Act specifically authorizes approval of agreements regulating competition between carriers, and this record establishes conclusively that the payments by carriers to forwarders are utilized by the carriers as a competitive device, and are recognized by them as such. In the circumstances, our jurisdiction is clear.

*Discrimination, preference and prejudice, and unreasonable practices by forwarders.*—Section 16 First of the Act makes it
unlawful for forwarders, as persons subject to the Act, directly or indirectly, to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any person or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. Section 17 of the Act, which is particularly applicable to the activities of forwarders as found by the Supreme Court in *U. S. v. American Union Transport*, supra, requires that forwarders shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property, and provides that whenever the Board finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice.

The record compels the conclusion that, in the assessment of charges by forwarders to their shippers, the practice of discrimination, preference, and prejudice is the rule rather than the exception. The charges vary from shipper to shipper for identical services, some shippers receive forwarding services free of charge or at nominal charges, and in billing for accessorail services, such as insurance and carting, most New York forwarders, who constitute the majority by far, practice unlimited discrimination in that disguised markups in some cases are added in varying amounts and in others are not added, with no apparent regard for cost of service or any other factors which should enter into the establishment and maintenance of just and reasonable charges. Such practices are *prima facie* discriminatory, *Contract Rates—Japan/Atlantic-Gulf Freight Conf.*, 4 F.M.B. 706, 735 (1955), and *Contract Routing Restrictions*, 2 U.S.M.C. 220, 225 (1939), and are thus unreasonable in the absence of justification therefor.

Rather than offer any justification for their practices as shown in the assessment of their charges, most forwarders opposed on the record any attempt to inquire into the levels of their charges, and the methods of assessment, on the ground that it would disclose the confidential relationships between the forwarders and their shipper clients. There can be nothing private or confidential in the operations of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce, *U. S. Atlantic and Gulf/Puerto Rico Rate Increase*, 5 F.M.B. 426 (1958), and the same is true with regard to any industry operating in a public calling and regulated by the Congress in the public interest, to the extent that the operations are made subject to regulation. *Smith v. Interstate Com. Comm.*, 245 U.S. 33 (1917).
Rebates.—It is now well settled that the performance by a freight forwarder of forwarding services free of charge to the shipper, and the concurrent receipt by the forwarder of brokerage from the carriers for the handling of the shipments, constitutes an indirect rebate to the shipper. American Union Transport v. United States, supra. The forwarders contend that the holdings of the court in that case should be narrowly construed, on the ground that it related to a specific set of facts surrounding specific shipments, and covered the operations of only one forwarder with respect to those particular shipments. To the contrary, this record discloses that the forwarding services performed in that case are the normal services performed by all forwarders, and that the relationship between forwarder and carrier there shown is the normal relationship between forwarders and carriers.

This record discloses that of the 1,273 forwarders responding, of which 283 did not actively engage in forwarding during 1957, 226 or almost 23 percent of the active forwarders in 1957 performed some free forwarding. Rebating of this type therefore cannot be said to occur only in isolated cases. Even more prevalent is the furnishing of forwarding services by forwarders to shippers at nominal charges, or at charges below the costs of such services. There is no real distinction, except in degree, between the furnishing of forwarding services free, and the furnishing of such services at nominal charges such as 1 cent and 10 cents per shipment in the case of the General Services Administration contracts shown or at charges lower than cost. If the former constitutes rebating, the latter does likewise, since the overall result is that the shipper, to the extent that brokerage payments subsidize the cost of forwarding services performed for him, receives his transportation for less than the rates and charges regularly established and maintained by the carriers. See Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. United States, supra.

The forwarders are generally agreed that the furnishing of forwarding services free or at non-compensatory rates is improper, and that some action should be taken to prohibit this practice, but they proposed no rules to accomplish this purpose, or suggested any other action than the exercise of our power, in situations of this character, to prescribe minimum charges for the forwarders.

The record also supports the conclusion that some carriers in the foreign export trades, though not identified of record, engage regularly in the performance of forwarding services for shippers,
and for some forwarders, free of charge. As previously indicated, such practices constitute direct rebates.

*Agreements.*—The record leaves little doubt that there are numerous arrangements between forwarders under which a forwarder at one port who controls the routing of a shipment refers that shipment to a forwarder at an out-port, the latter completes the forwarding services necessary, and brokerage and other fees are divided between the two. The forwarders contend that these arrangements are not agreements of the type contemplated by section 15 of the Act as requiring prior approval. They argue that the statute is directed principally to agreements which purport to regulate competition as between two or more persons subject to the Act. Section 15 provides among other things that all agreements controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition, pooling or apportioning earnings, or providing for exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangements, between persons subject to the Act, shall be filed for approval, and that operations under such agreements shall be unlawful until they are approved.

The agreements between forwarders here under consideration fall within these provisions. To the extent that referral to one forwarder at an outport is accomplished under such an agreement, other forwarders are denied an opportunity to compete for the traffic. The arrangements constitute cooperative working arrangements between the forwarders parties thereto for the performance of forwarding services. The arrangements contemplate, in almost every instance cited of record, a division of the revenues accruing from the performance of forwarding services between the forwarders parties thereto on an agreed basis. As shown, a number of such agreements or arrangements have been filed for approval, and no forwarder has questioned our authority to act under the statute with respect thereto. The forwarders contend that, since there may be a large number of such agreements in existence, the filing of them will create a burden for the forwarders and for us. The statute clearly places upon the parties to such arrangements the duty of filing them for approval, and proscribes operations thereunder until approval has been secured. We are required by the Act to take action with respect to such filings, and we may not shirk this duty because of its magnitude.

No parties to the proceedings have made mention of the arrangements shown of record between some forwarders and some carriers under which carriers perform the completion of forward-

6 F.M.B.
ing services at outports for forwarders. These arrangements are likewise cooperative working arrangements, required by the statute to be filed.

The record does not indicate with particularity the parties to the arrangements of both types which are in existence, but it may be concluded that the practices are rather widespread. All forwarders, and all carriers engaged in foreign commerce in the outbound trades from the United States, its territories and possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are respondents in one or the other of the proceedings here involved. All such agreements should be filed with us pursuant to Section 15.

Brokerage.—This record discloses that the payment by carriers of so-called brokerage to forwarders who render freight forwarding service to shippers of the cargo leads the forwarders into the practices of discrimination, preference, and prejudice as found above, that such payments almost always result in indirect rebates to the shippers through the performance by forwarders of forwarding services free or at non-compensatory rates or charges, that consequently the payment of brokerage by carriers is an unjust and unreasonable practice related to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property prohibited by section 17 of the Act. It follows that the payment of any fees or commissions to forwarders in connection with cargo with respect to which they render freight forwarding service by carriers must be prohibited. As to the inevitability of rebating under the present practices of forwarders, it has previously been found that at present in the forwarding industry as a whole, forwarding fees charged by forwarders to shippers do not fully cover the costs of performance by the forwarders of their forwarding services for the shippers. This is tacitly recognized in the brief of one forwarder, Universal Transport Corporation, which states:

For many years commission on freight, paid by carriers to forwarders compensated forwarders for their services to shippers, consigneers and carriers. The practice is an open one, known to all parties concerned and connected with the export of goods. It has reduced to a nominal sum and, in part, completely eliminated forwarding as a cost in the export of American products.

Reconsideration of prior decisions in No. 831.—The principal basis for the prior decisions in holding that conference prohibitions against the payment of brokerage, or limiting brokerage to less than 1 1/4 percent of ocean freight charges, would be detrimental to the commerce of the United States, is found in the finding in
Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, supra, at p. 177 that such conference actions had had and will have a serious effect upon the forwarding industry. This finding can be supported on this record, as urged by the forwarders and a number of other parties, but only if it is assumed that forwarding fees must remain at unremunerative levels with resulting indirect rebates to shippers and general disregard of the requirements of section 16 of the Act prohibiting rebates, discrimination, preference, and prejudice. On the other hand, the unregulated payment of brokerage has resulted in substantial payment by the carriers of unearned brokerage, as disclosed on this record, with consequent unnecessary dissipation of carrier revenues creating upward pressures upon ocean freight charges to the detriment of the commerce of the nation.

In addition, the prior decisions failed to recognize the true nature of brokerage of the type here involved as voluntary payments, made by the carriers as a competitive device to attract traffic or as a protective device to prevent the diversion of cargo over which the forwarders have control of routing. The continuance and recurrence of the widespread rebating resulting therefrom which this record shows to exist must cease. The safeguards included in the prior decisions to insure that an individual carrier should be free to pay or not to pay brokerage as it sees fit are, according to this record, generally of no avail, in view of the competitive pressures which prevail in the event that any brokerage is paid in a trade. There is in logic no sound reason why carriers acting in concert should be free to limit or regulate competition among themselves by imposing upper limits upon rates of brokerage, but at the same time be prevented from limiting or regulating competition among themselves by prohibiting in its entirety the payment of brokerage.

This record discloses with certainty that brokerage payments lead indirectly, through the forwarder recipients, to undesirable and unlawful practices. It must be concluded, therefore, that the prior findings under reconsideration in No. 831 are no longer valid, and are overruled.

In addition, in view of our findings above as to the violations of sections 16 and 17 of the Act which result from the payment of brokerage, and the consequent necessity for the imposition of a rule prohibiting such payments in connection with cargo with respect to which the freight forwarder renders freight forwarding service, the prior findings would be of no further material effect.
Rules.—In California v. United States, supra, it was held that when our predecessor, the Maritime Commission, found a breach of the duty imposed on those subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, by section 17 of the Act, the Commission was authorized and charged with a duty to determine and prescribe a just and reasonable regulation, and order it enforced. We have found a breach of this duty to establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to and in connection with the handling, storing or delivering of property. We have further found that existing practices on the part of both forwarders and common carriers relating to and in connection with the receiving, handling, storing and delivering of property are unjust and unreasonable.

The report of the Examiner contains a comprehensive discussion of the rules originally proposed by us, the positions of the parties with respect thereto and amendments proposed by them, the rules proposed by Public Counsel, and those recommended to us by the Examiner. It is clear that the Examiner, because of his view that the prohibition of brokerage constitutes a drastic remedy which should not be resorted to until all other measures have failed, attempted to devise rules which in his opinion would, with the cooperation of the forwarding industry, eliminate the violations of law which have been shown to stem from the payment of brokerage by the carriers. We are convinced that such half-measures will not suffice, and are of the opinion that the widespread rebating and discrimination here shown cannot reasonably be expected to cease without the total prohibition of brokerage payments to forwarders in connection with cargo with respect to which they render forwarding service. The nature of the brokerage practices and the practices of the forwarders in connection therewith, and the obvious attractions of inherently unearned compensation require this conclusion.

The Examiner proposed a rule requiring the establishment of minimum freight forwarding fees by forwarders, in order that such fees should not fall below remunerative levels with resulting indirect rebates of brokerage received by forwarders from carriers, and to eliminate discrimination, preference, and prejudice as found to exist in the charges of forwarders to shippers. These practices stem almost entirely from the brokerage practices, and elimination of the latter as found by us to be necessary should result in the establishment by the forwarders of realistic forwarding fees. We feel that the forwarders should, in their managerial discretion, be free to recast their charges to their clients, after dis-
continuance of brokerage, without prejudice to further action by us with respect thereto, upon complaint or upon our own initiative, should it be brought to our attention that the discriminations have not been eliminated.

There is set forth in the Appendix hereto the revision of General Order 72 which we find to be necessary. The rules reflect a number of the suggestions made by the parties hereto, and have been revised to eliminate redundancy. They are largely self-explanatory, and discussion herein will be limited to the most important features thereof. The definition of "freight forwarder" is similar to that originally proposed. In view of the lack of authority on the part of the Board to regulate entry into the business of freight forwarding, as previously indicated, the suggestions that only independent freight forwarders be permitted to operate cannot be given effect.

The definitions of broker, brokerage, and brokerage service are revised to conform with the recognized and settled principles of law referred to heretofore. Although the suspension or cancellation of registration numbers need not be made subject to notice and hearing since the registration numbers do not constitute licenses to do business, but are issued only to insure that those engaging in the forwarding business are made known to the Board, we feel that notice and an opportunity to be heard should be accorded before a registration is cancelled or suspended. Accordingly, section 244.5(b) provides for notice and hearing in such cases.

In section 244.5(d) registration is confined to the issuance of only one registration number to a particular forwarder, or only one of a group of forwarders under common control. The possibility of discrimination is obvious should recognition be granted to more than one business entity in such circumstances.

In section 244.7, the present regulations relating to the billing practices of forwarders are brought forward, and modified to prohibit the assessment of disguised markups in all instances which are shown on this record to result in violation of sections 16 and 17 of the Act.

Section 244.13, relating to brokerage payments, reflects our conclusions above that the receipt by forwarders and payment by carriers of brokerage in connection with shipments as to which the forwarders have performed forwarding services is violative of the statute, and is intended to prohibit brokerage payments in such instances. The provisions are not intended to prohibit the payment
of brokerage in those instances where the recipient has no other connection with the cargo than to perform the true functions of a broker. Despite the fact that section 244.14 of the rules amounts in effect to a restatement of the requirements of section 15 of the Act, we feel that they will serve to impress upon the forwarders the statutory requirements, in view of the fact that a copy of the rules will be served upon all active forwarders.

We are requiring that the revised General Order 72 will go into effect 120 days after promulgation, in order to provide a reasonable period of time for the forwarders, who will thereafter be prohibited from receipt of brokerage, to revise their charges to their clients in order to make up for the consequent loss of revenues. In fixing the effective date we assume that the forwarders will accordingly proceed forthwith.

Proposed findings and conclusions, and exceptions to the Examiner's recommended decision, have been fully considered, and except to the extent they are given effect in this report and our regulatory order, they are denied and overruled.

We conclude and specifically find, in the light of the foregoing:

1. That the performance by forwarders of forwarding services free of charge or at non-compensatory charges on shipments moving in the commerce of the United States, subject to the Act, and the receipt of so-called brokerage from common carriers by water subject to the Act on such shipments, constitute a violation of section 16 of the Act.

2. That forwarders, in assessing varying charges for like forwarding services to their shippers, in adding disguised markups to charges for accessorial services procured for their shippers, and in performing forwarding services free of charge or at non-compensatory charges for some shippers and not for others, thereby give undue and unreasonable preference or advantage to some of their shippers, and subject others of their shippers to undue and unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, in violation of section 16 First of the Act, and engage in unjust and unreasonable practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property, in violation of section 17 of the Act.

3. That forwarders have failed to establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to and connected with the receiving, handling, storing and delivering of property; and that the practices of forwarders as found in this record relating to and connected with the receiving, handling,
storing and delivering of property are unjust and unreasonable practices in violation of section 17 of the Act.

4. That the performance by common carriers subject to the Act of forwarding services free of charge or at non-compensatory charges on shipments transported by such carriers constitutes a violation of section 16 Second of the Act.

5. That payments by carriers to forwarders of brokerage relating to and in connection with the receiving, handling, storing and delivering of property result in indirect rebates to shippers through the performance by forwarders of forwarding services free or at non-compensatory rates or charges, in violation of section 16 of the Act, and that the payment of brokerage by carriers to forwarders in connection with cargo with respect to which the forwarders render freight forwarding services is an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of section 17 of the Act.

6. That violations of the Act found herein have occurred regularly and unjust and unreasonable practices exist relating to and in connection with the receiving, handling, storing and delivering of property, as found above, and that the rules and regulations shown in the Appendix hereto are just and reasonable in connection therewith, and are determined, prescribed and ordered enforced to prevent the continuance and recurrence of such violations.

7. That forwarders and carriers, not specifically identified on the record in all instances, have entered into, failed to file, carried out agreements or arrangements providing, in connection with the performance of forwarding services, for the regulation of competition, pooling or apportioning of earnings, and cooperative working arrangements, and have not secured the approval of the Board, in violation of section 15 of the Act.

8. That the findings in the prior decisions cited in the order in Docket No. 831, to the effect that agreements between common carriers by water subject to the Act prohibiting the payment of brokerage, or limiting the payment of brokerage to less than 1 1/4 percent of freight charges, are or would be detrimental to the commerce of the United States in violation of section 15 of the Act, are no longer valid. Orders in the proceedings cited carrying such findings into effect will no longer be considered effective.

An order discontinuing these proceedings will be entered.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

APPENDIX

RULES

BUSINESS PRACTICES OF FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND
OF CARRIERS IN RELATION THERETO

(GENERAL ORDER 72, REVISED)

Sec. 244.1 Definitions.
244.2 Registration.
244.3 Additional information.
244.4 Information available to public.
244.5 Registration numbers.
244.6 Registration lists.
244.7 Billing practices.
244.8 Consolidated shipments.
244.9 Special contracts.
244.10 Nondiscriminatory treatment required.
244.11 Exceptions as to special contracts.
244.12 Forwarders' receipts.
244.13 Brokerage payments.
244.14 Section 15 agreements.
244.15 Carrier performing forwarding services.
244.16 Penalties for violations.
244.17 Separability clause.
244.18 Effective date.


Sec. 244.1 Definitions. (a) “Freight forwarder” means any person engaged in the business of dispatching or facilitating shipments on behalf of other persons, by common carrier by water in transportation as defined in this part, and of handling the formalities incident to such shipments. This definition includes, without limitation, independent freight forwarders, common carriers, manufacturers, exporters, export traders, manufacturers' agents, resident buyers, brokers, commission merchants, and any other persons when they engage for and on behalf of any person other than themselves, in the aforementioned activity.

(b) “Common carrier by water” means any person engaged in transportation as defined in this part.

(c) “Transportation” means transportation of property by common carrier by water on ocean-going vessels in commerce from the United States, its territories and possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, to foreign countries, or between the United States, its territories and possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(d) “Freight forwarding service” means a service rendered by a freight forwarder, as defined in this part, in the process of dispatching or facilitating shipments on behalf of other persons, as authorized by such other persons. Such services include, but are not limited to: Examining instructions and documents received from shippers; ordering cargo to port; preparing
export declarations; booking cargo space; preparing and processing delivery orders and dock receipts; preparing instructions to truckman or lighterman, and arranging for or furnishing such facilities; preparing and processing ocean bills of lading; preparing consular documents, and arranging for their certification; arranging for or furnishing warehouse storage; arranging for insurance; clearing shipments in accordance with United States Government regulations; preparing advice notices of shipments, sending copies to bank, shipper, or consignee, as required; sending completed documents to shipper, bank, or consignee, as required; advancing necessary funds in connection with the foregoing; providing supervision in the coordination of services rendered to the shipment from origin to vessel; and giving expert advice to exporters as regards letters of credit, licenses, and inspection.

(e) "Freight forwarding fee" means any compensation paid by the shipper or consignee, or the agent of either, who engages the freight forwarder for the performance of a freight forwarding service.

(f) "Broker" means any person, not a common carrier by water and not regularly employed by any common carrier by water, who is engaged by such carrier to sell or offer for sale transportation, or who holds himself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as one who negotiates between shipper and carrier for the purchase or sale of transportation.

(g) "Brokerage service" means securing cargo for a vessel engaged in transportation as defined in this part by selling transportation or by negotiating for the purchase or sale of transportation.

(h) "Brokerage" or "brokerage fee" means compensation paid by a common carrier by water for the performance of a brokerage service.

(i) "Person" includes individuals, and corporations, partnerships, associations, and other legal entities existing under or authorized by the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any foreign country.

Sec. 244.2 Registration. (a) Each person who engages in business as a freight forwarder shall register with the Federal Maritime Board before engaging in such business. Registration shall be accomplished by executing and filing with the Federal Maritime Board Freight Forwarder Registration Form FMB-21 (set forth in paragraph (b) of this section), which will be furnished by the Federal Maritime Board upon request. All freight forwarders currently engaged in business as freight forwarders and holding registration numbers heretofore issued by the Federal Maritime Board shall, within 30 days from the effective date of the rules in this part, execute and file with the Federal Maritime Board Form FMB-21 as prescribed in this part.

(b) Form FMB-21, appended hereto, is hereby prescribed for registration under this section.

Sec. 244.3 Additional information. Registrants shall submit such additional information as the Federal Maritime Board may request from time to time, and shall notify the Federal Maritime Board of any change in facts reported to it under this part within ten days after such change occurs. Failure to comply with this section by a freight forwarder will be deemed sufficient reason to cancel his registration.
Sec. 244.4 Information available to public. Information set forth in Freight Forwarder Registration Form FMB-21 shall be public information and available for public inspection at the offices of the Federal Maritime Board.

Sec. 244.5 Registration numbers. (a) Each person who intends to engage in business as a freight forwarder and has filed the required information will be issued a registration number by the Federal Maritime Board after examination and verification of the information submitted by him and a determination that the issuance of a registration number will not be inconsistent with this part or the Shipping Act, 1916. Thereafter, such registration number shall be set forth on the registrant’s letterheads, invoices, advertising, and all other documents relating to his forwarding business. The issuance of a registration number by the Federal Maritime Board to a freight forwarder is for identification and informational purposes and does not mean that the Board has investigated and found that the freight forwarder is qualified. Use of these registration numbers in any manner other than to indicate the fact of registration with the Federal Maritime Board is prohibited.

(b) A freight forwarder’s registration may be suspended or cancelled after notice and hearing, if the Federal Maritime Board finds that the registrant has violated the rules in this part or the Shipping Act, 1916.

(c) A freight forwarder may not transfer or assign his registration number.

(d) A freight forwarder shall not be entitled to register under more than one name or to obtain more than one registration number regardless of the number of names under which he may be doing business. When two or more entities are owned or controlled by substantially the same interests they shall be treated as one entity for the purpose of registration and they shall not be entitled to separate numbers.

Sec. 244.6 Registration lists. The Board will compile periodically, and make available to the public upon request, lists of all registrants with their respective registration numbers.

Sec. 244.7 Billing practices. All freight forwarding shall use invoices or other forms of billing which state separately and specifically, as to each shipment:

(a) The amount of ocean freight assessed by the carrier;

(b) The amount of consular fees paid to consular authorities;

(c) The actual cost to the forwarder of insuring the shipment whether by a policy bought in the name of the shipper or by an open policy or otherwise;

(d) The amount charged for each accessorial service performed in connection with the shipment;

(e) Other charges.

Provided, however, That freight forwarders who offer to the public at large to forward small shipments for uniform charges available to all and duly filed with the Federal Maritime Board, shall not be required to itemize the components of such uniform charges on shipments as to which the charges shall have been stated to the shipper at time of shipment, and accepted by
the shipper for payment; but if such freight forwarders procure marine insurance to cover such shipments, they must state their total charge for such insurance, inclusive of premiums and placing fees, separately from the aforementioned uniform charge.

Sec. 244.8 Consolidated shipments. In the case of individual shipments consolidated with other individual shipments, the invoice or other form of billing concerning each shipment shall state the minimum ocean freight and consular fees that would have been payable on each shipment if shipped separately, and the amounts actually charged for these items by the freight forwarder, on the shipment in question.

Sec. 244.9 Special Contracts. All special agreements or contracts between freight forwarders and shippers or consignees shall be in writing and shall be filed with the Board within 10 days after they are signed.

Sec. 244.10 Nondiscriminatory treatment required. To the extent that special agreements or contracts are entered into by a freight forwarder with individual shippers or consignees, such freight forwarders shall not deny to other shippers or consignees similarly situated, and whose shipments are accepted by such freight forwarder, equal charges for forwarding and accessorials services to be rendered by the freight forwarder, insofar as such forwarding and accessorials services are similar to those performed for shippers or consignees holding special contracts.

Sec. 244.11 Exceptions as to special contracts. In the case of special contracts whereby the parties have agreed in advance as to the charges for services in connection with the forwarding of a shipment, the invoice or other form of billing shall refer to the agreement, in which event the charges need not be itemized.

Sec. 244.12 Forwarders' receipts. Freight forwarders' receipts for cargo shall be clearly identified as such and shall not be in form purporting to be ocean carriers' bills of lading.

Sec. 244.13 Brokerage payments. (a) No common carrier by water shall pay to a freight forwarder, and no freight forwarder shall charge or receive from any common carrier by water, either directly or indirectly, any compensation or payment of any kind whatsoever, whether called "brokerage", "commission", "fees", or by any other name, in connection with any cargo as to which the freight forwarder has performed any forwarding service as defined in paragraph 244.1(d) of this part.

(b) No freight forwarder may render, or offer to render, any forwarding service free of charge or at reduced rates in consideration of the shipper or carrier agreeing to allow or allowing the freight forwarder to receive brokerage on the shipment.

(c) Common carriers by water when acting in accordance with approved section 15 agreements or an individual carrier may make rules and regulations to assure that brokerage will not be paid under circumstances which will violate the Shipping Act, 1916, or the rules in this part.

(d) No freight forwarder or other person shall collect brokerage from a common carrier by water, and no such carrier shall pay brokerage to any freight forwarder or other person, in cases where payment thereof would
constitute a rebate, such as, for example, where the freight forwarder or other person: (1) is the shipper or consignee or is the seller or purchaser or purchasing agent of the shipment, (2) advances the purchase price of the goods shipped or guarantees payment therefor, or has any beneficial interest therein, (3) directly or indirectly, by stock ownership or otherwise, controls or is controlled by the shipper or consignee, or seller or purchaser or purchasing agent of the shipment or by any person having a beneficial interest in the shipment or person advancing the purchase price of the goods shipped or guaranteeing payment therefor, and (4) where the freight forwarder and the shipper, consignee, seller or purchaser or purchasing agent, or person advancing the purchase price of the goods shipped or guaranteeing payment therefor are owned or controlled by substantially the same interests.

(e) No freight forwarder shall share directly or indirectly any part of the brokerage deceived from a common carrier by water with a shipper, consignee, or an employee of a shipper or consignee or seller or purchaser or purchasing agent of the shipment or person advancing the purchase price of the goods shipped or guaranteeing payment therefor, or with any person having a beneficial interest in the shipment.

(f) No common carrier by water shall pay brokerage to a freight forwarder or other person when receipt of such brokerage by the freight forwarder is prohibited by the rules in this part or the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

Sec. 244.14 Section 15 agreements. (a) Copies of written agreements and true and complete memoranda of oral agreements between a freight forwarder and another freight forwarder or carrier or other person subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, or modifications or cancellations thereof, which relate to one or more of the following subjects must be filed with the Board:

(1) Fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares;
(2) Giving or receiving special rates, accommodations or other special privileges or advantages;
(3) Controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition;
(4) Pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic (including sharing or dividing forwarding or brokerage fees with another forwarder);
(5) Alloting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports;
(6) Limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried;
(7) In any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangement.

(b) Copies of all such agreements referred to in paragraph (a) of this section are required to be filed with the Federal Maritime Board accompanied by a letter stating that they are offered for filing in compliance with section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, specifically requesting the Board's approval and addressed as follows:

Federal Maritime Board,
Office of Regulations
Washington 25, D. C.
(c) All copies of memoranda or agreements, modifications or cancellations thereof submitted for the Board's approval under section 15 shall clearly show (preferably in the opening paragraph), their nature, the parties, ports and subject matter in detail, and reference to any previously filed agreements to which they may relate.

(d) All such agreements, or modifications or cancellations thereof, shall not be carried out without the prior express approval of the Board.

Sec. 244.15 Carrier performing forwarding services. Any common carrier by water performing forwarding services shall specify in his tariff the kinds of forwarding services performed by him and the charges made for such services.

Sec. 244.16 Penalties for violations. Penalties for violations of this part are prescribed by section 806 (d) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 46 U.S.C. 1228.

Sec. 244.17 Separability. The provisions of this order are not interdependent. If any portion hereof shall be enjoined, set aside, suspended, or held invalid, the validity and enforceability of all other parts shall be unaffected thereby, and shall to the full extent practicable, remain in full force and effect unless and until it is otherwise provided by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Sec. 244.18 Effective date. The rules in this part shall take effect 120 days after publication in the Federal Register.

By order of the Federal Maritime Board.

(SEAL)

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

Date:
USCOMM-MA-DC

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FREIGHT FORWARDER REGISTRATION

1. Name of registrant (if trade name is used by individual, show the words “doing business as” or the abbreviation therefor “d/b/a”, and the trade name)

2. Form of organization (corporation, partnership, individual, etc.)

3. If answer to 2 is “corporation”, state where organized.

4. Date organization established (Month) (Day) (Year)

5. If new registrant, show date freight forwarding operations will begin (Month) (Day) (Year)

6. *Principal Office—Street and number, and room number, if any, (P. O. Box is not regarded as complete address).

   City or Post Office and State

7. *Branch Offices

   Name under which operated   Business Address   Date Established
   (Month) (Day) (Year)

8. Average number of employees in the principal office and each branch office who handle freight forwarding work and matters incident thereto.

   Number of Employees   Office   Name of Person in Charge and Home Address

   Principal Office

   Branch Office
9. Other Registered Forwarders with whom registrant does business.

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Reg. No.</th>
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10. Names, addresses, and citizenship of principal stockholders, owners and officers, and extent of stock ownership or other interest of each.

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<tr>
<th>Name - Title</th>
<th>Home Address</th>
<th>Citizenship (Name of Country)</th>
<th>Extent of Stock Ownership or Other Interest</th>
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11. Total Stock Authorized: Total Stock Issued:

12. (a) Is registrant a parent corporation, subsidiary or affiliate of any other business? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(b) Is registrant connected with any other business through common ownership of stock or other interest, employment, or otherwise? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If answer to (a) and/or (b) is “Yes”, state name, address and description thereof.

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13. (a) Does registrant or any officer, stockholder, or employee of the registrant control or engage, directly or indirectly, in any business other than forwarding? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(b) If answer is “Yes”, (1) describe nature of such business, and (2) affirm that the provisions of General Order 72, revised, have been read and understood and that registrant will comply therewith, making specific reference to Rule 244.13 setting forth certain requirements for and certain restrictions against the collection of ocean freight brokerage.

14. Does registrant specialize in handling particular commodities, or in particular trades? ☐ Yes ☐ No If “Yes” give details.

_________________________  ________________________________
Date                                Signature of Official

______________________________
Title
The above statements are made subject to penalties prescribed by statute for any person who knowingly and willingly makes a false statement on any matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States (18 U.S.C. 1001).

*Note:*

"Branch office" means an office where the registrant maintains one or more full-time, salaried employees engaged in the business of furnishing forwarding services.

"Principal office" means the office designated by the registrant as its principal office engaged in the business of furnishing forwarding services, and at which the registrant maintains one or more full-time, salaried employees, or engages in such business as full-time owner or partner. Each registrant may designate only one office as principal office.

6 F.M.B.
Order

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, Held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 29th day of June, 1961

No. 765

INVESTIGATION OF PRACTICES, OPERATIONS, ACTIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND RELATED MATTERS, AND PROPOSED REVISION OF GENERAL ORDER 72 (46 CFR 244)

No. 831

INVESTIGATION OF PRACTICES AND AGREEMENTS OF COMMON CARRIERS BY WATER IN CONNECTION WITH PAYMENT OF BROKERAGE OR OTHER FEES TO OCEAN FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND FREIGHT BROKERS

These proceedings having been instituted by the Board upon its own motion, and having been duly heard and submitted, and investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is ordered, That these proceedings be, and they are hereby, discontinued.

By the Board

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-57 (Sub. No. 5)

APPLICATION OF STATES MARINE LINES, INC. FOR PERMISSION
UNDER SECTION 805(a), MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1936

Decided June 29, 1961

States Marine Lines, Inc. granted written permission under section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, (A) permitting continuance, in the event an operating-differential subsidy is awarded States Marine Lines, Inc., of the operation of the SS Alaskan, a tanker owned by Oil Transport, Incorporated, an affiliate of States Marine Lines, Inc., in the transportation of chemicals, petro-chemicals and lubricating oil in domestic commerce between U. S. Pacific ports on the one hand and U. S. Gulf and Atlantic ports on the other; and (B) permitting the Alaskan to be chartered or sub-chartered for the carriage of petroleum or petroleum products in the domestic intercoastal and coastwide commerce of the United States, since granting of the permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.


Robert Blackwell and Donald Brunner, Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

By an application dated July 18, 1960, States Marine Lines, Inc. (States Marine) requested: (a) permission under Sec. 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, (Act) for continued
operation of the SS Alaskan, by Oil Transport, Inc., after the award of an operating-differential subsidy to States Marine; (b) the issuance of a notice with respect to this application to limit the time within which intervention may be filed; and (c) the issuance of a notice of hearing to the effect that an initial decision will be issued.

Marine Navigation Co., Inc. (Marine Navigation) and Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (Marine Transport) requested and were granted permission to intervene.

Hearings were held in January 1961, followed without the filing of briefs by an initial decision of an Examiner served April 13, 1961.

The initial decision favored written permission under Sec. 805 (a) of the Act permitting continuance of the operation of the SS Alaskan in the event an operating-differential subsidy contract is awarded States Marine and permitting the SS Alaskan to be chartered or sub-chartered, in such event. Exceptions and replies were filed. The Board heard oral argument on June 21, 1961. The Examiner's decision is affirmed.

II. FACTS

An application by States Marine for an operating-differential subsidy under Title VI of the Act is pending before the Board. Hearings on such application involving issues under Secs. 605 (a), 804 and 805 (a) of the Act have been held and concluded in Docket S–57 and subsidiary proceedings upon which the Board has issued its reports.

Oil Transport, Inc. (Oil Transport) now proposes to operate the SS Alaskan as a contract carrier of chemicals, petro-chemicals and lubricating oil in domestic commerce between U.S. Pacific ports and U.S. Gulf and Atlantic ports. The SS Alaskan is an American-flag T–2 tanker. Oil Transport is a corporation, the stock of which is owned 50% by Global Bulk Transport Corp. and 50% by Joshua Hendy Corp. The owners of the majority of the stock of Global Bulk Transport Corp. also own a majority of the stock of States Marine. Oil Transport is considered to be an affiliate or associate of States Marine, the subsidy applicant.

Of 15 U.S. flag ships owned by Marine Transport, only 2 are confined to domestic service. These 2 ships are not in competition with the SS Alaskan. Of 7 ships chartered, only 4 are under U.S. flag and none of the 4 is confined to domestic service and of 48
ships managed for owners or charterers, only 12 are under U.S. flag and only 1 of the 12 is confined to domestic service. This one ship is not one of the 3 chemical carriers involved here. The 3 ships are not engaged exclusively in domestic trades and are privileged under their charters to engage in world wide service and actually operate in world-wide service. The decision to engage in domestic or international trade apparently rests with Dow, not with the intervenor. Three Marine Transport ships carry chemicals, but the Alaskan as a conventional tanker cannot carry the specialized chemicals which these ships, the Marine Chemist, the Marine Dow and the Leland I. Doan can carry. Each ship is owned by a separate corporation and bareboat chartered to Marine Transport. Marine Transport chartered the ships to Dow Chemical Corporation and operates the ships as agent for Dow Chemical Corp. Dow uses them for its own purposes and makes them available as a proprietary carrier when its cargoes are not enough to use the ships fully. None of these ships has been engaged exclusively in coastwise or intercoastal trade over the two years covered by an exhibit showing their operations. There is no conclusive evidence in this proceeding that they will so operate in the future.

The three tankers which carry chemicals because of specially lined tanks are capable of carrying chemicals which the ordinary T-2 tankers such as the Alaskan could not possibly carry.

The Alaskan was taken out of lay-up, employs American seamen, and carries products which are important to the economy of the country.

III. DISCUSSION

The jurisdiction of the Board is not challenged.

The application is for written permission pursuant to Sec. 805 (a) of the Act. This section provides that it shall be unlawful to pay any subsidy to States Marine if States Marine or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate or associate or any officer, director, agent or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own or operate any vessel engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns or operates any vessel in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service without the written permission of the Board. This provision makes it unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to States Marine if its associate Oil Transport, Inc. operates the SS Alaskan, in the domestic intercoastal or coast-
wise service, unless we give permission. Our findings must be related to (1) whether the intervenors have shown that any person, firm or corporation operates exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service, and if so, (2) whether the granting of the application (a) will result in unfair competition with such operator or (b) would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. The Examiner found that none of these circumstances existed and that the application for permission should be granted.

Marine Transport and Marine Navigation made the following exceptions to the initial decision:

1. The Examiner erroneously failed to dismiss the application because all the testimony in its support was hearsay, did not constitute "reliable, probative and substantial evidence" as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, and deprived intervenors of the right of effective cross-examination and hence a fair hearing.

2. The Examiner erroneously failed to dismiss the application on the ground that even if the hearsay is accepted as substantial evidence, applicant has failed to prove its case, as the record is bare of evidence of the essential relation for which permission is required.

3. The Examiner erroneously failed to find the application should be dismissed for lack of evidence as to the scope and competitive effect of the proposed domestic service and the lack of any showing of a need or desire for the service by the shipping public.

4. The Examiner erroneously failed to deny the permission sought on the ground that it would result in overtonnaging the chemical trade, causing the foreign transfer of an especially built U.S.-flag vessel and therefore prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

5. The Examiner erroneously failed to find that intervenor has pioneered and developed the coastwise and intercoastal chemical trades with both newly constructed vessels and specially converted vessels operating under U.S. registry, and therefore should be protected against the predatory operations for which applicant seeks permission.

6. The Examiner erroneously failed to find that, in the absence of evidence as to States Marine's intentions in the event the permission sought should be denied, it was impossible to make the determination that the proposed operation would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

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7. Joshua Hendy, the 50% owner of Oil Transport, is a “partner” of States Marine and should have been held to be its “associate” within the meaning of Section 805 (a).

8. The initial decision shows that the Examiner erroneously failed to place the burden of proof where it belongs, namely on the applicant, States Marine.

9. The Examiner’s conclusion that the competitive effect of the proposed operation would be no different if Joshua Hendy were either to buy the *Alaskan* or charter another T-2 tanker, or if States Marine obtained a subsidy, was unsupported by the record and erroneous.

10. The Examiner erroneously found that Marine Transport is not operating exclusively in the domestic trades. The first, second, third and eighth exceptions relate to the use of hearsay in the proceedings and to the burden of proof. The standards for denial of permission under Sec. 805 (a) of the Act are unfair competition or prejudice to the objects and policy of the Act. Applicants sustained their part of the burden of proof by showing that neither the applicant States Marine, nor any affiliate or subsidiary solicits cargo for the *SS Alaskan*, nor takes any from the *SS Alaskan*, that no subsidy can be diverted and that no advantage or preference could accrue to the applicant or to its associate. Thereafter the burden of proving unfairness and prejudice rested on the intervenor who asserts the unfairness and prejudice. *Grace Line, Inc.—Subsidy, Route 4, 3 FMB 731, 737 1952* ("Any evidence on this issue [undue advantage or undue prejudice] should come from parties claiming prejudice under this section." [Sec. 605 (c)]) *; American Export Lines, Inc.—Increased Sailings, Route 10, 4 FMB 568, 572 (1955) ; States Steamship Co.—Subsidy, Pacific Coast/Far East, 5 FMB 304, 309 (1957). In its earliest decision on the point, the Board applied this rule as to proof of unfair competition under Sec. 805 (a). *Balto. Mail Steamship Co.—Use of Vessels, 3 USMC 294, 297 (1938)*. The same burden was imposed on an intervenor in claiming protection of the “purposes and policy” clause of Sec. 805 (a) *T. J. McCarthy Steamship Co.—Sec. 805 (a) Application, 5 FMB 666, 670 (1959)*. The Board’s only decision placing the burden of proof under Sec. 805 (a) on the applicant, *Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805 (a) Calls at Hawaii, 5 FMB—MA 287, 297 (1957)* was reversed in *Pacific Far East Line v. Federal Maritime Board, 275 F. 2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1960).*

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Intervenors' need was facts proving something on their side. The alleged hearsay evidence did not preclude intervenors from bringing in their own evidence of the circumstances which were the subject of testimony. The Examiner evaluated what testimony there was and used what was relevant and material. The exceptions are not sustained.

The last paragraph of the third exception, the fourth exception and the sixth exception all relate to the objects and policy of the Act. The following considerations are advanced as affecting this issue:

(1) the shipping public's need for the service is the fundamental consideration in evaluating the objects and policy of the Act;

(2) overtonnaging of the chemical trade would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act; and

(3) if States Marine would be willing to terminate its affiliation with the operation of the *SS Alaskan* and still accept subsidy the objects and policy of the Act require that permission be withheld.

The intervenors contend that the shipping public's need is being met by the intervenors who are virtually exclusive suppliers of this service, and that overtonnaging will destroy the value of their exclusive service. Service and need, however, are not relevant here in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals in *Pacific Far East Lines v. Federal Maritime Board*, 275 F. 2d 184, at 186 (1960): "Service and need would be important if the Board were a public utility commission passing upon an application to enter a regulated field, but have nothing to do with the question whether PFEL's competition with Matson would be 'unfair'."

The issue of exclusive supply of the services and of the inevitable overtones of monopoly were dealt with in the PFEL case as follows (275 F. 2d, 186-7):

The Board has disclosed no basis for its finding the PFEL's entry into the trade would be 'prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act'. Preservation of Matson's monopoly is not an object or policy of the Act. On the contrary, the public interest in ending this monopoly should be considered. The Act does not exempt the California-Hawaii trade from the anti-monopoly policy which Congress has often expressed.

Intervenors also claim they will create a situation adverse to the objects and policies of the Act by transferring a ship to foreign registry if there is overtonnaging.

The objects and policy of the Act do not call for the termination of the applicant's affiliation with the operators of the *SS Alaskan* if subsidy is accepted, so that the intervenors can operate a ship instead.
This ground for passing on an application was dealt with in
*T. J. McCarthy Steamship Co.—Sec 805 (a) Application, supra,* at 672 as follows:

Nor can we find that the granting of the permission would be prejudicial
to the objects and policy of the Act. The denial of the application on this
ground would, as the examiner found, result merely in the deactivation of
McCarthy's three automobile carriers and the reactivation of Nicholson's
three carriers. This would not constitute a furtherance of the policy of the
Act, and would result in a denial to the principal shipper of his choice of
carriers. We therefore find that permission to engage in the automobile
carrying business from Detroit to Buffalo and to Cleveland, in the event
subsidy is awarded, would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the
Act. Section 805 (a) permission for this service will be granted, as a sepa-
rate and distinct service from the proposed subsidized service.

The fifth, ninth and tenth exceptions are addressed to the issue
of unfair competition and to the exclusively domestic character of
the competition. These are general complaints about "predatory"
operations, but without any substantiating facts. Without such
facts in the record, it is impossible to pass on the validity of the
complaints in the exception. In support of the contention of un-
fair competition, intervenor's witness testified that "Marine
Transport has been primarily engaged in the domestic trades." The
evidence is to the effect that intervenor is not primarily en-
gaged in the domestic trades.

The facts showing that intervenors' ships were not in domestic
intercoastal or coastwise service and that their charters permitted
international operations are not responsive to the statutory re-
quirement that the objector is operating "exclusively" in coastwise
or intercoastal trade. There was also ample testimony in addition
that differences in ships' characteristics, the types of products
carried, and work performed by allegedly competing ships were
such that the competition would not be substantial, much less un-
fair. These exceptions are rejected.

The seventh exception is an argument that Joshua Hendy should
be found to be an associate of States Marine. The grant of per-
misson to the applicant, States Marine, would be proper if the
applicant owned the *SS Alaskan* and operated it in the manner
shown on this record. The intervenors would not be entitled to
protection against the activities of the *SS Alaskan* no matter who
owned it, nor of Joshua Hendy's status, since they have no right
to exclusive service in the domestic bulk trade and they are not
entitled to displace a competitor's ship. See, *Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805 (a) Calls at Hawaii, supra* and *T. J. McCarthy
Steamship Co.—Sec. 805 (a) Application, supra.*
This report shall serve as written permission under Sec. 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for continued operation of the SS Alaskan by Oil Transport, Inc. after the award of an operating-differential subsidy to States Marine Lines, Inc.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. S-114

IN RE: GULF & SOUTH AMERICAN STEAMSHIP CO., INC.

Decided June 29, 1961

Operation of northbound Chinese flag ships by CSAV on Trade Route No. 31 found not to constitute liner or berth service and should not be given effect in determining substantiality and extent of foreign flag competition for purpose of determining operating-differential subsidy rates.

Odell Kominers and J. Alton Boyer for Gulf & South American Steamship Co., Inc.

John R. Tankard, Louis Zimmet, M. W. Belcher, Jr., and Benjamin R. Wolman as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER,

Vice Chairman

BY THE BOARD:

The Board by an Order dated July 11, 1960, ordered a hearing pursuant to the request of Gulf & South American Steamship Co., Inc. (G & SA) for a review and readjustment of certain operating differential subsidy rates in accordance with the provisions of Section 606(1) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the “Act”). It was the contention of G & SA that certain operating differential subsidy rates for the items of Maintenance and Repair and Hull and Machinery Insurance for the Calendar year 1959 were not correctly determined by the Board in that said rates did not include the costs of operation of the Chinese-flag ships of the Chilean Line (Compania Sud America Vapores) (“CSAV”), which G & SA contends was, during the calendar year 1958, a substantial competitor engaged in a “liner operation” on
the Essential Trade Route No. 31 (United States Gulf Coast/West Coast South America).

A hearing was held before an examiner who, in a recommended decision, found: "G&SA has the right to have considered the costs of CSAV's Chinese-flag vessels and their cargo carryings northbound as well as southbound in 1958 in this trade, as factors in the calculation of its operating-differential subsidy rates for 1959."

Exceptions to the recommended decision were filed, followed by oral argument.

FACTS

Briefly stated, the facts are: G & SA is a subsidized American-flag operator on Essential Trade Route No. 31 (United States Gulf Coast/West Coast South America) under Operating Differential Subsidy Agreement No. FMB-75. The issue in the matter at hand is whether the subsidy rates for 1959 operations of the operator's ships on this trade route have been correctly calculated in terms of existing Maritime manuals and procedures. Specifically, the question is whether there was justification for the exclusion from the determination of foreign-flag competition of the northbound carryings of the Chinese-flag ships of CSAV. It is the contention of the G & SA that such operations should have been included and that thereby the Chinese-flag operations would have been in excess of 15% participation in the trade, thereby requiring inclusion of their operating costs in the determination of the rates to be applied to the G & SA results for 1959. It is the contention of counsel for Maritime that the CSAV Chinese-flag operations were not "liner", or regular, northbound and that, therefore, they were properly excluded.

Section 603(b) of the Act provides for the payment of an operating differential subsidy for the items of wages, subsistence, insurance, maintenance and any other item at which the operator is at a substantial disadvantage in competing with vessels of a foreign country whose "... vessels are substantial competitors of the vessel or vessels covered by the contract." It is apparent from the statements of the Examiner, in the recommended decision and G & SA, through the record and arguments presented before this Board, that they misconstrue the issue in this proceeding as being whether the CSAV Chinese-flag ships are "substantial competitors". This presumption is not correct. The sole issue presented before this Board is whether the Chinese-
flag ships are engaged in a “liner” operation and thereby to be counted, northbound, in the determination of the substantiality and extent of foreign-flag competition on Trade Route No. 31.

The error of those contending that the issue is other than as herein-before set forth, apparently stems from their failure to recognize that the Board has already, for the purposes of proceedings such as this, resolved the basic issue of what shall constitute “substantial” competition by the promulgation and adoption of the “Manual of General Procedures for Determining Substantiality and Extent of Foreign-Flag Competition” and the application of the Manual of Essential United States Foreign Trade Routes. Specifically, the Board has used its specific powers, as set forth in Section 204 of the Act, to establish criteria for the determination of what shall constitute “substantial” competition and has published these criteria in the aforementioned Manual of General Procedures and applied said procedures in each subsidy rate determination presented for adoption.

The Board, in Docket S-29, 4 FMB 40, recognized that the language of Section 603(b) was not, in and of itself, sufficient to determine specific rates and that to do so required clarification and amplification of the term “substantial competitor”. Thus, in Docket S-29 the Board said, at page 44, that “Congress has not provided a definition of the term ‘substantial competition’ as it applies to foreign-flag operators.” In the exercise of its statutory authority (Section 204) and to clarify the indefinite term “substantial competition” the Board adopted the Manual of General Procedures wherein it is spelled out that there shall be counted “... carryings by ships of all foreign flags engaged in liner operation.” (emphasis added). Any argument that this is not sufficiently clear to establish operating criteria is answered by referral to that portion of the Manual of Essential Trade Routes, a formally adopted and published document, which defines berth, or liner service as follows:

*Liner, berth, or regular service*

These terms, often used interchangeably, have reference to a service, operating on a definite, advertised schedule, giving relatively frequent sailings at regular intervals between specific United States ports or range and designated foreign ports or range. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is, therefore, the opinion of the Board that to the extent that Section 603(b) requires clarification, such has been accomplished by the Board through the adoption, publication and application
of the aforementioned Manuals. While it has been argued that the criteria set forth in Exhibit 7 have not been formally adopted, the Board does not have to pass upon the correctness of such a statement since there are embodied in Board's manuals sufficiently clear criteria to resolve the issue in this proceeding. Any contention, therefore, that the Board has been arbitrary or otherwise acted without authority in its application of criteria for the determination of what constitutes "substantial competition" is wholly without merit and clearly erroneous in light of the existence of the aforementioned manuals and the past practice of the Board in acting upon final subsidy rate recommendations for each subsidized operator.

In an application of the criteria contained in the Manual of General Procedures and the Manual of Essential Trade Routes, to the facts in this case, it is the opinion of this Board that CSAV has not so operated its northbound ships as to constitute a liner service. Specifically, nothing has been presented which supports a contention that the Chinese-flag ships, in 1958, were "... operating on a definite, advertised schedule ..." in such manner as to afford a northbound shipper of general cargo any indication that the Chinese-flag ships were desirous of carrying, or in a position to carry, general cargoes on a definite basis.

Specifically, nothing which these ships do or the manner in which they are operated would lend support to a conclusion that they seek general cargo, either by their nature of operation or by their means of solicitation. Reduced to basics, the question to be asked is whether a shipper northbound could know with certainty that a CSAV ship under the Chinese-flag would, one, two, or six months hence, be able to carry his cargo from one point to another on the general trade route. The facts in this proceeding lead to the conclusion that such a shipper could not so rely upon the operations, space availability, or ports of discharge as to make plans for deliveries in the future.

It is here important to compare the operations of the G & SA ships and the CSAV Chinese-flag ships. G & SA operates a fleet of C-2 type ships, having a deadweight capacity of between 10,000 and 10,600 tons; CSAV ships are C1-MAV-1 type ships with a deadweight capacity of approximately 5,800 tons. In 1958 G & SA had thirty-three (33) northbound sailings, with a capacity of approximately 330,000 tons. Its ships carried only a total of 129,429 tons, being composed of 39,429 tons of general (representing 30.41% of total carried) and 90,000 of bulk. Utilization, on an
average basis and with little variation for each individual sailing, was somewhat less than 50%. Chinese ships of CSAV, on the other hand had nine (9) sailings northbound, with a capacity of approximately 52,000 tons. Its ships carried a total of approximately 50,263 tons, being composed of 811 tons of general (representing 3% of total) and 49,452 tons of bulk. Utilization, on an average basis and with little variation for each individual sailing was approximately 96%.

The bulk cargoes carried by CSAV Chinese-flag ships were primarily carried under contracts of affreightment which were of such duration that CSAV knew well in advance that each northbound sailing would have bulk utilization of the ship of approximately 96% of total available. Such cargo as may have been carried was in such small amounts as to appear to be on the basis of last-minute convenience rather than active solicitation. It does not appear that the materials submitted by G & SA in support of its contention that CSAV did advertise justify such a conclusion in light of all of the facts.

The contracts of affreightment referred to hereinabove are significant in an evaluation of whether the CSAV operation was a liner operation. A comparison of the respective contracts of affreightment (Ex. No. 3, Attachments 3 and 4) of CSAV and G & SA shows that in the latter there are specific reservations of the right to forego such bulk cargo as may have been available in the event the berth nature of the service was threatened. CSAV's contract, on the other hand, contains no such provision and places the greater emphasis upon the carriage of the bulk cargoes covered by the affreightments.

The applicant herein seeks to inject statements of the Board in its decisions in Dockets Nos. S-57, 5 FMB 537, and S-73, 5 FMB 771, to the effect that the carriage of only four tons of general cargo constitutes that sailing as "liner". Applicant misconstrues the prior statements as applying to the matter here under consideration. Such use as may have been made of a so-called "four ton" concept was solely for the purpose of determining whether the general cargo placed on top of military was sufficient to justify the conclusion that such a sailing was a part of an existing service. It was not directed to the question of whether such operations were competitive. Since the sole issue here is whether the competitive operations of CSAV were of a liner nature, there can be no reliance upon prior statements as to the significance of a given ship carrying as little as four tons of general cargo. It could not
be seriously contended that ships each carrying as little as four tons in a service which generated for another carrier in excess of 39,000 tons of general cargo in one year was a substantial competitor. Nor would the fact that such ship carried as little as four tons possibly represent a substitute for the requirement specified in the Manual and of the long established criterion of the Board that there be advertisement considerably before sailing. Thus, while the Board here reaffirms its reliance upon the criteria hereinabove stated as the determinant of whether an operation was "liner", the Board need only look to the type of service rendered by CSAV to see that it did not solicit general cargo and was not in a position to carry significant amounts of such cargo even if it was offered.

That G & SA would have liked to carry the bulk carried by CSAV, and would have been in a position to do so, does not override the fact that, to be counted in the determination of the extent of substantial foreign-flag competition an operation must be within the standards heretofore established by the Board and consistently followed in the determination of the subsidy rates for the five subsidized items for each subsidized operator on an annual basis.

CONCLUSION

The Board, therefore, finds that the CSAV northbound operation with Chinese-flag ships on Trade Route No. 31 was not "liner" and that such operations should not be counted in determining the substantiality and extent of foreign-flag competition for determining applicable rates for G & SA. Requested findings not made have been considered and found immaterial or not supported by the evidence. An Order of dismissal will be entered.

BOARD MEMBER WILSON, dissenting:

I find it necessary to dissent from this decision of the Board, which reverses the recommended decision of the Examiner, based on the premise:

That the operation of the Chinese-flag ships by CSAV in northbound service did not represent substantial competition to G & SA because this northbound service did not constitute berth liner service in accordance with criteria established by the staff.

This report defends the Board's previous action in establishing, in the Manual of General Procedure for Determining Substantial-
ity and Extent of Foreign Flag Competition, March 1959, the “Techniques Used in Determining Extent of Foreign Flag Competition.” I concur in the necessity for the Board to establish certain criteria as a guide in implementing the provisions of Section 603 (b) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936. However, such established criteria should not be used to prejudice the Board’s evaluation of the data reported or the application of legal standards to the facts of any individual calculation. Section 603 (b) does not restrict “substantial competitors” only to those ships under foreign registry which are engaged in berth liner service. This restriction is added only by strict adherence to the Manual. The result is a variation in the terms of the statute as mentioned by the Examiner.

The record shows that both G & SA and CSAV handled sizable quantities of bulk cargo on their northbound sailings. They are in direct competition for this cargo. In the case of iron ore from the principal shipper, G & SA in 1958 suffered a sharp decline in the amount carried while CSAV substantially increased its carriage. The comparative figures for 1958 are 21,763 tons for G & SA and 44,834 tons for CSAV. This can scarcely be said not to represent substantial competition. They are also competitive for other ores and nitrates.

In the general cargo area, there is one significant difference between the two lines taken note of by the Examiner but not referred to in the Report. G & SA serves Colombia, from which country originates about 98 percent of the coffee exported from the South American west coast. CSAV does not serve Colombia. The two lines are competitive for all other types of general cargo. The coffee shipments handled by G & SA are sizable and represent a large portion of the total general cargo tonnage for that line. A direct comparison of the percentage of general cargo carried by the two lines in competition is therefore misleading unless adjustment is made for the non-competitive coffee tonnage.

Even if the premise that substantial foreign competition can be legally restricted to berth liner operation were accepted, where the facts otherwise show its existence under one foreign flag, the exclusion of the Chinese-flag CSAV ships cannot, in my opinion, be justified.

The criteria used by the staff in determining what constitutes berth liner service have never been approved by the Board. It
therefore cannot be regarded as having legal standing in terms of the authorization contained in Section 204 of the Act.

The Report concedes that all of the staff criteria for determining what constitutes berth liner service were met by CSAV’s Chinese-flag ships with the exception, based primarily on the method of advertising, that they do not seek or solicit general cargo.

The Record shows that both lines advertise in the same media in accordance with South American practice, the only significant difference being in the amount of advance notice given to shippers. The minimum advance notice given by the CSAV was 5 days. Conceding this to be relatively short, it still allows sufficient time for available cargo to be booked. The Record also shows that general cargo was booked and carried in most of the Chinese-flag sailings in quantities far in excess of the minimum previously used by the staff in other cases for determining whether or not a particular sailing qualified for liner service.

The Record shows that the position first taken by the staff to disqualify the northbound Chinese-flag sailings from berth liner service was based on data taken from statements contained on Forms 7801 submitted by CSAV. That this data was meager and could be supplied by people with widely varying degrees of responsibility was not denied. As the matter progressed, other reasons were injected by the staff to support their original contention. Great reliance was later placed on the lack of proper advertising, although the staff admitted that at the time the original position was taken no information was available or sought in regard to CSAV’s advertising.

I cite the methods used by the staff in this case because they represent an arbitrary and bureaucratic approach to a problem which should not be condoned. I deplore the fact that the Board has not seen fit to take cognizance of it.

To the extent that it is held that the Board by strict adherence to an administrative manual may limit the character of the competition it will recognize and may exclude consideration of other competition, the Board has exceeded its authority. The use of manual provisions showing “techniques used in determining the extent of foreign flag competition” to determine rights of carriers under the statute is improper even though the manual provisions may have been uncontested for many years. It is never too late to correct errors of this type.
The Board should determine rights by the law, not by strict adherence to guiding manual provisions on unapproved staff criteria. The law states simply that the amount of the operating differential subsidy shall not exceed the excess of certain costs and items of expense which the Board finds "that the applicant is at a substantial disadvantage in competition with vessels" of a foreign country over the estimated fair and reasonable cost of the same items if the vessel were operated "under the registry of a foreign country whose vessels are substantial competitors of the vessel or vessels" covered by an operating differential subsidy contract. Substantial disadvantage in competition has been shown and the applicant is entitled to the cost difference.

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IN RE: GULF & SOUTH AMERICAN S.S. CO., INC. 395

ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D. C. on the 29th day of June, 1961

No. S-114

GULF & SOUTH AMERICAN STEAMSHIP CO., INC.

The Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record its report in this proceeding, which report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

It is Ordered, That the proceeding be, and it is hereby, dismissed.

By the Board

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 877

FILING OF FREIGHT RATES IN THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE U. S.

No. 878

PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION OF FREIGHT TARIFFS

Decided June 29, 1961

Elmer C. Maddy, for River Plate and Brazil Conferences, River Plate/United States-Canada Freight Conference, North Brazil/United States-Canada Freight Conference, Mid Brazil/United States-Canada Freight Conference, River Plate and Brazil/United States Reefer Conference, Brazil/United States-Canada Freight Conference.

John R. Mahoney, for Havana Steamship Conference, Havana Northbound Rate Agreement, Santiago De Cuba Conference, East Coast Colombia Conference, Leeward & Wind-Ward Islands & Guianas Conference, United States Atlantic & Gulf-Haiti Conference, United States/Atlantic & Gulf-Bermuda Freight Conference, Atlantic & Gulf/Panama Canal Zone, Colon & Panama City Conference, Atlantic & Gulf/West Coast of Central America & Mexico Conference, Atlantic & Gulf/West Coast of South America Conference, West Coast South America Northbound Conference, U. S. Atlantic & Gulf-Venezuela and Netherlands Antilles Conference, U. S. Atlantic & Gulf Ports-Jamaica (B.W.I.) S.S. Conference.


Leonard G. James, for CAMEXCO Freight Conference, Canal, Central America Northbound Conference, Capca Freight Conference, Caribbean/Pacific Northbound Freight Conference, Colpac Freight Conference, Japan-Puerto Rico & Virgin Islands Freight Conference, Outward Continental North Pacific Freight Conference, Pacific Coast/Caribbean Sea Ports Conference, Pacific Coast European Conference, Pacific Coast/Mexico Freight Conference, Pacific Coast/ Panama Canal Freight Conference, Pacific Coast River Plate Brazil Conference, Pacific Indonesian Conference, Pacific Straits Conference, Pacific/West Coast of South America Conference, Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan, United Kingdom/United States Pacific Freight Association, West Coast South America/North Pacific Coast Conference.

William R. Daly, for Harbor Commission, City of San Diego, California.

Elkan Turk, Jr., for Far East Conference, Straits/New York Conference, Associated Steamship Lines, New York Freight Bureau (Hong Kong), Siam/New York Conference, Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference.


Gordon L. Poole, and William H. King, for Pacific Westbound Conference.

Charles R. Seal, for North Atlantic Ports Conference.

Robert Kharasch, for French North Atlantic Westbound Freight Conference.

Walter J. Myskowski, for The Port of New York Authority.

Frank J. Mahoney, for Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman, and RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

In response to a “Notice of Proposed Rule Making” published in the Federal Register on January 5, 1960 (25 FR 60), the Federal Maritime Board has received and reviewed the public’s comments on proposed rules requiring every common carrier by water in the foreign commerce to file schedules showing rates and charges and related regulations for transporting property (except full shiploads of bulk cargo) and to establish a system for the distribution of schedules on rates and charges and rules and regulations for the transportation of property in the foreign trade.

After reviewing the written comments the Board listened to oral arguments on August 23, 1960, relative to the regulations proposed in Docket No. 877 and on August 24, 1960, relative to the regulations proposed in Docket No. 878.

The comments and arguments challenge the Board’s statutory authority to adopt the proposed regulations and point out certain burdens and hardships that will occur in the administration of the regulations if adopted. Changes were suggested.

The regulations are fully authorized by Sec. 204 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (1936 Act) and Sec. 21 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (Act). Sec. 204 (b) of the 1936 Act authorizes the Board to adopt “all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the powers, duties and functions vested in it by this Act.” Pursuant to Sec. 204 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, the functions, powers and duties vested by the 1936 Act were transferred to the U. S. Maritime Commission. Section 105(5) of Reorganization Plan 21 of 1950 transferred to the Federal Maritime Board so much of the functions with respect to adopting rules and regulations as relate to the functions of the Board under the provisions of the reorganization plan.

It is considered that the foregoing authorizations and assignment of functions give the Board power to adopt regulations for
the administration of Sec. 21 of the Act and to aid in the enforce-
ment of Secs. 16, 17 and 21 of the Act.

By Sec. 21 of the Act, the Board may require any common car-
rier by water, or any agent or employee to file with it any report,
or any account, record, rate or charge appertaining to the busi-
ness of such carrier, and to furnish such documents in the form
and within the time prescribed by the Board. The reporting re-
quirement as to the filing of rate schedules for transporting
property in foreign commerce is sustained under Sec. 21. A fil-
ing with respect to rate increases at least 30 days before the
effective date thereof is needed to enforce better the prohibitions
in Sec. 16 against giving undue or unreasonable preferences or
advantage and to prevent evasions of the prohibition against pro-
viding transportation at less than regularly established and en-
forced rates. Under the existing regulation, which requires filing
within 30 days after a change in rates, shippers could be charged
varying rates which would not appear in a reported tariff as long
as the rate was reported later because the regular rate or charge
established and enforced by a carrier would always be the rate
actually charged to a shipper instead of the one in the printed
tariff. The tariffs reported to the Board only reflected past
charges; the advance reporting of charges will protect shippers
against being charged a rate that does not appear in a reported
tariff and the “regular” rates referred to in Sec. 16 of the Act are
now made the reported rates.

Sec. 17 of the Act refers to the “demand” of unjustly discrimi-
natory rates. A rate or charge may be demanded under Sec. 17
not only by means of the printed tariff which a carrier maintains
but also verbally or by letter if the tariff may be changed subject
only to subsequent reporting. If the tariff rates are reported be-
fore a demand, however, the Board is in a position to discover
possible discriminatory rates and to require correction as it is
required to do by Sec. 17 before the injury is done to shippers.
The purpose of a regulation requiring a report is to aid in this
function of the Board.

The regulation requiring the establishment of a distribution sys-
tem for schedules of rates is necessary for the enforcement and
administration of provisions which prohibit false classification of
property under Sec. 16 and the demand of unjustly discrimina-
tory rates under Sec. 17.

Sec. 16 is violated only if a false classification is knowing and
willful. Where shippers have not had written tariff descriptions
of commodities to read and compare, it is virtually impossible to establish knowing and willful misclassification by shippers where two or more closely related commodities are involved. Dissemination of tariffs among shippers will eliminate this excuse for misclassification to obtain lower rates and will remove doubts as to whether such actions are taken knowingly and willfully. Recent proceedings before the Board have demonstrated the difficulties shippers and their agent forwarders have in applying the correct rates to their shipments as the result of inability to determine the proper classification because the tariff publication was not readily available to them.

Section 17 is violated if a common carrier by water in foreign commerce demands a rate or charge which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers. If the Board finds such a rate is being demanded it may alter the rate to the extent necessary to correct the unjust discrimination. The correction cannot be made in time to protect the shipper if the rate is filed after it becomes effective. The regulation requiring distribution of tariffs will enable shippers to detect allegedly discriminatory rates and to protect themselves by application to the Board.

General Orders in conformance with this report will be duly published in the Federal Register.

VICE CHAIRMAN UNANDER, dissenting:

The majority of the Board has adopted two rules requiring common carriers by water in foreign commerce to file their tariffs with the Board before the date they become effective and to distribute their tariffs to interested persons. In my opinion, the Board has not been authorized by Congress to adopt either of these rules.

FILING RULE

The practical effect of the filing rule in Docket No. 877 is that a shipper may now be charged only what appears in a tariff filed with the Board. Before this rule was adopted, a shipper could be charged a different rate than that shown in the tariff report filed with the Board because the reports were not made until after a new tariff rate became effective. The new rule is a vital and fundamental change from a reporting requirement to a tariff filing requirement. The Board cites Sec. 21 of the Shipping Act,
1916, as amended, as authority for its action. The pertinent part of Sec. 21 is:

The Federal Maritime Board . . . may require any common carrier by water . . . to file with it any periodical or special report, or any . . . rate, or charge . . . appertaining to the business of such carrier. . . . Such report . . . rate, charge . . . shall be furnished in the form and within the time prescribed by the Board. . . .

Any general authorization such as Sec. 21 would seem to be insufficient as involving an unconstitutional assumption of rule making or legislative powers by the Board without sufficiently specific standards. A rule which is so fundamental that it changes a reporting requirement into a tariff filing requirement should derive validity from a more express statutory authorization than Sec. 21. The purposes of Sec. 21 were stated as follows in Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. U.S. 300 U.S. 139, 144, 145 (1937).

The purpose of Section 21 is not far to seek. Other sections forbid allowance of rebates, require the filing of agreements fixing or regulating rates, granting special rates, accommodations or privileges, which may be disapproved, cancelled or modified if the board finds them unjustly discriminatory or violative of the act, prohibit undue or unreasonable preferences or the cutting of established rates and unjust discrimination between shippers and ports. To enable it to perform its functions the board may well need such information as that which the section gives it power to demand.

Traditionally a tariff is a written statement containing (a) a list of commodities which may be transported and (b) a schedule of rates and implementing regulations governing the application of the rates. A tariff states the common carrier's future charges for performing his undertaking to the public. A tariff is not the same thing as the reports, accounts, records, rates or charges or memorandums of facts and transactions appertaining to the business of a carrier which are referred to in Sec. 21 of the Act. The reports referred to in Sec. 21 are informative and contain evidence of past facts. They are not required to be filed until after the events which are reported have occurred. This has been the consistent interpretation placed on Sec. 21 by the Board and its predecessor agencies and is the premise for the adoption of the order which preceded the present regulation. The order was originally adopted in 1935 and reads in part as follows: "It is ordered, in pursuance of the powers conferred by Sec. 21 of the Shipping Act, 1916, that [a carrier] . . . is . . . required to file with the Division of Regulations . . . each port-to-port and transshipment rate charged and/or collected . . . for the transportation of property, except cargo loaded and carried in bulk without mark or

6 F.M.B.
count, from all points in continental United States of America to all points in foreign countries; indicating plainly as to each such rate, the place from and to which it was charged and/or collected, the effective date thereof, . . . and any rules or regulations which in any wise changed, affected, or determined any part of any such aforesaid rate . . . .” This is the reporting requirement that was sustained in Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, supra.

The Court in referring to “other sections” is referring to the regulatory features of the Shipping Act, 1916, embodied in Sections 14 through 19 of the Act (46 U.S.C. §§ 812-818). Section 21 grants the Board merely an ancillary power, related to these other sections, to require the production of information necessary to the accomplishment of the Board's duties under these other sections. Section 21 grants no substantive, regulatory powers, additional to those set forth in the other sections. The rule adopted by the majority, however, seeks to impose a substantive, regulatory burden on carriers, additional to the duties imposed in the other sections.

The legislative history of the Shipping Act, 1916, sufficiently illustrates the intent of Congress not to regulate to any degree the ratemaking power of the water carriers in the foreign commerce of the United States. The Alexander Committee in its recommendations stated:

it might prove injurious to both ship owners and American exporters to require the lines to file their rates and not be permitted to lower them until after a stipulated period of notice to change rates had been given. Investigation of Shipping Combinations Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 63d Cong., Vol. 4, p. 420 (1914).

At the hearings on H.R. 14337, a bill to regulate carriers by water in the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States, Dr. Emory R. Johnson commented that:

The law, however, does not provide that the board shall require carriers by water in foreign commerce to file their rates or tariffs.

This bill leaves it to the steamship line to work out its rates, which it does not have to print, even if it does not choose to; certainly it does not have to file them . . . . There is no requirement that he has to notify anybody about it, except the party who is interested in it.

Under this bill the carrier not only has the power to make the rate, but it does not have to publish or file it. Hearings on H.R. 14337 Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., (1916), pp 10, 12, 35, and 38.
Dr. Johnson's comment is equally applicable to the present statute, for Section 10 of H.R. 14337 was substantially identical with what is now Section 21 of the 1916 Act.

The Board's lack of authority to require the filing of tariffs in foreign commerce is highlighted by the express provision for such authority which Congress enacted with respect to tariffs in the domestic trades. The Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, 46 U.S.C. Sections 843-848, enacts such a requirement. It requires no elaboration of reasoning to conclude that where Congress wished to impose a tariff filing requirement instead of a reporting requirement upon carriers, it knew how to express this requirement with clarity.

The provision in the filing rule which requires reports to be filed "before the date such schedule, change, modification, or cancellation becomes effective" instead of afterwards converts the former reporting requirement into a fundamentally new type of provision, namely, a tariff filing requirement which Congress has heretofore always authorized in express terms. The general language of Sec. 21 may not be converted into such an important authorization simply by telescoping the present 30 day after the effective date reporting requirement into an "on or before" reporting requirement which has the significant practical effect on shippers and carriers noted above.

It may be that some such control over the freedom of carriers to adopt rates should be imposed. As we have held in Afghan-American Trading Company, Inc. v. Isbrandtsen, 3 F.M.B. 622, 624 (1951), and United Nations, et al. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., et al., 3 F.M.B. 781, 786 (1952), no liability attaches to a carrier merely because it has charged a rate different from that reflected in its schedules as subsequently reported to the Board. The carrier, in short, has no legal obligation to adhere to any particular schedule of rates. If some more rigid requirement ought to be imposed upon carriers, it must be imposed by legislation, candidly requested, and openly canvassed in the proper legislative forum. Then, and only then, can it fully be explored whether such a degree of greater economic regulation is desired. In short, if the majority of the Board believes its powers to be too limited under the existing statute, and that the public interest will be served by a tariff filing requirement, these objectives should be achieved by express legislation, and not by the questionable avenue of patching up the statute by Board-announced rules.

6 F.M.B.
The Notice of Proposed Rule Making cites section 204, Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as one source of authority for the second proposed rule in Docket No. 878. In Carrier-Imposed Time Limits for Freight Adjustments, 4 F.M.B. 29, 34-35 (1952), we stated:

[Counsel for the Board] urges that Section 204 (b) is a source of substantive and novel powers. It is true that Section 204 (b) gives to the Board authority to adopt rules which the Board did not have before, but the section limits the power to making such rules as are necessary "to carry out the powers, duties, and functions" vested in the Board.

Neither the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended nor any subsequent legislation has vested any "power, duty, or function" in the Board concerning the distribution to the public of freight tariffs of a common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the United States. The legislative history of the Shipping Act, 1916, on the contrary, indicates a directly opposite intent on the part of the legislative draftsmen as noted above in the testimony of Dr. Johnson.

The comments are particularly persuasive when the Shipping Act, 1916, is compared with other statutes regulating transportation. In the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, the only requirement as to tariff publicity is that carriers shall file their tariffs with the Board and keep them open to public inspection and "such schedules shall be plainly printed and copies shall be kept posted in a public and conspicuous place at every wharf, dock, and office of such carriers where passengers or freight are received for transportation, in such manner that they will be readily accessible to the public and can be conveniently inspected." Section 2, Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, 46 U.S.C. Section 844. In the Interstate Commerce Act, section 6 (6), 49 U.S.C. Section 6 (6), makes a substantially similar requirement as to rail carriers; while section 217 (a), 306 (b), and 405 (b), 49 U.S.C. sections 317 (a), 906 (b), 1005 (b), expressly vest the I.C.C. with authority to make regulations as to posting requirements relative to tariffs of motor carriers, water carriers, and freight forwarders respectively. Likewise the Federal Aviation Act vests the agency responsible for the regulation of air common carriers with authority to make regulations as to tariff posting requirements. 49 U.S.C. section 1373 (a).

These statutory provisions, dealing expressly with tariff posting requirements in transportation fields where federal regula-
tion is comprehensive and exacting, have no counterpart in the field of transportation by common carriers in foreign commerce. The Shipping Act does not set up nearly as comprehensive or exacting a regulatory scheme. Yet, by the proposed rule, the Board would establish tariff distribution requirements which go beyond those expressly required in these other, more extensively regulated transportation fields. What was stated above with regard to the need for express delegations of authority on such an important subject is equally applicable.

The notice of Proposed Rule Making, Docket No. 878, also cites sections 15, 16, and 17, Shipping Act, 1916, as authority for the proposed rule.

Section 16 of the 1916 Act confers no rulemaking power on the Board. It merely prohibits certain practices with the principal objective of assuring like treatment to all shippers who apply for and receive the same service.

Section 15 of the 1916 Act exempts from antitrust statutes agreements of common carriers by water among themselves or with other persons subject to the Act. In this section the Board is granted the power to:

- disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or as unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be in violation of this Act, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations.

Nothing in this section grants the authority to the Board to promulgate a rule requiring the distribution of carriers' tariff to interested parties. In addition, the Board cannot under this section determine a priori that the failure of the conference carriers to furnish such tariffs to interested parties is either unjustly discriminatory, unfair, to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or in violation of the Act. The section clearly states that the Board may disapprove, cancel or modify an agreement only "if [the Board] finds" that the agreement has the harmful effects enumerated in the statute. Upon such a finding the Board may modify such agreements; but here there has been no such finding. Hence, no rule may be promulgated pursuant to this section.

Finally, section 17 also cited in the notice, gives no support to the proposed rule. It is true that the first paragraph of section
17 of the 1916 Act places “an obligation on every common carrier by water in foreign commerce to make its rates public and available on equal terms to all shippers”. Section 19 Investigation, 1935, 1 U.S.S.B. 470, 502 (1935). But there has been no finding by the Board that the carriers do not do so. On the contrary, from all indications the opposite appears to be true. All carriers heard at oral argument before the Board on this subject stated that at the very least, rates are available to all shippers at the carriers’ offices; and a number of carriers stated that they do in fact voluntarily distribute their tariffs to interested parties.

The second paragraph of section 17 deals with the establishment, observance and enforcement by the carriers of reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. The Board is then authorized to determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice when it finds any regulation or practice to be unjust or unreasonable. While this paragraph does confer a sort of rule-making authority upon the Board, such authority does not relate to carrying or transporting, but only receiving, handling, storing and delivering by the carrier. Los Angeles By-Products Co. v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 2 U.S. M.C. 106, 113, 114 (1939). Since the proposed rule is primarily associated with the transportation by carrier, the paragraph does not confer upon the Board the necessary authority to promulgate the rule.

For these reasons, I conclude that the Board lacks the authority to issue a rule establishing any requirement of distribution of freight tariffs to the public by common carriers by water in the foreign commerce of the United States. Lacking necessary authority, the Board cannot promulgate such a rule regardless of how desirous it may be and irrespective of the advisability in the public interest in the promulgation of such a rule.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 897

FILING OF PASSENGER FARES IN THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE U.S.

Decided June 29, 1961

Charles F. Warren for CAMEXCO Freight Conference; Canal, Central America Northbound Conference; CAPCA Freight Conference; Caribbean/Pacific Northbound Freight Conference; COLPAC Freight Conference; Pacific Coast/Caribbean Sea Ports Conference, Pacific Coast European Conference; Pacific Coast/Mexico Freight Conference; Pacific Coast/Panama Canal Freight Conference; Pacific Coast River Plate Brazil Conference; Pacific/West Coast of South America Conference, and West Coast South America/North Pacific Coast Conference.

Edward D. Ransom for Trans-Pacific Passenger Conference.
Ronald A. Capone for U.S. Lines.
Frank B. Stone for American Export Lines, Inc.
John R. Mahoney for Western Hemisphere Passenger Conference.

Burton H. White for Trans Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference; Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference.
John Robert Ewers for Black Ball Transport, Inc.
William B. Ewers for Moore McCormack Lines.
W. H. Parsons for Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman; SIGFRID B. UNANDER, Vice Chairman, RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

In response to a “Notice of Proposed Rule Making” published in the Federal Register April 22, 1960 (25 F.R. 2401), the Federal
Maritime Board has received and reviewed the public's comments on proposed rules requiring every common carrier by water in the foreign commerce (1) to file its schedules of passenger fares and charges, and (2) to file reports with respect to persons carried free or at reduced fares.

After reviewing the written comments, the Board heard oral arguments on August 30, 1960, relative to the regulations proposed.

The comments and arguments challenged the Board's authority to adopt the proposed regulations and point out certain expenses, burdens and hardships that will occur in the administration of the regulations if adopted. Changes were suggested.

The regulations are fully authorized by Sec. 204 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (Merchant Marine Act) and by Sec. 21 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Shipping Act). Sec 204(b) of the Merchant Marine Act authorizes the Board to adopt "all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the powers, duties and functions vested in it by this act." Pursuant to Sec. 204 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, the functions, powers and duties vested by the Merchant Marine Act were transferred to the U. S. Maritime Commission. Section 105(5) of Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950 transferred to the Federal Maritime Board so much of the functions with respect to adopting rules and regulations as relate to the functions of the Board under the provisions of the reorganization plan.

It is considered that the foregoing authorizations and assignment of functions give the Board the power to adopt regulations for the administration of Sec. 21 and to aid in the enforcement of Secs. 16, 17 and 21 of the Shipping Act.

By Sec. 21 of the Shipping Act the Board may require any common carrier by water or any agent or employee to file with it any report, record, rate or charge or any memorandum of transactions appertaining to the business of such carrier. The documents must be furnished in the form and within the time prescribed by the Board. The regulations prescribe a filing "at least 30 days before the date" any schedule, change, modification or cancellation becomes effective.

Sec. 16 of the Act makes it unlawful for any common carrier by water, either directly or indirectly, (a) to give any undue preference or advantage to any person in any respect whatsoever and (b) to allow any person to obtain transportation for property at
less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carrier by any unjust or unfair device or means. Sec. 17 makes it unlawful for any common carrier by water in foreign commerce to charge any rate which is discriminatory between shippers or prejudicial to exporters of the U. S. as compared with their foreign competitors.

Heretofore discovery of violations of these provisions has depended upon complaint to the Board. This procedure has not resulted in the detection of violations which have recently been shown to exist.

The Board considers that a report of passenger fares and free and reduced rate privileges submitted pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Act will provide information required to discharge its regulatory responsibilities. An examination of the reports of passenger fares and rates applicable to various accommodations and classes will enable the Board staff to determine first whether undue preferential or advantageous treatment is being accorded any particular person; second, whether shippers are, through the economic advantage derived thereby, getting transportation by water for property at less than the rates or charges otherwise applicable and, third, whether transportation has been obtained by an unjust or unfair device or means. The giving of free or reduced fare transportation to shippers, consignees, their officers, agents or employees and members of their families may cause a discrimination between shippers and may prejudicially influence the routing of cargo and may constitute an unfair device or means within the meaning of the Act.

A General Order in conformance with this report will be duly published in the Federal Register.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

No. S-126

MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, INC.—APPLICATION UNDER SECTION
805(a)

Decided July 21, 1961

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. granted written permission under Section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, for its owned vessel, the SS MORMACSUN, which is under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., to permit States Marine Lines, Inc., to subcharter said vessel to Matson Line of San Francisco for one voyage of approximately one month's duration commencing on or about July 22, 1961, in Matson Line's regular liner service in the domestic trade of the United States between Hawaii and U. S. Atlantic ports, since grant of permission found (1) not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade, and (2) not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

John Robert Ewers, Ira L. Ewers and Willis R. Deming, of counsel, for Applicant.

Wm. Jarrel Smith, Jr., Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mormac) filed an application for written permission under section 805 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1223 (the Act) for its owned vessel, the SS MORMACSUN, which is under time charter to States Marine Lines, Inc., for a period of three to five months

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1 Section 805 (a) is set forth in Appendix A, attached hereto.
from May 10, 1961, to permit States Marine Lines, Inc., to sub-
charter said vessel to Matson Line of San Francisco for one voyage
of approximately one month's duration commencing on or about
July 22, 1961, in Matson Line's regular liner service in the domes-
tic trade of the United States between Hawaii and U. S. Atlantic
ports.

The application was duly noticed in the Federal Register of July
18, 1961, 26 F.R. 6457.

No petitions to intervene in the proceeding were received.

After hearing on July 21, 1961, written permission for one voy-
age was granted.

The record establishes that there is a demand for increased
cargo space to accommodate the movement of commodities, par-
ticularly pineapple, between Hawaii and U. S. Atlantic ports.

On this record it is found that the granting of the permission
for one voyage will not result in unfair competition to any person,
firm or corporation operating exclusively in the domestic coast-
wise or intercoastal trades or be prejudicial to the objects of the
Act.
Section 805 (a):

"It shall be unlawful to award or pay any subsidy to any contractor under authority of title VI of this Act, or to charter any vessel to any person under title VII of this Act, if said contractor or charterer, or any holding company, subsidiary, affiliate, or associate of such contractor or charterer, or any officer, director, agent, or executive thereof, directly or indirectly, shall own, operate, or charter any vessel or vessels engaged in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, or own any pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any person or concern that owns, charters, or operates any vessel or vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service, without the written permission of the Commission. Every person, firm, or corporation having any interest in such application shall be permitted to intervene and the Commission shall give a hearing to the applicant and the intervenors. The Commission shall not grant any such application if the Commission finds it will result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service or that it would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of this Act: Provided, that if such contractor or other person above-described or a predecessor in interest was in bona-fide operation as a common carrier by water in the domestic, intercoastal, or coastwise trade in 1935 over the route or routes or in the trade or trades for which application is made and has so operated since that time or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona-fide operation in 1935 during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, except in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall grant such permission without requiring further proof that public interest and convenience will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings as to the competition in such route or trade.

"If such application be allowed, it shall be unlawful for any of the persons mentioned in this section to divert, directly or indirectly, any moneys, property, or other thing of value, used in foreign-trade operations, for which a subsidy is paid by the United States, into any such coastwise or intercoastal operations; and whosoever shall violate this provision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
One voyage by the SS ROBIN KIRK, commencing on or about July 30, 1961 carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products from United States North Pacific ports to United States Atlantic ports, found not to result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation engaged exclusively in coastwise or intercoastal services, and not to be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

Ira L. Ewers and John Robert Ewers for Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.

William Jarrell Smith, as Public Counsel.

REPORT OF THE ACTING DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR

BY THE ACTING DEPUTY MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR:

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mormac), has applied for written permission of the Maritime Administrator under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (the Act), (46 U.S.C. 1223), for its owned ship the SS Robin Kirk, which is under time charter to States Marine Lines Inc. (States Marine), to engage in one eastbound intercoastal voyage commencing at a United States North Pacific port on or about July 30, 1961, carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products for discharge at United States Atlantic ports. Notice of hearing was published in the Federal Register of July 28, 1961, and hearing has been held before the Acting Deputy Maritime Administrator. No petitions to intervene were filed and no one appeared in opposition to the application.
States Marine, the charterer of the SS *Robin Kirk*, conducts as a part of its regular steamship operations an eastbound inter-coastal lumber service. For this sailing it has been unable to get any other suitable ship. No exclusively domestic operators in this trade have objected to the use of this ship for this sailing.

Upon this record, it is found and concluded that the granting of written permission under section 805(a) of the Act for the Mormac owned ship SS *Robin Kirk* which is under time charter to States Marine, to engage in one intercoastal voyage commencing at a United States North Pacific port on or about July 30, 1961, carrying a cargo of lumber and/or lumber products to United States Atlantic ports will not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coast-wise or intercoastal service and will not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act.

This report shall serve as written permission for the voyage.
The practice of assessing a wharf tollage charge on cargo transferred from barge to ocean vessel moored at respondent's wharf, without cargo moving across wharf, found not unreasonable or unduly prejudicial. Complaint dismissed.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS E. STAKEM, Chairman; RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

Evans Cooperage Co., Inc. (Evans) filed a complaint against the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans (Commis-
sioners) on June 10, 1959, alleging violations of Secs. 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act). Evans Transportation Co., the Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Association and Arkansas Grain Corp., Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co. and Manchester Terminal Corp., Hess Terminal Corp., the Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, International Lubricant Corp., Delta Petroleum Co., and Atlas Lubricant Corp. petitioned and were granted leave to intervene.

Hearings were held before an Examiner, followed by an initial decision served on May 19, 1961. Exceptions and replies have been filed but oral argument was not requested.

II. FACTS

Complainant manufactures and reconditions steel shipping drums and barrels and barrels liquid commodities such as vegetable and lubricating oil for shippers in the export trade. Complainant places the shipments on barges which are towed from its plant across the Mississippi to New Orleans and tied to the stream side of ships moored at respondents wharf. The shipments are loaded from the barge by the ship's gear without passing over the wharf.

The respondent's tariffs provide that vessels engaged in foreign and coastwise trade shall be assessed a harbor fee to assist in defraying the expense of administration and maintenance of the port and harbor. All cargo or freight, including mail, is also subject to a "Wharf Tollage Charge, as follows: * * * 3. Such cargo or freight is delivered to or received from vessels by other water craft, or when transferred over the side of vessels directly to or from the water: * * * (B) When said vessels are moored outside of other water craft occupying berths at wharves, docks, landings, mooring facilities or other structures; * * *". The rate of wharf tollage is 28¢ per ton of 2000 lbs. or fraction thereof. "Wharf Tollage" is defined as "A charge against cargo, based on the number of tons received or discharged by vessels".

The tariff also provides that mined products in bulk transferred directly from barge to a vessel, while such vessel is moored to a public facility within the port, are exempted from the payment of wharf tollage. We concur in these and the other findings of fact by the Examiner.
III. DISCUSSION

Insofar as pertinent Sec. 16 of the Act provides that it shall be unlawful for any person subject to the Act directly or indirectly to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever or to subject any particular person, locality or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever and Sec. 17 provides that every person subject to the Act shall establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices related to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing or delivering of property. The respondent commissioners do not question that they are "other persons subject to the Act" and therefore subject to the Board's jurisdiction.

The Examiner found that the practice of assessing a wharf tollage charge on cargo transferred from a barge to a ship moored at respondent's wharf was not unreasonable or unduly prejudicial. The complainant excepts as follows:

1. To the conclusion that the evidence is convincing that the wharf tollage charge was not designed to cover specific services.

2. To the conclusion that the cargo and the barge here involved enjoy substantial benefits from the services and facilities provided by respondent.

3. To the failure to discuss undue preference and prejudice against the complainant as the result of exempting from tollage bulk mineral cargoes.

4. To the finding that complainant makes use of the wharf which is designed and constructed to stand the stress and strain of barges tied to ships moored at the wharf.

5. To the failure of the Examiner to give weight to certain testimony that the handling of barge to ship cargo at Houston and Galveston was inconsequential and therefore there is none of such traffic that they could lose.

6. To the failure of the Examiner to discuss other charges paid by the ship at New Orleans whereby it is already being charged for all of the services it is claimed complainant should pay for.

7. To the failure of the Examiner to consider the special tollage rate on liquids loaded via pipelines that actually use the wharf.

8. To the finding of the Examiner that the practice complained of is more or less uniform throughout the country.
9. To the failure to consider the expense on the commission for 30 days free time on the wharf for lots of 5000 tons or more.

10. To the finding that no evidence of unreasonableness of charges exists and that the record affords no basis upon which a reallocation of costs, charges and services could be made if unreasonableness were shown.

11. This is a general exception to the decision.

Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 all deal with the unreasonableness of the charges under Sec. 17 of the Act and exceptions 3 and 7 deal with the competitive inequality issues under Sec. 16.

The first, second, fourth, sixth and tenth exceptions in effect say that the charges are unreasonable because no specific service is rendered to the complainant and that the Examiner did not consider the evidence showing this. The Examiner, however, considered evidence that wharf tollage does not necessarily cover expenses and services directly rendered to the cargo and also gave weight to the opinions of complainant’s witness on this point. The Examiner found that complainant’s barge and the cargo involved enjoyed substantial benefits from the services and facilities provided by the respondent. Complainant’s barge was tied to the ship and such mooring would not be possible unless the water berth was dredged deep enough to accommodate the ship and unless the mooring facilities were adequate for the ship. Police protection was also present and not denied to the complainant regardless of the fact that direct vision by the policeman might be difficult. The fire tug was available for protection without extra charge having been levied thus far except for the cost of chemicals used in fire fighting. Both forms of protection had to be paid for by users of respondent’s property as well as those who shared in overall benefits, including incidental benefits, of the commission’s facilities. The fact that the operators of the ship must also pay charges was considered and not found to be controlling.

Complainant contends that by definition it is an essential element of wharf tollage that the cargo pass over the wharf and that the charge should be for the use of the wharf to avoid being unreasonable. We do not need to be too concerned about other definitions of wharf tollage. The commission has made a charge to help defray its costs of operating facilities as measured by cargo handled in the area and the only question is whether its facilities are being used and the commission is performing a serv-
ice reasonably related to its charges. The Examiner considered the evidence and found that it was.

In view of the finding that there can be no precise equivalence between services rendered and the charges, we would agree with the Examiner that the record contains no basis upon which reasonable allocation of costs could be made. *Terminal Rate Structure—California Ports*, 3 U. S. M. C. 57, 60, 69 (1948).

The subject of the third and seventh exceptions was considered by the Examiner when he compared the exemption of mined products with the liquid products handled by the complainant as well as the special tollage rates on liquids moved through pipelines under the wharves. The evidence showed that this type of service is different from that given to the complainants'. The police and fire protection given the different services likewise differs. Since the services are not comparable, no discrimination or prejudice is involved in establishing different charges therefor as the Examiner concluded. Moreover, the greater value of the liquid products in drums or barrels was shown to preclude any competitive relationship as well as justify different charges.

The testimony of the other port witnesses referred to in the fifth exception was considered by the Examiner. The fact that the transfer of cargo from barge to the ship was inconsequential or small does not lessen the probative value of the testimony as noted in the Examiner’s decision. The fact is that a charge is assessed at Galveston and Houston for the same type of services and the elimination of the charge at New Orleans would be adverse to the practices observed at these two ports. Its use at these and other ports tends to establish this type of charge as an accepted and reasonable trade practice.

With regard to the eighth exception, complainant cites the practices in New York where there is no wharfage or tollage on cargo that is lightered alongside of ships. However, it does appear to be the practice in the Gulf area to make such a charge; the New York area undoubtedly reflects such costs in charges for other services.

With regard to the ninth exception, complainant appears to contend that because it does not burden wharf space with its cargo it releases such space for other cargo and accordingly should be allowed credit to the extent that it should not be charged for wharf tollage. Whether the specific space alongside the ship being serviced is so utilized by others or not does not alter the obligation of
maintaining the facility and of assessing users of the facility reasonable charges which will provide continued existence of the facility.

The initial decision of the Examiner is sustained.

6 F.M.B.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 4th day of August 1961

No. 857

EVANS COOPERAGE CO., INC. v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS

This case being at issue upon complaint and answer on file, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Board, on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report stating its conclusions and decision thereon.

It is ordered, That the complaint in this proceeding be, and it is hereby, dismissed.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI,
Secretary.

6 F.M.B.
FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD

No. 726

ISBRANDTSEN CO., INC.
v.
STATES MARINE CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, ET AL.

No. 732

H. KEMPNER
v.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC., ET AL.

No. 733

H. KEMPNER
v.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC., ET AL.

No. 734

GALVESTON COTTON COMPANY
v.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC., ET AL.

No. 735

TEXAS COTTON INDUSTRIES
v.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC., ET AL.

Decided August 4, 1961

Exclusive Patronage Contracts and Dual Rate Systems used by the Far East Conference and by the Gulf-Mediterranean Ports Conference found to be pursuant to agreements filed with the Federal Maritime Board and approved by the Board. The agreements filed by Far East Conference and Gulf-Mediterranean Ports Conference found not to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers or carriers, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be in violation of Sec. 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.
ISBRANDTSEN CO., INC. ET AL. v. STATES MARINE ET AL. 423

States Marine Corporation of Delaware, a common carrier by water, found to have demanded, charged and collected a rate which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers in violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

Waterman SS Corp., a common carrier by water, found to have demanded, charged and collected a rate which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers in violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., complainant, entitled under Sec. 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, to reparation for the injury caused by the violation of said Act by States Marine Corporation of Delaware and Waterman SS Corp. in the amount of $6,687.28.

Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., found not to have proven violations of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, including Secs. 14, 15 and 16 thereof, by the Far East Conference or by any of its members.

Complainants, Harris L. Kempner, Trustee, Galveston Cotton Co. and Texas Cotton Industries, Inc., shippers, found not to have proven violations of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, including Secs. 14, 15, 16 and 17 by the Far East Conference or by the Gulf-Mediterranean Conference or by any of the members thereof.

Motion of respondents, other than Isthmian Steamship Company, to remand the record and the recommended decision to the chief examiner with directions to rule on additional findings denied.

John J. O'Connor and John J. O'Connor, Jr. for Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.

Richard W. Kurrus for Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.

Delmar W. Holloman and Shelby Fitze for Harris L. Kempner, Trustee, Galveston Cotton Co. and Texas Cotton Industries, Inc.

Herman Goldman, Elkan Turk, Elkan Turk, Jr., Seymour H. Kligler and Sol D. Bromberg for Far East Conference and its members, other than Isthmian Steamship Co.

Walter Carroll for Gulf-Mediterranean Ports Conference and its members.


REPORT OF THE BOARD

THOS. E. STAKEM, Chairman, RALPH E. WILSON, Member

BY THE BOARD:

I. PROCEEDINGS

These proceedings involve five complaints of excessive freight charges for the shipment of cotton from Gulf of Mexico ports in 1951, 1952 and 1953.
In Docket No. 726 Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. (Isbrandtsen), as a shipper, complains that the Far East Conference (Far East) and its twenty member and five associate lines violated Secs. 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended (Act) by a refusal to carry cotton to Japan either pursuant to an exclusive patronage contract or subject to the lower freight charges applicable to shippers having such a contract. Isbrandtsen also complains that Far East's "system" of requiring an exclusive patronage contract as a prerequisite to lower freight rates had not been filed with the Board and in any event may not be approved by the Board if it is filed. Overcharges by specified carriers on bills of lading "to the prejudice of, and in discrimination against Complainant, and in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916, and other laws of the United States" are charged by Isbrandtsen in Docket No. 726.

In Docket No. 732 Harris L. Kempner, Trustee (Kempner) as a shipper complains that specified common carriers by water, the Gulf-Mediterranean Ports Conference (Mediterranean) and its members violated the same sections of the Act by a refusal to carry cotton to Italy, Yugoslavia and Spain under similar conditions.

In Docket No. 733 Kempner, as a shipper, complains that specified common carriers by water, the Far East Conference and its members violated the same sections of the Act by a refusal to carry cotton to Japan, Indo China and the Philippines under similar conditions.

In Docket No. 734 the Galveston Cotton Co. (Galveston Cotton) as a shipper, complains that specified common carriers by water, the Far East Conference and its members violated the same sections of the Act by a refusal to carry cotton to Japan under similar conditions.

In Docket No. 735 Texas Cotton Industries Inc. (Texas Cotton) as a shipper, complains that specified common carriers by water, the Far East Conference and its members violated the same sections of the Act by a refusal to carry cotton to Japan under similar circumstances.

The complaints in Docket Nos. 732, 733, 734 and 735 also alleged that actions complained of "will constitute violations of the Shipping Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act". Reparations damages and other relief are asked for by all of the complainants.

At a prehearing conference June 25, 1953, the five separate proceedings were consolidated for hearing on a single record.
Docket Nos. 726, 733, 734 and 735 contain complaints against the Far East Conference and its members and Docket No. 732 contains a complaint against the Mediterranean Conference members. An Examiner submitted a recommended decision on November 8, 1957. The recommended decision was followed by the submission of exceptions and replies thereto, followed by oral argument before the Board on February 10, 1959. No report was issued in view of pending litigation and Congressional legislation and subsequently two new members of the Board were appointed. The present Board decided to hear oral argument on the existing record prior to making its decision. We heard further oral argument on May 3, 1961.

II. FACTS

Isbrandtsen's complaint is directed primarily at States Marine Corporation of Delaware (States Marine) and Waterman Steamship Corp. (Waterman), common carriers by water, and members of Far East, to recover $6,687.28 as reparations for excess freight charges in the amount of $4.00 a ton on 6320 bales or about 1,672 short tons of cotton carried to Japan. Far East, since February 1950, has followed the practice of charging shippers who sign exclusive patronage contracts $4.00 per short ton less than its established tariff rates for shipments of cotton. Isbrandtsen was not a party to an exclusive patronage contract at the time of the shipments in question. Isbrandtsen became a shipper of cotton as the result of its inability to charter a ship to carry cotton which Kempner had booked with Isbrandtsen as a common carrier by water. Isbrandtsen sought to discharge its obligation to Kempner by having the cotton shipped by States Marine and Waterman. The shipments were transported to Japan pursuant to 51 bills of lading showing Isbrandtsen as the shipper and dated from August 3, 1952 to September 18, 1952. Reparations were claimed in the amount of $5,455. from States Marine and $1,232.28 from Waterman. Isbrandtsen paid the freight at non-contract rates.

Kempner's complaint in No. 732 is directed primarily at six common carriers by water, members of Mediterranean, to recover reparations indicated for overcharges on bills of lading as follows:

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. (Lykes) $6,861.19
(26 bills of lading dated from 3-15-51 to 10-27-52)
The cotton was shipped to Italy, Yugoslavia and Spain. Mediterranean charges 25c, 30c and 35c per 100 lbs. extra for cotton not shipped pursuant to an exclusive patronage contract.

Kempner's complaint in No. 733 covers a similar cause of action naming the following common carriers by water, and is for the purpose of recovering the reparations indicated for overcharges on bills of lading as follows:

**Lykes**

- $19,288.66
  - (69 bills of lading dated 2-15-51 to 12-31-52)
- 12,737.67
  - (77 bills of lading dated from 2-28-51 to 9-30-52)
- 1,860.82
  - (12 bills of lading dated 11-13-51 to 9-30-52)
- 2,374.84
  - (13 bills of lading dated 11-30-51 to 8-25-52)
- 103.97
  - (1 bill of lading dated 11-15-52)
- 4,708.24
  - (23 bills of lading dated 9-19-51 to 11-28-52)
- 2,408.23
  - (10 bills of lading dated 5-31-52 to 9-9-52)

Galveston Cotton's complaint in No. 734 covers a similar cause of action naming the following common carriers by water and is for the purpose of recovering the reparations indicated for overcharges on bills of lading as follows:

**Lykes**

- $8,787.13
  - (77 bills of lading dated 2-9-51 to 12-31-52)

**Nippon**

- 4,828.99
  - (38 bills of lading dated 9-19-51 to 11-26-52)

**Fern-Ville**

- 1,079.86
  - (7 bills of lading dated 5-31-52 to 12-18-52)
Waterman $ 10.17
(1 bill of lading dated 7-12-51)

Kokusai 1,286.62
(9 bills of lading dated 11-11-51 to 9-30-52)

Mitsui 2,290.35
(12 bills of lading dated 11-30-51 to 7-26-52)

States Marine 11,483.17
(90 bills of lading dated 4-30-51 to 11-22-52)

Texas Cotton's complaint in No. 735 covers a similar cause of action naming the following common carriers by water and is for the purpose of recovering the reparations indicated for overcharges on bills of lading as follows:

Lykes $1,139.30
(9 bills of lading dated 4-15-52 to 8-4-52)

Nippon 518.86
(1 bill of lading dated 11-28-52)

Fern-Ville 311.42
(1 bill of lading dated 7-31-52)

Kokusai 106.78
(1 bill of lading dated 9-30-52)

States Marine 379.64
(3 bills of lading dated 5-27-52 to 8-15-52)

The carriers in docket Nos. 733, 734 and 735 were members of the Far East Conference.

The Mediterranean Conference is associated pursuant to a contract made on the 28th day of December 1929, first approved by the U.S. Shipping Board on January 23, 1930. It has operated under successive agreements and amendments, the latest of which was approved June 2, 1954 (Agreement No. 134-19). During the period of the actions covered by the complaint Mediterranean was operating under the conference contract as amended and approved to July 21, 1950. The conference contract of Mediterranean has never and does not now contain any provisions expressly authorizing the use of an exclusive patronage contract nor differentials in freight rates for contracting shippers. The record did not contain any minutes of meetings at which the contract and "dual" rate system was formally adopted by Mediterranean but the following two extracts from minutes establish the existence of the practice on the dates of the actions referred to in the complaint:

6 F.M.B.
CONFERENCE CONTRACTS ON COTTON
Gulf/French Atlantic Hamburg Range Freight Conference
Gulf/Mediterranean Ports Conference

The Executive Secretary reported, verbally, to the meeting on what transpired since the joint meeting of the Conferences on June 16, 1949, in connection with the Conference contracts on Cotton.

Considerable discussion was had and the States Marine Corporation was informed that the Conference Contract System on Cotton, which was unanimously approved by all members of the two Conferences, had already actually been established to become effective as of July 1, 1949, at the request of the Special Committee of the American Cotton Shippers Association, and after careful consideration and study by that Committee and the Cotton Committee of the Conferences.

None of the other Member Lines of the Conferences would agree to suspending the contracts, for various reasons, including the fact that the contracts had been definitely announced to commence July 1, 1949 and, at the time of the meeting, more than forty-five (45) shippers had accepted the contracts.

This subject was continued on the docket and the meeting recessed, subject to call by the Executive Secretary of the Conferences.

2. CONFERENCE MEETING OF FEBRUARY 1, 1950 * * *

Recordation is herein made that the Joint Conference Cotton Contract Committee and the Special Committee of the American Cotton Shippers Association, late in the afternoon of February 1, 1950, agreed on the following which was officially announced on behalf of the Gulf/French Atlantic Hamburg Range Freight Conference and the Gulf/Mediterranean Ports Conference by the Executive Secretary of those Conferences in a special letter dated Wednesday evening, February 1, 1950, to the Member Lines of the Conferences:

Effective as of February 2, 1950, through June 30, 1951, (repeat, nineteen fiftyone), the date of the bill of lading to govern application of rates, COTTON, Basis High Density Bales, contract basis, $1.40 per 100 lbs., (Standard Compressed Bales $1.90 per 100 lbs.) to all ports in the French Atlantic (Bordeaux/Dunkirk range), and Antwerp, Ghent, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg and all Mediterranean Base ports, including Spanish Mediterranean Base ports.

An addendum, in the form of a letter from the Executive Secretary, to cover this extension of the Conference Cotton Contracts, is being prepared
and will be forwarded to all Cotton Contract signers (both shippers and receivers) for their necessary and prompt acceptance.

All other conditions of the Conference Cotton Contracts (Bordeaux/Hamburg range and Mediterranean) remain unchanged.

The record disclosed no denial that Mediterranean followed the practice of offering exclusive patronage contracts and dual rates.

Far East is an association of common carriers by water in the foreign commerce of the United States acting pursuant to a "Memorandum of Agreement" made between the parties signatory on the first day of September 1922, approved by the U.S. Shipping Board on November 14, 1922 (Agreement No. 17). At the times referred to in the complaints Far East was operating under such agreement as amended and approved through September 7, 1951. The contract contains no provisions expressly authorizing the use of an exclusive patronage contract or differentials in freight rates for contracting shippers.

Prior to the association evidenced by the 1922 memorandum of agreement, an agreement was reached in a conference of representatives of steamship lines and a representative of the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation at meetings on April 12 and April 19, 1920 concerning the obligations of carriers to each other with respect to their operations between North Atlantic ports in the U.S. and the Far East. The transcript of the minutes is the only evidence of the agreement. The minutes of the meeting refer to the assemblage as "Conference No. 17". At that time the carriers were all companies acting as managing agents of ships operated by the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. A letter dated May 5, 1920 "relative to legality of the conferences" signed by the "Examiner in Charge, DIVISION OF REGULATIONS" of the Shipping Board refers to the transcript of minutes as follows:

... An examination of these papers does not disclose any objectionable features, they will be accepted and filed under Sec. 15 of the Federal Shipping Act and may be regarded as tentatively approved. Proceedings within the scope of this Conference as outlined in these papers will be lawful unless you shall be hereafter notified to the contrary.

I note that you will arrange to forward to this office copies of future minutes, agreements, tariffs and rates as may be authorized by the Conference... .

The record does not contain any further directives by the government concerning the filing of transcripts of minutes but the
practice of submitting such papers to the government appears to have been followed thereafter. The Board's General Order No. 76, promulgated November 1952, however, requires filing of statements concerning the initiation of dual rate-contract arrangements by carriers. (See Sec. 15 Inquiry, 1 U.S.S.B. 121 (1927)).

At the conclusion of hostilities in World War II cotton freight rates were controlled by a government agency until 1949 when commercial shipments of cotton were resumed but there was no offer of a rate differential until 1950.

The transcript of an extract from the minutes of a special meeting of Far East held on February 16, 1950 contains a statement that "This Special Meeting was called to hear further report of Conference Counsel with respect to Cotton contracts; and the following:

"On the question as to whether or not the Conference should proceed with the contract on Cotton, upon Motion seconded and carried it was unanimously agreed that the Chairman be instructed to mail the contract to the Cotton Shippers for their signature."

Special rate differentials for cotton shipped pursuant to exclusive patronage contracts are first evidenced by a routine tariff revision effective as of February 7, 1950 approved at a meeting on February 14, 1950 which was followed by the February 16 action noted above relative to the issue of a contract to put the dual rate into effect.

Minutes of Conference meetings are reduced to writing and copies have been transmitted to the Federal Maritime Board or its predecessor agencies. Standard Board practice is to review these documents and, if action believed to be contrary to law is shown, to make the matter a subject of official correspondence or of formal proceedings. If no illegal actions are shown, the papers are filed and no further administrative action is taken. A transcript of minutes showing the action of Far East in extending its contract rate practice to include cotton was filed with the Board.

No minutes or memorandum or other evidence of any agreement to revise, rescind or revoke the foregoing action by either Conference had been filed with the Board by January 1, 1953.

Isbrandtsen (in No. 726) signed a "Memorandum of Agreement" made the 10th day of January 1946 with Far East and member carriers agreeing "in consideration of the rates and
other conditions stated . . . to forward by vessels of the Carriers all shipments . . . to ports in Japan”. Far East under date of October 1, 1948 sent contract shippers including Isbrandtsen proposed “Amendments to Conference Freight Contract” with the condition that “if you should omit to accept this proposal on or before November 1, 1948, we shall . . . terminate this agreement effective December 1, 1948 . . . Isbrandtsen omitted to accept the proposal. No new agreement was made covering the period of the bills of lading in evidence. Isbrandtsen asked Far East for a contract for its August 1952 shipments but the Conference representative advised that it would not permit Isbrandtsen sent to sign a contract to cover these shipments and States Marine advised that even if Isbrandtsen obtained a freight contract, States Marine would not carry the cotton Isbrandtsen tendered.

Kempner (in No. 732) signed a “Memorandum of Agreement” made the 12th day of July 1949 with Mediterranean and member carriers agreeing “in consideration of the rates and other conditions stated . . . to offer . . . to the Carriers for transportation by them to all ports . . . served on the Mediterranean Sea . . .” On May 16, 1950 Kempner was alleged to have shipped cotton on a nonconference ship and thereby to have failed to offer his cargo to the member carriers. After an exchange of telegrams and correspondence, beginning June 27, 1950, regarding this failure, Mediterranean by letter dated July 14, 1950 assessed damages pursuant to the agreement in the amount of $6,010.20, against Kempner and advised that failure to pay in 30 days would be cause for termination of Kempner’s right to “contract rates” until paid as provided in the agreement. On July 27, 1950 Mediterranean advised Kempner that “the ‘non-contract’ basis of rates will be applicable effective on and after August 17, 1950”. Kempner did not pay the damages assessed against it and has paid non-contract rates since August 17, 1950.

Kempner (in No. 733) signed a “Memorandum of Agreement” made the 7th day of February 1950 with Far East and member carriers designating therein under its signature as “Subsidiary Associated and/or Parent Companies” Galveston Cotton Company and agreeing “in consideration of the rates and other conditions stated . . . to forward by vessels of the Carriers all shipments made . . . to ports in Japan”. By letter dated September 25, 1950 Kempner wrote Far East “we herewith tender our resignation from the Far East Conference Agreement”. The agree-
ment provides that it "may be terminated upon 90 days written notice by the Shipper" (Kempner). The "resignation" was construed as a "termination" by the parties effective December 24, 1950. No new agreement was made covering the period of the bills of lading in evidence.

Neither Galveston (in No. 734) nor Texas Cotton (in No. 735) is a party in its own name to an exclusive patronage contract with either Far East or Mediterranean. Galveston is a Texas Corporation which is a wholly owned subsidiary of H. Kempner, a Massachusetts Trust. Texas Cotton is a Texas corporation and 50% of its stock is owned by H. Kempner.

Kempner never asked for a new shippers' contract and until this action never claimed a right to ship at contract rates.

On the dates of all the shipments forming the basis of complaints herein, no other adequate means were available to complainants to transport the shipments of cotton.

The differential between tariff rates for persons having exclusive patronage contracts for the transportation of cotton by Far East members and for those not having such contracts was $4.00 per ton and by Mediterranean carrier members was 20%.

Far East Conference carriers had however allowed shipments of other commodities by Isbrandtsen between New York and Japan at contract rates for a period of time immediately preceding August 1952. Such contract rates were extended to Isbrandtsen even though its was not a party to a shipper's exclusive patronage contract.

On the ships which carried Isbrandtsen's cotton at non contract rates, in August and September 1952, all of the other cotton on board was carried at contract rates. During the period in question, the conference lines also shipped cotton for "spot" cotton brokers and forwarders at contract rates and considered such persons as shippers even though they did not own the cotton they shipped.

Isbrandtsen paid $13,373.96, the difference between the rate Kempner paid Isbrandtsen and the non contract rate paid by Isbrandtsen for shipping Kempner's cotton. Isbrandtsen did not pass on to the buyer the extra freight paid to the conference lines.

The following is a summary of outside competition met by conference lines in the Gulf-Far East trade during the period 1949-1955: In 1949, 4 non-conference liner sailings and 34 tramp sailings; in 1950, 15 non-conference liner sailings, and 29 tramp
sailings; in 1951; a non-conference liner sailing applying conference contract rates, and 38 tramp sailings; in 1952, 54 tramp sailings; in 1953, 5 non-conference liner sailings, and 68 tramp sailings; in 1954, one non-conference liner sailing, and 77 tramp sailings; and in 1955, 61 tramp sailings.

DISCUSSION

The complainants in all five of these proceedings seek to have the "dual rate contract arrangement" in use by Far East and Mediterranean made illegal under the Act.

The complainants after alleging the use of "dual rate, contract/non-contract system" in the Far East and Mediterranean trades state that such system is unlawful for the following reasons: 1. the use of the system contravenes the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Act; 2. the use of the form of shipper's contract and of rate differentials in the tariffs of the conferences has never been approved by the Board under Sec. 15 of the Act and may not be approved under Sec. 15; 3. the system and the dual rates used are unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and disadvantageous to persons in violation of Sec. 16 of the Act; and 4. the system (this term is used herein interchangeably with "arrangement") and the dual rates used are unjustly discriminatory between shippers and are unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United States in violation of Sec. 17 of the Act.

If the arrangements have been agreed to by common carriers by water and thereafter carried out in whole or in part without Board approval, the arrangements are illegal for this reason under Sec. 15 and for no other reason. If the arrangements embodied in agreements have been approved by the Board, on the other hand, it cannot be argued here that the arrangements are illegal unless a court has interpreted the Act to say so, notwithstanding the Board's approval. If any Court has done so, we hold as hereinafter noted, that Sec. 14 of the Act restricts our authority to construe or apply the Act to make unlawful any dual rate contract arrangement in use on May 19, 1958. (The "arrangement" or "system" referred to herein consists of conference action to (1) adopt and tender to shippers an exclusive patronage contract and (2) issue tariffs containing rate differentials for contracting shippers.)

The procedure by which agreements between carriers are declared legal or illegal under the Act is that they be 1. filed with the Board pursuant to Sec. 15; 2. reviewed; and 3. passed on for
legality. There is no filing requirement until there is an agreement or a meeting of minds by two or more common carriers by water or other persons subject to the Act regarding activities described in Sec. 15. Until common carriers by water or other persons subject to the Act agree to put rate differentials into effect and to tender shippers exclusive patronage contracts, the so-called "arrangement" is a trade practice or simply a part of the commercial environment in which common carriers by water and other persons subject to the Act operate. The trade practice must be distinguished from agreements. The "arrangement" is put into effect through agreements, commodity by commodity, as the needs of the trade appear to dictate. In the present case the cotton shippers wanted a contract and the conference, as the minutes herein show, put the arrangement into effect by the actions at conference meetings. Agreements came into being at the time the common carriers by water which are members of Far East and Mediterranean agreed to offer cotton shippers rate differentials by means of tariff revisions and to tender them exclusive patronage contracts. Complainants, in effect, challenged the validity of the actions evidenced by the meetings of Far East on February 16, 1950, and of Mediterranean on February 1, 1950, when they assert the unlawfulness of the "dual rate exclusive patronage contract." If the agreements reached at these meetings violate any provision of the Act or operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States or are unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers and shippers they may be disapproved by the Board. If the "practice", "system" or "arrangement" resulting from these agreements violates any provision of the Act the Board may also award complainants reparations under Sec. 22 for the injury, if any, caused by the violation.

The facts showing that Mediterranean filed and obtained Board approval of a conference contract and filed transcripts of minutes of its meetings showing agreement among its members for the adoption of the practice of offering dual rates and exclusive patronage contracts and filed tariffs containing dual rate provisions establishes that Mediterranean has filed an agreement pursuant to Sec. 15. The fact that Far East also filed transcripts of extracts from the minutes of its meetings showing adoption of the practice of offering dual rates and exclusive patronage contracts for cotton shippers as well as the filing of tariffs showing dual rates established that Far East filed its agreements pursu-
suant to Sec. 15. These transcripts have been reviewed by the Board's staff and no exception taken thereto. Board approval of both agreements is required, IsbrandtSEN Co. Inc. v. U.S., 211 F. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. den. 347 U.S. 990 (1954), and approval has been given. The Board's approval was neither subsequent nor retroactive, but existed at the time it accepted tariff changes showing dual rates and did not disapprove the results of the conference meetings and the tariff revisions by order. Empire State Highway Transport Assn. v. F.M.B., U.S.A. and American Export Lines, Inc., 291 F. 2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

The Board has followed for many years the administrative practice of initiating proceedings and of issuing orders where agreements were to be disapproved under Sec. 15 and where organic agreements and modifications thereof are approved. Section 15 Inquiry, 1 U.S.S.B. 121 (1927).

Sec. 15 authorizes the Board to disapprove by order, but not approve by order. All other agreements may simply be approved. Approval has been tacit where no action was taken and no order was issued, and this has always been considered as appropriate and consistent with Sec. 15. Section 15 Inquiry, supra. Other forms of approval by the issue of written statements have heretofore not been considered a necessary technique of administering the Act. Limitations of staff compelled the use of the technique which was followed. Since the decision in IsbrandtSEN Co. Inc. v. U.S. supra and River Plate & Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co. Inc., 227 F. 2d 60 (2d Cir. 1955), however, new approval procedures have been instituted.

The purpose of filing agreements under Sec. 15 of the Act is to give the Board the opportunity to review the agreements to determine their conformity with the standards specified in Sec. 15. The complaint is that such a review will show the agreement to use the dual rate exclusive patronage contract system by common carriers by water does not conform; and particularly that it violates Sec. 14 of the Act. This contention has been reviewed in the past by the courts in several cases, but none of the cases declare the practice or system unauthorized under all circumstances. In U.S. Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant steamship lines from using the contract rate system on the ground that such practice violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, C. 647, 26 Stat. 209, Title 15, U.S.C. §§ 1-7 and the Clayton Act, C. 323, 38 Stat. 730, Title 15, U.S.C. §§ 12-27. The decree dismissing the bill of
complaint was affirmed on the ground that the Act covers the dominant facts alleged as constituting a violation of the Anti-Trust Acts, particularly Sec. 14 of the Act which prohibits retaliation by common carriers by water against a shipper by resorting to discriminating or unfair methods. If the system were illegal under any circumstances, the dismissal because of the Board's primary jurisdiction would have been a useless action and the court should have passed on the issue then and there. The case of Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. U.S., 300 U.S. 297 (1937), involved an appeal from an order of the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary's order had enjoined the use of the exclusive patronage contract rate system in the intercoastal trade on the ground that, as he interpreted the evidence, the operation of the contract system in the circumstances of the case would not differ substantially from the deferred rebate system outlawed in both foreign and coastwise shipping by Sec. 14 of the Act. This case is not authority for the conclusion that any contract rate system is unlawful. The court said: "Even though, as appellants seem to argue, the evidence may lend itself to support a different inference, we are without authority to substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary that the discrimination was unreasonable." at 307. Unreasonable discrimination, not illegality under any circumstance, was the basis of the decision.

In Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., v. United States et al, 96 F. Supp 883 (U.S.D.C.S.D. N.Y., 1951), aff'd., 342 U.S 950 (1952), the facts showed that the North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference on October 1, 1948, "sent notices to all known shippers in the North Atlantic trade that effective November 1, 1948, the exclusive patronage contract-noncontract rate system would be inaugurated and that shippers who refused to enter into contracts to ship with the conference lines exclusively when they could provide transportation were to be charged 20% to 30% higher than the contract rates." The Board by its order of December 1, 1950 (3 F.M.B. 235) dismissed a complaint alleging illegality in such action. The plaintiff Isbrandtsen, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Agriculture joined in contending "that in no circumstances can a dual rate provision (i.e., exclusive patronage, or dual rate, or contract noncontract provision) in a conference agreement be valid" under Sec. 14. The court said "for the purposes of this decision we assume that, as the Board contends, under some circumstances the Board may, pursuant to 46 U.S.
C.A. § 814 approve a conference agreement containing such a provision."

The court however set aside the Board's order and enjoined the conference from acting pursuant to the dual rate provision on the ground that the 20% to 30% differential in rates had been arbitrarily selected and decided that the Board itself made the examiner's finding to this effect its own. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the District Court without opinion in A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Redeir. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950, (1952). In Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952), the Attorney General brought a suit under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, supra, to enjoin defendants from using the exclusive patronage contract rate system. The important distinction between this case and the Cunard case above was that now the government rather than a private shipper was seeking to enjoin the maintenance of dual rates. This fact was held to be immaterial and since the Board was the expert agency responsible for administering the Act, the court held that administrative remedies before the Board must be exhausted before resort may be had before the courts. Here again the court declined to hold that the contract rate system was unlawful under any circumstances.

Up to this point we do not construe any of these decisions as outlawing the trade practice of common carriers by water agreeing to tender shippers exclusive patronage contracts which provide for less than tariff rates and of issuing tariffs containing rate differentials for shippers having exclusive patronage contracts. We construe the present status of the law as follows: 1. where an issue as to the validity of agreements among common carriers by water to use exclusive patronage contracts and dual rates is concerned, the complaint and facts must first be presented to the Board for decision; 2. where we find the operation of an exclusive patronage dual rate system has the effect of creating deferred rebates or unreasonable discrimination, we must hold the agreement to maintain the system is unlawful; 3. dual rate differentials which are arbitrarily selected must be held invalid; and 4. a dual rate system which is agreed to for the purpose of curtailing competition and an agreement to offer an exclusive patronage contract containing provisions tying shippers in such a way as to have the effect of stifling outside competition must both be held unlawful.

Finally on May 19, 1958, the Supreme Court in Maritime Board
v. Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), passed on the issue of illegality under all circumstances. Isbrandtsen filed a petition to review an order of the Board in Docket No. 730, Contract Rates-Japan/Atlantic-Gulf Freight Conference, 4 F.M.B. 706 (1955), which order approved under §15 the agreement embodied in a statement filed by the Conference. The Conference's statement proposed to initiate an exclusive patronage contract/non-contract freight rate system (dual rate system) in the trade from Japan, Korea and Okinawa to U.S. Gulf Ports and Atlantic Coast Ports. The Court held: "In view of the fact that in the present case the dual-rate system was instituted for the purpose of curtailing Isbrandtsen's competition, thus becoming a device made illegal by Congress in §14 Third, we need not give controlling weight to the various treatments of dual rates by the Board under different circumstances." The Court had stated that: "Ties to shippers not designed to have the effect of stifling outside competition are not made unlawful. Whether a particular tie is designed to have the effect of stifling outside competition is a question for the Board in the first instance to determine." The circumstances here were that the conference was trying to stifle outside competition.

Our approval of the Mediterranean and Far East conference agreements and of their subsequent agreements to initiate the exclusive patronage contract dual rate system to the carriage of cotton, and the consistency of such approval with court decisions has been noted above. The main question now is whether our former approval must be revised as a result of the last Isbrandtsen decision.

The complainants' claim is that we now lack authority to approve a dual rate system because Sec. 14 Third provides that no common carrier by water shall "Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse, space accommodations when such are available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair methods, because such shipper has patronized any other carrier * * * or for any other reason."

The Circuit Court had stated "since the dual rate system here constitutes retaliation it must be condemned without regard to the question of its reasonableness, as are deferred rebates." Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. United States, 239 F. 2d 933 (D.C. Cir., 1956), Cert. granted, 353 U.S. 908 (1957). The Supreme Court affirmed the result which was to set aside the Board's orders "insofar as they approve the exclusive patronage contract/non-
contract rate system” of the Japan-Atlantic & Gulf Freight Conference, but for different reasons it held that Sec. 14 Third “strikes down dual-rate systems only where they are employed as predatory devices”, and precise findings by the Board “as to a particular system’s intent and effect” are essential to a judicial determination of a system’s validity under the statute. Isbrandtsen at 499.

We are called on to make precise findings as to the intent and effect of the arrangement as a result of the Isbrandtsen decision, and of respondents’ (Far East) motion to remand the record and the recommended decision filed November 3, 1958 after the Isbrandtsen decision, to decide whether the arrangement should now be disapproved as a result of the findings herein about the system’s intent and effect and to decide whether our former approval should be revoked.

On August 12, 1958, Congress enacted P.L. 85-626, 72 Stat. 574 “amending the section of the Shipping Act on which the Isbrandtsen decision was based, [Sec. 14] so as to hold valid any dual rate contract arrangement in use by the members of a Conference on May 19, 1958” Anglo Canadian Shipping Co. Ltd. et al v. United States, 264 F. 2d 405, 409 (9th Cir., 1959).

Before discussing the effect of P.L. 85-626 and the amendment of Sec. 14 Third on complainants’ claims, on the precise findings required and on the Isbrandtsen decisions a short summary of the history of the trade practice and of agreements relating to exclusive patronage contracts and dual rates will throw some light on the retaliatory, predatory and discriminatory aspects of the arrangement and on its intent and effect.

Steamship freight conferences came into being in 1875 to provide regular services and fixed rates of freight which were the same to all shippers. In return for regular service and stable rates, the associated steamship lines sought assurances from shippers of their exclusive support for all members of the conference. Shippers supporting the conferences also sought preferential freight rates over those who did not. The assurances of support took two forms: the deferred rebate system and the contract system and rate differential. Under the deferred rebate system, shippers who confined their shipments to conference lines for stated periods can claim a rebate at the end of each period measured as a percentage of the freight paid and payable at a later date. Under the contract system shippers are
required to sign a contract in advance and to confine all their shipments to conference lines. In return they either receive a discount on freight rates or else lower rates of freight than non-contractors. Penalties are usually prescribed for violation of the contract.

Two significant conclusions emerge from this summary: first, the use of exclusive patronage contracts providing for less than tariff rates was an established trade practice long before the Act, in 1916, and existed at the time of the Act, and, second, the trade practice was brought about principally in response to demands of shippers rather than as a result of conference efforts to improve the members' competitive position vis-a-vis outsiders. The intent and effect of the dual rate contract traditionally is not to meet outside competition. The conference agreements between carriers may have been designed to regulate competition, but not the exclusive patronage contract between carriers and shippers nor the differential in freight rates which the contract provided. The carrier-shipper relation is the only one involved here. The inter-carrier relation was involved in the Isbrandtsen case.

The trade practice of requiring a shipper tie to a conference by means of the contract and rate differentials for contracting shippers is what has come to be known as a "contract system" or as the "dual rate system" or the "exclusive patronage, dual rate, contract/noncontract system" or a "dual rate contract arrangement".

Since this trade practice was so well known in American and British ocean commerce by 1916, it would have been anomalous for Congress in 1916 to outlaw the system by inference rather than expressly as it did in the case of rebates.

Since 1916 the public policy aspects of shippers' contracts and rate differentials as trade practices have not been successfully challenged. Certain aspects of the arrangement such as excessive rate differentials have been invalidated because they were "arbitrarily" selected, A/S J. Ludwig Monwinekels Redair v. Isbrandtsen Co., supra, or were undue or unreasonable, Swayne and Hoyt Ltd. v. United States, supra; the administrative procedures or formality of approval under Sec. 15 have been declared improper, River Plate & Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co. Inc., supra and the U.S. Shipping Board has condemned the arrangement where it operates solely to effect a monopoly, Eden
Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & SS Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 41 (1922), but the trade practice itself had never been declared invalid “per se” until the Court of Appeals said so in the Isbrandtsen case (239 F. 2d 933) in 1956. This unqualified holding however does not appear to us to have been fully sustained by the Supreme Court in 1958.

We are inclined to believe that the latest Isbrandtsen case did not affirm that part of the Circuit Court decision (239 F. 2d 933) which set aside the Board’s orders “in so far as they approve the exclusive patronage contract/non-contract rate system” as a general proposition, but affirmed such decision only to the extent of disapproving the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference arrangement which used the particular shippers’ contract to injure the plaintiff, an independent common carrier by water.

Up to this point and until 1958, a period of about 83 years following the formation of the first shipping conference in 1875, the shippers’ exclusive patronage contract and rate differentials have survived legislative inquiry and judicial scrutiny in both Great Britain and America without being found to be a retaliatory device and as such sufficiently contrary to public policy to justify remedial legislation or adverse court orders.

In 1958, in the Isbrandtsen case, the Supreme Court concluded, on the premise of our finding the dual rate contract of the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference was a necessary competitive means to offset the effect of Isbrandtsen’s non-conference competition, that the arrangement was a resort to other discriminatory or unfair methods in violation of Sec. 14 Third of the Act.

Notwithstanding 1. the special facts of the present case showing there have been no unjustified reductions in freight rates (i.e. “rate cutting”), 2. the fact that shippers, and not carriers, are complainants herein, and 3. the absence of significant independent liner competition for cotton out of the Gulf since World War II, all of which alter the premises herein, the complainants and respondents adopted differing views about the effect of the Isbrandtsen decision.

Insofar as the decision invalidated practices heretofore generally used for over 83 years in the seaborne foreign commerce of the U.S., it had a profound effect upon the industry and action by Congress followed. The cause for Congressional action was stated in the report of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to accompany S. 3916 (Report 1709, Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.) as follows: “Whether the above language
from the Court's opinion would justify operation of a dual-rate system if it is not directed at a non-conference competitor or competitors, or whether, as Justice Frankfurter construed it in a dissenting opinion, it declares illegal all dual-rate systems, is certainly not clear. About the only point rendered unmistakably clear by the two opinions is that, as a result of the Court's decision, the shipping industry is likely to be plagued with widespread confusion and endless litigation over the months, and possibly years, ahead."

After the Supreme Court decision on May 19, 1958, and the Committee's Report on June 13, 1958, Congress enacted Public Law 85–626 (72 Stat. 574) which, as amended by Public Law 86–542 (74 Stat. 253), and by Public Law 87–75 (75 Stat. 195), amended Sec. 14 Third of the Act to provide that nothing in the Act "shall be construed or applied to forbid or make unlawful any dual rate contract arrangement in use by the members of a conference on May 19, 1958 which conference is organized under an agreement approved under section 15 of this Act" by the Board unless and until the Board disapproves or modifies the arrangement in accordance with the standards of Sec. 15 of the Act. This amendment is in effect until September 15, 1961.

The Committee's action put a stop to litigation over the effect of the Isbrandtsen decision, but in its place, litigation began over the interpretation of the amendment of Sec. 14 Third of the Act. The New York Supreme Court in Pasch v. Chemoleum Corp. 209 N.Y. Supp. 2d 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 1960) had the following to say about the effect of the amendment:

The legislative history of this amendment makes plain the intention of Congress, by this legislation, to provide the industry with a moratorium during which Congress might study and investigate, to the end that appropriate legislation might thereafter be enacted. Petitioner asserts the amendment preserves the validity of the dual rate contracts now under consideration. Respondents argue to the contrary and contend the amendment was intended to do no more than preserve the status quo that had been disturbed by the adjudication of the Supreme Court of the United States in the later Isbrandtsen case; that it was not the intention of Congress to limit the effects of the adjudication in the earlier Isbrandtsen case, and, as a consequence, the amendment must be deemed to include the qualification that exclusive patronage-dual rate contracts must, in any event, have been approved by the Federal Maritime Board to acquire validity.

I reach a different conclusion. Respondents' contention as to the meaning of the amendment works a distortion in the language employed by Congress which plainly states "* * * unless and until such regulatory body disapproves, cancels or modifies such arrangement in accordance with the standards set forth in section 15 of this Act. It would have been a simple
matter for Congress, if it desired to do so, to insert appropriate language in the amendment limiting the validity of the dual rate contracts to those actually approved by the Board. It is incredible to assume that Congress was wholly unaware of the earlier IsbrandtSEN case when it enacted the legislation. I conclude Congress neither intended nor desired to limit the effect of the amendment in the manner suggested by respondents.

Later the following on this case was stated by Justice McGivern in *Pasch v. Chemoleum Corporation*, 210 N.Y.S. 2d 738 (1960) before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court:

In any event, any infirmity which may have existed in the contract was cured by the enactment on August 12, 1958, of Public Law 85–626 (72 Stat. 574) which amended section 14 of the Shipping Act (46 U.S.C. 812).

The dual rate contract arrangement of petitioner was in existence on May 19, 1958, and it is conceded that the conference was one organized under an agreement approved under section 15 of the Shipping Act by the regulatory body administering the act. Under the circumstances, in the absence of any evidence that the regulatory body has disapproved, canceled, or modified the dual rate contract form theretofore filed with it on February 26, 1953, by petitioner in compliance with the regulatory body's General Order 76, directing it to supply complete information as to the dual rate contract arrangement then in force, this court must find the contract executed by petitioner and respondent valid. (P. 742).

More recent support for this conclusion is found in the Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 6775, on June 8, 1961 (87th Cong. 1st Sess. House of Representatives, Report No. 498) interpreting Sec. 14 Third of the Act as amended by P.L. 85–626 in 1958 and P.L. 86–542 in 1959, as follows:

In view of the grave doubts cast by the Supreme Court decision upon the legality of the dual rate system and the possible detrimental results to both American shipping and American foreign commerce, legislation was enacted in the 2d session of the 85th Congress to authorize the continuation in force of any existing dual rate contract arrangement until June 30, 1960. (emphasis supplied).

The arrangement of Far East and Mediterranean was in use by members of the Conference on May 19, 1958. The Conferences were organized under agreements approved under Sec. 15 of the Act. Sec. 15 requires an order if the Board is to disapprove an agreement. The standards for determining the lawfulness of an arrangement set forth in Sec. 15 are: 1. is the arrangement unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers and carriers; 2. does the arrangement operate to the detriment of the commerce of the U.S.; and 3. is the arrangement in violation of the Act?

We have found that the arrangements of Mediterranean and
Far East are embodied in arrangements heretofore approved by the Board and in use by the members of the conferences on May 19, 1958. The question now is whether we should disapprove or modify these arrangements by revoking our prior approval.

On the present record no independent common carrier by water is complaining of the retaliatory or predatory effect of the arrangement. Instead, as shown in complainant's memorandum, in recent oral argument before us and in the exceptions and replies filed after the Isbrandtsen decision, it is argued by a group of shippers that the historically established trade practices are contrary to public policy and were outlawed by Congress in Sec. 14 of the Act. The Supreme Court, however, only found that the arrangement of the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference used the shippers' contract and its dual rates as a predatory device and as evidence thereof referred to a shippers' exclusive patronage contract containing oppressive conditions. The Court stated: "... the dual-rate contracts here require the carriers to carry the shipper's cargo only 'so far as their regular services are available'; rates are 'subject to reasonable increase' within two calendar months plus the unexpired portion of the month after notice of increase is given; '[e]ach member of the Conference is responsible for its own part only in this Agreement'; the agreement is terminable by either party on three months' notice; and for a breach, 'the Shipper shall pay as liquidated damages to the Carriers fifty per centum (50%) of the amount of freight which the Shipper would have paid had such shipment been made in a vessel of the Carriers at the Contract rate currently in effect.' Until payment of the liquidated damages the shipper is denied the reduced rate, and if he violates the agreement more than once in 12 months, he suffers cancellation of the agreement and the denial of another until all liquidated damages have been paid in full." The shippers' contracts in this record are similar to the shippers' contracts before the Supreme Court.

Because of this similarity with the contracts in this record and the Court's inference therefrom that such an oppressive contract plus a dual rate system constitutes a predatory device, it is argued that we should hold that the actions of Mediterranean and Far East violate Sec. 14 although as far as this record is concerned there is no evidence whatever that the carrier's actions in adopting the shippers' contract and the dual rate was directed at any other carrier.
The circumstances of this case are that the shippers’ contract was asked for by the shippers themselves. The contract was not adopted as an anti-outside-carrier device but as an accommodation to shippers desiring stable conditions in the trade which would give them assured service at reasonably firm and level rates for predictable periods. We find no evidence in this record to show that the drafting and tender of the shippers’ contract or that the rate differential established in the published and filed tariffs was a competitive device, was designed to stifle outside competition or even had this effect. No carrier introduced any evidence to this effect.

The absence of substantial non-conference liner competition and the absence of any complaint by carriers in independent non-conference liner service and the circumstances under which cotton shippers negotiated the exclusive patronage contracts, leads us to conclude that the arrangement herein was not unjustly discriminatory or unfair between shippers and carriers, was not retaliatory, did not stifle outside carrier competition and does not violate the Act.

The Examiner has found that the differentials in rates of each conference are not discriminatory or unfair or detrimental to the commerce of the U.S. or in violation of the Act. We have reviewed the record of the facts on which this finding is based, have no disagreement therewith and concur with the Examiner’s finding.

In view of the history of the exclusive patronage contract and rate differential arrangements, we conclude that such arrangement does not operate to the detriment of the commerce of the U.S. We conclude further that the dual rate and exclusive patronage contract herein was not a resort to other discriminatory or unfair methods against the shipper complainants herein in violation of Sec. 14 of the Act. We find no reason to disapprove the agreements of Far East and Mediterranean here-tofore filed with the Board.

We conclude further that “system and rates thereunder” are not unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and disadvantageous to persons in violation of Sec. 16 of the Act and are not unjustly discriminatory between shippers and unjustly prejudicial to exporters of the United States in violation of Sec. 17 of the Act as claimed in respondents’ complaints.

The complainants also asked for reparations based on violations of the Act.
The facts showing that APL, East Asiatic, Maersk and NYK gave Isbrandtsen the lower contract rates without the necessity for a contract and then in August and September other conference members demanded the payment of non-contract rates established that Isbrandtsen was discriminated against by States Marine and Waterman in violation of Sec. 17 of the Act. Sec. 17 forbids any common carrier by water in foreign commerce from charging any rate which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers. States Marine and Waterman as members of Far East failed to extend to Isbrandtsen the same rates which other conference members had granted earlier.

Respondents claim that Isbrandtsen is not a shipper and therefore cannot claim that he has been discriminated against as a shipper. Isbrandtsen's name appears as the shipper on the bills of lading in evidence, signed by the masters of respondent's ships, the cargo described thereon was taken aboard and transported and Isbrandtsen's freight payments as shipper were accepted. Isbrandtsen's name also appears on all other shipping documents. As a shipper Isbrandtsen tried to get a contract and contract rates but was refused both. At the same time, States Marine and Waterman were carrying the same kind of cotton for other shippers at contract rates, under identical conditions. States Marine and Waterman refused to give Isbrandtsen similar rates. As a result of these actions, Isbrandtsen was charged a rate which was unjustly discriminatory between shippers. Isbrandtsen showed further that it incurred expenses, lost profits and suffered damage to the extent of its out-of-pocket expenses at the result of the denial of a contract and payment of the higher rates. *Eden Mining v. Bluefields* at 1 U.S.S.B. 41 (1922). Respondents did not prove any mitigating factors affecting Isbrandtsen's damage although the burden was on them to do so. *Roberto Hernandez Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein, Etc.*, 116 F. 2d 849 (2nd Cir. 1941; cert. den. 313 U.S. 582 (1941).

Kempner and Galveston signed a shippers' contract on February 7, 1950, and terminated their contract September 25, 1950, effective 90 days later on December 24, 1950, as shown. Unlike Isbrandtsen, no new contract was requested. These respondents were never unjustly refused a contract rate. Consequently, for shipments made during and after January 1951, Kempner and Galveston could not claim status as contract shippers and were not discriminated against. Kempner and Galveston were not
given the lower contract rates during any period when they did not have a contract.

Texas Cotton never had a shippers' contract with either Mediterranean or Far East. Kempner in the only Far East shippers' contract it had did not list Texas Cotton as a subsidiary, affiliate or parent company. No contract existed at any time on which Texas Cotton either assumed the obligations to patronize the conference exclusively or acquired the right to ship at the lower contract rates either independently or as a subsidiary. This respondent was never unjustly refused a contract rate.

Since none of the complainants in Dockets No. 732, 733, 734 and 735 could validly claim status as contract shippers, nor ever received contract shippers' rates during a period when they did not have a contract, there has been no discrimination against such complainants.

Isbrandtsen's claim for reparations under Sec. 22 of the Act has been found to be the result of discrimination. We have recently held that "overcharges and discriminations have quite different consequences as far as reparation is concerned. A different measure of recovery applies where the shipper has paid the applicable rate (non contract) and sues upon the discrimination caused by other shippers having to pay less or by being unjustly refused the contract rate." Swift & Co. and Swift & Co. Packers v. Gulf & South Atlantic Havana SS Co. et al, 6 F.M.B. 215 (1961). In the Swift case the complainant was given the opportunity to prove its damages at a further hearing. Although the basis for the decisions are the same, such further proceeding is not necessary here because Isbrandtsen has only asked for the sum of $5,455, with interest, from respondent States Marine Corp. of Delaware and $1,232.28, with interest, from the respondent Waterman SS Corp. In the Swift case complainants had asked for reparations and other relief as a result of the damage suffered from the enforcement by the conference of certain contract provisions against Swift. Accordingly, States Marine and Waterman will be ordered to pay to complainant Isbrandtsen on or before 60 days from the date of our Order $6,687.28 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on any amount unpaid after 60 days as reparation from the injury caused by the respondent's violation of Sec. 17 of the Act.

We have reviewed the record as well as the conclusions of the Supreme Court in the second Isbrandtsen case and the subse-
quent relevant Acts of Congress. Under the circumstances, it is not considered that the motion of respondents, other than Isthmian Steamship Company, to remand the record and the recommended decision to the examiner with the directions to rule on additional findings should be granted. The motion will be denied.

After due investigation and hearing, our conclusions in respect to the five complaints are as follows:

1. Complainant Isbrandtsen in Docket No. 726:
   a. has proven its complaint of a violation of Sec. 17 of the Act by States Marine Corp. of Delaware, a common carrier by water, and shall be paid on or before 60 days from the date of our order herein with interest at the rate of 6% per annum for every day after such 60 days until paid, the sum of $5,455. as reparation for the injury caused by said violation;
   b. has proven its complaint of a violation of Sec. 17 of the Act by Waterman SS Corp., a common carrier by water, and shall be paid on or before 60 days from the date of our order herein with interest at the rate of 6% per annum for every day after such 60 days until paid, the sum of $1,232.28 as reparation for the injury caused by said violation;
   c. has not established that respondents should be ordered to cease and desist from using the exclusive patronage dual rate contract/non-contract system, or such contracts with shippers, or from using the spread and differential of four dollars ($4.00) per ton and any other spread or differential between contract and non-contract tariff rates or participating in such contracts;
   d. is not entitled to any other additional and further relief.

2. Complainant Kempner in Docket No. 732:
   a. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Lykes Bros. SS Co. Inc;
   b. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Kerr Steamship Company;
   c. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by States Marine Corporation of Delaware;
   d. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Societa Italiana de Armamento "SIDARMA";
   e. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Compania Maritima del Nervion;
   f. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Societa Anonima Navigazione Alta Italia, Ltd., Genoa (Creole Line);
g. has not established that respondents should be ordered to cease and desist from the violations of the Act complained of or from using a dual rate contract/non-contract type of tariff involving a spread or differential now being charged or any other differential or charge which will not be available to contract and non-contract shippers alike;

h. is not entitled to any other and further relief.

An order dismissing the complaint will be entered.

3. Complainant Kempner in Docket No. 733:
   a. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act against Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.;
   b. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by States Marine Corp. of Delaware;
   c. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Kokusai Lines Joint Service;
   d. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Mitsui Steamship Co., Ltd.;
   e. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.;
   f. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Ltd.;
   g. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Fern-Ville Far East Lines/Barber-Fern-Ville Lines—Fearnley & Eger and A. F. Klaveness & Co., A/S;
   h. has not established that respondents should be ordered to cease and desist from the violations of the Act complained of or from using a dual rate contract/non-contract type of tariff involving a spread or differential now being charged or any other differential or charge which will not be available to contract non-contract shippers alike;
   i. is not entitled to any other and further relief.

An order dismissing the complaint will be entered.

4. Complainant Galveston Cotton Co. in Docket No. 734:
   a. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.;
   b. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Ltd.;
   c. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Fern-Ville Far East Lines/Barber-Fern-Ville Lines—Fearnley & Eger and A. F. Klaveness & Company, A/S;
   d. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Waterman Steamship Corp.;
e. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Kokusai Lines Joint Service;
f. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Mitsui Steamship Company, Ltd.;
g. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by States Marine Corp. of Delaware;
h. has not established that respondents should be ordered to cease and desist from the violations of the Act complained of or from using a dual rate contract/non-contract type of tariff involving a spread or differential now being charged or any other differential or charge which will not be available to contract and non-contract shippers alike;
i. is not entitled to any other and further relief.

An order dismissing the complaint will be entered.

5. Complainant Texas Cotton Industries in Docket No. 735:
a. has not proven its complaint of a violation of the Act by Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., et al;
b. has not established that respondent should be ordered to cease and desist from the violations of the Act complained of or from using a dual rate contract/non-contract type of tariff involving a spread or differential now being charged or any other differential or charge which will not be available to contract and non-contract shippers alike;
c. is not entitled to any other and further relief.

An order dismissing the complaint will be entered.
ORDER

At a Session of the FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD, held at its office in Washington, D.C., on the 4th day of August 1961.

No. 726
ISBRANDTSEN Co., INC.
V.
STATES MARINE CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, ET AL.

No. 732
H. KEMPNER
V.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP Co., INC., ET AL.

No. 733
H. KEMPNER
V.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP Co., INC., ET AL.

No. 734
GALVESTON COTTON COMPANY
V.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP Co., INC., ET AL.

No. 735
TEXAS COTTON INDUSTRIES
V.
LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP Co., INC., ET AL.

These proceedings being at issue upon complaints and answers on file and having been duly heard and submitted, by the parties, and full investigation having been had, and the Board,
on the date hereof, having made and entered of record a report containing its conclusions and decision thereon, which said report is hereby referred to and made part hereof:

It is Ordered, as follows:

1. That respondent, States Marine Corporation of Delaware, be, and it is hereby, notified and directed to pay unto complainant Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., of 26 Broadway, New York 4, New York, on or before 60 days from the date hereof, $5,455. with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on any amounts unpaid after 60 days, as reparation for the injury caused by respondent’s violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended;

2. That respondent, Waterman Steamship Company, be and it is hereby notified and directed to pay unto complainant, Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., of 26 Broadway, New York 4, New York, on or before 60 days from the date hereof, $1,232.28 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on any amounts unpaid after 60 days, as reparation for the injury caused by respondent’s violation of Sec. 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended; and

3. That the motion of the respondents, other than Isthmian Steamship Company, to remand the record and recommended decision to the examiner with directions to rule on additional findings, be, and it is hereby, denied.

The proceedings are dismissed.

By the Board.

(Sgd.) THOMAS LISI

Secretary
**TABLE OF COMMODITIES**

*Bananas.* Ecuador to Atlantic ports. 262.
*Cigarettes.* New York, N.Y. to Ponce and San Juan, P.R. 48.
*Cigars.* New York, N.Y. to Ponce and San Juan, P.R. 48.
*Explosives.* Absorption or equalization. 139.
*Fibre Concrete Forms.* Classification. 189.
*Glass Articles.* Misclassification and misbilling. 155.
*Silica.* Misclassification. 289.
*Tobacco.* New York, N.Y. to Ponce and San Juan, P.R. 48.
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[Numbers in parentheses following citations indicate pages on which the particular subjects are considered]

**ABSORPTIONS.** See also Proportional Rates.

Shipper and carriers violated section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916 where they agreed that carrier would absorb difference between shipper's cost of delivery of explosives to San Francisco loading point and cost of delivery at Blake Island, Wash., this was interpreted by parties to mean that carriers could absorb cost of inland movement less costs to shipper of moving property from DuPont, Wash., to Blake Island, and shipper advised carriers that this amount was $10.96 although its costs were actually in excess of that figure, and the shipper knew the facts about its costs. Shipper knowingly and willfully by means of false billing obtained transportation at less than applicable rates by an unfair or unjust means and carriers knowingly allowed this. Carriers were not unaware of the facts, although they may not have known the precise amount involved. Absorption or Equalization on Explosives, 138 (149–151).

Carriers cannot avoid responsibility for allowing a shipper to obtain transportation for property at less than regular rates by the unjust or unfair means of paying the shipper far in excess of an agreed reimbursement in violation of section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916 by claiming ignorance of obvious facts. To the extent of excessive reimbursement the carriers subjected other shippers to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of section 16-First, and charged a rate discriminatory as against other shippers in violation of section 17 of the Act. Id. (150).

Where carriers deliberately, or through calculated ignorance, allowed themselves to be sidetracked in the search for a cost figure instead of pointing out to the shipper the true meaning of a reimbursement agreement (in connection with absorption of the cost of inland movement of explosives) with the result that the carriers allowed the shipper to obtain a discriminatory rate, the case was not one of inadvertence. It involved such a disregard of the facts of the tariff regulation as to amount to an intent and a knowing scheme to violate sections 16 and 17. Id. (150, 151).

**ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT.** See Practice and Procedure.

**ADVERTISEMENTs.** See Agreements under Section 15; Common Carriers.

**AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 15.** See also Brokerage; Contract Rates; Forwarders and Forwarding.

—*Agreements required to be filed*

Legislative history of the Shipping Act of 1916 makes it clear that Congress was interested in oral understandings, tacit agreements and gentlemen's agreements between common carriers by water such as those herein involving fixing and regulating rates. The purpose of section 15 of the Act was to place in custody of the Board information and proofs which it could review and analyze to determine whether the requirements of the section were being followed with
respect to discrimination, unfairness or detriment to the commerce of the United States. Since the respondents had not put in the Board's hands evidence of understandings to which they were parties or to which they conformed, the complaint of a violation of the requirement in section 15 as to filing agreements relating to fixing or regulating transportation rates was proven. Oranje Line v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 199 (208, 209).

The provisions of section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916 requiring the filing of agreements relating to allotment of ports, the restriction or regulation of the number and character of sailings between ports and to exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangements were proven to have been violated where no evidence of such agreements was ever filed with the Board and such agreements were shown to have been carried out. Id. (210).

Where, subsequent to approval by the Board of an agreement between carriers in the North Atlantic/Baltic Trade to alternate their Swedish and American flag sailings, and of an amendment providing for an increase in sailings from time to time as might be mutually agreed to carry out the purpose of the agreement as to an even distribution of freight, alternate sailings were discontinued, the changes in operating pattern were consistent with the parties' undertakings and were operating matters comparable to current rate changes which need not be filed. Correspondence between the officers of the lines concerning the desire and intention of the American line to institute a monthly sailing from Gothenburg, Sweden, with the time of the month to be decided upon after consultation, was merely an implementation of the basic agreement. Unapproved Section 15 Agreement—North Atlantic/Baltic Trade, 320 (321, 322).

—Approval of agreements

Where a conference has filed and obtained approval of an agreement and filed transcripts of minutes of its meetings showing agreement among its members for adoption of the dual-rate system and filed tariffs containing dual-rate provisions, the conference has filed an agreement pursuant to section 15 for which approval is required. When the Board took no action its approval was neither subsequent nor retroactive but existed at the time it accepted the tariff changes showing the dual rates and did not disapprove the results of the meetings and the tariff revisions by order. Section 15 authorizes the Board to disapprove by order, but not approve by order. Limitations of staff compelled the use, in the past, of the technique of tacit approval. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 422 (434, 435).

—Arbitration decisions, effect of

There is no provision in the United States Arbitration Act which limits the authority of the Board to interpret a freighting agreement to determine whether it is a modification of an approved conference agreement. Arbitration decisions are not binding on the Board. Swift & Co. v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference, 215 (222).

—Evidence of existence

The significance of joint notices issued by steamship lines, relating to the number and character of sailings between ports, was not that they involved joint advertising, which by itself does not justify finding that the action was taken pursuant to agreement, but that the information contained in the notices required cooperative arrangements to carry out the commitments made to the public. Oranje Line v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 199 (209).
INDEX DIGEST

Carriers' joint advertising of services does not justify per se a finding by the Board that cooperative working arrangements exist, but in this case the information contained in such advertisements showed that cooperative arrangements were necessary to carry out the commitments made to the public and that such commitments required activity going far beyond that which occurred simply as a result of respect by carriers for the historic position of each line in a port. Id. (209, 210).

Carriers must have had explicit understandings among themselves as to cooperative activity to regulate sailings between allotted ports, and as to distribution of revenues and sharing of expenses, where their advertisements and schedules bespoke mutual understandings as to allotment of ports, printing and timing of schedules, and destination and other services to ports; departures and arrivals from allotted ports were in accordance with public notice; and use of berths, loading of cargo and allocation of revenues and costs required coordinated activity which could only be accomplished by a policy of cooperation followed by arrangements made at the managerial level by participating carriers. Id. (209, 210).

Where carriers denied that they had entered into an agreement, but the evidence showed that departures and arrivals of ships from allotted ports in accordance with a joint notice, the use of berths, the loading of cargo and the allocation of revenue all required coordinated activity which could only be accomplished by a policy of cooperation followed by arrangements made at the managerial level, the complaint of a violation of section 15 as to the filing of agreements relating to the allotment of ports, the restriction or regulation of the number and character of sailings between ports and exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangements was proven. Id. (209, 210).

Where carriers passed ships from one company to another to enable each to carry cargo to ports each served; there was no break in the pattern of exclusive and preferential service from various ports; no inference of independent operation was possible; mutual agreement was essential to the effective accomplishment of the operations shown of record; and one carrier's officer stated that service was operated in conjunction with others and to avoid treading on others' toes, the conclusion is inescapable that agreements existed among the carriers. Id. (210).

—Modification of agreements

To the extent any interpretation of a freighting agreement extended its scope beyond that allowed by the authorized conference agreement, the freighting agreement would modify the conference agreement and would be a new section 15 agreement. Such modified agreement is unlawful until it is filed and the Board approves it. Therefore, the meaning of the freighting agreement was properly in issue before the Board, since respondents were saying that a decision upon arbitration between the shipper and the conference was more than just a finding that the shipper violated the freighting agreement because the arbitrators must first have found the existence of an obligation to be violated. Thus the arbitrators' decision was a final opinion that the freighting agreement was not a modification of the conference agreement but an interpretation of what had existed all along. If the provision is a modification, the arbitrators' decision is a final opinion that the arbitrators, not the Board, may approve the provision and may go on to find it has been violated. Only the Board may approve agreements or modifications. Swift & Co., v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference, 215 (221, 222).
Where the language of an approved conference agreement relating to shipments to Cuba from named Gulf and Atlantic ports was clear, an attempt to extend its terms to shipments from St. Louis, Mo., by an "interpretation" by the conference was in effect a fundamental modification of the scope of the agreement and of its terms, and conference members were guilty of violating section 15 in failing to file immediately with the Board a true copy or memorandum of such modification. Id. (223, 224).

Provision of conference agreement authorizing dual rates for stabilization purposes and the absence of a provision containing "any limitation upon the Conference's contract rate authority in terms of origin of cargo, mode of transportation to ports served by the Conference or in any other terms", did not justify the conference in not filing a modification of the agreement which extended its coverage to an inland port (St. Louis) not named in the agreement. The "Gulf and South Atlantic ports" and Havana, Cuba ports provision in Article 1 coupled with the meaning of such ports in Article 15 and the statement in the opening clause of the agreement that "nothing herein shall be construed to extend the provisions of this Agreement to ports or territories other than as described herein" constituted such a limitation. Id. (224).

—Rates and Tariffs

Transportation rates were fixed and regulated where carriers distributed copies of a tariff among themselves and quoted rates to shippers exactly as they appeared therein; the tariff was not on file anywhere; the rates used were uniform, even when they differed on one or two occasions from the tariff rates; carriers' advertisements asked shippers to call any one of them for rate information; and no evidence of any agreement for such fixing and regulating of rates was filed with the Board. Oranje Line v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 199 (208).

Carrier which quoted proposed tariff rates under agreement not filed with Board, but which did not participate in any of the joint services of other carriers through an exchange of ships or cooperative sailing arrangements has not violated section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916 insofar as it relates to agreements for allotting ports, restricting or regulating sailings and providing for exclusive, preferential or cooperative arrangements. Id. (213).

—Scope of agreements

The scope of any freighting agreement is necessarily limited by the agreements between common carriers by water, or other persons subject to the Act, which are filed and approved as required by the first sentence of section 15 of the Act. Swift & Co. v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference, 215 (223).

Where there is a continuous movement of cargo shipped in the same barge from St. Louis, Mo., to Cuba, neither the change from river to ocean tugs at the port of New Orleans nor a temporary halt in the barge movement converts the cargo to a shipment from an ocean port, so as to require compliance with the provisions of a conference agreement covering only shipments from ocean ports. Id. (224, 225).

AGREEMENTS WITH SHIPPERS. See Contract Rates.

ARBITRATION. See Agreements under Section 15.

BILLS OF LADING. See Classifications; Forwarders and Forwarding.

BILLS OF LADING ACT. See Forwarders and Forwarding.

BOOKING. See Terminal Facilities.

BROKERAGE. See also Forwarders and Forwarding.
A broker is an agent employed to make contracts between others for a compensation, commonly called brokerage. A broker may act as agent for his customer only under an express or implied contract. His right to recover commissions must be predicated on a contractual relation. Freight Forwarder Investigation, 327 (347).

Carriers' agreements prohibiting or limiting brokerage are subject to the Board's jurisdiction under section 15 in circumstances where it is shown that payments by carriers to forwarders are utilized by the carriers as a competitive device, since section 15 specifically authorizes approval of agreements regulating competition between carriers. Id. (358).

Brokerage payments by carriers to forwarders who render freight forwarding service to shippers are voluntary payments made by the carriers as a competitive device to attract traffic or as a protective device to prevent diversion of cargo over which the forwarders have control of routing. The resultant violations of sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act must be curbed by imposing a rule prohibiting such payments. All prior contrary findings are overruled. Id. (362-364).

The provisions of the rule relating to brokerage payments are not intended to prohibit the payment of brokerage in those instances where the recipient has no other connection with the cargo than to perform the true functions of a broker. Id. (365, 366).

BROKERS. See Brokerage.

CLASSIFICATIONS. See also Tariffs; Volume Rates.

In determining the proper tariff classification of articles the starting point should be the manufacturer's catalogue, sales efforts and common understanding as to what the manufacturer-shipper had for sale. Such common understanding is reached by a study of the essential characteristics of articles. Misclassification and Misbilling of Glass Articles, 155 (158).

The essential character of articles is not changed by possible other use and such possible use is not a lawful basis for a difference in freight charges. This is particularly true in the present case where tumblers (classified as empty jars or jugs instead of glassware) were not shown to have been sold for packaging but were sold as table glassware. Id. (159).

Drinking glasses, notwithstanding any adaptability as containers when capped, are more correctly described by common usage as "tumblers" rather than "jars". The controlling use as a drinking glass determines the correctness of the tumbler classification. The "jars" classification used to describe tumblers was factually incorrect. Drinking glasses or tumblers were falsely classified as jars. Id. (159).

False classification resulted in the billing and payment of a lower freight rate than would have been applicable to tumblers and glassware. To the extent the billing depended on the classification for its correctness it too was false. Section 16 is violated by shippers and forwarders if the false classification and the false billing were knowingly and willfully made. Id. (159).

Shipper and freight forwarder obtained transportation at less than the rate and charge otherwise applicable where they knew of a variance between what was being shipped and what was described in bills of lading calling attention to section 16; the variances were willfully created; the tariff was studied and a classification chosen giving the lowest rate; and the improper description was consistently and continually chosen. The choice involved willfully ignoring a printed warning, as well as a more descriptive classification of the articles
shipped with full knowledge of the characteristics and normal use of the articles and of the proper classification therefor. Id. (160, 161).

Section 16 is violated by common carriers by water if they allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carriers by means of false billing or false classification. To "allow" a person to do something means to approve or to sanction an act or to suffer something to be done by neglecting to restrain or prevent. Id. (161, 162).

Descriptions of commodities in export declarations do not necessarily conform to those in tariffs, and it is possible to check a declaration against a bill of lading and not find an inconsistency when in fact there is a false classification. Nevertheless, the declaration is a useful guide to variances in descriptions of property and can lead to discovery of a misclassification. Id. (164).

That there is no law or regulation requiring comparison by a carrier of documents describing articles shipped is not essential or material in determining whether section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916 has been violated since the carrier's liability is not for violation of a nonexistent law or regulation but for allowing illegal transportation by a wanton disregard of duty. Id. (166).

A background of widespread false billing need not always be shown as an essential ingredient in an offense under section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916. Id. (166).

Carriers violated section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916 when they allowed shipper to obtain transportation of articles at less than the applicable rate established and enforced by them, as a result of ineffective office procedures, total reliance on shippers for discovery of the truth, and failure to inspect cargo when alerted. Id. (166).

Carriers cannot avoid responsibility under section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916 by inaction, ineffective internal procedures and inexpert personnel. Intent to avoid such duty will be inferred from the carriers' refusal to rely on their own processes of discovery and on their own personnel, and from placing of complete reliance on shippers or forwarders who have an incentive to conceal; this constitutes a willful and knowing means to avoid discovery of the truth, which is an unjust and unfair means under section 16. Id. (166).

Use by a carrier of a tariff classification of "forms-fibre" for fibre tubes, rather than "conduits-fibre", was reasonable where the essential characteristics of the product as understood by the shipper more closely fitted the carrier's classification, although the bill of lading description was "fibre conduit" and the product had some use as such but was not so advertised or sold. Raymond International, Inc. v. Venezuelan Line, 189 (190–192).

Shipper, a printer and manufacturer of composition books, business blanks, receipt books, and other school and business paper products, was guilty of false billing within the meaning of section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916, where such goods were described as "printing paper" for the purpose of obtaining lower freight rates. Rubin, Rubin & Rubin Corp., 235 (239).

Where a shipper, with full information about the article shipped, after studying the tariff, chooses an improper description consistently and continually by ignoring a more descriptive classification, and where a shipper knows of the variance between what is being shipped and what has been described, such shipper knowingly and willfully obtains transportation by water for property at less than rates or charges otherwise applicable by means of a false classification. Id. (239).
Where a shipper has doubt as to the proper tariff designation of his commodity, he has a duty to make diligent and good faith inquiry of the carrier or conference publishing the tariff. "Resort to a definition" of an article "which does such violence to the clear meaning of the tariff, at best, manifests such an indifference and lack of care in construing the tariff as to constitute a deliberate violation of section 16." A persistent failure to inform one's self by means of normal business resources might mean a shipper or forwarder was acting knowingly and willfully. Indifference on the part of shippers is tantamount to outright and active violation and diligent inquiry must be exercised by shippers and forwarders. Id. (239, 240).

Shipper is not exonerated from willful conduct tending to obtain lower rates by false billing by fact that he was attempting to meet unfair competition of others doing the same thing. Id. (240).

Shipper obtained lower rates by means of false billing "knowingly and willfully" where it was found that for a while shipper correctly classified its products in bills of lading in accordance with the tariff and paid the correct charges, and, after he found out that he was losing business because of high freight, misdescribed the products to get a lower freight rate, in the meantime continuing to have the cartons containing his product correctly stencilled and to prepare invoices with accurate references to what they were. Id. (240).

Shipper's choice in the preparation of inaccurate bill of lading involved willful and knowing conduct, where though he might not be well informed about the preparation of the bill of lading, he knew that he was not shipping merchandise as described and made no effort to obtain enlightenment about the obvious discrepancy between the description and both the facts and the correct description he saw on the invoices. Id. (241).

Forwarder's conduct in forwarding misdescribed goods was willful, where it was expert in preparing shipping documents; same goods had been shipped under different designation calling for higher freight rate; when there was a change in description, but no change in product; forwarder conformed to the change without inquiry; and where, though the incorrect classification was adopted for the purpose of obtaining lower freight rates, the goods were properly classified for the purpose of statistical classification of commodities exported from the United States. Id. (241, 242).

Unquestioning reliance by a carrier on shippers for the truth as to information on bills of lading is not enough. Where, for years, stencils on boxes accurately and properly described their contents to the carrier, the carrier was bound to inquire why, such stencils remaining the same, the description in the bill of lading called for a lower freight rate. Id. (243).

Where (1) shippers and their forwarders falsely classified dried diatomaceous earth (obtained from mines of diatomaceous silica) as silica on bills of lading, thus obtaining a lower rate for transportation, (2) the products are distinguishable mainly by their densities (so that silica stows at 35 to 40 cu. ft. per ton compared to 150 to 100 cu. ft. for diatomaceous earth), (3) the carriers' written tariff descriptions, which when the dispute arose did not contain a measurement factor, were not made available and requests to examine the tariffs were refused, (4) the Bureau of Census authorized a 'silica description in export declarations for diatomaceous earth and at the same time used a code number covering diatomaceous earth and products, and (5) the carriers' meager verbal statements about the tariffs, together with the known high silica content of the product shipped, were sufficient to create an ambiguity in the minds of the shippers, the shippers and forwarders did not knowingly and will-

Where the precise classification of a product as earth or silica could be determined only by microscopic analysis, the carrier's official was concerned only with establishing a compensatory rate for shipping the product (diatomaceous earth), the official was confused by various descriptions furnished to him but, when the confusion was brought to his attention, he took steps promptly to have the product investigated and the rate adjusted, the carrier in allowing transportation of the product at less than the regular established rate did not show a wanton disregard of its duty to exercise reasonable diligence to collect applicable rates such as to amount to an intent to collect less than applicable rates. However, carriers should take more care in making definitions clear and precisely descriptive of the commodities covered and in specifying rates applicable thereto. Id. (299).

COMMON CARRIERS.

—Who is common carrier

A steamship line was operating as a bona-fide common carrier between California and Hawaii from 1935 to 1938 when it maintained its own offices, held itself out to the public, issued its own tickets and bills of lading, paid its own claims, filed its own passenger tariff and carried passengers and cargo, although under an agreement with another line, it carried passengers and cargo as agent and paid half the gross domestic revenue to the other line, did not advertise for or solicit cargo or passengers, turned inquiries for transportation over to the other line, and did not have a cargo tariff on file, due apparently to an oversight. American President Lines, Ltd.—Hawaii Passenger Service, 6 (9).

Carriers which, through the medium of conference tariffs, (1) hold themselves out to transport explosives and establish rates applicable thereto, subject only to such restrictive conditions as are required by the cargo, (2) apply the restrictive conditions alike to all shippers, (3) enter into no special contracts for such cargo, and (4) transport the explosives at tariff rates and in accordance with tariff conditions are common carriers. A common carrier is such by virtue of his occupation, not by virtue of the responsibilities under which he rests. Absorption or Equalization on Explosives, 138 (148).

A carrier may be both a common and a contract carrier, but not, however, on one vessel on the same voyage. Id. (148).

Where respondent claimed it was not a common carrier on the grounds that its advertisements showed that it was a loading broker and that the conference secretary testified that it was not considered a common carrier, but respondent's advertisements did not indicate its status as a loading broker until after the complaint was filed; it appeared to have held itself out to the public as a common carrier; it advertised its schedule for an entire season for four ships which were passed between companies; and, while the evidence was not entirely clear, the preponderance of unrepudiated evidence showed that it wanted to be known as the carrier of shippers' goods tendered to it, respondent was shown to be a common carrier by water. Oranjé Line v. Anchor Line Ltd., 199 (211, 212).

A nonvessel carrier which, by the terms of its bill of lading and agreement with the vessel carrier does not assume sole responsibility to the shipper for the safe water transportation of shipments, but is, instead a "forwarding agent" for the "convenience of the shipper" insofar as the water transportation part of the journey is concerned, does not come within the definition of a common carrier by water. Determination of Common Carrier Status, 245 (254).
The term "common carrier" is not defined by the Shipping Act but the legislative history of the Act indicates that the person to be regulated is the common carrier at common law: One who holds himself out to carry for hire the goods of those who choose to employ him. Id. (251).

Common carrier status does not depend on ownership or control or means of transportation, but rather on the nature of the undertaking with the business served. Where complete responsibility for the safe transportation and delivery of goods entrusted from time of receipt from the shipper to arrival at ultimate destination is assumed, common carrier status exists. Id. (251, 252).

An express company is not a common carrier by water although it acts as a principal and not as agent for the shipper insofar as the water transportation part of the journey is concerned unless it is shown that, although it disclaimed liability to the shipper for that part of the journey, the disclaimers of liability are invalid or liability is otherwise imposed by law. Assumption or attempted assumption of liability should not be sole test of common carrier by water status. The actual existence or imposition of liability is also a significant factor. Actual liability as a common carrier over the entire journey, including the water portion, is essential. Id. (255, 256).

A person who holds himself out by establishment and maintenance of tariffs, by advertisement and solicitation, and otherwise, to provide transportation for hire by water in interstate or foreign commerce, assumes responsibility for the safe water transportation of the shipments, and arranges in his own name with underlying water carriers for the performance of such transportation, whether or not owning or controlling the means by which such transportation is effected, is a common carrier by water as defined in the Shipping Act. Id. (256, 257).

Express company and freight forwarder assuming full common carrier liability from origin to destination based on value of property shipped as declared by the shipper, and having eliminated restrictions on or disclaimers of liability contained previously in their bills of lading, are "common carriers by water" within the meaning of section 1 of the Shipping Act of 1916, insofar as the water transportation part of the journey is concerned. Determination of Common Carrier Status, 287.

CONTRACT RATES. See also Agreements under Section 15; Discrimination.

—In general

A conference agreement (or its modification) which bars shippers of lard by barge to Cuba from the port of St. Louis, Mo., from the benefit of obtaining contract rates on other traffic, where conference members do not provide barge service nor any other service from river ports but only service by ships from ocean ports, prevents (1) shippers from using the Mississippi River, (2) river port cities from obtaining cargo for shipment therefrom, and (3) traffic in lard by barge transportation when it has certain economic advantages, since it tends to compel shippers either to forego these advantages and ship lard on conference ships from the ports they serve, or, as to other traffic, to ship by conference ships at noncontract rates. Consequently, such an agreement would be subject to disapproval by the Board pursuant to section 15 in that it constitutes a routing restriction detrimental to the commerce of the United States and unjustly discriminatory as between shippers or ports. Furthermore, such an agreement (1) subjects particular persons, i.e. shippers, and localities, i.e. ports, to undue prejudice or disadvantage, in violation of section 16, second paragraph, First, and (2) involves the demand, charge or collection of a rate, fare or charge which is

Contentions of conference carriers urged to prove detriment to the commerce of the United States (if dual-rate contract routing restriction is not approved) that barges will be damaging to their business, but that their service is better anyway, exemplifies the contradictions involved in considering either one as a dominating consideration in a study of detriments to the commerce of the United States. The interests and needs of shippers in foreign commerce should dominate where competing methods and new techniques of water transportation are involved. An arrangement would seem to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States or be unfair as between shippers and exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors which prevents the former from having a free choice among competing methods of transportation for cost advantages. Anything which impedes such free choice is a detriment to commerce in the long run. Id. 226.

Dual-rate contract obligation requiring shippers to offer conference members all cargoes to Cuban ports, including those originating at inland or river ports not served by the carriers, is inconsistent with the decision in Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U.S.M.C. 220. The use of barge transportation in the instant case as opposed to ocean-going, deep-draft ships in the earlier case does not provide any distinction relevant to the existence of shipper and port discrimination under section 15 as interpreted in the Contract Routing case. Since the contract obligation herein has the effect of eliminating St. Louis as a port for ocean cargoes which can be put on barges there, the obligation unjustly discriminates against the port of St. Louis and is unfair to potential shippers therefrom who have cargo suited to barge transportation. The same facts insofar as they create discrimination against shippers and ports also involve the demand, charge or collection of a rate which is unjust in violation of section 17 by compelling shippers to pay rates based on shipments from the ports served by the carriers instead of rates from ports and by transportation methods chosen by shippers. Id. (227, 228).

Performance of an exclusive-patronage contract, during a time when the carrier unjustly discriminated against a shipper in the matter of cargo space and gave undue and unreasonable prejudice or advantage to particular persons, was not a valid excuse for nonperformance of obligations under sections 14 and 16 of the Act. The performance of the contract was the very act which constituted violations of the sections. Such conduct had previously been held improper in the proceeding. There can be no question of inequity to the carrier in such a case. It is the excluded shipper who has the equities on his side, not the favored shipper nor the discriminatory and preference-giving carrier. Philip R. Consolo v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana S.A., 262 (270).

Until carriers agree to put rate differentials into effect and to tender shippers exclusive patronage contracts, the "arrangement" is a trade practice which must be distinguished from an agreement. When cotton shippers requested a contract and the conference agreed to offer them rate differentials and exclusive-patronage contracts, agreements came into being. If such agreements violate any provision of the Shipping Act, operate to the detriment of United States Commerce, or are unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers and shippers, they may be disapproved. If the "practice", "system", or "arrangement" resulting from such agreements violates any provision of the Act, reparations may be awarded under section 22 for the injury, if any, caused by the violation. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 422 (434).
Where a dual-rate contract, similar to that reviewed by the Supreme Court in *Isbrandtsen*, was requested by the shippers themselves, there was no substantial nonconference liner competition, and no carriers in independent nonconference liner service were complaining; the arrangement was not unjustly discriminatory or unfair between shippers and carriers, was not retaliatory, did not stifle outside carrier competition, and did not violate the Act. When, in addition, the rate differentials were not discriminatory or unfair or detrimental to the commerce of the United States or in violation of the Act, such an arrangement does not operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, and the conference agreements will not be disapproved. Moreover, "systems and rates" under the agreement are not unduly and unreasonably prejudicial and disadvantageous to persons in violation of section 16 and are not unjustly discriminatory between shippers and unjustly prejudicial to exporters in violation of section 17. Id. (444, 445).

—**Effect of Public Law 85–626**

Where a dual-rate conference agreement did not extend to inland ports not served by conference members, and an attempt was made so to extend it for the first time on July 10, 1958, by a conference "interpretation" and, subsequently, by a modification of the agreement, the dual-rate system covering cargo originating from inland ports was not "in use" on May 19, 1958, and thus is not protected by the amendment of section 14 contained in Public Law 85–626. *Swift & Co. v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference*, 215 (229).

The dual-rate system has never been held to be illegal in all circumstances. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in *Isbrandtsen*, the Board must make precise findings as to the intent and effect of the arrangement, which findings are essential to a judicial determination of a system's validity under the Act. The effect of the amendment of section 14 by Public Law 85–626 was to authorize the continuation in force of any dual-rate arrangement in use by members of a conference on May 19, 1958, which conference was organized under an agreement approved under section 15, unless and until the Board disapproved or modified the arrangement. *Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware*, 422 (435–443).

—**Retaliation**

The extension by a shipping conference of a dual-rate system to inland ports not served by conference members is in violation of section 14 where it is shown that it was used as a predatory device for the purpose of stifling competition by nonconference carriers. *Swift & Co. v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference*, 215 (229).

*Isbrandtsen* (356 U.S. 481) does not apply only to dual-rate obligations which stifle "independent non-conference common carrier or berth operations". The language of the decision is not limited to such carriers. The decision referred to "stifling the competition of independent carriers". The sole qualification is found in the word "independent". This means any carrier not a conference member. A contract carrier carrying cargo by barge meets this description. Moreover, no provision of the Act or of the Supreme Court's discussion of the *Isbrandtsen* case makes the direction or origin of cargoes a significant factor in interpreting the law. Extension of dual-rate system to inland ports not served by conference members violates section 14—Third of the Act. Id. (229, 230).

—**Stability of Rates**

Stability of rates is not an end in itself. It is a significant factor in upholding a dual-rate system but not a justification for otherwise discriminatory or unfair
practices or for other illegal activity. Swift & Co. v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference, 215 (228).

DAMAGES. See Reparation.

DELIVERING OF PROPERTY. See Terminal Facilities.

DETREIMENT TO COMMERCE. See Agreements under Section 15; Contract Rates; Volume Rates.

DEVICES TO DEFEAT APPLICABLE RATES. See Absorptions; Classifications; Terminal Facilities.

DISCRIMINATION. See also Absorptions; Contract Rates; Forwarders and Forwarding; Proportional Rates; Rates, Filing of; Tariffs; Volume Rates.

A contention that a carrier cannot be accused of discrimination against a particular port if it does not serve the port, was considered and rejected in Beaumont Port Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 3 FMB 556, on the ground that injury to the port adversely affected by equalizing proportional rates is caused directly by the action of the carrier establishing such rates and is proscribed by statute. Proportional Commodity Rates on Cigarettes and Tobacco, 48 (55).

Where a shipper was given the lower contract rates, without the necessity for a contract, by several conference members, and later other conference members demanded payment of noncontract rates, the shipper was discriminated against by the latter carriers in violation of section 17 of the Act which forbids a carrier from charging a rate which is unjustly discriminatory between shippers. Isbrandtsen was discriminated against as a shipper since its name appeared on bills of lading as the shipper, the cargo described on the bills of lading was taken aboard and transported and Isbrandtsen's freight payments as shipper were accepted. Its name also appeared on all other shipping documents. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 422 (446).

Shippers who had exclusive patronage contracts, terminated them, and failed to request new contracts, and shippers who never had such contracts or requested them, neither class ever receiving contract shippers' rates during a period when they did not have a contract, have not been discriminated against by carriers charging them the noncontract rates. Id. (446, 447).

DUAL COMMON AND CONTRACT CARRIERS. See Common Carriers.

DUAL-RATE CONTRACTS. See Agreements under Section 15; Contract Rates.

EXCLUSIVE-PATRONAGE CONTRACTS. See Contract Rates.

EXPRESS COMPANIES. See Common Carriers.

EQUALIZATION. See Absorptions; Proportional Rates.

FAIR RETURN. See Rate Making.

FINDINGS IN FORMER CASES. See Brokerage; Discrimination; Intercoastal Operations (Sec. 805(a)); Rate Making; Subsidies, Operating—Differential.

FORWARDERS AND FORWARDING. See also Brokerage; Classifications; Common Carriers.

In the light of the comprehensive record herein it is concluded that, except in those rare instances in which forwarders are retained by carriers, under either express or implied agreements, to secure spot cargo, forwarders are not brokers. Long accepted definitions of "broker" and "brokerage" are valid in relation to the services performed by forwarders. Brokers are specifically named in section 16 among those forbidden to obtain or attempt to obtain rebates, and there is no indication that this term was used by Congress in any other than its accepted sense. Freight Forwarder Investigation, 327 (348).
The duty of the carrier under the Harter Act and the Bills of Lading Act to issue bills of lading, together with preparations of bills of lading by forwarders, does not make the forwarders agents of the carriers. The duty of the carriers is accomplished by the issuance of the original bill of lading and additional copies are prepared for use of the shipper, ordinarily at the shipper's expense, and forwarders are not employed by the carriers to perform this function. Id. (348).

Forwarders' contentions that brokers are not persons subject to the Act and that the Board has no authority to establish definitions for "broker", "brokerage", or "brokerage service" are based on the erroneous premise that forwarders, in relation to carriers, are brokers. Id. (358).

Where forwarders' charges vary from shipper to shipper for identical services, some shippers receive services free or at nominal charges, and in billing for accessorial charges, such as insurance and carting, most New York forwarders (who constitute the majority) follow a practice of disguising markups, the forwarders' practices are prima facie discriminatory and thus unreasonable in the absence of justification. Failure to offer any justification cannot be excused on the ground that a confidential relationship exists between forwarders and their shipper clients. Id. (359).

Performance by a freight forwarder of forwarding services free to the shipper, with concurrent receipt by the forwarder of brokerage from the carrier, constitutes an indirect rebate, and there is distinction in degree only between furnishing services free, at nominal charges, or lower than cost. The practices of some carriers in the foreign export trade of performing forwarding services free for shippers, and for forwarders, constitute direct rebates. Id. (360, 361).

Arrangements between forwarders under which a forwarder at one port who controls the routing of a shipment refers that shipment to a forwarder at an out- port, the latter completing the forwarding services, brokerage and other fees being divided between the two, are cooperative working arrangements requiring approval under section 15. Likewise, arrangements between forwarders and carriers under which carriers complete the forwarding services at outports are cooperative working arrangements and must be filed with the Board. Id. (361, 362).

Since the Board cannot regulate entry into the business of freight forwarding, suggestions that only independent freight forwarders be permitted to operate cannot be given effect. Id. (365).

Although suspension or cancellation of freight forwarders' registration numbers does not require notice and hearing since the numbers do not constitute licenses to do business, but are issued to insure that those engaging in the business are known to the Board, notice and opportunity to be heard should be accorded before suspension or cancellation. Id. (365).

Registration will be confined to the issuance of only one registration number to a particular forwarder, or only one to a group of forwarders under common control. The obvious possibility of discrimination requires this procedure. Id. (365).

The rule relating to the billing practices of freight forwarders is designed to prohibit the assessment of disguised markups in all instances shown in the record to have resulted in violations of sections 16 and 17. Id. (365).

The rule requiring the filing of agreements between a freight forwarder and another freight forwarder or carrier or other person subject to the Act is a restatement of the requirements of section 15. Id. (366).

FREE TIME. See Terminal Facilities.
FREIGHT FORWARDERS. See Brokerage; Forwarders and Forwarding.

GENERAL ORDER 24. See Rate Making.

GENERAL ORDER 31. See Rate Making.

HANDLING. See Terminal Facilities.

HARTER ACT. See Forwarders and Forwarding.

HUSBANDING. See Terminal Facilities.

INTERCOASTAL OPERATIONS (Sec. 805(a))

—in general

The argument that denial of section 805(a) permission would force a subsidy applicant to breach its contract to carry ore or to abandon its subsidy application is a pristine example of an "operation boot strap". The requirements of statutes are not subversive to the provisions of private contracts. T. J. McCarthy S.S. Co.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 3 (4).

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 contains no limitation or directive authorizing the Board to consider the impact of its decision on land or air transportation of any kind. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (133, 134).

Permission was granted under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to charter and subcharter certain vessels for operation in the intercoastal trade where the rates appeared reasonable, no unfair competition to competing operators appeared to exist and no prejudice to the objects and policies of the Act had been shown. Id. (134).

—Agency relationship

Subsidy applicant was granted permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to continue agency relation with an affiliate operating vessels in the intercoastal service where no unfair competitive advantage was shown to exist. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (135).

—Competition to domestic operators

Earlier decision (5 FMB 666) denying section 805(a) permission for subsidy applicant to continue to engage in bulk service on the Great Lakes will be modified to permit continuation of ore and coal trades through 1961. Termination of the applicant's ore and coal business would result in little benefit to the primarily domestic intervenors and modification of the earlier decision would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. T. J. McCarthy S.S. Co.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 3 (4, 5).

While applicant's proposed service between California and Hawaii after 1962 was in excess of its grandfather rights, the domestic operator had withdrawn a vessel from the service with the result that the vessel capacity is far less than the projected surface passenger movement between California and Hawaii for both 1962 and 1965. Thus granting permission to applicant to carry no more than 6,000 passengers and 3,320 L/T of cargo in 1963 and thereafter would not result in unfair competition to any person, firm, or corporation operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade. American President Lines, Ltd.—Hawaii Passenger Service, 6 (13).

Where carriers only commenced exclusively domestic services after a section 805(a) application was filed, no question of unfair competition is present. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (121).

Under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 unfair competition to an existing service does not result where the new service [container vessels] offered is needed to meet the demands of shippers even though the existing service [break-bulk vessels] has excess capacity and may suffer from the effects
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of the new competition. The suffering is not a source of unfairness. The new
service proposes to meet the need and the existing service does not. Id. (124).

Under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 no unfair competition
to an exclusively coastwise operator results where additional service is needed
to provide regular and adequate service in the trade, the coastwise carrier has
operated at substantial capacity one-way notwithstanding the operation of the
additional service, the coastwise operator does not provide reefer space and the
coastwise operator will not commit an additional available vessel to the trade
on a permanent basis, unless there is sufficient return cargo to make it attractive.
The granting of section 805(a) permission in the above circumstances would not
be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Id. (126, 127).

Container service of affiliate of section 805(a) applicant from New Orleans
to New York is not needed where the combined tonnage carried by it and an
exclusively coastwise operator in 1958 was lower than that carried by the latter
alone in 1957, few shipper witnesses indicated they were switching over to the
affiliate or had any strong preference for its service, and to the extent service
is needed, the domestic operator claimed it would extend its Seamobile service.
Id. (128, 129).

Under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 no unfair competition
to an exclusively coastwise operator results where such operator does not
have the physical capacity to carry all of the traffic now moving in the trade
and the affiliate of the 805(a) applicant has generated and served a substantial
demand for its new service. Id. (130–132).

Facts showing that intervenors' ships were not in domestic intercoastal or
coastwise service and that their charters permitted international operations are
not responsive to the statutory requirement that the objector is operating “exclusively” in coastwise or intercoastal trade. States Marine Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805
(a) Application, 378 (384).

—Diversion of subsidy

The prohibition in section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 against
direct or indirect diversion of money or property used in foreign trade opera-
tions, for which a subsidy is paid, into coastwise or intercoastal operations re-
quires more than threats and speculations as to such use for domestic operations
by an affiliate of an applicant for subsidy to make the prohibition effective. As
to commingling of subsidy and other funds and the use of subsidy money for
nonsubsidy purposes, the Board will see to it that no diversion of subsidy occurs
and that requirements on applicants under any loan agreements are separate,
distinct, and above those required for subsidy. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec.
805(a) Application, 115 (133).

—“Domestic intercoastal or coastwise service”

The chief reliance in proving an exclusively domestic status must be placed
on sailings antecedent to the date of application for section 805(a) permission,
otherwise an intervenor could enter the service purely for the purpose of affect-
ing determination under the section. Voyages prior to the filing of an applica-
tion for section 805(a) permission must be considered as the basis for determi-
nation of exclusively domestic status; otherwise an intervenor could gain
such status merely by announcing a prospective confining of his operations to
domestic ports, thus preventing a new service by a subsidized operator, or elim-
ninating a long existing service by a new subsidy applicant without assuring any
service in the trade to the shipping public. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a)
Application, 115 (121, 122).

A single foreign call as much as 4 years earlier does not deprive a weekly
North Atlantic/Puerto Rico service of its exclusive coastwise status. Nor do calls at Puerto Rico by vessels in an operator's North Atlantic/Venezuelan service deprive the separate North Atlantic/Puerto Rico service of its exclusively domestic character. Id. (123).

—"Fundamentally entitled" doctrine

Even if certain carriers qualified as exclusively domestic operators in their Gulf-Puerto Rico services, the "fundamentally entitled" doctrine was not applicable. The doctrine will not be extended to deny continuation of an exclusively domestic service by a subsidy applicant where he proposes to operate such service separate from his subsidized service. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (122).

—Grandfather rights

Where carrier in 1935 provided service between California and Hawaii by two ships which operated between California and the Far East and also by five ships which served San Francisco and Hawaii in connection with a service from New York to the Far East, grandfather rights were not limited to the service provided by the two ships, but included service provided by the five ships operating in the New York-Far East service. The fact that service consisted partly of operations over a segment of an entire route or service is inconsequential. Service between California and Hawaii was provided by the vessels in the so-called New York/Manila service just as much as the service provided by the vessels in the transpacific service. American President Lines, Ltd.—Hawaii Passenger Service, 6 (9).

Grandfather rights, under section 805(a), were not abandoned in circumstances where a steamship line called at Hawaii with only one of its first six postwar sailings, there was a lapse of 45 days between the first and the second call, and the other five voyages were devoted to urgent postwar needs of carrying displaced persons, repatriates and other passengers to the Far East. Id. (10).

In disposing of the question of section 805(a) grandfather rights, the Board is guided by two considerations: (1) substantial parity must exist as between proposed and past operations, for the protection of domestic operators already interested in the trade, and (2) the grandfather clause cannot be so strictly read as to permit absolutely no flexibility in equipment. Id. (11).

Applicant contended that the limitation on its grandfather rights between California and Hawaii was the space left available upon completion of its transpacific bookings, rather than the number of voyages and passengers and cargo actually carried in 1935. Although the burden of proving grandfather rights rests on the party claiming such rights, applicant was unable to show the amount of salable space available to passengers between California and Hawaii on voyages in 1935. The Board found that subject to the limit of passengers and cargo carried in 1935 and the number of voyages in 1937, the service proposed by applicant was in substantial parity with that maintained by it or its predecessor in 1935. Id. (11).

Under section 805(a), grandfather "rights" (as distinguished from "permission") to participate in the intercoastal trade arise by virtue of the operator's activities in 1935, and since they constitute an exception to the necessity of meeting the conditions prescribed by section 805(a), must not be enlarged by a liberal construction of the statute. American President Lines, Ltd.—Hawaii Passenger Service, 95 (96).

Grandfather rights under section 805(a) entitle holders of such rights to substantial parity of operations during the base year 1935. Substantial parity
cannot be equated with growth and a right to maintain the same position in relation to increased volume of travel. Id. (98).

Provision in Motor Carrier Act (section 206(a)) prohibiting the Interstate Commerce Commission from limiting a carrier's rights to add to equipment and facilities as the development of the business and the demands of the public require, which provision has been interpreted by the courts as denying a purpose to freeze the service to its exact status as the base year or precise pattern of prior activities, is not applicable to section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, otherwise the omission of similar language from the latter Act would be meaningless. The Board will not restore the meaning of omitted words by its decisions. The legislative history of section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 shows the purpose of the section was to protect those operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal service from the subsidy-aided competition and to allow those who receive operating-differential subsidy aid to continue the coastwise or intercoastal service they were giving in 1935. Expansion was authorized only if it was determined pursuant to application therefor that the proposed service would not result in "unfair competition" to the exclusively coastal and intercoastal operators, but only under other parts of section 805(a). Id. (98, 99).

Claim to grandfather rights under section 805(a) as alleged successor in interest is not supported where good will only was purchased for a 10-year period, the predecessor withdrew from the trade, no ships were transferred to or operated by the successor, and no increase in the successor's level of operations resulted from the so-called acquisition. The predecessor's service was abandoned. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (120).

Applicant under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 has grandfather rights although the deadweight bale cubic of the vessels presently serving the trade has increased and reefer service has been added since the grandfather clause cannot be so strictly construed as to permit absolutely no flexibility in equipment. Id. (120).

Grandfather rights under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 were not destroyed where a break in service occurred to permit conversion of vessels from break bulk to trailerships in order to survive in the trade, there was no intention to abandon the service, the vessels were earmarked for the service and were not used in any other, and the conversion was a means to the continuation of the service. However, a break of over 2 years which was not beyond the control of the carrier and which was not essential in the improvement of its future coastwise service was an abandonment of grandfather rights. Id. (127, 128).

—Intervention and hearing

A subsidy applicant, seeking section 805(a) permission for an associate to operate a vessel in the domestic trade, sustained its burden of proof when it showed that neither it nor any affiliate or subsidiary solicits cargo for the vessel, nor takes any from the vessel, that no subsidy can be diverted and that no advantage or preference could accrue to itself or to its associate. Thereafter the burden of proving unfairness and prejudice rested on the intervenor. The same burden has been placed on an intervenor in claiming protection of the "purposes and policy" clause. States Marine Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 378 (382).

—Military cargo

Application under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 for one voyage to transport military cargo at the request of the Military Sea Transport
Service was granted where there would be no departure from the normal schedule of the vessel involved, MSTS was unable to negotiate transportation of the cargo by other lines, intervenor offered loading on October 15 and 16 but MSTS attributed military importance to a loading on October 14 and intervenor did not object at the hearing to the lifting by the applicant on October 14 of the one cargo involved. Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 153.

—Prejudice to objects and policy of the Act (See also Competition to domestic operators, infra, and Single voyages; unopposed applications, supra)

Since the record demonstrated that without the proposed carryings of a vessel to be added to applicant's California-Hawaii service in 1963 and thereafter (resulting in service in excess of grandfather rights) there would be insufficient capacity to carry the potential surface passengers, the proposed service would not be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. American President Lines, Ltd.—Hawaii Passenger Service, 6 (13).

To deprive the domestic water-borne commerce between the Gulf and Puerto Rico of an operator who has provided shippers with efficient service for a long time by denying section 805(a) permission might well be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936; granting such permission is therefore not prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (122).

To deny section 805(a) permission would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 where shippers need and rely upon the service provided (containership operation), the service is essential to a solution of Puerto Rico's terminal problems and the operation is more efficient than other service available and tends to reduce operating costs. Id. (125).

Where the exclusively domestic operator has the capacity and ability to provide adequate service now and in the foreseeable future, section 805(a) permission should be denied. Otherwise, prejudice to the objects and policy of the Act would result. Id. (129).

Grant of permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to a subsidy applicant to engage in a domestic trade is not prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act where the applicant has expended large sums of money to convert vessels for use in the trade, and the converted vessels represent a forward step in meeting the needs of shippers, increasing efficiency and reducing cost. Denial of permission would be prejudicial because an operator not already subsidized would not consider spending money to improve his vessels used in the domestic trade if he knew that if he later should seek operating subsidy aid he would have to give up his coastwise service, even though adequate capacity in meeting the needs of shippers was not otherwise available. Id. (132).

In considering the question of whether the grant of section 805(a) permission would be prejudicial to the objects and policy of the Act, the shipping public's need for the service, and overtonnaging of the trade with consequent diminution of the value of virtually monopolistic service in the trade being provided by intervenors, are not relevant. Preservation of a monopoly is not an object or policy of the Act. States Marine Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 378 (383).

The objects and policy of the Act, in the face of a claim by intervenors that they will transfer a ship foreign if there is overtonnaging, do not call for denial of a section 805(a) application, so that intervenors may operate a ship instead. Id. (383).
—Single voyages; unopposed applications

Section 805(a) permission was granted for subcharter of a vessel for one intercoastal eastbound voyage carrying general cargo, where no one objected; no other vessel could be obtained for the sailing in question; and it was found that no unfair competition would result to anyone operating exclusively in the coastwise or intercoastal trade and that there would be no prejudice to the objects and policy of the Act. Farrell Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 1.

Application for permission under section 805(a) for the operation or charter of tanker vessels in the domestic intercoastal or coastwise service to carry petroleum products was granted, retroactively for a 6-month period and prospectively, where no operating or traffic connection between the applicant and the coastal operator existed or could develop, an important industrial operation otherwise would be seriously handicapped, specialized and rigidly controlled cargo space was required and the subsidy operator could not divert cargo from the operation as its vessels were not equipped for the carriage of liquid commodities in bulk. American President Lines, Ltd.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 59 (61, 62).

Application for permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to charter a vessel for one voyage between the west coast of the United States and British Columbia and the Hawaiian Islands, with option for a second voyage was granted where no one appeared in opposition after due publication of notice and the vessel was required for the time involved. Pacific Far East Line, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 65.

Application for permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 for single voyage to carry lumber eastbound was granted where no one appeared in opposition after due publication of notice, no other suitable vessel could be obtained, and the normal pattern of scheduling in the service would not be increased. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 67, 69.

Application under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 for single voyage carrying general cargo from Hawaii and California ports to Gulf ports was granted where no one appeared in opposition after due publication of notice, the vessel originally intended for use had been damaged and the vessel proposed to be used was the only one in position to satisfactorily perform the voyage. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 101.

Permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 granted to subsidy applicant to continue operation of a coastwise service from Pacific coast ports to Puerto Rico where only limited service would otherwise be available, shippers are dependent on applicant's service, ocean shipments are the life line of Puerto Rico, and no one opposed continuance of the service. No unfair competition or prejudice to the objects and policies of the Act would result. This includes permission for continuation of agency arrangements between applicant and its subsidiary companies in connection with such service and permission for continuation of the interest in applicant corporation of its parent corporation and the interlocking of their officers and directors. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 109 (112).

Permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was granted to subsidy contractor for continuance of certain intercoastal and coastwise services by an associate of the contractor, where the said services had previously been authorized by the Board, no one opposed their continuation, and no unfair competition or prejudice to the objects and policies of the Act would result. American Export Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 172.

Permission under section 805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was granted to subsidy operator for use of one of its vessels under time charter to
carry lumber on a single intercoastal voyage where the charterer was unable to get any other suitable ship and no one opposed the sailing. No unfair competition or prejudice to the objects and policies of the Act would result. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 176.

Section 805(a) permission was granted for vessel under time charter to engage in one eastbound intercoastal voyage carrying lumber. No parties intervened in opposition. No other suitable vessel was available. No unfair competition or prejudice to the objects and policy of the Act was shown. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 259.

In view of the fact that opposition to application was withdrawn subsequent to hearing, the Administrator adopted the examiner's initial decision granting subsidized operator's application for permission under section 805(a) for its parent company to charter applicant's vessel for operation in the intercoastal service for a period of from two to four months. Oceanic S.S. Co.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 276.

Application for permission under section 805(a) for a single voyage to carry lumber from the northwest to Atlantic ports was granted where there was no opposition, no other suitable vessel was obtainable, and the sailing would not increase the normal pattern of scheduling in the charterer's intercoastal service. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 324.

In view of the demand for increased cargo space to accommodate the movement of commodities, particularly pineapple, between Hawaii and United States Atlantic ports, section 805(a) permission was granted for one voyage of approximately one month's duration in Matson Line's regular liner service in the domestic trade between the ports in question, no party objecting. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 410.

Application for section 805(a) permission for a single voyage to carry lumber from North Pacific ports to Atlantic ports was granted where there was no opposition and no other suitable ship was available. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 413.

JURISDICTION. See Agreements under Section 15; Brokerage; Forwarders and Forwarding; Passenger Fares; Practice and Procedure; Rates, Filing of.

MANUAL OF ESSENTIAL UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES.
See Subsidies, Operating—Differential.

MANUAL OF GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING SUBSTANTIALITY AND EXTENT OF FOREIGN-FLAG COMPETITION. See Subsidies, Operating—Differential.

MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1936. See Intercoastal Operations (Sec. 805(a)); Passenger Fares; Practice and Procedure; Section 804 Waivers; Subsidies, Operating—Differential.

MISBILLING. See Absorptions; Classifications.

MISCLASSIFICATION. See Classifications.

MOTOR CARRIER ACT. See Intercoastal Operations (Sec. 805(a)); Grandfather rights.

NONVESSEL CARRIERS. See Common Carriers.

OPERATING-DIFFERENTIAL SUBSIDIES. See Subsidies; Operating—Differential.

OVERCHARGES. See Reparation.

PASSENGER FARES.
The Board has authority to require every common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the United States to file schedules of passenger fares and charges, and to file reports with respect to persons carried free or at reduced rates. This authority is derived from section 204 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, section 21 of the Shipping Act of 1916, and section 105(5) of Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, and the regulations are adopted to aid in enforcing sections 16, 17, and 21 of the Shipping Act. Filing of Passenger Fares in Foreign Commerce of U.S., 407 (408, 409).

PORT EQUALIZATION. See Proportional Rates.

PORTS. See Agreements under Section 15; Contract Rates; Proportional Rates; Terminal Facilities.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

—Investigations; notice of violations

The Board's order of investigation states the issues, and the examiner's ruling granting discovery and production of documents requires Public Counsel to make available to respondents, at least ten days in advance of the hearing, an outline of the principal facts to be presented. At this stage neither the Board nor its staff is obliged to draw an indictment. It is sufficient that before any affirmative proof of an alleged wrongdoing is presented, respondents be given a fair and adequate notice of what violations of the 1916 Act they will be charged with and an opportunity to defend against them. Unapproved Section 15 Agreements—Spanish/Portuguese Trade, 103 (106).

—Petitions to intervene

Petition to intervene and reopen the record filed three months after submission of the case to the Board was denied under Rule 5(n) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure. Waterman S.S. Corp.—Sec. 805(a) Application, 115 (135).

—Petitions to reopen record

Petition to reopen the record after recommended decision was denied where the evidence sought to be adduced did not relate to anything done or existing during the period of time which was the subject of investigation of violations of section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916. Misclassification and Misbilling of Glass Articles, 155 (166, 167).

—Prehearing discovery

Examiners' directives for the production of documents pursuant to Rule 12(k) are authorized by the 1936 Act, even though the investigation is initiated pursuant to the 1916 Act. Section 204(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 transferred to the Maritime Commission "all the functions, powers, and duties vested in the former United States Shipping Board by the Shipping Act, 1916", and section 204(b) of 1936 Act authorized the Commission to "adopt all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the powers, duties, and functions vested in it by this Act", which included Shipping Act powers. Investigation of violations is a major function, power, and duty of the agency administering the Shipping Act. Section 104 of Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950 transferred to the Federal Maritime Board (established in section 101 thereof) the regulatory functions of the Maritime Commission under the Shipping Act of 1916 and by section 105 of the Plan the Board was given "(5) so much of the functions with respect to adopting rules and regulations, making reports and recommendations to Congress, subpoenaing witnesses, administering oaths, taking evidence and requiring the production of books, papers and documents under
the provisions of sections 204, 208, and 214 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended . . . as relates to the functions of the Board under the provisions of this Reorganization Plan.” Unapproved Section 15 Agreements—Spanish/Portuguese Trade. 103 (104 105); Unapproved Section 15 Agreements—Japan-Korea-Okinawa Trade. 107.

Power to direct the production of documents in the manner prescribed by Rule 12(k) of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure is impliedly contained in the Shipping Act of 1916 as a necessary adjunct to the powers vested in the Board by that Act to conduct administrative proceedings, and section 22 of the 1916 Act authorizes the Board to investigate any violations of the Act’s provisions. Rule 12(k) of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure was adopted under the Board’s rule-making power, as expressly vested in the 1936 Act and as impliedly vested in the 1916 Act. Id. (105) ; 107.

“Good cause” for the direction to produce documents before the Board is shown where the order of investigation reflects that the Board had reason to believe that respondents had entered into and carried out agreements in violation of the Shipping Act and the ground for the directive to produce documents is that such documents are necessary and relevant to the preliminary stages of the inquiry. Id. (105) ; 107.

Public counsel, under the rules of the Board, is a “party” and may invoke Rule 12(k). Id. (105) ; 107.

—Production of documents located overseas

The Board has power to require the production of documents physically located outside the United States in aid of the investigation of violations of provisions of the Shipping Act, since the Act proscribes certain practices and agreements whether accomplished in the United States or abroad and imposes in the Board the responsibility of regulating common carriers by water in foreign commerce regardless of their nationality. Unapproved Section 15 Agreements—Spanish/Portuguese Trade, 103 (106); Unapproved Section 15 Agreements—Japan-Korea-Okinawa Trade, 107.

—Rule making

The Board has authority to institute a rule-making proceeding per se, under section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Freight Forwarder Investigation, 327 (358).

PRACTICES. See Forwarders and Forwarding; Terminal Facilities.

PREDATORY DEVICE. See Contract Rates, Retaliation.

PREFERENCE AND PREJUDICE. See Absorptions: Contract Rates; Proportional Rates; Rates, Filing of; Terminal Facilities.

PROPORTIONAL RATES. See also Discrimination.

Proportional commodity rates which are unduly prejudicial to a particular port and which unduly prefer another port violate section 16 of the 1916 Act. A port is a “locality” within section 16. It is immaterial that the rates are for through service of shipments loaded in trailer vans at interior origins and not off-loaded at the port from which shipped. From the standpoint of service which it performs, the carrier’s status is no different from that of any other ocean carrier, since it exercises no control over, nor participates in, the interior transportation. Proportional Commodity Rates on Cigarettes and Tobacco, 48 (54, 55).

Proposed rates which would establish varying charges for identical services are prima facie discriminatory and are thus unreasonable in the absence of
justification therefor. Predecessors of the Board in earlier decisions approved proportional rates which represented absorptions of inland rate differentials. Later decisions, however, have recognized the destructive nature of such absorptions to the right of ports to traffic originating in the areas naturally tributary to their port locations, in the absence of adequate ocean service available at the particular ports. Id. (55, 56).

Proposed proportional commodity rates for through motor-water trailership transportation, designed to equalize costs between the ports of New York and Baltimore, are unduly preferential of the port of New York and unduly prejudicial to the port of Baltimore in violation of section 16—First of the Shipping Act of 1916, where the traffic would normally move through Baltimore, the proposed rates would operate to divert such traffic, the revenues from such traffic are substantial, there is a gradual trend of traffic away from Baltimore and toward New York under present differentials in inland rates, and the principal Baltimore carrier has found it necessary to eliminate during summer months certain direct service because of insufficient traffic. Equalization rates between ports are not justified by a showing that a new and improved type of through sea-land service would be made available when there was no evidence that shippers needed or desired such service, or that the present service was inadequate or unsatisfactory in any respect. Id. (56).

PUBLIC LAW 85-626. See Contract Rates.

RATE MAKING.

—Allocation of voyage expenses

In rate-making proceedings, where allocation of voyage expenses is necessary as between the regulated and nonregulated trades to determine the adequacy of revenue in the regulated trade, allocations made principally on the basis of ton-mile prorate formulae were proper. The use of revenue prorate formulae in the case of integrated operations in the trade to Puerto Rico and to the Dominican Republic would cause distortion of the results in the Puerto Rican trade since the revenue per ton in this trade is lower and the costs of discharge of cargo higher than in the Dominican trade. Atlantic Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (27).

—Depreciation charges on vessels

In determining results of operations in a trade the use of depreciation charges on vessels as an item of expense, which charges were made in conformity with usual tax practices and with the Board's General Order 24, was proper since to adopt a standard based upon economic residual values as reflected by the fluctuating market values as shown in the record, would be to substitute speculation for certainty, as depreciation charges would vary with differing judgments as to possible future residual values which may be affected by unforeseen circumstances. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (29).

In rate-making proceedings, vessel depreciation charges based upon the costs of acquisition, rather than on book values maintained by the seller prior to such acquisition, were proper where the seller and purchaser dealt at arm's length and the book values maintained by the purchaser reflected the true acquisition costs of the vessels. A.T. & T. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, holding that the proper guide to book value of a utility's property is the cost as of the time when the property was first acquired or dedicated to the public use is also authority for the proposition that acquisition cost of the last owner in a bona-fide arm's-length transaction properly may be entered on the books of the acquiring utility and is the proper depreciation base. Id. (30).
—Dominant carrier

In rate-making proceedings the dominant carrier in a noncontiguous domestic trade will be taken as the rate-making line. A carrier is by far the dominant one where its gross revenues exceed those of the other three carriers and are approximately two and a half times those of the next largest carrier. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (43).

—Operating expenses

In rate-making proceedings general operating expenses, but not depreciation expenses, incurred by a carrier during a strike are to be excluded from expenses for the year in question since the strike, a jurisdictional dispute, was unrelated to ordinary labor-management controversies. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (39).

In rate-making proceedings the expenses of a carrier incurred as a result of actions brought in Puerto Rican courts for overtime wages by stevedore foremen are properly included in operating expenses related to the carrier's Puerto Rican trade. The suits arose from a difference of opinion as to the carrier's liability for overtime payments and the resulting expense is not improperly attributed to operating expenses on the ground that a violation of law by the carrier was involved. Id. (40).

In rate-making proceedings the charter hire paid for a vessel not included in the rate base is properly included in operating expenses, but interest paid on a vessel mortgage is a cost of capital employed which must be borne out of profits earned. Id. (41).

—Operating results—revenues

In rate-making proceedings, revenues of a carrier for the year preceding a further rate increase do not have to be restated so as to reflect actual operating results for that year during which an initial increase in rates was effective, since such operating results do not enter into projections for the future and thus would serve no useful purpose. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (39).

In rate-making proceedings, earnings of a carrier derived from interest on a mortgage on a terminal unrelated to earnings derived from a Puerto Rican service, and earnings from carrying bagged sugar and from conducting stevedoring operations resulting from a strike the expenses for which have been disallowed by the Board, are to be excluded from revenues assigned to the service. Id. (39, 40).

—Rate of return

In determining the reasonableness of rates, the fair-return-on-fair-value standard used by the Board and its predecessors will not be departed from, and the operating ratios experienced by the carriers will be rejected as a method of determining rates. A rate of return of not in excess of 7.5 percent after income taxes of the rate bases determined as set forth in the Board's findings is fair and reasonable. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (43, 44).

—Regulated and nonregulated trades—separation required

In rate-making proceedings it is the justness and reasonableness of rates in the regulated trade, not the profit accruing as a result of operations which include nonregulated service, which must be decided on the basis of the adequacy of the revenues derived therefrom, and the Board in making its determinations may adopt appropriate means of effectuating a separation of the regulated...
and nonregulated portions of an integrated service. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (27).

—Statutory reserve funds

Statutory reserve funds should not be considered as property devoted to the Puerto Rican service and are not to be included in a rate base. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (33).

—Vessel and other property values

In rate-making proceedings, where the Board had before it the results of a rate increase for almost a full year and the results of a further increase for almost 6 months, property values for the purpose of calculating the rate of return will be determined as of the end of year following the first increase and the resulting rate bases will be applied to the actual operating results as determinable for that year and to the projected results for the next year. Extreme precision is not required and it is doubtful that the result of using the above method would vary substantially from the result of using average values of property employed during the first year, applying operating results for that year to the resulting figures to determine rates of return actually earned, and then to ascertain values as of the last day of the year, applying projected operating results for the next year, based on actual operations during the first 6 months of that year, to the ascertained values as of the last day of the preceding year. Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (31).

For rate-making purposes the value of vessels on the domestic market at the time the rate increase is requested with adjustments to eliminate short term peaks in value, is the proper method (not weighting based on 70 percent of reproduction costs depreciated, and 30 percent of acquisition costs, depreciated; or an average of original costs and reproduction costs) for determining the reasonable value of the property being used for the public; it will not be assumed for rate-making purposes that a carrier has reproduced its vessels and the shipping public should not be forced to pay rates based even in part on the conjectural value of some phantom vessel which may never serve it. To the extent conclusions in prior cases disagree with the above they are expressly overruled. Id. (34, 35).

The value of nonowned property used by a carrier will not be included in rate bases since carriers are not devoting their capital to the shipping public insofar as such property is concerned; it is proper to include in allowable expenses the rental paid and other expenses of the carriers which arise by reason of the use of such property. There is no binding precedent requiring inclusion of such property in a rate base. It was error to include the value of a chartered vessel in a rate base in General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, 5 FMB 486. Id. (37).

It was proper to include in carrier's rate base the net book value of Puerto Rican terminals owned by it and devoted to the Puerto Rican trade. Rentals from a building located on property adjoining one of the terminals which building occupied about one-twelfth of the area and which was leased for purposes unrelated to the Puerto Rican trade, as well as any profit realized from the operation of the terminal will be credited to the carrier's Puerto Rican service. Id. (38).

—Working capital

In rate-making proceedings, in determining a fair and reasonable allowance for working capital as an element of the rate bases, the Board will limit the
amount to that determined under Limitation 4 of General Order 31 and give no consideration to limitation 3 of that Order (clarifying General Increase in Hawaiian Rates, 5 FMB 347 and General Increases in Alaskan Rates and Charges, 5 FMB 486 (1958)). Atlantic-Gulf/Puerto Rico General Rate Increases, 14 (35, 36).

**RATES, FILING OF.** See also Contract Rates; Passenger Fares; Proportional Rates; Rate Making; Volume Rates.

The Board has authority to require every common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the United States to file schedules showing rates and charges and related regulations for transporting property and to establish a system for the distribution of schedules on rates and charges and rules and regulations for the transportation of property in the foreign trade. This authority is derived from section 204 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, section 21 of the Shipping Act of 1916, and section 105(5) of Reorganization Plan 21 of 1950, and the regulations are adopted to aid in enforcing sections 16, 17, and 21 of the Shipping Act. Filing of Freight Rates in Foreign Commerce of U.S., 396 (397, 398).

By section 21 of the Act, the Board may require any common carrier to file with it any report or any account, record, rate, or charge pertaining to its business, and to furnish such documents in the form and within the time prescribed by the Board. The reporting requirement as to the filing of rate schedules for transporting property in foreign commerce is sustained under section 21. Id. (399).

Filing of rate schedules for transportation of property in foreign commerce 30 days before the effective date is needed for the better enforcement of the prohibitions of section 16 against giving undue or unreasonable preference or advantage and to prevent evasions of the prohibition against providing transportation at less than regularly established and enforced rates. The "regular rates" referred to in section 16 henceforth will be reported rates. Id. (399).

The purpose of the Board, vis-a-vis section 17 of the Shipping Act, in requiring the filing of rate schedules in foreign commerce 30 days before their effective date, is to aid the Board in discovering possible discriminatory rates, and require correction as it must do under section 17 before the injury is done to shippers. Id. (399).

**REBATES.** See Forwarders and Forwarding.

**RECEIVING OF PROPERTY.** See Terminal Facilities.

**REGISTRATION OF FREIGHT FORWARDERS.** See Forwarders and Forwarding.

**REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 21 OF 1950.** See Passenger Fares; Practice and Procedure; Rates, Filing of.

**REPARATION.** See also Contract Rates.

Overcharges and discriminations have quite different consequences as far as reparation is concerned. A different measure of recovery applies where the shipper has paid the applicable rate and sues upon the discrimination caused by other shippers having to pay less or by being unjustly refused a contract rate. Discrimination depends on what the carriers do, not on loss by the complainant. Swift & Co. v. Gulf and South Atlantic Havana S.S. Conference 215 (230, 231).

It was error for an examiner to conclude that there was no discrimination against complainant because complainant "could not produce any documentary evidence which would show its comparative costs," where the examiner had found that enforcement of the proposed contract resulted in discrimination
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against shippers (i.e. complainant) in violation of sections 15, 16, and 17. Complainant should be given an opportunity to prove its damages, and not necessarily by documentary proof. The measure of damages, if any, for the enforcement of an unlawful dual-rate system is not the difference between the freight actually paid and the sum which would have been paid. Id. (230, 231).

Where claim to reparation is based on allegation that complainant could not obtain lower contract rates because of unlawful discriminatory practices by conference members, complainant could not recover extra-freight paid after publication in the Federal Register of Board’s order enjoining such practices, since from that date complainant was charged with notice of the fact that he could obtain the lower contract rates. The fact that the conference had not notified complainant of its intention to obey the order to cease and desist, is immaterial. Id. (231, 232).

The measure of damages for carrier’s refusal to carry a shipper’s cargo is the difference between the value of the goods at the point of tender and their value at the proposed destination, less the cost of carriage. Philip R. Consolo v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 262 (266).

In action for reparation for carrier’s refusal to carry a shipper’s cargo the burden of proof is on the complainant to show cost, outturn and selling price. Id. (266).

Proof of damages deriving from carrier’s failure to carry shipper’s cargoes of bananas, meeting the specific standards of cost, outturn and selling price, was sufficient where: (1) witnesses were agreed on the availability of bananas in Ecuador and the existence of a market for them in the United States; (2) complainant was shown to have the resources to buy and ship bananas; (3) loading sheets showed actual purchases, and outturn sheets and liquidation sheets showed actual sales, expenses and net proceeds for each shipment by complainant on ships other than of respondent’s during the reparation period; (4) the space that would have been used on respondent’s ships at respondent’s rates was shown; (5) costs in Ecuador were taken from actual loading sheets showing actual purchases week-by-week; (6) freight charges were supplied from respondent’s records; and (7) stevedoring costs were established by testimony of banana shippers as to actual cost at New York. Id. (266, 267).

Damages by shipper for carrier’s failure to carry shipper’s cargoes of bananas are properly computed by establishing, from data supported in the record, a dollar figure for profit per banana stem shipped before stevedoring and freight, and by deducting from the amount of profit per voyage the freight, stevedoring and incidental administrative overhead and other expenses. Id. (267).

No interest should be allowed on an award for reparations for damages suffered by a shipper as a result of carrier’s refusal to carry its cargo, since it would be inequitable to award interest on an unliquidated claim before it was due. Id. (269).

Reparations for failure to allot space to a shipper in violation of sections 14-Fourth and 16 of the Shipping Act are due for the period commencing when space was denied, not for the period commencing when the Board found that the denial of space was in violation of sections 14-Fourth and 16 of the Shipping Act, and awarded reparations to the shipper for the injury caused by such violations. Id. (270).

A carrier is not excused from payment of reparations to shipper (for failure to offer nondiscriminatory and nonpreferential service for the carriage of bananas in refrigerated compartments) because (1) it had filed a petition for declaratory relief asking the Board to determine the validity of exclusive contract carriage
and (2) the Board failed to make a timely response thereto. This is so especially where the same issue had been disposed of by the Board in a similar case, and, instead of accepting the Board's ruling for its guidance, the carrier refused to offer service and litigated the issues relying on arguments relating to the alleged differences between respondents' vessels in the two cases. It was not incumbent on the Board to give a carrier a legal opinion on the effect of its conduct upon shippers. Common carrier status is not created nor are violations of the Act nonexistent until the Board's report is served. Id. (270, 271).

The reparation period for carrier's failure to offer nondiscriminatory service for the carriage of bananas should not be extended beyond the effective date of the Board's order requiring the carrier to offer space to all qualified shippers, to the date when complainant shipper was ready to provide a cargo where there was no proof that, after the effective date of the order, the carrier refused to accept cargo and that the shipper was willing and ready to provide a cargo or that cargo had been tendered. Id. (271, 272).

The reparation period for carrier's failure to offer nondiscriminatory service for the carriage of bananas was properly computed from the date when carrier refused space on a nonpreferential basis, not from the date of offers and counteroffers by complainant shipper for special contract carriage which would make complainant a favored shipper too. Id. (272).

In measuring shipper's past damages for carrier's failure to offer nondiscriminatory service for the carriage of bananas, it was improper for the examiner to find complainant entitled to one-third of carrier's space, based on the fact that complainant was one of three qualified applicants and that other applicants were declared to be unqualified, where, when space was finally allocated, five shippers actually qualified and measurement by carrier's technical adviser showed that in actual practice over a period of time there had been an allotment to, and use by, complainant of 18.46 percent of the cubic capacity of carrier's ships. The actual experience with the respondent was a just and reasonable guide of what complainant was entitled to for the purpose of measuring his past damages. Id. (272, 273).

Once the failure to perform common carrier obligations to provide nondiscriminatory service to a shipper was shown, the burden to show a failure to mitigate the damages was upon the respondents. Respondents had failed to show any mitigating factors where they suggested that chartered ships might be used but offered no proof that suitable ones were available. Id. (273).

Where a shipper's claim for reparations under section 22 has been found to be the result of discrimination, and the damages sought are the difference between rates charged and the lower noncontract rates, plus interest, a further proceeding is not necessary and reparations will be ordered paid on the basis of the amounts claimed, with interest at the rate of 6 percent on any amounts unpaid after 60 days from the date of the order. Isbrandtjen Co., Inc. v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 422 (447).

ROUTING RESTRICTIONS. See Contract Rates.
RULE MAKING. See Practice and Procedure.
SAILINGS, REGULATION OF. See Agreements under Section 15.
SECTION 804 WAIVERS.

The term "service" in section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 embraces much more than vessels; it includes the scope, regularity, and permanency of the operation, the route covered, the traffic handled, the support given by the shipping public, and other factors which concern the bona fide character of the operation. States Marine Lines, Inc.—Sec. 804 Waiver, 71 (75).
Section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 requires only that American-flag service be determined to be essential under section 211 of the Act. To be essential, service of American-flag vessels need not be identical with service supplied by foreign-flag vessels if the same products are carried to and from the same areas. Id. (75); Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Sec. 804 Waivers, 89 (92, 93).

Lack of American-flag vessels of a particular type does not preclude a finding of competition by foreign-flag vessels with American-flag service under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 where transportation service is provided by American-flag vessels of a different type. Id. (75); Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Sec. 804 Waivers, 89 (92).

The existence, not the degree, of competition is the test under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936; it is immaterial that there would be no harm to particular intervenors, or that some of them do not object, or that other carriers failed to intervene; lack of vessel to vessel competition is equally immaterial. Id. (76); Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Sec. 804 Waivers, 89 (93).

The Board's responsibility in connection with section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 exists regardless of whether there are intervenors or not. Failure of anyone to intervene shows only lack of interest and does not create an inference of lack of competition. Id. (76); Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Sec. 804 Waivers, 89 (93).

Considering the legislative history, the primary purpose of section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was to prevent contractors receiving operating-differential subsidies from paying their associates and affiliates for services involving the use of foreign-flag vessels which compete with American-flag services. The purpose was to stop the use of foreign-flag vessels which compete with American-flag service unless it could be shown that subsidy payments would not be affected by their operation or that there was no competition. The purpose was not to prohibit the use of foreign-flag vessels. The Board will not prohibit the use of foreign-flag vessels by refusing to grant waivers where the applicant can show special circumstances and good cause. Id. (76, 77).

The phrase "under special circumstances and for good cause" in section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 calls for the exercise of the Board's discretion consistent with the declaration of policy of the Act since there appears to be no legislative history of the meaning of the phrase. Id. (78).

A special circumstance exists for waiver of the provisions of section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 where the proposed foreign-flag vessel use will not adversely affect subsidy payments or the subsidy service and the applicant would suffer a hardship if the prohibition was enforced; and good cause is shown if the proposed vessel use will have an insignificant effect on American-flag service, if ownership or operation of the vessels under United States registry by citizens is not practicable, and there is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels of the right type to serve the purpose. Other good causes and special circumstances may exist for the granting of a waiver. Waiver of the provisions of section 804 was granted where the record disclosed that the above special circumstances and good cause were shown. Id. (78, 81); Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Sec. 804 Waivers, 89 (93).

A request for a waiver made at a hearing but not in the application for waiver under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 will be acted upon outside the scope of the proceeding and will be granted in accordance with prior practice of the Board, since section 804 does not require a hearing. Id. (80).

It has been suggested by intervenors that they may inquire into the foreign-flag vessel operation of any other associates not named in the application for
waiver of section 804. The Board deals only with the application presented, that is, only with those matters specifically requested in the application and noticed for hearing. If there are other situations covered by section 804 and no waiver is granted, then the provisions of that section will be applicable. Id. (80).

A waiver under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 will be granted for a husbanding agency where the owner of the vessels does his own solicitation, makes his own bookings and calls on the agency for clerical, mechanical or housekeeping services when the vessel is in a United States port. Id. (80).

Where a husbanding agency involved limited noncompetitive activities, had existed for a long time, and was a valuable business connection; and lighterage service operations were both necessary to the efficient use of port facilities and were local in nature, having a minimum competitive effect, special circumstances and good cause have been shown for section 804 waivers. Id. (81).

Application for waiver of the provisions of section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to permit the president and director of applicant company to retain substantial ownership of stock in company operating foreign-flag vessels was granted for two years subject to cancellation upon 90 days' notice where such retention would not adversely affect subsidy payments or the subsidized service, the president would suffer a hardship through the sacrifice of personal holdings, the effect on American-flag service would be insignificant, and American-flag vessels of the right type are insufficient to serve the purpose of carrying the cargo which is vital to American industry. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc.—Sec. 804 Waivers, 89(94).

A waiver under section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 is not required to permit a subsidiary of a subsidy contractor to act as agent for foreign-flag vessel operators where no competition exists with American-flag service determined to be essential under section 211 of the Act. Waterman S.S., Corp.—Sec. 804 Application, 174 (175).

Circumstances justifying a waiver of section 804 are that the proposed foreign-flag vessel use will not adversely affect subsidy payments on the subsidized line, the applicant would suffer hardship if the prohibition is enforced, and the proposed vessel use will have an insignificant effect on American-flag service. Id. (175).

Application for waiver of section 804 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, to permit subsidiary of applicant to act as agent for foreign-flag vessel operator, was granted where there was no evidence that increased subsidy would be needed, the effect of applicant's foreign-flag agency operation on its regular operation would be minimal, the unsubsidized subsidiary would not receive any benefit from subsidy payment to the applicant, termination of the agency account would be a hardship to the applicant with no provable gain to any other subsidized American carrier and the possible effect on another American-flag operator was apparently so slight that such operator did not intervene in the proceeding. Special circumstances and good cause were shown for the waiver. Id. (175).

STORAGE. See Terminal Facilities.

SUBSIDIES, CONSTRUCTION—DIFFERENTIAL. [No cases]

SUBSIDIES, OPERATING—DIFFERENTIAL. See also Intercoastal Operations (Sec. 805(a)).

—in general

Letters in support of a subsidy application are admissible in evidence. Administrative agencies customarily accept letters of such type. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc. and Bloomfield S.S. Co.—Extension of Service, Route 21, 278 (285).
INDEX DIGEST

Adequacy of service

In view of the provisions of sections 704 and 705 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 calling for the removal of Government-owned vessels from service as soon as practicable and for the development of a privately owned merchant fleet, competing Government-owned service should not be considered in reaching conclusions as to the inadequacy of service within the meaning of section 605(c) of the Act. Grace Line, Inc.—Application to Serve Haiti from U.S., 194 (196, 197).

United States-flag service in the North Atlantic/Port-au-Prince trade is inadequate within the meaning of section 605(c) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, where even including the carryings of a Government-owned line, overall participation by such flag vessels fell from 50% for the period 1955-1958 to 40.7% in 1959 and declined to 57% in 1958 from 64% in 1957. United States-flag service in the New York segment of the North Atlantic/Haiti trade is inadequate where New York is not the dominant port as was New Orleans with respect to other Gulf ports in another case (5 FMB 747). New York’s percentage share of total North Atlantic outbound cargo in 1959 was 51.1% and appears to be declining (versus 72% in the New Orleans case), United States-flag participation in commercial cargo in liner service from New York is most recently 60.6% (versus 83%), and in the total North Atlantic trade United States-flag outbound participation is 31% and has declined the last three years (versus 61%). Id. (197).

Existing service to ports of Mobile, Ala., Gulfport and Pascagoula, Miss., and Pensacola and Panama City, Fla., is inadequate where United States-flag ships carried approximately 25% of the outbound and 37% of the inbound commercial cargo during the years 1953 to 1958; United States-flag participation has declined recently; an increase of available space on United States-flag ships will give the ports the benefit of more adequate service; and while future increases in exports are inevitably speculative, they appear to be based on tangible factors of industrial expansion, supported by some shipper demand for present service. The presence of American-flag vessels on a route is the determinative factor for showing adequacy or inadequacy of service, not foreign lines. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc. and Bloomfield S.S. Co.—Extension of Service, Route 21, 278 (284).

Where applicants proposed to extend services to East Gulf ports, service to other East Gulf ports already served by them will not be considered in determining adequacy of service to the former ports. Under such circumstances adequacy of United States-flag service should be coextensive with the service proposed. Id. (285).

Where adequacy of service to a number of ports is in issue, and the proposal is to serve all of such ports, adequacy of service will not be examined port by port, but all the ports will be considered together. Id. (285).

Foreign-flag competition—subsidy rates

The issue in the proceeding (subsidy rates) was not to determine whether foreign-flag vessels were “substantial competitors” of the subsidy operator’s vessels but whether the foreign-flag ships were engaged in “liner” operation and were therefore to be counted in the determination of the substantially and extent of foreign-flag competition for subsidy rate purposes. The Board, exercising its powers under section 204, adopted the Manual of General Procedures for Determining Substantiality and Extent of Foreign-Flag Competition to clarify the indefinite term “substantial competition” as used in section 603(h), and provided in the Manual for counting “carryings of all foreign flags engaged in liner operation.” Considered in conjunction with the definition of liner service in the
Manual of Essential United States Foreign Trade Routes, clear criteria have
been adopted by the Board to determine the issue of whether a foreign-flag
operation is liner service or not. Thus, whether or not criteria used by the staff
have been formally adopted by the Board is immaterial, and any contention that
the Board acted arbitrarily or without authority in applying criteria for deter-
mining what constitutes “substantial competition” is without merit and erroneous
in the light of the Manuals and the past practice of the Board in acting upon
final subsidy rate recommendations for each subsidized operator. Gulf & South

Where Chinese-flag ships of a Chilean line carried in one year 49,452 tons of
bulk cargo, representing 96% of the total cargo carried, because of the contracts
of affreightment, the line knew well in advance that each sailing would have
approximately 96% bulk utilization, and carried general cargo on the basis of
last-minute convenience, the ships were not providing liner service in competi-
tion with a subsidized operator. Liner service requires operation on “a definite,
advertised schedule” so that shippers of general cargo may so rely upon the
operations, space availability, or ports of discharge as to permit the making of
plans for deliveries in the future. Publication of the sailings of the ships was
not “advertising.” Id. (389, 390).

In determining whether a foreign-flag operation is liner operation a comparison
of its contracts of affreightment with those of the subsidized operator, claiming
the existence of competition, is significant. Where the subsidized operator's
contracts specifically reserve the right to forego available bulk cargo in the event
the berth nature of the service is threatened, while the foreign-flag carrier's
contracts contain no such provision and emphasize the carriage of bulk cargoes,
and the latter carrier was not in a position to carry significant amounts of
general cargo, the foreign-flag operations will not be counted in determining the
extent of substantial foreign-flag competition encountered by the subsidized
operator. The carrying of a small amount of general cargo on a sailing may
constitute the sailing as “liner” for the purpose of determining whether there
was an existing service, but is not determinative where the issue is whether such
an operation is competitive. Id (390, 391).

—Modification of contract—unprofitable operation

In passing on an application under section 606(4) of the 1936 Act for modifi-
cation of an operating-differential subsidy agreement so as to relieve the operator
from the obligation to maintain service on a particular route or line, the Board
must take into consideration the profit projection and experience under the
entire contract. The operator does not prove that it cannot maintain and
operate its vessels with a reasonable profit on its investment unless it establishes
that it cannot operate under the contract with a reasonable profit on its entire
investment devoted to performance of the contract. The contention that the
“investment” referred to in section 606(4) relates only to a specified “service,
route, or line” is rejected. Grace Line, Inc.—Contract Modification, Route 33,
82 (83).

Section 211 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 indicates that the Act contem-
plates subsidy contracts covering American-flag service on routes and lines which
may be unprofitable. Such service could not be obtained if section 606(4) of
the Act were interpreted as granting relief when a profit cannot be obtained in
one particular trade route. The Act must be construed to give meaning to the
over-all policy sought to be achieved. Congress did not intend to guarantee a
subsidized operator a profit on each trade route, nor on the whole contract. Id. 84.
Section 211 (a) and (b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 shows plainly that a service or route may be determined to be essential to the foreign commerce of the United States even though operation on the service or route will result in substantial losses, if such losses are not disproportionate to benefits accruing to such foreign commerce. Id. (85).

The words "upon his investment" in section 606(4) should be construed to mean upon the investment under the entire subsidy contract. Section 606(4) provides for relief if the contractor establishes that "he cannot maintain and operate his vessels on such service, route or line, with a reasonable profit upon his investment." These words must be construed to mean the investment under the entire contract rather than the investment in the service, route or line. Even if the words "upon his investment" refer back to "service, route, or line", the requirement is that the contractor establish that he cannot make a reasonable profit on his entire investment under the contract. The Board construes the words "service, route or line" as "services, routes or lines", in sections 601(2) and 603(a), and these words should be construed the same way in section 606(4). Id. (85, 86).

Interpreting "service, route, or line" as "services, routes, or lines" and contracting for more than one service, route, or line in a single contract, permits the averaging for recapture purposes of profits and losses from all services, routes, and lines in the contract. To include all of the operator's services, routes, and lines in one contract carries out the purposes of the Act in that it permits the more profitable operations to help carry the less profitable and thus assists in obtaining service on the less profitable services, routes, and lines. Id. (86).

Under Article II–32, Part II (modification or rescission clause) of the subsidy contract, if the contractor had more than one service, route, or line, he would have to establish that he could not make a profit on his investment in all of them, in order to be entitled to relief. The provisions of Part I of the contract relating to financial accounting and replacement vessels, also indicate that this is the correct construction of Article II–32. Id. (87).

Modification of an operating-differential subsidy contract to permit discontinuance of operation on a particular trade line was granted with conditions where the applicant therefor had suffered and would continue to suffer losses on its investment on the line and no American shipper or exporter had objected, even though the applicant had no right under section 606(4) to such a contract modification. Id. (87).

—Undue advantage or prejudice as between citizens

Finding of inadequacy of service disposes by inference of the issue of whether additional vessels should be operated in the service in question and the question of whether there would be undue prejudice against an existing operator. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. and Bloomfield S.S. Co.—Extension of Service, Route 21, 278 (286).

TARIFFS. See also Agreements under Section 15; Classifications; Terminal Facilities; Volume Rates.

Tariffs must be read in whole and not in part. An item in a port terminal tariff which provided that the tariff was notice to all concerned that the rates, rules and charges apply to all traffic and to arrangements with shippers takes precedence over another item reserving to the port the right to make agreements with shippers concerning rates and services. Storage Practices at Longview, Washington, 178 (182).

Descriptive words in tariffs must be construed in the sense they are generally understood and accepted commercially. Shippers cannot be permitted to avail
themselves of a strained and unnatural construction. The proper test is the "meaning which the words used might reasonably carry to the shippers to whom they are addressed." Use in a few isolated instances does not contradict the essential characteristics of the property. Raymond International, Inc. v. Venezuelan Line, 189 (191).

Where two commodity rates are adequately descriptive the one making the lower charge is applicable. Ambiguities should be resolved against the carrier writing the tariff. Misclassification of Diatomaceous Earth as Silica, 289 (296).

Establishment of a distribution system for tariffs in foreign commerce is necessary for the enforcement and administration of provisions which prohibit false classification of property under section 16 and the demand of unjustly discriminatory rates under section 17. Where shippers have not had written tariff descriptions of commodities to read and compare it is virtually impossible to establish knowing and willful misclassification where closely related commodities are involved. Distribution of tariffs will enable shippers to detect allegedly discriminatory rates and to protect themselves by application to the Board which can alter the rates to the extent necessary to correct unjust discrimination. Filing of Freight Rates in Foreign Commerce of U.S., 396 (399, 400).

TERMINAL FACILITIES. See also Tariffs.

The practices of a port terminal in allowing free time for cargo to occupy wharf premises or storage facilities in excess of that fixed by its tariff, which free time varied greatly from shipper to shipper and from commodity to commodity, so as to afford the port an opportunity to provide unequal treatment of shippers and preferred treatment of certain classes of cargo, are clearly unduly prejudicial and preferential in violation of section 16, and unjust and unreasonable in violation of section 17 of the Shipping Act, notwithstanding there were no complaints and no competition between terminals was involved. Storage Practices at Longview, Washington, 178 (183, 184).

Where carrier entered into arrangement with a firm, ostensibly for husbanding and booking agency services, but, in fact, paid the firm substantial amounts of money to provide free or low cost storage and other terminal services exclusively for shippers which the firm solicited for the carrier, and normally such shippers would have had to buy such terminal services from the port from which the firm rented space, the carrier gave undue preference and advantage to traffic through the port and subjected other ports to undue prejudice and disadvantage, and allowed shippers or consignees to obtain transportation of property at less than the regular rates then established by the carrier by an unjust or unfair means, contrary to requirements of section 16 of the Shipping Act. The preference and advantage to the one port and the prejudice and disadvantage to other ports was "undue" because substantial economic advantages were available only through the firm and only at the one port. The substantial economic advantage was the unfair means. It was immaterial that the firm acted independently in furnishing services because the carrier had a duty to terminate its payments when it knew how they were being used. The further facts that the carrier collected full freight from the shipper or consignee and paid the port compensation properly due to it for acting as terminal agent were also immaterial, since indirect actions and actions "in conjunction with" others are also prohibited by section 16. Storage Practices at Stockton and Oakland, California, 301 (311, 312).

A person is furnishing warehouse or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water who receives custody of property from such carrier or its agent after unloading at dock or pier, and keeps custody within
the geographical confines of an ocean terminal facility until relinquished to an inland carrier or to the consignee. The terminal aspect of handling property is not complete at the time goods are delivered by a port furnishing terminal facilities to a lessee of its assigned warehouse space. Id. (313, 314).

Firm which rented warehouse space; offered warehouse and terminal services to potential clients; contracted for the lessor's terminal services for its clients; and received consignees' cargoes from a carrier under arrangement with the carrier which, in fact, paid for most of the services, was carrying on business of furnishing warehouse or other terminal facilities, was acting "in connection with a common carrier by water", and was, therefore, an "other person subject to this Act" within the definition in section 1 and as the term is used in the second paragraph of section 16 of the Shipping Act. Id. (314).

Practices of a firm were related to and connected with the receiving, handling, storing and delivery of property where the firm received property unloaded from a carrier's ship, handled the property by having it moved to the firm's assigned space in the terminal area, stored the property and performed further handling operations on the property and delivered it to an inland carrier. These practices involve services related to the provision of warehouse and terminal facilities. Id. (314, 315).

Firm which, under an arrangement with a common carrier, in essence solicited shippers by offering "free storage", which made noncompensatory charges for its terminal services, and which received from the carrier amounts not remotedly commensurate with its services, all with the result that shippers were the beneficiaries of the carrier's payments to the firm and the carrier was the recipient of the shippers' business, gave economic preference, as an "other person" subject to the Act, to the locality and to shippers using the carrier at the port. As a result other localities and other shippers were subjected to prejudice and disadvantage and shippers through the port were allowed to obtain transportation at less than the carrier's established rates. Id. (315).

Operator of rented terminal space which represented that it would perform certain services, concealing that the terminal operator performed the services pursuant to a tariff, and absorbing on behalf of shippers, the normally applicable warehouse service costs with payments made by a carrier ostensibly but not actually, for husbanding and booking agency services, used unjust and unfair means of allowing, and indirectly allowed, its shipper-clients to obtain transportation for property on the carrier's ships at less than regular and established charges. Id. (316).

Assumption of custody by warehouse or storage operator over shippers' and consignees' property without executing receipt therefor, or being named agent in any shipping documents, and assertion of power to direct terminal operator from which it rented space as to movement of and services to the property without furnishing proof of its interest therein, constituted failure to establish just practice relating to receiving, handling, storing, and delivering of property within the meaning of section 17. Id. (316).

Where firm rented space from port to provide warehousing and distributing services; insulated its clients from port's warehouse tariff; failed to publish its own tariff for furnishing identical service, but made varying charges based on negotiations; and was acting under arrangement with a carrier which resulted in shippers obtaining transportation of cargo at less than established rates, the absence of a tariff was an unfair or unjust device or means. Id. (316).

Firm which rented warehouse space and limited its services to cargoes of one carrier, excluding cargoes of other carriers from the economic advantages of
its facilities, prejudiced the excluded carriers and placed them at an unreasonable disadvantage in the competition for cargoes. Id. (316).

Language in section 16 of the Shipping Act referring to acts "in conjunction with any other person" does not require showing of agency relationship. Carrier and firm collaborating in plan to provide free storage services to carrier's customers were acting as independent contractors and in conjunction with each other. Id. (317).

Where carrier, its agent, and terminal operator made arrangements for operator to bill agent for storage services provided to certain customers of the carrier, and carrier reimbursed agent, the provisions of section 16 of the Shipping Act were violated, since such concessions were not available to all shippers and different periods of storage were required by different shippers. Such actions were likewise unreasonable practices connected with the receiving, storing, and handling of cargo. Id. (317).

Terminal operator's submission to agent of carrier of invoices for storage services rendered to customers of the carrier, with knowledge such invoices would be paid by carrier rather than shippers, and its participation in such arrangement constituted an unjust and unreasonable practice connected with the receiving, handling and storing of property, in violation of section 17. Id. (318).

Assessment by New Orleans port of a wharf tollage charge on cargo transported by barge to a vessel moored at the port, with the cargo being transferred to the vessel without moving across the wharf, is not an unreasonable practice in violation of section 17 of the 1916 Act. The barge, including its cargo, uses some of the dredged basin alongside ship; the barge and cargo receive the benefits of the mooring facilities; police protection is available; and fire protection is available free except for cost of chemicals used. The Board need not be too concerned with definitions of wharf tollage, e.g., that it is essential that cargo pass over the wharf. The charge was made to help pay costs and the service rendered was reasonably related to the charge. Reasonable allocation of costs could not be made on the record. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 415 (418, 419).

Exemption of bulk mineral cargoes from a tollage charge and a special tollage rate on liquids loaded via pipelines that actually use the wharf were not discriminatory or prejudicial to complainant whose liquid products loaded directly from barge to ship were subject to a wharf tollage charge. The type of service given was different; police and fire protection given the different service likewise differed; and complainant's products were of greater value, thus precluding any competitive relationship and justifying different charges. Id. (419).

Elimination of a wharf tollage charge on barge to ship cargo at New Orleans would be adverse to the practices observed at Galveston and Houston, where a charge is assessed for the same type of service. Its use at the latter ports and other ports tended to establish the type of charge as an accepted and reasonable trade practice. Id. (419).

The fact that complainant does not burden wharf space with its cargo which is loaded from barge to ship does not require that it be allowed credit to the extent that it should not be charged for wharf tollage. Whether the specific space alongside the ship being serviced is utilized by others or not does not alter the obligation of maintaining the facility and of assessing users of the facility charges which will provide continued existence of the facility. Id. (419, 420).

UNJUST OR UNFAIR DEVICES. See Absorptions; Classifications.
VESEL VALUES.  See Rate Making.

VOLUME RATES.

Rates charged by a carrier for fibre forms on the measurement rather than the weight basis are not excessive and thus not detrimental to commerce in violation of section 15 of the Shipping Act in view of the amount of space taken, the requirements for a protective covering and the difficulties of handling the property.  Use of volume measurement rates rather than measurement ton rates for the carrying of fibre forms does not violate section 15 of the Shipping Act even though the result is an excessive ratio of value of the product to the freight rate since the cargo has “balloon” characteristics in that it takes up a large amount of space in relation to its weight and is not compressible.  Raymond International, Inc. v. Venezuelan Line, 189 (192).

No discrimination between shippers, in violation of sections 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act, is shown where a carrier used different tariff classifications (volume v. weight) for fibre forms and pipe since the products were not competitive, their characteristics and use were different, and one was much heavier and more durable than the other.  Id. (192).

WAREHOUSE SERVICE.  See Terminal Facilities.

WHARF TOLLAGE CHARGE.  See Terminal Facilities.

WORKING CAPITAL.  See Rate Making.